JUDGMENT This is a petition u/s 482 of Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 28.8.89 passed in exercise of revisional powers by the Sessions Court in proceedings initiated u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. It appears that non-petitioner No.1 is a tenant in the premises owned by the petitioner. The petitioner wanted the tenant to be ejected and had served a notice for that purpose. On the contrary, the allegation of the non-petitioner No.1 was that the petitioner was after throwing out the tenant some how and for that purpose he was indulging in deliberately damaging the tenanted premises. Ultimately, the petitioner initiated proceedings u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. contending that the premises occupied by the non-petitioner No. 1 were unfit for human as residence and hence the nuisance was liable to be removed. In substance, he had prayed for demolition of the premises occupied by the non-petitioner No. 1. The preliminary order having been passed, the non-petitioner No.1 appeared and showed cause insisting on dropping of the proceedings as the dispute between the parties was of a civil nature incapable of being justly disposed of u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. The trial Court held the application to be not maintainable. The non-petitioner preferred a revision. The learned Sessions Judge upon a perusal of all the facts and circumstances of the case formed an opinion that the proceedings u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. were misconceived as in his opinion it was not a case of removal of nuisance contemplated by section 133 Cr.P.C. at all. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two grounds in support of his petition. He submits that the preliminary order having been passed u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. the only course open to the trial Judge was to adjudicate upon the dispute finally and not to drop the proceedings in between. He further submits that the satisfaction whether a case u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. was made out or not should have been arrived at by the trial Magistrate and not by the revisional Court. His second submission is that the order rejecting the preliminary objection made by the non-petitioner No.1 before the trial Magistrate was an interlocutory order against which a revision was incompetent. In so far as proceedings u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. are concerned, they are of a summary nature and are supposed to remove the nuisance to public. His second submission is that the order rejecting the preliminary objection made by the non-petitioner No.1 before the trial Magistrate was an interlocutory order against which a revision was incompetent. In so far as proceedings u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. are concerned, they are of a summary nature and are supposed to remove the nuisance to public. Individual rights are not supposed to be adjudicated upon u/s. 133 Cr.P.C. A preliminary order is passed in the absence of the opposite party and hence the opposite party is justified on appearance in pointing out that the proceedings were incompetent and hence the preliminary order should not have been made. The application made by the non-petitioner No. 1 should have been considered by the trial Magistrate and disposed of on merits. She had to approach the superior Court in revision. The finding of the Sessions Court based on consideration of record that the facts and circumstances of the case did not warrant proceedings u/s. 133 Cr.P. C. cannot be said to be mistaken. The Sessions Court was right in observing that the landlord had adopted a shortcut so as to get rid of an unwanted tenant. In such circumstances, the Sessions Court was justified in directing the proceedings to be dropped. There can be two opinion on the question as to whether a revision against an order of trial Magistrate was competent or not before the Sessions Court but there cannot be two opinion on the point that this Court should not exercise its inherent or revisional jurisdiction by making an interference with an order otherwise just and legal or at least by which a just result has been achieved. It is strange that the premises which was alleged to be unfit and dangerous for human habitation in the year 1985 and which was apprehended to collapse to the ground in the ensuing rainy season has continued to stand in spite of the lapse of five years with human habitation therein. This subsequent event lends additional assurance to the contention raised by the non-petitioner No. 1. The petitioner should have been better advised to initiate proceedings seeking eviction of the tenant before a competent Court of law instead of wasting five years in these ill-advised proceedings. The upshot of the abovesaid discussion is that the present petition is held to be without any merit and is dismissed accordingly.