GULAB C. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) THIS is complainant's application u/s. 439 (2), Cr. P. C. challenging the legality of grant of bail to the non-applicants by order dt. 23-10-1989 passed by Shri M. S. A. Siddiquee, Sessions Judge, Shahdol in bail application No. 940/89, directing release of the non-applicants on bail on their furnishing bail bonds and surety bonds for a sum of Rs. 3,000/- each. The applicant not only prays for revocation of the said bail but also that the non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 be arrested and committed to judicial custody pending trial. ( 2 ) THE applicant is the father of late Smt. Sushma Gupta who unfortunately died in the night between 7/ 8th Oct. 1989. There appears to be no dispute that the said, Smt. Sushma Gupta was married to Shri Pankaj Gupta, the son of the non-applicants 2 and 3 on 2nd Feb. 1987 and a son was born to her on 7-9-1988. The applicant had lodged a report with the Officer Incharge of Police Station, Shahdol, on 8-10-1989 alleging that the non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 and their son Pankaj Gupta had been treating his daughter Smt. Sushma Gupta with cruelty and demanding dowry. He further alleged that he had spent about Rs. 80,000/- at the time of marriage and had given dowry to the best of his capacity. The applicant alleged that the death of Smt. Sushma Gupta was not accidental. The non-applicants, the applicant alleged had either forced her to commit suicide or had caused death by burning her. It appears that following the said complaint, the non-applicants Nos. 2 and 3 and their son were arrested on 12-10-1989, on allegation of offence punishable u/s. 304-B, IPC. The non-applicants 2 and 3 filed their bail application on 23-10-1989, which was heard and decided on the same date directing release of the non-applicants on bail. According to the learned Judge, case diary contains a letter written by Smt. Sushma Gupta wherein she has stated that she was committing suicide on her own and nobody should be blamed for the same. The learned Judge further noticed that the non-applicants No. 2 is an Advocate practicing at Shahdol and non-applicant No. 3 is his wife and, there was nothing on record to indicate that they will misuse the liberty granted to them. The learned Judge further noticed that the non-applicants No. 2 is an Advocate practicing at Shahdol and non-applicant No. 3 is his wife and, there was nothing on record to indicate that they will misuse the liberty granted to them. It was mainly on these two grounds that the bail has been granted. ( 3 ) THE submission of the applicant is that the learned Sessions Judge has disregarded the law on the subject and has not even looked into the facts of the case to ascertain whether it was a fit case for releasing the non-applicants on bail. According to the applicant, the so called letter, even on bare examination, indicates that it was of doubtful origin and if facts of the case were taken into consideration, it would have been possible to hold that it was not a case of suicide but a case of murder. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents, however, is that the respondents are respectable citizens, have not misused the liberty so far and, therefore, there is no reason to recall the bail order. ( 4 ) BEFORE considering the legal and factual controversy of the case, principles governing grant of bail should be recalled. S. 436 (1), Cr. P. C. confers a right on an accused person to be released on bail in bailable offences only. S. 437, Cr. P. C. confers power on courts other than the High Courts and Court of Sessions, to release on bail as accused person even in non-bailable offences, subject, however, to the conditions mentioned therein. S. 439, Cr. P. C. gives similar powers to the High Court and Court of Session. This provision has been interpreted as conferring wide discretionary powers on the Court of Session to grant bail unfettered by any conditions or limitation (See: Gulam Mohd. v. State, AIR 1959 MP 147 : 1959 Cri LJ 600 ). It has also been repeatedly held that the discretion in granting bail under this provision has to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. In State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 215, it was clarified that where an offence is bailable, bail has to be granted u/s. 436, Cr. It has also been repeatedly held that the discretion in granting bail under this provision has to be exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. In State v. Captain Jagjit Singh, AIR 1962 SC 253 : (1962 (1) Cri LJ 215, it was clarified that where an offence is bailable, bail has to be granted u/s. 436, Cr. P. C. but when the offence is not bailable, further considerations arise and the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of those further considerations. It is not any one single circumstance in the case which necessarily concludes the discretion which must be exercised as a cumulative effect of all circumstances of the case. In the aforesaid Supreme Court case it was specifically pointed out that where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment of life, the Court should exercise its powers in favour of granting bail not as a general rule but only in exceptional cases. It is, therefore, the duty of the Court to review the whole material before it and to come to its own conclusion while exercising the discretion under this provision. It was perhaps for this reason that it was held in Sant Ram v. Kalicharan, 1977 Cri LJ 486 (Delhi), that where a Sessions Judge does not take into consideration the various factors which are required to be considered while granting bail in non-bailable cases and does not keep in view the nature of the offence of which the respondents are accused, falls into an error in forming a prima facie opinion to grant bail. Similarly in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1978 SC 179 : (1978 Cri LJ 129), it was held that where the Sessions Judge did not consider gravity of offence, status of accused and influence they wielded over the witness before granting the bail, he committed a mistake in exercise of jurisdiction under this provision. ( 5 ) JUDGED by aforesaid judicial standards, the impugned order of the Sessions Court does not stand the test of legal scrutiny. The letter of the deceased alone would not indicate that allegations against the non-applicants were not true. ( 5 ) JUDGED by aforesaid judicial standards, the impugned order of the Sessions Court does not stand the test of legal scrutiny. The letter of the deceased alone would not indicate that allegations against the non-applicants were not true. Then the fact that the non-applicant No. 2 is an Advocate and, therefore, a person of status is wholly irrelevant as would be clear from the decision of Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe, AIR 1990 SC 625 : (1990 Cri LJ 788 ). In this case the Court took pains to provide the guidelines for exercise on judicial expression while granting bail as under:" There are no hard and fast rules regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has to be considered on its own merits. The matter always calls for judicious exercise of discretion by the Court. Where the offence is of serious nature, the Court has to decide the question of grant of bail in the light of such considerations as the nature and seriousness of offence, character of the evidence, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, a reasonable possibility of presence of the accused not being secured at the trial and the reasonable apprehension of witness being tampered with, the larger interest of the public or such other similar considerations. "those considerations do not include the status of the accused and, therefore, the same could not be a relevant consideration. ( 6 ) THE facts of the case may, therefore, be examined to consider the nature of the offence as noticed earlier. The deceased was married on 2-2-1987 and a son born to her on 7-9-1988. The son was just 13 months old on the date of incident. Normally no mother who is living a reasonably comfortable life would like to leave such an infant child shelterless. There must be compelling reasons for her to adopt such a course. What are those reasons? Information of the offence was given to the police on 8-10-1989 at 4 a. m. and thereafter the dead body was sent to postmortem examination. The postmortem information revealed 8 contusions on the body of the deceased caused by hard and blunt object within 24 hrs. These contusions were antimortem in nature, and of various sizes on the head, abdomen, ankles etc. Some undigested food articles (semisolid) were also found in the stomach. The postmortem information revealed 8 contusions on the body of the deceased caused by hard and blunt object within 24 hrs. These contusions were antimortem in nature, and of various sizes on the head, abdomen, ankles etc. Some undigested food articles (semisolid) were also found in the stomach. Entire body was burnt from head to toe except lower portion of the abdomen and some part of the lower back and smell of kerosene was coming from the body. According to medical opinion, death was due to asphyxia and shock caused by extensive antimortem buras (dry heat ). This report clearly indicates that the lady had died within two hours of her taking food or else stomach would not have contained semi-solid food articles. It also indicates that she suffered beatings by some hard and blunt object at the time of her death. Mobile F. S. L. Unit Police, Shahdol seems to have inspected the place of incident and found that the body was found in a room which was full of so many other articles. According to this report, it does not appear to be a case of suicide particularly because skin blood spot was not found anywhere in the room and not even plastic boxes had suffered damage which they would normally suffer because of heat. The Inspection Report further notices that though the kerosene oil was found on the floor, it was not found under the body indicating that there was no body movement at the time of burning. The report further notices that the place where the deceased's mouth was resting on the floor was stained with blood. This report would again indicate that it was doubtful if the lady had committed suicide. Applicant's statements which are available in this case file and not looked into by the learned Sessions Judge gave details of demand of dowry and deserved consideration. Several other witnesses who were examined during the course of investigation and whose statements were available in the case diary, also indicated that the deceased was being tortured. Applicant's statements which are available in this case file and not looked into by the learned Sessions Judge gave details of demand of dowry and deserved consideration. Several other witnesses who were examined during the course of investigation and whose statements were available in the case diary, also indicated that the deceased was being tortured. Now if all these facts and circumstances of the case are taken into consideration, it would be clear that there was previous history of cruelty against the deceased which fact is also prima facie proved by the presence of a contusions on the person of the deceased at the time of her death whether evidence of applicant, his wife, sons and daughters should be believed or not is not a question to be considered at this stage. Indeed the Court is not supposed to engage in any meticulous examination of evidence at this stage or to believe or disbelieve a witness. Oral evidence collected during investigation without doubt connects the cruelty to the demand of dowry. Added with it is the broad question whether the death was suicidal or homicidal. These facts sufficiently establish the grievous nature of allegations against the non-applicants. That the non-applicants were in the house at the time of incident being beyond dispute, there is prima facie material to connect them with a heinous crime. ( 7 ) HOW should such a crime be considered by a Court of law? In Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 737 : (1987 Cri LJ 705), the Supreme Court condemned the widespread belief that the dowry death is even now treated with casualness at all levels in the judiciary and held that "it was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail. " Apparently, therefore, the matter must be considered with all seriousness it deserves. S. 304-B, IPC was inserted into the Code by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986 with the solemn intent to save brides from being burnt for non-payment of' dowry and curb the social evil which was gaining momentum. This Act also introduced u/s. 113-B in the Evidence Act to enable the Court to draw the presumption of dowry death under conditions mentioned therein. Since these provisions aim at curbing the social evils, they must be interpreted in such a manner as to promote their object and purpose. This Act also introduced u/s. 113-B in the Evidence Act to enable the Court to draw the presumption of dowry death under conditions mentioned therein. Since these provisions aim at curbing the social evils, they must be interpreted in such a manner as to promote their object and purpose. It is the duty of the Court, while interpreting such statute to so interpret the language as to give most complete remedy which the physiology will permit and ensure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the class intended to the relief. Normally, therefore, objective assessment of these provisions should be the obligation of the Court and its approach in the matter should be to remedy the wrong intended to be covered by it. Under the circumstances, law courts must share the mission of these provisions and use them in such a manner as to curb this growing social evil. This is, however, not to say that a person against whom there is no sufficient material to allege this offence, should be denied his liberty. Sentimentalism has no place in judicial process and yet sensitivity to social problems and commitment to constitutional mission is its virtue which has sustained it so far. The question for consideration therefore is whether, the mission of the law would be defeated by granting bail to the non-applicants in the aforesaid factual situation? ( 8 ) THE manner in which the bail has been granted to the non-applicants creates the impression in the mind of this Court that the privilege was granted to non-applicant No. 2 only because he represents a distinguish class of Advocate. This, however, is wholly irrelevant for the purpose. This Court would not like to create the impression in the mind of general public that it has any soft corner for accused persons belonging to this category. Indeed, this Court would think that this is an aggravating circumstances as the society does not expect such an inhuman and cruel treatment from persons belonging to this category. If lawyers who are not only trained in law but also officers of the Court, adopt lawlessness as their creed, not only individual affected thereby but the rule of law itself would be endangered. This Court expects all officers of the Court to share the judicial destiny and help in honestly and efficiently administering justice. If lawyers who are not only trained in law but also officers of the Court, adopt lawlessness as their creed, not only individual affected thereby but the rule of law itself would be endangered. This Court expects all officers of the Court to share the judicial destiny and help in honestly and efficiently administering justice. If this label is forgotten, there would be nothing to justify grant of bail to the respondent No. 2. In this view of the matter, the bail order, in so far as the respondent No. 2 Sri Ram Vishnu Gupta is concerned is hereby cancelled. He is directed to surrender by 16-7-1990 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Shahdol to be committed to judicial custody during the pendency of the trial. ( 9 ) THE respondent No. 3 Smt. Kusum Lata Gupta is a lady needing special treatment u/s. 437, Cr. P. C. She is the wife of the respondent No. 2. Though mothers-in-law are cursed in our society; that curse alone would not be enough to commit her to judicial custody as there is no direct or specific allegation against her. This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that this lady alone would not have done anything in the matter if other male members of the house had provided protection to the deceased. In this view of the matter, the impugned order granting bail to the non-applicant No. 3 Smt. Kusum Lata Gupta is maintained. The application partly succeeds as aforesaid and is allowed to that extent. Application allowed in part. .