JUDGMENT 1. The present Bench was constituted under the orders of Sri P. R. Vyas Bhiman, Chairman, Board of Revenue, U.P. dated 11-8-1986. The need arose as a result of the Judgement of Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha 'in writ petition no. 5063 of 1986 - Prakash Narain Khanna and Sudhir Narain Khanna v. Board of Revenue, U.P. Lucknow and others. The writ petition was moved before the High Court by Prakash Narain Khanna and Sudhir Narain Khanna under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying that a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari be issued quashing the Commissioners order dated 16-6-1986 which was annexure 2 to the petition. It was further prayed that a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus be issued commanding the Board of Revenue to hear and decide the revision petition which was annexure 3 to the writ petition. 2. The facts are that the petitioners were aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Commissioner Lucknow Division dated 16-6-1986 with regard to sale objection no. 49 of 1985-86 and sale objection no. 50 of 1985-86 of district Lucknow. They therefore, presented a revision petition before the Board of Revenue. However, para 25 of the writ petition states that Members of the Board of Revenue have stopped entertaining such revisions placing, reliance on the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court in Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner Agra Division, Agra (1984 R.D. page 299) wherein a view was taken that no revision lies under section 219 of the U.P, Land Revenue Act because the Commissioner while deciding objections against auction sale etc acts as Revenue Officer and net as a court. 3. Consequent to the amendment of para 911 of the Revenue Manual the entire proceedings relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue before the Commissioner, including an objection under section 173 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act (in respect of area to which the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act do not apply) and while exercising powers under Rule 28 5-1 and other relevant rules of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, the Commissioner acts as a court and not as a revenue officer. 4. 4. According to Chapter XXXV of the revised Revenue Manual, as laid down in G. O. No. 2812/IB- 1000(B)/XXXV-54 dated April 6, 1956, judicial and non-judicial matters under Section 234 (Y) of the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 (U.P. Act No, 111 of 1901) are specified as below : - "911. Proceedings and orders as well as appeals, revisions and references in the following cases under the United Provinces Land Revenue Act, 1901 (U.P. Act III of 1901) shall be deemed judicial for the purposes of the said Act : (a) Correction in map and field book (Khasra) under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act." Sub-para (K) has been added to para 911 of the Revenue Manual vide Uttar Pradesh Government Revenue Department Notification No. 236/3/69/11- 862 dated December 3, 1969 which is as follows : "In para 911 of Chapter XXXV of the Manual of orders of the Government of Uttar Pradesh in the Revenue Department (1967) Edition after clause (j) the following shall be added as a new clause : (k) Proceedings taken before the Commissioner or orders passed by him in matters relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue or sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue." When the amendment was brought to the notice of the Hon'ble High Court in writ petition, referred to above, Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha gave the following direction : "The matter can be examined in the light of the provisions of the Revenue Manual in which the necessary amendment has been brought about. The learned member, Board of Revenue, is directed to hear the revision on merits and after taking into account the amended provisions which escaped the notice of the Division Bench, dispose of the revision. The amendment brought about in the Revenue Manual was not brought to the notice of the Division bench and a petition had been filed before the Court. In view of the Division Bench decision the matter has been referred to a larger Bench for decision. This court will be benefited by a detailed discussion by the Board of Revenue on : this aspect of the matter. Thus, on giving my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances, 1 direct opposite party no. In view of the Division Bench decision the matter has been referred to a larger Bench for decision. This court will be benefited by a detailed discussion by the Board of Revenue on : this aspect of the matter. Thus, on giving my anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances, 1 direct opposite party no. 1, the Member, Board of Revenue, to hear the revision preferred by the petitioners Prakash Narain Khanna and Sudhir Khanna and dispose of the same in the light of the observations made above." This order was passed on 31st July, 1986. On receipt of this order by the Board of Revenue, an application for disposal of the revision was moved by Prakash Narain Khanna and another, praying that in view of the above order of the Hon'ble High Court in writ petition, no. 5063 of 1986, the. Board may hear and dispose of the revision petition moved by the applicants early before the Board. The then Chairman, Board of Revenue, Sri P. R. Vyas Bhiman on this application passed the following order on 11-8-1986 : "The question raised is important and had better be considered by a Bench. The Bench will consist of Sri Sonkar, Member (LR), Sri H. N. Srivastava, Judicial Member, and Sri R. P. Gupta, Judicial Member. In view of the orders of the Hon'ble High Court, the Bench shall hear and dispose of the matter on 30-8-1986 at Lucknow." Notices were issued accordingly. Subsequenty, Sri H. N. Srivastava. Judicial Member was transferred and Sri Jitendra Prasad who joined in his place, retired. Thereafter this Bench was reconstituted under the orders of the present Chairman, Sri S. N. Acharya, and he directed that it should consist of Dr. A. N. Segal (Member I), Sri R. P. Gupta, Judicial Member, and Sri S. K, Lakhtakiya, Judicial Member- 5. We have heard arguments of both parties and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 6. The Judgement of the Division Bench of the Hon'ble High Court, referred to by the Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha in his Judgement, referred to above,' is that of Hon'ble Justice K, N, Singh and Hon'ble Justice Gopi Nath in writ petition no. 10513 of 1983 disposed on July 30, 1984 (Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra) published in Revenue Decisions, 1984 page 299. 10513 of 1983 disposed on July 30, 1984 (Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra) published in Revenue Decisions, 1984 page 299. In this Judgement, the learned Judges have taken the following view: "The nature of the proceedings under the provisions aforementioned suggests that the period of thirty days is a fixed time schedule for the filing of an application for setting aside of the sale ; and the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not seem to apply to the proceedings under Rule 285-1 as the Commissioner does not act as a court under that provision. The Commissioner in matters relating to realisation of arrears of land revenue acts as a revenue officer, and not as a revenue court. The Commissioner in the instant case acted as an administrative authority in a proceeding which was quasi-judicial in nature. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court can issue a writ or direction in a proceeding as the one in question. We accordingly hold that the respondent no. 1 exceeded his jurisdiction in setting aside the sale. He wrongly gave the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act to the respondents nos. 3 and 4 and erred in condoning the applications filed for setting aside the sale." In this Judgement, there is no mention of the amendment of para 911 of the Revenue Manual. In his Judgement dated 31st July, 1986, Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha, while directing the Board of Revenue to hear the revision, has observed that "the matter has been referred to the larger Bench for a decision " and he consequently sought the views of Board of Revenue which he felt would be of assistance to the larger Bench. Apparently, the fact that this matter had been referred to a larger Bench of the Hon'ble High Court was not brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Justice K. C. Agarwal and the Hon'ble Justice R. K. Gulati, who in Civil Miscellaneous writ petitions no. 15833 and 16624 of 1985 (Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue and others) have taken the view vide their Judgement dated 19-5-1987 that "So far as section 333 of the U.P. Act no 1 of 1951 is concerned, it maybe stated that a revision under that section would be filed if it arises out of an order passed in a suit or proceedings. An order rejecting an objection is not passed either in any suit or proceeding contemplated by Section 333. The provisions of the Division Bench in Indu Engineering and Textiles Limited (supra) in that connections which negatived the argument of the petitioner, are as follows : - "A Commissioner has two capacities under the Land Revenue Act Under section 4 (8) of that Act, he acts as a court while under Section 4 (9) he acts as a revenue officer. It seems to us that he acts as a court in respect of proceedings mentioned in Appendix III and Schedule II to the Act, while he acts as a revenue officer in respect of other proceedings. For what we have said above, we reject both the writ petitions with costs. The stay orders in both the cases are vacated". (R.D. 1987 page 308). 7. In the instant Judgement, the provisions of the amendment to para 911 of the Revenue Manual, which made proceedings taken before the Commissioner or orders passed by him in matters relating to recovery of arrears of land revenue or sums of money recoverable as arrears of land revenue judicial and laid down that Commissioner functions as a Court, were brought to the notice of the Hon'ble Judges, and while matter has been discussed by Hon'ble Judges in the Judgement, the relevant portion of the Judgement, referred to above is as follows : - "Counsel for the petitioner urged that the learned Judges in the case of Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra) wrongly held that the Commissioner although was exercising Judicial functions, still was not a "Court" in respect of the proceedings before him. We are unable to uphold the submission. Unless the Commissioner was specifically constituted as a court, he could not be termed as such merely because he was performing judicial functions. It would be needless exercise to refer to various decisions on this controversy. Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra) has referred to 27 authorities for coming to the view. Unless the Commissioner was specifically constituted as a court, he could not be termed as such merely because he was performing judicial functions. It would be needless exercise to refer to various decisions on this controversy. Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra) has referred to 27 authorities for coming to the view. We have already held that the Commissioner in matters relating to realisation of arrears of land revenue acts as a revenue officer, and not as a revenue court." Reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in Virendra Kumar Satyabadi v. State of Punjab in which it was observed : "When a question arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a court as distinguished from a quasi judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard, to the provisions of the Act, it possesses all the attributes of a Court." In view of the decisions of the Division Bench in Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra) holding that the Commissioner in matters relating to realisation of arrears of land revenue acts as a revenue officer and not as a revenue court find that the revision under Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue' Act as against an order of the Commissioner passed under Rule 285-I will not be maintainable." (R.D. 1987 pages 311-312) 8. The view, therefore, taken by the learned Judges is that provisions of Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act will not be attracted as the amendment made in para 911 of the Revenue Manual by the Uttar Pradesh Government would be inoperative. 9. While relying on the Division Bench Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra) they have quoted from the same Judgement which observes: " In Sudama Prasad and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra), it was held that proceedings for realisation of land revenue are essentially of a non-judicial character, and although at some stage may assume the character of a quasi-judicial proceedings but the circumstance does not alter the essence of the proceedings as a whole. It was further held that Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act was to be deemed to be a part of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act add there was no conflict between Rule 285-K of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules and Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, and full RJ - 27 effect had to be given to the provisions of Section 210 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. In Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra and others (supra), the controversy was whether the Commissioner dealing with objection under rule 285-1 prescribing 30 days period for filing of the same could extend the time under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The court negatived the argument by holding that a Commissioner is not a court and, as such Section 5 could not be applied. For the view taken in the aforesaid decision, there is ample authority." ................ We have found above that the two decisions in case of Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. (supra) and Sudama Prasad (supra) do not contradict with each other. The observations made in the two decisions in the set of facts as they arose in each one of them were fully justified. We respectfully agree with the view taken in the case of Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd., (supra) that a Commissioner deciding an objection under rule 285-1 is not a court. That being so, Section 219 would not be attracted, and, as such, a revision under that section would not lie." (R.D. 1987 pages 311-12) 10. It is thus clear that the learned Judges have taken the view that while the provisions relating to sale of immoveable property under rule 285-1 and objections thereto when disposed of by the Commissioner may be quasi judicial in nature and while he may be acting judicially he is not a court despite the amendment in para 911 of the Revenue Manual by the Government of Uttar Pradesh. "Section 293 of the U.P. Act No. I of 1951 which applies the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act to applications and proceedings made or taken under this Chapter. The expression this chapter' used in Section 293 refers to Chapter X of U.P. Act I of 1951. The expression this chapter' used in Section 293 refers to Chapter X of U.P. Act I of 1951. The rules framed under Section 294 would also be covered. Consequently, Section 219, which is to be found in Chapter X of U.P. Land Revenue Act, applies to the proceedings covered by Chapter X of U.P. Act I of 1951 and the rules framed thereunder," (R.D. 1987 page 309) The Division Bench has further observed : "The question of maintainability of revision as against an order passed in connection with the arrears of land revenue came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this court in Sudama Prasad and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others (supra). The Division Bench held : According to the classification of judicial and non-judicial orders found in paragraphs 911 and 912 of the Revenue Manual proceeding for realisation of dues under U.P. Large Land Holdings Act and other statutes should be treated as a non-judicial proceeding. It may be that paragraphs 911 and 912 of the Revenue Manual do not in terms apply to the instant case. But the classification made in the Revenue Manual is on the whole sound". (The emphasis is ours) A proceeding for collection of land revenue is essentially of administrative nature. It may be that at some stage in the proceedings the hearing before the Commissioner assumes the character of quasi judicial nature. But that circumstance does not alter the essence of the proceedings as a whole. Consequently, this court found that the collection of land revenue being administrative in nature, no revision lay to the Board of Revenue under Section 219." (Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue and others, R.D. 1987 page 309) Therefore, it is clear that the view taken by the Division Bench is that the function of the Commissioner in respect of realisation of Government dues through sale of immoveable property is quasi judicial and he does not function Court While finding that the disposal of objections under rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules in respect of sale of immoveable property by the Commissioner are administrative in nature, they have relied on the case of Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner. Agra Division, Agra, where the Hon'ble Judges have come to the conclusion without referring to the amendment of para 911. Agra Division, Agra, where the Hon'ble Judges have come to the conclusion without referring to the amendment of para 911. As stated above, the amendment of para 911 had not been brought to their notice. 11. Hon'ble Justice K. C. Agarwal has held in Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue and others, 1987 R.D. page 312, that since the proceedings are not those of a court, Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is not applicable, in coming to this conclusion, he has relied on two Judgements, the first is Brijnandan Sinha v. Jyoti Narain, A.I.R. 1956 page 66. Para 18 of this decision is as follows : "It is clear therefore, that the order to constitute a court in the strict sense of the term, an essential condition is that the court should have apart from having some of the trappings of a judicial tribunal power to give a decision or definitive Judgement which has finality and authoritativeness which are the essential tests of a judicial pronouncement." He further relies on the Hon'ble Justice Gajendragadkars observations made in Engineering Mazdoor Sabha v. Hind Cycles Ltd, Bombay, which are as follows : - "The expression a court in the technical sense is a Tribunal constituted by the State as a part of ordinary hierarchy of courts which are invested with the States inherent judicial powers. The Tribunal as distinguished from the court, exercises judicial powers and decides matters brought before it judicially or quasi judicially, but it does not constitute a court in the technical sense." (A.I.R. 1963 S C. p. 477) 12. Here, it may be mentioned that the Commissioner and the Board are admittedly revenue courts. The main objection on the basis of which the Commissioner has not been held to be a court in the instant case appears to be that in the hierarchy of revenue courts Commissioner is not the court of first instance/lowest court. The objection in regard to immoveable property are heard by the Commissioner and not by any one else to begin with under rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules. 13. The intention of the legislature in including sub-para (k) in para 911 of the Revenue Manual obviously was that the Commissioner should be deemed to function as a court while disposing of objections pertaining to sale of immoveable property. 13. The intention of the legislature in including sub-para (k) in para 911 of the Revenue Manual obviously was that the Commissioner should be deemed to function as a court while disposing of objections pertaining to sale of immoveable property. In this context, the observations of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in Thuraka Onnuramma and another v. Tahsildar, Kadiri and others (A.I.R. 1980 A.P. pages 275-276) are relevant. These are as follows: "It is now well settled that a decision rendered overlooking a statutory provision shall be treated as per incuriam and cannot be regarded as binding precedent. Salmond on Jurisprudence (Twelfth Edition) page 150 says, "A precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of a statute i. e., "delegated legislation". Salmond cites in support of his proposition of the high authority of Lord Halsbury in the House of Lords in London Street Tramways v. London County Council, 1896 A C. 375 and of Lord Greene M. R. in Court of appeal in that well known case of Young v. Britol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., (1944) 1 KB 718. As examples of per incuriam Judgements Salmond cites a case where the court knew the statute but did not refer to the precise term of the statute as well as to a case where the Court knew the statute but failed to appreciate the relevance to the matter in hand. On the extensive scope of the doctrine of per incuriam Salmond says that, "Even a lower court can impugn a precedent on such grounds". Volume 22 of Halsburys Law of England Third Edition, page 799, says that a "Court" is not bound to follow a decision of its own if given per incuriam". "A decision may also be given per incuriam when it is given in ignorance of the term of a statute or of a rule having the force of a statute". This principle is referred to with approval by our Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan, (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. page 83 at page 89)." 14. It is clear that amendment to para 911 of the Revenue Manual has been made by the State Government in exercise of its rule-making powers. This principle is referred to with approval by our Supreme Court in Jaisri v. Rajdewan, (A.I.R. 1962 S.C. page 83 at page 89)." 14. It is clear that amendment to para 911 of the Revenue Manual has been made by the State Government in exercise of its rule-making powers. Section 234 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, as amended upto 1965, vide Act XII of 1965, laid down : "The State Government may make rules consistent with this Act in respect of matters under clauses (a) to (f), sub-clause (1) of clause (m), clauses (o) to (s), sub-clause (i) of clause (v), sub-clause (i) of clause (w), sub-clause (i) of clause (x), and clauses (y) and (z), and the Board may with the previous sanction of the State Government make rules consistent with this Act in respect of matters under clauses (g) to (1), sub-clause (ii) of clause (m), clauses (n), (t) and (u), sub-clause (ii) of clause (v), sub-clause (ii) of clause (w) and sub-clause (ii) of clause (x)." Clause (y) of amended Section 234 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, referred to above, reads as follows : "Defining the classes of cases, matters, business or orders or proceedings which are to be deemed judicial or non-judicial respectively. The amendment was made in 1969. Therefore, the State Government at that time had full competence to make rules for determining matters, business, orders or proceedings which are to be deemed to be judicial and which are to be deemed to be non-judicial. It is in the exercise of these powers that para 911 of the Revenue Manual was amended in 1969, vide Notification No. 236/3/69/II/862 dated 3-12-1969. It is in the exercise of these powers that para 911 of the Revenue Manual was amended in 1969, vide Notification No. 236/3/69/II/862 dated 3-12-1969. This amendment also added sub-clause (2) to Section 234 which reads as follows: "All rules made by the State Government under this section shall, as soon as may be after they are made, be laid down before each house of the State Legislature while it is in session for a total period of not less than 14 days extending in its one session of more than one successive sessions and shall, unless some later date is appointed, take effect from the date of their publication in the Gazette subject to such modifications or annulments as the two Houses of Legislature may agree to make, so, however, that such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder." Subsequently, Section 234 was further amended : "Power of the Board to make rules - The Board may with the previous sanction of the State Government, make rules consistent with this Act in respect of all or any of the following matters, namely. (e) regulating the procedure to be followed by any officer (or other person) who under any provision of this Act is required or empowered to take action in any case or proceeding under this Act; (f) generally for the guidance of all persons in a case or proceeding under this Act, and for carrying out the provisions of this Act in respect of such case or proceeding. (2) Notwithstanding anything in sub-section (1), all rules made by the State Government or the Board under this section as it stood immediately before the date of commencement of Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act 1975, and in force on such date shall continue in force unless repealed, amended or altered by the competent authority." It will thus be seen that under the provisions of latest (1975) amendment to Section 234 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, as it now stands, earlier rules framed by the State Government had been validated by sub-section (2) of Section 234 of that Act. In terms of Section 234, as amended upto 1965 read with sub-section (2) of section 234 as it stands today, amendment to para 911 by adding sub-para (k) became valid with effect from 3-12-1969 and continues to be effective till today under the provisions of Section 234 (2), referred to above. 15. Now the only question raised by Hon'ble Judges (R.D. 1987 pages 308-312) that remains is whether the Commissioners functioning in this matter is part and parcel of the hierarchy of revenue courts The Commissioner entertains these objections under Rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, which reads as follows:- "(i) At any time within thirty days from the date of sale, application may be made to the Commissioner to set aside the sale on the ground of some material irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting it; but no sale shall be set aside on such ground unless the applicant proves to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he has sustained substantial injury by reason of such irregularity or mistake. (iii) The order of the Commissioner passed under this rule shall be final." 16. For Non-Z, A. Areas where the U.P. Land Revenue Act still applies, for realisation of Government dues the relevant section of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is Section 174 which reads as follows : - "Order confirming or setting aside sale - On the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale, if no such application as is mentioned in Section 172 or 173 has been made, or if such application has been made and rejected, the Commissioner shall pass an order confirming the sale : and, if application under Section 173 is made and allowed, the Commissioner shall pass an order setting aside the sale. Every order under this section shall be final." Therefore, the main difference between the provisions of Section 174 and Rule 285-J (these two provisions) is that whereas under the U.P. Land Revenue Act every sale of immovable property has to be confirmed by the Divisional Commissioner, under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, this will come up to him only if there are objections. The proceedings for all practical purposes are at the level of the Collector. The proceedings for all practical purposes are at the level of the Collector. The Commissioner has been given this specific power by the legislature under the provisions of Section 219 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act read with Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the provisions of the amended para 911 (k) of the Revenue Manual. 17. The relevant view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been expressed in the case of The Sahkari Ganna Vikas Samiti Ltd. v. Mahabir Sugar Mills (P.) Ltd., (A.I.R. 1982 S.C page 119) : "The High Court itself found that so far as the Commissioner of the Division is concerned, he was undoubtedly a Revenue Court but it held that as the matter arose out of the U.P. Sugarcane (Regulation of Supply and Purchase) Act, 1953, the Commissioner was exercising appellate jurisdiction as an authority under the said Act and was therefore persona designata. There is no doubt that the Cane Commissioner is highest authority under the Act and if the intention of the legislature was that appeal should lie to Special Tribunal, then it would have clearly provided that the appeal should lie to the Cane Commissioner and not to the Divisional Commissioner. This fact which does not appear to have been noticed by the High Court clearly shows that the Divisional Commissioner was made an appellate court not as persona designata but was acting as a revenue court. If this is the position it is obvious that Section 5 of the Limitation Act applied and hence the Divisional Commissioner had ample power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay." Accordingly, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had allowed the appeal. 18. It is true that in this case the Commissioner has been designated -outside the ambit of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The fact, however, remains that in terms of Rule 285-1 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules he is to go into the questions of material irregularity, mistakes in publication and to see whether substantial injury has been caused to any of the persons involved in the proceedings. This includes very often even determination of title of shares of individuals or group of individuals involved in the recovery proceedings. This includes very often even determination of title of shares of individuals or group of individuals involved in the recovery proceedings. In the instant case, it is clear from the Commissioners order in objection No. 49 of 1985-86 passed on 16-6-1986 that it had been averred on behalf of Sri Prakash Narain Khanna that the Sales Tax Authorities in determining the liability with regard to this immoveable property for payment of dues have failed to take into account as to who was the real owner of the land and who was the owner of which plot. It is thus clear that the proceedings involved a question of title over End and also the question as to who was the owner and in possession of particular plot numbers mentioned in the order of the Commissioner. Such matters often come before all Commissioners while disposing of objections in view of the provisions of Rule 285-1, referred to above. Therefore, in this ways Commissioners have to exercise their judicial discretion after hearing both parties carefully. It is perhaps for this reason that the Commissioner has been designated as court for this purpose. This Rule treats the Commissioner as separate from the revenue officers upto the level of Collector for this purpose. There are various processes for the Collector, the Sub-Divisional Officer and Tahsildar to be adopted for the Government dues. They issue citations, warrants for arrest or attachment of moveable property. The Commissioner has been made the authority only in matters relating to sale of immoveable property and that too where there are serious objections. Under Section 174 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act he is a part of the hierarchy because every sale is to be confirmed by him. This is not the case under the U.P. Zamindar; Abolition and Land Reforms Act. He comes in the picture by designation as a court and that too only when there are objections. Normally the sale would be finalised by the. Collector. It is thus clear that the legislature wanted him to function as a court because substantial questions of title and rights of individuals and of the State are involved. More than one group of individuals are involved in most cases because the land belongs to one individual or group while the other individual or group of individuals purchase it through auction. More than one group of individuals are involved in most cases because the land belongs to one individual or group while the other individual or group of individuals purchase it through auction. We would, therefore, respectfully differ from the Bench of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue, (R.D. 1987 page 308-312) for the following reasons: Firstly that the Bench has placed much reliance on Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra (1984 R.D. page 299) which is a Judgement passed without having any regard to the amended para 911 (k) of the Revenue Manual which is a statutory rule and which it appears though operative at that time was never brought to the notice of the learned judges. Secondly because unlike the provisions of Section 174 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act in this case the Commissioner is not treated part of the hierarchy of revenue officers but is treated as a revenue court designated separately for hearing of objections involving issues of rights and title and other material irregularities mentioned in Rule 285-1 between individuals, groups of individuals and the State. For this reason we respectfully point out that the views mentioned by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1982 AIR page 120 apply and for that reason a revision would lie to the Board. 19. The learned counsel for the State has relied on the Full Beach ruling of the Board of Revenue in Brij Mohan v. Ram Dularey, 1972 R.D. page 176, wherein it has been held that in spite of the provisions to the contrary para 911 of the Revenue Manual and Section 28 U.P. Land Revenue Act the proceedings for correction of the village map are non-judicial The S.D.O. and other sub - ordinate revenue staff can decide matters relating to Section 28. Amendments made to para 911 Revenue Manual declaring Section 28 proceedings as judicial do not carry any legal sanctity of validity. The Hon'ble Board in this case have further observed : The intention of Section 28 appears to be to prescribe the maintenance oF the map, and its index-the field book by observation on the spot ; and the errors which are to be corrected under, this section refer to those classes of errors which could be shown at the spot to have been made. It is important to note that the word used in this section is shown and not proved. In Section 33 (2) the word proved has been used in connection with errors found in the record of rights. The verb prove carries with it a judicial approach to the dispute, and the proof would be that prescribed by the Indian Evidence Act. In the case of correction of map and khasra on the spot, no such judicial proof is needed. The Revenue officers on their partal round, if obvious mistakes are shown, would be within their rights' to order or make corrections under Section 28. It was for this reason that Section 28 did not find a place in para 911 of Revenue Manual till September 1963. While correction of map involves only a correction of revenue records on the basis of the position on the spot, the disposal of objection under rule 285-1 has no such things. 1 he Commissioner is to decide the material irregularity and substantial injury caused to a party as a result of sale proceedings and this also means that the Commissioner often has to decide substantial question of title to the land. Therefore, it is clear that the function of the Commissioner under this rule is judicial in character. The only question that emerges is whether he functions as a court or not. The full Bench ruling of the Board (R.D.1972 page 176) does not help the learned counsel for the State much because the very nature of the proceedings under rule 285-1 and Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are entirely different. More ever by statutory rule the Commissioner has been made a court in this specific matter it is true that realisation of Government dues are proceedings which are non-judicial in nature but the disposal of objection relating to sale of immovable property have been set apart from these proceedings in terms of rule 285-1 and it is obvious for this reason that the legislature has separately designated the Commissioner for disposal of the objections pertaining to sale of immovable property as a court. The Board, it follows has the power of revision as the Commissioner is revenue court under the Board of Revenue for this purpose as already discussed above. 20. The Board, it follows has the power of revision as the Commissioner is revenue court under the Board of Revenue for this purpose as already discussed above. 20. Once it is accepted that the Commissioner is a revenue court for disposal of such objections, it follows that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act becomes applicable to such proceedings. Further objections have been raised in averments made before us that even if the commissioner is deemed to be a court an objection beyond 30 days cannot be entertained in view of the provisions of rule 285-I itself. The reasons given is that firstly Rule 285-I (iii) clearly says that "the order of the Commissioner passed under this Rule shall be final and further that rule 285-K lays down: if no application under rule 285-I is made within the time allowed therefor, all claims on the ground of irregularity or mistake in publishing or conducting the sale shall be barred: provided that nothing contained in this rule shall bar the institution of a suit in the civil court for the purpose of setting aside a sale on the ground of fraud" 21. In Sudama Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, 1968 R.D. page 88, it has been observed by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court: "Mr. S. N. Kacker, advanced various reasons why the State Government could not entertain any revision under Section 219 Land Revenue Act, he pointed out that section 219 Land Revenue Act empowers Government to call for records of nonjudicial proceedings only. He urged that the present case related to a judicial proceeding. He pointed out that in disposing of an objection the Commissioner has to adjudge the rights between the owner of the land and the auction purchaser. It was therefore, urged that the proceeding before the Commissioner is judicial." It was further observed : - "In the first place there is no direct conflict between rule 285-k and Section 219, Land Revenue Act. Secondly, even if there was such a conflict, the provision of Section 219, Land Revenue Act, must prevail as against Rule 285-k which is in the nature of subordinate legislation. Consequently/full effect must be given to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. The learned single Judge was right in holding that the State Government was competent to entertain a revision under Section 219, of U.P. Land Revenue Act." 22. Consequently/full effect must be given to Section 219, Land Revenue Act. The learned single Judge was right in holding that the State Government was competent to entertain a revision under Section 219, of U.P. Land Revenue Act." 22. We rely on the above view and are of the well considered opinion that despite the limit of 30 days and despite the finality attributed to the order of the Commissioner, the revision would be entertain able under Section 219 read with amended para 911 (k) of the Revenue Manual and as such the revision would not only be entertain able by the Board of Revenue, but since the Board of Revenue would function as a Revenue Court, provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be applicable. In this context, the view of the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Board of Revenue, (1972 R.D. pages 228-231) is relevant it has been held : "The proceedings under rule 115-N being judicial in nature, and the Assistant Collector being a court subordinate to the Board of Revenue, a revision against his orders is maintainable. A revision lies to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against the order of an Assistant Collector incharge of a sub-division (S.D.O.) passed under rule 115-N of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, setting aside an auction of an abadi site by the Land Management Committee." The matter was referred to the Bench in this case by Hon'ble Justice W. Broome in his Judgement in Krishan Lal Jat v. State of U.P., while referring the following question to a Division Bench, he raised the following question : - "Whether a revision lies to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act against the order of an Assistant Collector incharge of a sub-division (S.D.O.) passed under Rule 115-N of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, setting aside an auction of an abadi site by the Land Management Committee" In the same Judgement Kishan Lal Jat v. State of U.P. he has held that "a revision lies to the Board of Revenue under Section 333 only against decisions of a subordinate court; and it cannot be said that the S.D.O. acting under Rule 115-N function - as a Court (quoted by Division Bench of Satish Chandra and J. S. Trivedi, JJ. in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Board of Revenue, 1972 R.D. page 228 23. The reasons given by the Bench for coming to the conclusion that Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division (S.D.O.) functions as a revenue court are as follows : "Under Section 333 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act a revision lies to the Board of Revenue in any suit or proceeding decided by any subordinate court in which either no appeal lies to it or, if an appeal lies, it has not been preferred. Section 331 provides for institution of suits in courts mentioned in column 4 of the Second Schedule. Sub-section (2) provides for an appeal against orders and decrees so passed to courts mentioned in column 5 and sub-section (4) provides for a second appeal from, the final order or decree parsed in appeal under sub-section (2) to the authority mentioned in column 6. That authority is the Board of Revenue. Sub-section (2) provides for an appeal against orders and decrees so passed to courts mentioned in column 5 and sub-section (4) provides for a second appeal from, the final order or decree parsed in appeal under sub-section (2) to the authority mentioned in column 6. That authority is the Board of Revenue. It will thus be seen that the scheme of Section 331 read with the second schedule is for institution of suits in designated courts of original jurisdiction, from whose decrees or orders appeal lies to higher courts. This being the hierarchy of courts envisaged by the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, it can, within the meaning of Section 333, be said that the courts of original jurisdiction given in column 4 of the Second Schedule are courts subordinate to the courts of appeal and courts of second appeal mentioned in column 5 & 6, and similarly, that the court of first appeal mentioned in column 5 is subordinate to the court of second appeal mentioned in column 6 thereof. Column 6 of the Schedule refers to the Board of Revenue while column 5 mentions the Commissioner. Column 4 dealing with the courts of original jurisdiction refers to several authorities like Assistant Collector, Assistant Collector, First Class, as well as the Assistant Collector in charge of a sub-division. In many entries, like entries nos. 5, 11,20, 21A, 30, 31, 35, 41 and 42, the court of original jurisdiction is the Assistant Collector in charge of a sub-division. These Provisions clearly treat the Assistant Collector in charge of a sub-division as the court of original jurisdiction ; and they treat it as a court subordinate to the court of the Commissioner as well as the court of the Board of Revenue. Section 333, when it uses the phrase "subordinate court" must be held to be having the same hierarchy of courts in mind as is provided for in Section 331 read with' the Second Schedule. In other words, subordinate court within the meaning of Section 333 and with reference to the Board of Revenue are the court of the Commissioner and the courts of original jurisdiction mentioned in column of the Second Schedule. In other words, subordinate court within the meaning of Section 333 and with reference to the Board of Revenue are the court of the Commissioner and the courts of original jurisdiction mentioned in column of the Second Schedule. Thus a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue in any suit or proceeding "decided" inter alia by the Assistant Collector in charge of a sub-division in which either no appeal lies to the Board or, if it does lie, it has not been preferred. The use of the words courts and decided in Section 333 shows that the Legislative intent was that a revision would lie under it against judicial adjudications of suits and proceedings. Administrative proceedings conducted by those very authorities would not be within the purview of Section 333. This is in.consonance with Section 219, Land Revenue Act, which provided that in judicial cases and cases connected with settlement, a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue, while in non-judicial proceedings not connected with settlement a revision would lie to the State Government. It was urged that proceedings under rule 115-N are non-judicial. In opinion, the submission is misconceived. Under rule 115-N, the Assistant Collector incharge of sub-division resolves as his between two parties. In view of sub-section (3) he makes a "decision" in the case. His decision is final. Under sub-rule (iii), he has to hear the parties. Thereafter, he decides the case by a written order which records the reasons for the conclusions reached by him. Further, he can cancel the allotment only on grounds mentioned in sub-rule (1). These various features leave no room for doubt that the Assistant Collector discharges judicial functions under rule 115-N. The proceedings cannot possibly be held to be administrative in nature. The proceedings under rule 115-N of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. rules being judicial in nature and the Assistant Collector being a court subordinate to the Board of revenue a revision against his order is maintainable. 24. The above view is relevant to the present case for two reasons. Firstly it was clearly held that even where a proceeding is final, a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue. Under rule 285 (1) the order of the Commissioner is final and the objection, has to be made within thirty days. Even then a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue. Firstly it was clearly held that even where a proceeding is final, a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue. Under rule 285 (1) the order of the Commissioner is final and the objection, has to be made within thirty days. Even then a revision would lie to the Board of Revenue. Secondly, because the Commissioner determines material irregularity or mistake in conducting sale and whether there, was or, not any substantial injury caused to the objector by such mistake, he has obviously to weigh evidence and decide such questions of title. He has to satisfy himself as to whom the land belongs and as to whether the portion auctioned and sold indeed belonged to the person against whom there were dues and constituted his exclusive property. Therefore, in terms of the finding given in the above ruling Commissioner also functions as a court and is a court subordinate to the Board of Revenue in this matter. 25. As observed by Mr. Justice D. N. Jha in his Judgement in writ petition no. 5063 of 1985-86, the question had already been referred to a larger Bench of the Hon'ble High Court at Allahabad (Lucknow Bench). From the Judgement of the Bench consisting of Hon'ble Justice K. C. Agarwal and R. K. Gulati, it appears that this fact that the whole issue arising out of the Judgement of another Bench of the same High Court in Indu Engineering and Textiles Limited v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, (1984 R.D. page 299) and the earlier amendment inserting para 911 (k) of the Revenue Manual had been referred to a larger Bench of the High Court, had not been brought to the notice of Hon'ble Justice K. C. Agarwal and Hon'ble Justice R. K. Gulati in Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue, (1987 R.D. 308). This matter has been decided by the Bench even before the larger Bench could take a view in the matter. 26. Now we come to the question of competence of the Board of Revenue to dispose of the present revision application, in view of the fact that it is settled law that decisions taken by the Hon'ble High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are binding on the Board. 26. Now we come to the question of competence of the Board of Revenue to dispose of the present revision application, in view of the fact that it is settled law that decisions taken by the Hon'ble High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are binding on the Board. In the instant case, the Board are acting under the specific direction given in a writ petition by Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha in his order dated 31-7-1986. Therefore, obviously the Board has to comply with the orders of the High Court and express its view. For this reason, there is no substance in this averment made by the learned counsel for the State. The learned counsel for the State has averred that in the present matter Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha, directed that the Member, Board of Revenue dispose of the revision petition. Hence the matter should have been decided by a single member and not by a Bench. As we have already mentioned, the present Bench was constituted under the orders of the Hon'ble Chairman, Board of Revenue as important questions of law were involved. As such there was neither any prejudice to any party, nor any illegality in our disposing of.the revision petition in pursuance of the High Courts order. 27. From the above, it follows that we have to dispose of the revision also because in his order dated 16-6-86 the Commissioner has held that Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act does not apply to proceedings under rule 285-1. It is mentioned in this rule 285-1 that objections have to be filed within thirty days and it is clear that they were filed well beyond thirty days. We have already taken the view that Limitation Act applies to such proceedings, and for sufficient reasons delay can be condoned. A perusal of the Commissioners Judgement shows that in the instant revision after the auction and sale of the property objections were filed before the Commissioner on 6-5-1985. He set aside the auction and ordered a fresh auction in view of the irregularities that were brought to his notice. A perusal of the Commissioners Judgement shows that in the instant revision after the auction and sale of the property objections were filed before the Commissioner on 6-5-1985. He set aside the auction and ordered a fresh auction in view of the irregularities that were brought to his notice. Subsequently, the property was auctioned again and it has been challenged on the ground that he was not allowed to inspect the file by the Deputy Collector (Sales Tax) on the ground that it was not a public document and other objections were also raised. The Commissioner has dismissed these objections on the ground that in terms of the ruling of the Hon'ble High Court given in Indu Engineering and Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra, (1984 R.D. page 299) Limitation (Sic) there had been undue delay in filing objections in these cases, as they were filed well beyond thirty days. We have already taken the view that the Limitation Act does not apply in this case. The fact is that objections were once allowed and the auction sale held thereafter. The revisionist was aware that the sale was likely to take place again. The grounds taken by him do not carry weight. As long as he was aware of the proceedings failure to show him the file does not constitute a material irregularity. Moreover, the delay of more than 3 months in filing the objections on 11-6-1986 while auction took place on 1-3-1986 has not been adequately explained. The only reason he gives is that he knew of the sale only in June 1986 when the sale certificate was issued by the A. D. M. Also, only then did he become aware of the auction. The matter had been sent back for - re-sale after upholding the objection. It was his duty to have pursued the matter. He has not shown that he pursued the matter with due diligence and kept himself informed of the developments. The sale took place twice. It is, therefore, held that the delay has not been adequately explained. Consequently, we come to the same conclusion as the learned Commissioner has come in his order dated 16-6-1986 though for pretty different reasons. He has not shown that he pursued the matter with due diligence and kept himself informed of the developments. The sale took place twice. It is, therefore, held that the delay has not been adequately explained. Consequently, we come to the same conclusion as the learned Commissioner has come in his order dated 16-6-1986 though for pretty different reasons. The Commissioner has come to the correct conclusion on the basis of the ruling of the High Court in Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra (1984 R.D. page 299), as also on merits. His view that the Limitation Act does not apply is however, not correct. We, therefore, dismiss the revision as the objections before the Commissioner were time barred. 28. The order will also govern Revision No. 4/L.R. 29. A copy of this order should also be sent to the Hon'ble High Court in order to assist the larger Bench in corning to a just conclusion regarding the important legal issue, referred to them, in compliance with the direction given in the Judgement of the Hon'ble Justice D. N. Jha in writ petition no. 5063 of 1985-86 dated 31-7-1987, referred to above, as it is for the larger bench to weigh the propriety of the rulings of the division bench (Indu Engineering & Textiles Ltd. v. Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra (R.D. 1984 page 299) and Nihal Singh v. Board of Revenue (R.D. 1987 page 308) which are binding on this court. ORDER 30. Same order as in Revision No. 4 of 1986/Lucknow.