G. B. PATTANAIK, J. ( 1 ) DEFENDANT is the appellant against the judgment and decree of the Subordinate Judge, Titilagarh, in a suit for recovery of Rs. 6,000/- from the defendant. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF filed the suit alleging that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 4,120/- on 27-1-1967 on executing a registered usufructuary mortgage deed (Ext. 1) in respect of the plaint schedule land and the plaintiff remained in possession of the land. Again on 18-7-1968, the said defendant received a sum of Rs. 1,880/- and executed a registered usufructuary mortgage deed (Ext. 2) for a total sum of Rs. 6,000/ -. The lands were mortgaged as the money was needed to meet the family necessity. The defendant agreed to pay interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum and the principal sum of Rs. 6,000/- in case the plaintiff is dispossessed from the land. The plaintiff remained in possession till 31-12-1973. The defendant filed a petition under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act to declare the transfer invalid as the same was without prior permission of the competent authority and the transfer was one from a Scheduled Caste in favour of a non-Scheduled Caste. It is the further case of the plaintiff that he was not aware on the date of mortgage that permission of the competent authority was necessary and on believing in good faith had paid the principal amount. The Sub-Divisional Officer in that proceeding passed an order on 31-12-1973 declaring the transfer to be invalid and directing restoration of possession to the defendant and, therefore, the plaintiff filed the suit for refund of the consideration money which the defendant is liable to refund. ( 3 ) DEFENDANT's case in the written statement is that he had not received Rs. 6,000/- as alleged in the plaint nor did he execute any mortgage deed in favour of the plaintiff. It was also stated that the suit was barred by the provisions of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, as well as the Orissa Money-Lenders Act. It was the further case of the defendant that he was taking sundry loans from the plaintiff on different occasions and in 1967 he was told that the amount had gone up to Rs. 500/- and the plaintiff impressed upon him to execute either a sale deed or a mortgage deed in his favour. It was the further case of the defendant that he was taking sundry loans from the plaintiff on different occasions and in 1967 he was told that the amount had gone up to Rs. 500/- and the plaintiff impressed upon him to execute either a sale deed or a mortgage deed in his favour. He also told the defendant that the permission of the Sub-Divisional Officer would be delayed and persuaded him to execute a deed and accordingly the defendant executed the same without even the deed being read over and explained to him. He, however, admitted that the total amount of loan he had incurred from the plaintiff together with interest worked out at Rs. 1,880/ -. He reiterated that he belonged to the Scheduled Caste and permission would be necessary to effect the transfer. ( 4 ) ON these pleadings the learned Subordinate Judge framed 9 issues and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was not a money-lender in regular course of business and, therefore, the suit was not barred by the provisions of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act. It was also held that the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit land on 31-12-1973 by order of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Titilagarh, and not on 16-4-1974 as alleged by the defendant. The mortgage deeds were genuine and valid and the plaintiff was entitled to refund of Rs. 6,000/ -. The suit was not hit by S. 23 (4) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, as the said provision came into force by Amendment Act of 1976 and was prospective in nature and, therefore, would have no application. On the question of limitation, it was found that the suit was not barred by limitation. On the question whether the mortgage stood redeemed by virtue of S. 17 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act, the learned Trial Judge found that S. 17 had no application. On these findings, the suit was decreed. On the question of limitation, it was found that the suit was not barred by limitation. On the question whether the mortgage stood redeemed by virtue of S. 17 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act, the learned Trial Judge found that S. 17 had no application. On these findings, the suit was decreed. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the defendant-appellant assails the judgment and decree of the trial Court on two grounds:- (I) The conclusion that the suit is not hit by S. 23 (4) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act is untenable in the eye of law and on the finding that the transfer has been declared invalid under S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act and the plaintiff-transferee has been evicted therefrom, the said plaintiff will not be entitled to refund of the amount paid by him to the transferor (defendant) by way of consideration, as provided in sub-sec. (4) of S. 23 of the Act; and (II) In view of sub-sec. (1) of S. 17 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act, the plaintiff being in possession for more than seven years, the mortgage stood discharged after expiration of the period of seven years and, therefore, the plaintiff will not be entitled to ask for any money passed under the mortgage deed. Both these contentions require a careful examination of the relevant provisions and the relevant materials in that connection. ( 6 ) COMING to the question whether S. 23 (4) of the Orissa Reforms Act applies to the present case and thereby the plaintiff is disentitled to the refund of the amount paid by him, admittedly the said provision came into force by Orissa Act 44 of 1976 and by the date the said sub-sec. (4) was inserted, the transfer in question had already been declared invalid and the transferee (the plaintiff) had already been evicted. The question, therefore, crops up for consideration is whether the said provision has any retrospective operation. According to Mr. Pati, the learned counsel for the appellant, the said provision being a beneficial provision intended to save scheduled castes people from exploitation of higher caste people, it must be construed that the provision in question has retrospective operation even at the cost of violence of the language and, therefore, the conclusion of the learned trial Judge that it is prospective must be interfered with. In support of this submission, the learned counsel places strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Sree Bank Ltd. (in liquidation) v. Sarkar Dutt Roy and Co. , AIR 1966 SC 1953 . In the aforesaid case, while considering the question whether sub-sec. (1) of S. 45-O of the Banking Companies Act has any retrospective application or not, their Lordships have held that the object for which the said provision was inserted in the statute book would be better achieved by giving it retrospective operation and even looking at sub-sec. (3) of the said section, it has been held by their Lordships that the provision has retrospective application. But I fail to appreciate as to how the aforesaid decision will apply to the present case. It is a universal rule of construction that a retrospective operation to a statute is not to be given so as to extinguish an existing right or obligation unless the enactment is expressed in language giving it retrospective operation. So far as the language of S. 23 (4) of the Orissa Land Reforms Act is concerned, there cannot be any manner of doubt that there is nothing in the same to indicate that the Legislature intended its retrospective application. Along with Section23 (4), S. 23a was also inserted by the very same Orissa Act 44 of 1976. In considering the said provision, a Bench of this Court in the case of Siapi Nag v. Gobardhan Ganda, (1986) 62 Cut LT 281, held that S. 23a providing for an extended period of limitation would not affect any rights of the parties crystalised. In other words, by the time S. 23a also into the statute book, if an unauthorised occupant had prescribed his title by adverse possession being in possession continuously for more than 12 years, then S. 23a will not apply. In the case of Dasa Meher v. Chanposwar Bentkar, 1988 (1) OLR, 1, considering the said S. 23a of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, I had held that the amended provision was prospective in nature and had no retrospective application. There is no reason as to why this decision deciding prospective application of S. 23a will also not apply to sub-sec. (4) of S. 23. There is no reason as to why this decision deciding prospective application of S. 23a will also not apply to sub-sec. (4) of S. 23. Entitlement of a transferee to get back the refund after the transfer was declared invalid and transferee was dispossessed on the date of dispossession cannot be taken away by a provision which came into the statute book 3 years after. In that view of the matter, in my considered opinion, sub-sec. (4) of S. 23 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act is prospective in nature and will have no application to the present case. The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant must accordingly fail. ( 7 ) COMING to the second question, under S. 17 of the Orissa Money-Lenders Act any possessory mortgage stands discharged after the expiration of a period of seven years from the date of the mortgage. The mortgage in the present case was executed on 26-1-1967 and accordingly to the plaintiffs case he was dispossessed from the land on 31-12-1973. On the date of his dispossession, therefore, a period of seven years had not expired. But according to the case of the defendant, the mortgagee continued to remain in possession till 16-4-1974 by which time more than seven years had expired and, therefore, the mortgage stood discharged by operation of law. The question that arises for consideration therefore is when was plaintiff dispossessed? ( 8 ) D. W. 1 his the evidence has categorically stated that he was the Revenue Inspector of Saintala Circle and on 16-4-1974 he gave delivery of possession to Sujan Majhi, the defendant, in presence of the villagers and reported the same to the Sub-Divisional Officer. The report of the Revenue Inspector to the Sub-Divisional Officer has been exhibited as Ext. A and Ext. B is the forwarding letter. Excepting a bare suggestion to this witness that he had not delivered the land to defendant as stated, nothing has been elicited in cross-examination to impeach his testimony. Ext. A fully corroborates his evidence. The learned trial Judge discarded Ext. A from consideration on the ground that there is an alleged interpolation or overwriting on the date it bears. I have myself examined Ext. A in original, but I do not find any interpolation or overwriting so as to discard the same. Ext. A fully corroborates his evidence. The learned trial Judge discarded Ext. A from consideration on the ground that there is an alleged interpolation or overwriting on the date it bears. I have myself examined Ext. A in original, but I do not find any interpolation or overwriting so as to discard the same. So far as the month and year are concerned, there has been absolutely no overwriting, but in respect of the date 16', there has been some double marking on 6', but that cannot be held to be an overwriting or interpolation so as to discard the same from consideration. The subsequent report dated 7-8-1974 (Ext. B) corroborates the fact that possession was delivered under Ext. A. It further transpires that the Sub-Divisional Officer had required the Revenue Inspector to deliver possession by his order dated 4-1-1974 and pursuant to the same, the Revenue Inspector went to the spot and delivered possession on 16-4-1974. The evidence of D. W. 1 is wholly reliable and is corroborated by Exts. A and B. D. W. 2 who is the defendant himself also states in his evidence that the Revenue Inspector came to the village to deliver the suit land on 16-4-1974 and he got possession only on 16-4-1974. D. W. 3 is a co-villager and he also states in his evidence that D. W. 1 delivered possession to the defendant in Chaitra of 1974 in his presence and he is a signatory to Ext. A and according to him, the plaintiff (P. W. 3) was in possession prior to such delivery of possession. D. Ws. 1 and 3 are independent witnesses and nothing has been elicited from their evidence to doubt the veracity of their statements. As against this overwhelming evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant, on the side of the plaintiff on the question as to when possession of the land was delivered to the defendant from the plaintiff, there is the sole evidence of the plaintiff (P. W. 3 ). His bald statement without any supporting document cannot outweigh the overwhelming documentary and oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant as discussed earlier. His bald statement without any supporting document cannot outweigh the overwhelming documentary and oral evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant as discussed earlier. In that view of the matter, on the materials on record, disagreeing with the learned trial Judge, I hold that the plaintiff was dispossessed from the land on 16-4-1974 and by that date the plaintiff had been in possession for more than seven years. Consequently, by operation of law, the mortgage stood discharged and, therefore, the plaintiff cannot get refund of the amount that was paid under the mortgage deeds. The second contention of the learned counsel for the appellant must accordingly be sustained. ( 9 ) IN the result, therefore, the judgment and decree of the learned trial Judge are set aside and the plaintiffs suit is dismissed. This First Appeal is allowed, but in the circumstances, there would be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.