P. K. MUKHERIEE, J. ( 1 ) ORDER of termination passed by the Director of Cottage and Small Scale Industries dated December 18, 1987, has been impugned in the instant writ petition by the writ petitioner, Debi Prasanna Chattopadhaya. ( 2 ) IT appears that the said order of termination was passed in respect of the petitioner, Debi Prasanna Chattopadhaya, who was appointed provisionally on "purely temporary basis pending verification of his antecedents to the "extra-temporary post of Enumerator" under the Scheme of Census Cum Sample Survey of Small Scale Industrial Units in West Bengal, by order of the Directorate dated March 25, 1983, which has been terminated from the date of issue of the order, as he was considered "unsuitable" for employment under the Government. ( 3 ) THIS writ petition was admitted by Mahitosh Majumdar J, on April 8, 1988, and subsequently this writ petition was mentioned before me on March 9, 1990, and, after completion of affidavits, it was heard on several days by me. ( 4 ) MR. Kashi Kanta Moitra, learned Advocate appearing at the final hearing of the writ petition on behalf of the writ petitioner, after placing the aforesaid order of Termination of Service from Annexure "b" to the writ petition, submitted that as the petitioner's service has been terminated on the ground of "unsuitability", it casts "a stigma", on his future employment in the Government service and, as such, the said order has penal consequence and the respondents are duty bound to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the writ petitioner. ( 5 ) IN support of this branch of his submission, he has relied on a judgment in the case of Kalyan Kumar Mukhopadhaya v. District Inspector of Schools and Ors. delivered by Tarun Kumar Basu, J; since reported in 1979 (11) CHN 125, wherein the said learned Judge held that the order of termination of service of the petitioner, who had been temporarily remployed as a peon in the office of the District Inspector of Schools on the ground of an alleged "adverse police report" against him was bad in law, as the petitioner has not been given an opportunity of being heard. ( 6 ) IT appears that the learned single Judge has placed reliance on a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manager, Government Branch Press v. D. B. Belliappa, reported in AIR 1979 SC 429 . In that case, it was, inter alia, held that it was perhaps open to the Government to say in view of the complaint alluded to in the show cause notice against the integrity and fidelity of the employee, that the former had lost confidence in the latter and considered him "unsuitable" to be continued in the post, which was one of trust and confidence. ( 7 ) IN the result, the application was allowed and the Rule was made absolute and the impugned order of termination was set aside. ( 8 ) MR. Moitra at the final hearing also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the Belliappa's case (supra) wherein in paragraph 24 it was observed, as follows: -"if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated in accordance with the conditions of his service on the ground of unsatisfactory conduct or his unsuitability for the job and/or for his work being unsatisfactory, or for a like reason which marks him off a class apart from other temporary Servants who have been retained in service, there is no question of the applicability of Article 16. Conversely, if the services of a temporary Government servant are terminated arbitrarily and not on the ground of his unsuitability, unsatisfactory conduct or the like which would put him in a class apart from his juniors in the same service a question of unfair discrimination may arise, not-withstanding the fact that in terminating his service, the appointing authority was purporting to act in accordance with the terms of the employment. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is leveled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel the charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motive which impelled to take the impugned action. Where a charge of unfair discrimination is leveled with specificity, or improper motives are imputed to the authority making the impugned order of termination of the service, it is the duty of the authority to dispel the charge by disclosing to the Court the reason or motive which impelled to take the impugned action. Excepting, perhaps, in cases analogous to those covered by Article 311 (2) (c), the authority cannot withhold such information from the court on the excuse that the impugned order is purely administrative and not judicial, having been passed in exercise of its administrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of the service. " ( 9 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Moitra, in the present case the order of termination of service has been passed on the basis of "adverse police report" and accordingly the petitioner's services were terminated as he was found "unsuitable" for Government employment. ( 10 ) ACCORDING to Mr. Moitra, once the petitioner has entered into service, he enters in the realm of conduct and not of status and services of the petitioner could not be terminated on adverse police report by casting stigma upon the petitioner, so that the petitioner is found unsuitable for getting any other Government posts and accordingly the principle of "audi alteram partem" should be invoked and the gammut of procedure has to be followed even in case of temporary employment, as in the case of the petitioner. ( 11 ) IN this context, Mr. Moitra has referred to a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmal Kanti Kanjilal v. Senior Manager, Post and Telegraph, reported in 1974 (1) CLJ 443. In the said decision Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. (the present Chief Justice of Maharashtra High Court) (as His Lordship then was) took the view as a Trial Judge, that as the order of termination was an order of "termination simpliciter" and as such, the Court was not entitled to lift the veil and go behind the order. On appeal presided over by Sankar Prasad Mitra, C. J. sitting with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (now the Chief Justice of India ). On appeal presided over by Sankar Prasad Mitra, C. J. sitting with Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (now the Chief Justice of India ). Their Lordships had set aside the said view taken by the single Judge and allowed the writ petition holding, inter alia, that the Court was entitled to lift the veil and go behind an order to look into the notice for which the same was passed. ( 12 ) THE Appeal Court in the said judgment, further held, as follows: -"in cases like the present one, the Court has to itself the following questions: (1) Were there any charges against the Government servant? (2) If so, was the order of termination made because of these charges? In other words, in the absence of the charges would the order have been made at all? if the answer to the first question be in the affirmative and the second question be in the negative, the order has to be struck down if the procedure indicated by Article be not followed. In the instant case, if the Senior Manager had taken into consideration the past records of the appellant' as well as the incident of disappearance of the radiator and had come to the conclusion that the appellant was unsuitable for retention in service, 'no exception could be taken to the order of termination. But unfortunately in Ext. y, he has made certain observations which indicate his definite finding that the appellant had committed the theft. That finding was. arrived at without giving to the appellant an opportunity of being heard. And there is no doubt, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, that the said finding was the principal ground for the order of termination of service. That being the position, the said order is liable to be struck down. Hence the appeal was allowed. " ( 13 ) MR. Moitra has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court delivered by Pradyot Kumar Banerjee and Bankim Chandra. Ray, JJ. (as Their Lordships then were) in the case of Satyabrata Kar Mahapatra vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , reported in 1981 (II) CHN 20. In the said case, the appellants-petitioners were appointed Assistant Public Prosecutors, Contai. During the period of probation their services were terminated as their performance was found to be not suitable. Ray, JJ. (as Their Lordships then were) in the case of Satyabrata Kar Mahapatra vs. State of West Bengal and Ors. , reported in 1981 (II) CHN 20. In the said case, the appellants-petitioners were appointed Assistant Public Prosecutors, Contai. During the period of probation their services were terminated as their performance was found to be not suitable. In the judgment the Division Bench had set aside the order of rejection of the writ petition by the Trial Judge, and allowed the appeal, observing, inter alia, as follows: -"it is now well-settled that a Government servant appointed as a probationer or an officiating basis or temporarily does not acquire any right to the post he held unless and until in the case of a probationer confirmation is made and in the case of temporary employees they acquire quasi-permanent status on the basis of the Service Rule governing the conditions of their service. The position is now well-settled that if an order of termination is made in accordance with the terms of the service rules or has not been passed or made in consideration of any misconduct, gross negligence of duty inefficiency or other disqualification, the order cannot be termed as an order made by way of punishment provided the same does not cast any stigma or aspersion on the integrity of the Government servant. Even though the order of termination on the facts of it appears to have been made in an innocuous manner without casting any aspersion or stigma in the Government servant concerned the order may be said to have been made by way of punishment if it is proved that though the order appears to have been couched in unexceptional form but in fact it has been made following a report on an enquiry on allegations of misconduct. The form of the order is not conclusive. It is the substance of the matter that has to be looked into. " ( 14 ) MR. Dipak Prakash Kundu, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has opposed the writ petition and placed the following facts from the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Dilip Kumar Mukhopadhaya, Personal Assistant to the Director of Cottage and Small Scale Industries. It is the substance of the matter that has to be looked into. " ( 14 ) MR. Dipak Prakash Kundu, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents, has opposed the writ petition and placed the following facts from the affidavit-in-opposition affirmed by Dilip Kumar Mukhopadhaya, Personal Assistant to the Director of Cottage and Small Scale Industries. ( 15 ) IN paragraph 5 of the said affidavit, the deponent stated that the petitioner was appointed provisionally on purely temporary basis for a period upto August 31, 1983, subject to satisfactory report of verification of antecedents and medical fitness, under order No. 178/estt. dated 25th March, 1983. It was specifically stated that in the appointment letter "the services of each incumbant as named above shall stand terminated forthwith in case of receipt of adverse reports in respect of verification of his/her antecedents and medical fitness. " ( 16 ) AS according to Mr. Kundu the appointment was conditional in nature i. e. subject to verification of his antecedents and medical fitness, it cannot be suggested by any stretch of imagination that the petitioner was appointed. temporarily in the said post. ( 17 ) FURTHER, according to Mr. Kundu, such condition of appointment not having been fulfilled, the respondents are entitled to terminate the service of the writ petitioner on the basis of the "adverse police report" as it was done in the present case. ( 18 ) ALTHOUGH Mr. Kundu has not referred to what was the adverse police report, but at the time of hearing of the writ petition, in his fairness, be has produced the relevant file for perusal of this Court wherefrom it appears that there was a criminal case in which the petitioner was involved, but ultimately acquitted. ( 19 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Kundu submits that the judgment in the Belliappra's case (supra) has no manner of application as the said case interprets the provision of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution and not Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. ( 19 ) IN support of his contention, Mr. Kundu submits that the judgment in the Belliappra's case (supra) has no manner of application as the said case interprets the provision of Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution and not Article 311 (2) of the Constitution. ( 20 ) ACCORDING to him, the observations made in paragraph 24 of the said judgment referred to hereinabove, does not support the writ petitioner, as in the said paragraph the Supreme Court observed that cases analogous to those covered by Article 311 (2) (c) of the Constitution, the authority cannot withhold any information from the Court on the lame ground that the impugned order is purely administrative order and not judicial, having been passed in exercise of its administrative discretion under the rules governing the conditions of service. The giving of reasons, as Lord Denning put in Brown v. Amalgamated Union 1971 (1) All ER 1148 "is one of the fundamentals of good administration" and to recall the words of the Court in Khudiram v. State of West Bengal 1975 (2) SCR 832 at page 845- AIR 1975 SC 550 at page 558 in a Government of laws "there is nothing like unfettered discretion immuned from judicial review ability". The executive, no less than the judiciary, is under a general duty act fairly. Indeed, fairness founded on reasons is the essence of guarantee opitomised in Articles 14 and 16 (1) of the Constitution. ( 21 ) IN support of his contention, he has relied on a decision in the case of State of West Bengal v. Somendra Nath Lahiri, reported in 80 Calwn 638, delivered by Sankar Prasad Mitra, C. J. and S. K. Dutt, J. wherein it has been held that order of discharge itself does not by use of the word "unsuitable" attach any stigma to the respondent writ petitioner and the same cannot be challenged on the ground that requirement of Article 311 (2) has not been complied with. ( 22 ) IN paragraph 10 of the said judgment it was observed as follows: -" It is clear, therefore, that unless there is an aspersion against character or integrity an order of discharge cannot be considered to be an order by way of punishment. In fact, the word "stigma" means imputation attaching to a person's reputation. ( 22 ) IN paragraph 10 of the said judgment it was observed as follows: -" It is clear, therefore, that unless there is an aspersion against character or integrity an order of discharge cannot be considered to be an order by way of punishment. In fact, the word "stigma" means imputation attaching to a person's reputation. " ( 23 ) HE has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. P. S. Bhatt, reported in AIR 1961 SC 957, wherein the Supreme Court in interpreting an order of reversion passed during the period of probation of the writ petitioner came to the conclusion that the same was not by way of punishment. In the said case incidentally in paragraph 7 of the judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows:-"the law in relation to termination of service of an employee on probation is well settled. If any order terminating the service of a probationer be an order of termination simpliciter without attaching any stigma to the employee and if the said order is not an order by way of punishment, there will be no question of the provisions of Article 311 being attracted. As the law on the question appears to be well settled it does not become necessary to consider the various decisions which have been cited. " ( 24 ) IN the present case before us also Mr. Kundu has placed strong reliance on the other judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 965 (Commodore Commanding Southern Area v. N. Region), AIR 1960 SC 689 (State of Bihar v. Gopi Kishore), AIR 1967 SC 1264 (I. N. Saksena v. State of U. P.) AIR 1968 SC 1089 (State of Punjab and Anr. v. Sukhraj Bahadur) and AIR 1980 SC 42 (State of Maharashtra v. Saboji ). ( 25 ) THEREFORE, it has become necessary for this Court to arrive at a necessary conclusion as by passing the impugned order of termination on the ground of unsuitability the respondents have cast a stigma towards the writ petitioner so that the petitioner is to be adjudged incompetent for accepting other Government services. ( 25 ) THEREFORE, it has become necessary for this Court to arrive at a necessary conclusion as by passing the impugned order of termination on the ground of unsuitability the respondents have cast a stigma towards the writ petitioner so that the petitioner is to be adjudged incompetent for accepting other Government services. ( 26 ) I have meticulously gone through the impugned order wherefrom it appears that the petitioners' services has been terminated with effect from the date of issue of the order, i. e. December 18, 1987 as he was considered unsuitable for employment under Government although the respondents had not referred to the said fact in the order that there was any adverse police report or any reasons alike that. ( 27 ) INDEED, if the order of termination simpliciter is passed, it is not for this Court to lift the veil and go behind the order because trend of decisions of the Supreme Court upto AIR 1968 SC 1089 (State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur ). ( 28 ) IN the said case the Supreme Court observed about the propriety of the order of reversion of a probationer during the probationary period which itself was found not amounting to punishment. ( 29 ) IN paragraph 16 of the said judgment the Supreme Court laid down five circumstances which are as follows: - (1) The services of the temporary servant or a probationer can be terminated under the rules of his employment and such termination without anything more would not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (2) The circumstances preceeding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. (3) If the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspertion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be done by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant. (4) Order of termination of service in unexceptional form proceeded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (4) Order of termination of service in unexceptional form proceeded by an enquiry launched by the superior authorities only to ascertain whether the public servant should be retained in service, does not attract the operation of Article 311 of the Constitution. (5) If there be a full scale departmental enquiry envisaged by Article 311 i. e. an enquiry officer is appointed, a charge sheet submitted, explanation called for and considered any order of termination of service may thereafter will attract the operation of the said Article. ( 30 ) THEREFORE, it will be necessary for me to adjudge the propriety or otherwise of the impugned order of termination in the light of the five tests laid down hereinabove by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Sukhraj Bahadur (Supra ). ( 31 ) IN my view, the order of termination of service if had been passed without quoting the remark "unsuitable", this Court could not and should not interfere with such order of termination, as it was observed in the aforesaid decisions, but in my view the Supreme Court observed in the criterion no. (3) stated as aforesaid, if in the order any stigma is cast in that case this Court can interfere even in case of appointment of a probationer or temporary servant as in the present case before us. ( 32 ) ACCORDINGLY, in my view, the impugned order cannot be sustained in law and, therefore, liable to be set aside by issue of appropriate writ in the nature of certiorari. ( 33 ) THIS will not, however, take away the right of the respondents to initiate a proceeding against the writ petitioner departmentally and pass appropriate order of termination and/or removal or dismissal from service in accordance with law. ( 34 ) BEFORE parting, I must record my appreciation of which, I have received both Mr. Moitra and Mr. Kundu and the able assistance given to this Court by them in arriving at the aforesaid decision. ( 35 ) IN order to test my judgment, in the higher up, the operation of this judgment shall remain stayed for a period of six weeks from this date. Application allowed.