JUDGMENT B. C. CHAKRABARTI (Chairman). - All these cases involve substantially identical questions of law. The cases though heard in batches, one after the other, are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The case of the applicants in RN-375 (T) of 1989 and RN-160 (T) of 1989 arise out of an application under article 226 of the Constitution of India filed before the High Court at Calcutta being Matter No. 1458 of 1988. On transfer to this Tribunal the application has been renumbered as RN-375 (T) of 1989. RN-160 (T) of 1989 also arises out of the same matter being an application for extension of an interim order passed by the High Court in the same matter. The application for extension of interim order was numbered as RN-160 (T) of 1989. The said application was disposed of vide our order dated 19th May, 1989. 3. The case of the applicant in brief is as follows : The applicant is a partnership firm engaged in the business of manufacturing diverse types of edible and non-edible oils having its factory at 1/B, Madan Mohan Burman Street, Calcutta. The applicant No. 2 is a partner of the firm which is applicant No. 1. Being attracted and encouraged by the incentive scheme for industrial development and enjoyment of tax holiday, the applicant No. 1 drew up a scheme for manufacturing edible and non-edible oils and established a unit for the purpose. On an application for being registered as a small-scale industrial unit ("S.S.I." in short), the Director of Cottage and Small-scale industries initially granted provisional registration on 11th August, 1982, which was renewed from time to time until permanent registration was granted in 1983. The partners of applicant No. 1 also applied for certificate of registration under the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act, 1941 (hereinafter called "the BFST Act") and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter called "the CST Act") in April, 1983 and the applicant was granted registration certificates accordingly. In April, 1983, the applicant applied before the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, North Circle, for issuance of eligibility certificate claiming exemption from payment of tax under rule 3(66) of the Rules under the BFST Act. The eligibility certificate was granted and renewed from time to time, the last such renewal being valid till 31st September, 1987. In April, 1983, the applicant applied before the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, North Circle, for issuance of eligibility certificate claiming exemption from payment of tax under rule 3(66) of the Rules under the BFST Act. The eligibility certificate was granted and renewed from time to time, the last such renewal being valid till 31st September, 1987. In setting up the factory the applicant placed total reliance upon the statutory provisions of sections 5 and 6B of the BFST Act as well as rule 3(66) of the Rules framed thereunder. The applicants were all along given to understand that they would be entitled to enjoy tax holiday in respect of sales tax and turnover tax for a period of five years. Under the aforesaid sections and rules, goods generally exempt under section 5(2)(a)(vi) are not to be included in calculating the taxable turnover. The applicants being a newly set up S.S.I. unit, the turnover of the applicants will not qualify for being included in calculating the taxable turnover for the purpose of levy of turnover tax under section 6B of the BFST Act. By an amendment effected in 1987 by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B has been omitted with retrospective effect. The State Government having once held out an assurance that the applicants would be entitled to enjoy tax holiday for a period of five years, cannot now go back on their assurance by deleting clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B of the BFST Act to the prejudice of the applicants who had acted bona fide on the assurance held out to them. The applicants have complied with all the conditions and requirements of rule 3(66), and as such, are entitled to the benefit of tax holiday both as regards to sales tax and turnover tax. By way of abundant caution and without prejudice to their rights and contentions the applicants, however, deposited a sum of Rs. 3,58,777.47 on account of turnover tax for a period up to 15th February, 1988, particulars whereof are appended in a schedule annexed to the petition (annexure E). In the facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the respondents requiring the applicants to pay turnover tax is arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. 3,58,777.47 on account of turnover tax for a period up to 15th February, 1988, particulars whereof are appended in a schedule annexed to the petition (annexure E). In the facts and circumstances of the case, the action of the respondents requiring the applicants to pay turnover tax is arbitrary and violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India. 4. By filing the writ application the applicants have challenged the amendment whereby clause (e) of section 6B(2) was omitted. They have prayed for a direction in the nature of a mandamus commanding the respondents to refund the sum of Rs. 3,58,777.47 which was paid by the applicants without prejudice to their rights and contentions. 5. The case of the applicants in RN-316 (T) of 1989 may be briefly stated thus : The applicant No. 1 is the managing partner of the partnership firm, applicant No. 2 is running the business of manufacture of raincoat, ground sheet, the G.P. cover, aluminium, D.T. cloth, etc. On application made by the applicant, the Commercial Tax Officer, Amratala Charge issued sales tax registration certificate on 11th September, 1987 and the applicant became a registered dealer under the BFST Act. The applicant was advised by their lawyer and the applicant also came to know of the provisions of rule 3(66) of the Rules under the BFST Act, 1941, that in order to provide an incentive to persons intending to set up small-scale industries a provision was made for tax holiday during the first five years of setting up of the industry. According to the provisions, total exemption was granted from payment of sales tax and turnover tax for the aforesaid period. Acting on such representation the applicant No. 1 formed a partnership firm in the name of applicant No. 2 and started its business at Howrah. The applicant also obtained a certificate for permanent registration as S.S.I. unit, issued by the Directorate of Cottage and Small-scale Industries, Government of West Bengal, on 15th November, 1978. The applicant ventured to set up the industry by reason of the representation made in the BFST Act, 1941, as well as in the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954. Had there been no such representation and statutory sanction at the relevant time, the applicants would not have started the business. The applicant ventured to set up the industry by reason of the representation made in the BFST Act, 1941, as well as in the West Bengal Sales Tax Act, 1954. Had there been no such representation and statutory sanction at the relevant time, the applicants would not have started the business. The applicants duly applied before the proper Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes for issuance of eligibility certificate in order to avail of tax holiday in respect of sales tax/turnover for a period of five years. The eligibility certificate as prayed for, was granted and renewed from time to time till 17th January, 1984. Accordingly, the applicants have been enjoying exemption from payment of sales tax from 18th January, 1979 to 17th January, 1984. On and from 18th January, 1984, the applicants have been submitting their returns and paying sales tax according to law. A tax known as turnover tax is imposed on a dealer by introducing section 6B of the BFST Act, 1941. Sub-section (2) of section 6B of the BFST Act enumerates the items which are to be deducted from the turnover for the purpose of calculating the gross turnover on which the dealer shall be required to pay turnover tax. One such item as enumerated in clause (e) relates to sale of goods which are generally exempt from tax under section 5(2)(a)(vi). This clause, however, was deleted by the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, with retrospective effect. The applicants are thus required to pay the turnover tax which they cannot realise from customers and the imposition of the tax generally and more particularly in the case of the applicants is confiscatory in nature and amounts to unreasonable restriction upon the applicants' business, and thus violates the provisions of articles 304 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The respondent No. 4 has assessed the applicant's liability to pay turnover tax for a period of five quarters ending June, 1983, a sum of Rs. 55,464.95. The imposition is arbitrary, unconstitutional and barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The applicants cannot be made liable to pay turnover tax during the period they were entitled to enjoy tax holiday. The respondent No. 4 has assessed the applicant's liability to pay turnover tax for a period of five quarters ending June, 1983, a sum of Rs. 55,464.95. The imposition is arbitrary, unconstitutional and barred by the doctrine of estoppel. The applicants cannot be made liable to pay turnover tax during the period they were entitled to enjoy tax holiday. The applicants have prayed for a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondents to withdraw the impugned order of assessment made by the respondent No. 4, and declare that the West Bengal Taxation (Amendment) Act, 1987, is ultra vires the Constitution of India. 6. The case of the applicants in RN-154 (T) of 1989 also arises out of a writ application under article 226 of the Constitution of India. The case of the applicants in brief is as follows : The applicant No. 1 is a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 1956 and the applicant No. 2 is a director thereof. The applicant No. 1 is registered under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 and BFST Act, 1941. The applicant No. 1 is a newly set up S.S.I. unit duly registered with the Directorate of Cottage and Small-scale Industries, Government of West Bengal. Under the provisions of the BFST Act and the Rules framed thereunder the applicant was entitled to tax holiday for a period of five years. The applicant was granted eligibility certificate by the Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes in July, 1985. The application for renewal of the eligibility certificate is, however, pending for disposal. By an amendment made in 1987, clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B of the BFST Act was omitted with retrospective effect with the result that the applicant would not be entitled to exemption in respect of the sales prescribed under the BFST Act or the Rules framed thereunder. It is further the case of the petitioner that the State Legislature be estopped from effecting an amendment in view of the fact that on a clear and unambiguous promise on the part of the State Legislature the applicant had set up the S.S.I. unit with the assurance that there is an exemption from payment of sales tax including turnover tax. The amendment made to the BFST Act by deleting clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act is illegal, invalid and beyond the competence and authority of the State Legislature. The Act is liable to be struck down in view of the provisions of article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and article 300A of the Constitution of India. In the premises, the applicants have prayed for a declaration that the Amendment Act of 1987 in so far as it relates to the omission of section 6B(2)(e) and collection of turnover tax from newly set up S.S.I. units, is ultra vires the Constitution of India and a direction upon the respondents not to withhold the issue of declaration forms under the BFST Act, 1941 and the CST Act, 1956. 7. In RN-376 (T) of 1989 the case of the applicant is exactly identical. The applicant is also a newly set up S.S.I. unit. The applicant has paid a sum of Rs. 4,53,031 as turnover tax as assessed under protest. The petitioner was granted eligibility certificate under rule 3(66) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules for a period of five years from April 10, 1981. The applicant has prayed for reliefs as in the previous case. 8. RN-310 (T) of 1989 also arises out of a writ application filed by Suresh Kumar Rungra under the name and style of Messrs. Dhanaluxmi Oil Mills. The applicant carries on the business of manufacturing oil and oil cake and is a registered dealer under the BFST Act, 1941. Being a newly set up S.S.I. unit the applicant was granted the eligibility certificate for a period of five years beginning from 31st October, 1978. By two purported orders of assessment for four quarters ending 15th day of A.B. 2038 and 2039 the respondent No. 1 levied turnover tax under section 6B of the BFST Act, 1941 for a sum of Rs. 31,573.29 and Rs. 34,444.69, respectively in spite of the fact that the applicant was in the possession of an eligibility certificate during the said periods. On the grounds as alleged in RN-376 (T) of 1989, the applicant has prayed for identical reliefs as in that case. 9. The original applicant Shri Suresh Kumar Rungra having died, his heirs, namely, widow and two sons have been substituted, and brought on record. 10. On the grounds as alleged in RN-376 (T) of 1989, the applicant has prayed for identical reliefs as in that case. 9. The original applicant Shri Suresh Kumar Rungra having died, his heirs, namely, widow and two sons have been substituted, and brought on record. 10. RN-371 (T) of 1989 also arises out of the same matter and relates to an application for extension of the interim order granted by the High Court. The application for extension was disposed of by our order dated 29th May, 1989. 11. The case of the applicant in RN-376 (T) of 1989 is briefly as follows : The applicant-firm is engaged in the manufacture of edible oil as a newly set up S.S.I. unit. The applicant was granted eligibility certificate in terms of rule 3(66) from 8th April, 1981, and was renewed from time to time till 31st March, 1986. Assessment against the applicant in respect of his business for the period ending October, 1985, has been completed. No turnover tax was charged in respect of the previous accounting year. In a judgment delivered in C.R. No. 4769 (W) of 1985 the High Court at Calcutta held that while rule 3(66) may not grant general exemption but section 6B(2)(e) has exempted all sales prescribed by rules and it was further held that the turnover from new S.S.I. units will not qualify for being included in the taxable turnover for the purpose of levy of turnover tax. In or about July, 1987, an amendment was effected to the BFST Act by West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987. By the said amendment clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B of the BFST Act was omitted with retrospective effect. The applicant thus has become liable to pay turnover tax with retrospective effect although in all the previous years the applicant was granted exemption from payment of the same on the sale of its manufactured goods in West Bengal in view of the grant of eligibility certificate in favour of the applicant. In or about August, 1988, the applicant received a notice purporting to have been issued for the purpose of the review of the assessment order for a period of four quarters ending KB/14, 2041 by charging turnover tax which was alleged to have become payable in view of the aforementioned Amendment Act with retrospective effect. In or about August, 1988, the applicant received a notice purporting to have been issued for the purpose of the review of the assessment order for a period of four quarters ending KB/14, 2041 by charging turnover tax which was alleged to have become payable in view of the aforementioned Amendment Act with retrospective effect. By filing the present writ application the applicant has challenged the amendment of the BFST Act omitting clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B with retrospective effect. The substance of the applicant's case is that since the applicant holds an eligibility certificate under rule 3(66) of the Rules under the BFST Act, 1941 the sale covered under rule 3(66) are required to be deducted in computing the gross turnover and since the entire sales of the applicant are covered by rule 3(66) of the Rules and such sales are generally exempt from tax, no turnover tax can be or is payable by the applicant. The imposition of turnover tax during the period of tax holiday would frustrate the very object for which the provision for tax exemption under rule 3(66) was provided for. The applicant has also pleaded estoppel against the State Legislature in effecting such amendment with retrospective effect in view of the fact that on a clear and unambiguous promise on the part of the Legislature the applicant had ventured to set up the S.S.I. unit. The amendment sought to be introduced by the Amendment Act of 1987 is in contravention of article 300A of the Constitution of India and is also otherwise arbitrary, illegal and without jurisdiction. The applicant has accordingly prayed for a declaration that the provisions of the said Amendment Act of 1987 in so far as it relates to the omission of clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act, 1941 and assessment/collection of turnover tax from newly set up S.S.I. units during the period of eligibility certificate is ultra vires the Constitution. The applicant has accordingly prayed for a declaration that the provisions of the said Amendment Act of 1987 in so far as it relates to the omission of clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act, 1941 and assessment/collection of turnover tax from newly set up S.S.I. units during the period of eligibility certificate is ultra vires the Constitution. The applicant has also prayed for a declaration that the notice issued upon the applicant to show cause why the assessment order made for a period of four quarters ending KB/14, 2041 and the order of assessment for the subsequent year charging turnover tax be quashed and a writ or direction in the nature of prohibition commanding the respondents to forbear from giving any effect to or taking any steps whatsoever on the basis of and/or pursuant to the provisions of the Amendment Act of 1987. 12. It will appear from the cases of the applicants as stated above, that each of the applicants has raised a short question, namely, whether a newly set up small-scale industrial unit enjoying the benefit of exemption from payment of sales tax under rule 3(66) of the Rules framed under the BFST Act, 1941, would or would not be liable to pay turnover tax under section 6B of the BFST Act during the period of tax holiday and whether or not the retrospective effect given to the amendment is bad in law. 13. The respondents have opposed all these cases on identical grounds. Their case in short is as follows : There being some obscurity and ambiguity in the language employed in clause (e) of sub-section (2) of section 6B of the BFST Act, 1941, some assessees started disputing the levy of turnover tax on sales on the plea that the exemption provided in all the sub-rules of rule 3 was of a general nature and not a conditional one for the purpose of levy of turnover tax. With a view to remove the confusion, amendment of section 6B was felt necessary and accordingly clause (e) of section 6B(2) was deleted with retrospective effect. The amendment was merely clarificatory in nature and did not amount to imposition of a fresh tax. Those who were enjoying tax holiday by virtue of eligibility certificates granted to them, are entitled to exemption from sales tax only but are liable to pay turnover tax as every other dealer. The amendment was merely clarificatory in nature and did not amount to imposition of a fresh tax. Those who were enjoying tax holiday by virtue of eligibility certificates granted to them, are entitled to exemption from sales tax only but are liable to pay turnover tax as every other dealer. In short, their case is that the tax holiday is limited only to sales tax and does not include the turnover tax. In regard to the plea of promissory estoppel, as raised by some of the applicants, the contention of the respondents is that there was no promise in regard to turnover tax, and that in any event, the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in order to restrict the legislative functions of the State Legislature. 14. After a decision rendered by a learned single Judge of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Krishna Laminating Industries v. State of West Bengal reported in [1987] 20 STA 35, an amendment was made by deleting clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act, 1941. In that decision it was held that while rule 3(66) of the Rules framed under the BFST Act, 1941 may not grant a general exemption, but section 6B(2)(e) has exempted all sales that are prescribed by the rules. It was further held that the proviso to section 5(2)(a)(vi) lays down certain conditions which are special conditions required to be fulfilled in order to obtain exemption in the special cases mentioned in the proviso. After this, the amendment to the BFST Act, 1941, as referred to above, was made with retrospective effect. In view of the amendment so made, the Revenue has been demanding turnover tax from eligibility certificate holders who have set up small-scale industrial units. According to rule 3(66) small-scale industrial units, upon fulfilling certain conditions, are entitled to a tax holiday for a period of five years or seven years, as the case may be, depending upon the location of the industry. The demand has been challenged on various grounds one of which is that the Government is estopped from making the demand by reason of the inducement held out to them by making provision for tax holiday. The demand has been challenged on various grounds one of which is that the Government is estopped from making the demand by reason of the inducement held out to them by making provision for tax holiday. In short, the contention is that the applicants, being assured of tax holiday, had altered their position, made considerable investments by setting up small-scale industries and that the Government cannot now veer round and demand turnover tax from them at least for a period during which they are entitled to the benefit of tax holiday. In other words, their contention is that the demand for turnover tax from eligibility certificate holders (for short "E.C. holders") is hit by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. In support of the contention, reliance was placed in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. reported in [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC). It was held in this case that in order to invoke the rule of promissory estoppel, variously described as the "equitable estoppel", "quasi estoppel" and "new estoppel", it is enough to show that the promissee, acting in reliance on the promise, altered his position and it is not necessary for him further to show that he has acted to his detriment. Government is equally subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of the rule are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. 15. Another decision reported in [1988] 70 STC 59 (SC) (Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes v. Dharmendra Trading Company) was also referred to in support of the plea of promissory estoppel. This decision also relied on the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC). The case of the State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industrial Ltd. reported in [1987] 65 STC 430 (SC) was also referred to and relied upon by the applicants. The facts of the case of Motilal Padampat [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) are, however, entirely different. The Director of Industries, Government of U.P., issued a statement which appeared as a news item, that the Government have decided to grant exemption from sales tax for three years to all new industrial units with a view to enabling them to come on a firm footing during the developing stage. The Director of Industries, Government of U.P., issued a statement which appeared as a news item, that the Government have decided to grant exemption from sales tax for three years to all new industrial units with a view to enabling them to come on a firm footing during the developing stage. The appellant having come to know of this, wrote to the Director that he was inclined to set up a hydrogenation plant for manufacture of vanaspati and sought for confirmation that the unit would be entitled to tax holiday. The Director confirmed. Thereupon the appellant took steps for setting up the factory and also wrote to the Chief Secretary of the Government for a reassurance. The appellant was informed that the Government was willing to consider the request and asked the appellant to submit a formal application. The appellant was eventually assured categorically that the proposed factory would be entitled to exemption for three years from the date of commencement of production. Acting on this assurance, the appellant proceeded with the work of setting up of the plant. Subsequently, however, the Government took a policy decision that the units would be given only partial concession in regard to sales tax with effect from a certain date. The appellant went into production before that date. In the context of these facts it was held that there was clear representation from the Government about exemption from the payment of sales tax for three years and that the appellant had acted on this representation. Therefore, the facts necessary for invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel were found to have been clearly established. In the case of State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. [1987] 65 STC 430 (SC) the facts were as follows : Under a resolution dated 29th September, 1973, amended by another resolution dated 29th June, 1976, the Government of Bihar decided to grant various sales tax incentives to new large and medium industrial units for a period of 10 years from the date they went into production. Relying on the resolution dated 29th June, 1976, the respondent took steps for setting up a new industrial unit. That resolution was later modified and amended by another dated 28th November, 1976. The respondent set up the industry during 1977-78 and went into production on 21st March, 1979. Relying on the resolution dated 29th June, 1976, the respondent took steps for setting up a new industrial unit. That resolution was later modified and amended by another dated 28th November, 1976. The respondent set up the industry during 1977-78 and went into production on 21st March, 1979. In the meantime, on 5th August, 1977, the respondent wrote to the Director of Industries for confirmation and the Director assured the respondent that it would get the incentive as stated in the resolution of the Government. The sales tax authorities, however, held that in accordance with the notification dated 18th March, 1977, the respondent was entitled to exemption only for a period from 21st March to 31st March, 1979. On a writ petition, the High Court held that the sales tax authorities were bound to give the exemption on the basis of the resolutions and the respondent was entitled to the incentives in terms of the resolutions. On an appeal being preferred by the State, the Supreme Court dismissed the same. In coming to the decision reliance was placed on the cases of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) and Pournami Oil Mills v. State of Kerala [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC). In the case of Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC) also the appellant set up an industrial unit being assured of exemption from payment of sales tax for a period of five years. The assurance was given in the shape of an order passed by the Government of the State of Kerala on 11th April, 1979. On 21st October, 1980, the Government published a notification under section 10 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, whereby some limits were imposed on the concession. The notification was to be deemed to have come into force with retrospective effect from 1st April, 1979. It was held that if in response to the order dated 11th April, 1979 and in consideration of the concession made available any small-scale industrial unit has been set up within the State of Kerala, they were entitled to plead the rule of estoppel in their favour when the State purported to act differently. 16. Reliance was also placed on the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Limited reported in [1986] 59 Comp Cas 526 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 806 . 16. Reliance was also placed on the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Limited reported in [1986] 59 Comp Cas 526 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 806 . It was observed in this case that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive function and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action cannot be invoked to defeat the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel. 17. Certain observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Shri Bakul Oil Industries v. State of Gujarat [1987] 64 STC 304 were also relied on. It was observed in this case that the rule of promissory estoppel could be invoked only if, on the basis of the representation made by the Government, an industry was established to avail of the benefit of exemption. In the facts of that case, however, it was held that the question of promissory estoppel did not arise. 18. Finally, Mr. Somen Bose relied on a very recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir reported in AIR 1989 SC 1629 . In that case the petitioners had claimed that pursuant to the arrangement entered into between them and the State following the invitation by the State, they had invested considerable sums of money in the shape of plant, machinery and erection of building. The petitioners were invited to set up industry by assuring them supply of raw materials. They changed their position on the basis of representation made by the State, and when the factories were ready and they were in a position to utilise the raw material, the impugned Act came into force to obliterate their rights and enabled the State to get out of the commitments. Their Lordships while allowing the petitions on the ground that the impugned Act suffered from the vice of taking away rights of property without providing for compensation at all and is hit by article 31(2) of the Constitution, observed as follows : "We are inclined to agree with the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the circumstances gave rise to a fact situation of estoppel. It is true that there is no estoppel against the Legislature and the vires of the Act cannot be tested by invoking the plea but so far as the State Government is concerned the rule of estoppel does apply and the precedents of this Court are clear." Relying on these decisions it was argued that once the E.C. holders were granted the benefit of tax holiday for a certain period, the Government is estopped from demanding turnover tax from them during the said period. On the side of the respondents, however, it was conceded that even though the doctrine of promissory estoppel may be invoked against the Government but the doctrine cannot bind the Legislature. Indeed in the case of Motilal Padampat [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) it has been held that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot, however, however, be applied in the teeth of obligation or liability imposed by law. Where the Government owes a duty to the public to act in a particular manner, a duty meaning a course of conduct enjoined by law, the doctrine cannot be invoked for preventing the Government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. It was further held that the Legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to that doctrine. We have already indicated the facts of that case. It will bear repetition that there, the parties were assured of tax concession by Government notifications and not by statutory rules. 19. On the side of the respondents a reference was made to a Full Bench decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Bombay Conductors and Electricals Ltd. v. Chandramouli, Under Secretary to the Government of India, reported in [1984] 55 STC 162. It was held in this case that in tax law there is hardly any room for applicability of promissory estoppel. The object of promissory estoppel is to enforce contractual obligations, but taxation is not a contract. It is an expression of unilateral will of the Legislature. There are not promises; there are no contractual obligations. If there are any promises, they are subject to the overriding public interest. 20. The object of promissory estoppel is to enforce contractual obligations, but taxation is not a contract. It is an expression of unilateral will of the Legislature. There are not promises; there are no contractual obligations. If there are any promises, they are subject to the overriding public interest. 20. The case of Shri Shiv Kumar Bajaj v. Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1986] 63 STC 354 (Cal) referred to on behalf of the respondents, though relates to a different question, but contains some observations which have a relevance to the point at issue. It was observed that the duty and obligation of the statutory authority was to adhere to the requirement of statute and no extraneous matter ought to be taken note of. The creators of the statute in taxing statutes were to follow the rigours of law and no extraneous matter ought to be taken into consideration in interpreting a taxing statute. 21. The case of Pournami Oil Mills [1987] 65 STC 1 (SC) referred to earlier, had decided that the petitioners were, in the facts and circumstances of the case, entitled to plead the rule of estoppel in their favour when the State purported to act differently. In this case also the principle laid down in Motilal Padampat's case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC) was applied and we have already indicated that there are clear observations in that case that the doctrine cannot be invoked to bind the Legislature. 22. Mr. Bose, however, contended that while it may be true that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to hinder legislative functions, yet Government is bound to keep its promise on the basis of which the petitioners had altered their position by setting up industrial units and investing sums of money in the hope of getting tax holiday. In other words, his contention is that when once the Government had decided to grant tax exemption or concession, the Government should be compelled to stick to that position irrespective of any subsequent legislative enactments. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. The Supreme Court has unequivocally laid down that the doctrine cannot be invoked against legislative functions of the State. The position would have been different if the Government had decided to withdraw the concession by an executive order or a notification. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. The Supreme Court has unequivocally laid down that the doctrine cannot be invoked against legislative functions of the State. The position would have been different if the Government had decided to withdraw the concession by an executive order or a notification. The position, however, becomes different when withdrawal of concession, if any, is made by an Act passed by the Legislature. 23. It is true that in the case of Vij Resins Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 1629 it was observed that the circumstances gave rise to a fact situation of estoppel but at the same time it is held in that very case that there is no estoppel against the Legislature and the vires cannot be tested by invoking the plea of promissory estoppel. 24. The cases cited on behalf of the applicants, all relate to Government notifications not authorised or sanctioned by law. They were executive orders and the Government was bound to honour their promise held out to intending investors. The decision in the case of Vij Resins Private Limited AIR 1989 SC 1629 cannot be considered as an authority for the proposition that the Legislature also is circumscribed by the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India Ltd. [1986] 59 Comp Cas 526 (SC); AIR 1986 SC 806 after referring to various decisions of the Supreme Court, as also some English decisions, and mainly relying upon Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC), came to the conclusion that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable against the Government in the exercise of its governmental, public or executive functions and the doctrine of executive necessity or freedom of future executive action could not be invoked to defeat the applicability of promissory estoppel. It is significant to note that the doctrine was found as against the Government in the exercise of its governmental or executive functions but not as against the legislative functions. A slightly different view was taken in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 1980 SC 1285 which held that the doctrine was not applicable against the exercise of executive functions of the State and the State cannot be prevented from exercising its functions under the law. A slightly different view was taken in the case of Jit Ram Shiv Kumar v. State of Haryana AIR 1980 SC 1285 which held that the doctrine was not applicable against the exercise of executive functions of the State and the State cannot be prevented from exercising its functions under the law. This decision, however, expressed its disagreement with the observations made in the case of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC). P. N. Bhagwati, Chief Justice, as his Lordship then was, also observed [See Union of India v. Godfrey Philips India ltd. AIR 1986 SC 806 at 815. - Ed.] that it was difficult to understand how a bench of two Judges in Jit Ram's case AIR 1980 SC 1285 could possibly overturn or disagree with what was said by another Bench of two Judges in Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills case [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC). It was further observed by his Lordship that it was not right on their part to express their disagreement with the enunciation of law by a co-ordinate Bench of three Judges. The view expressed on the main issue by Bhagwati, C.J., was the minority view but the majority view, however, agreed with the observations of the Chief Justice on the question of promissory estoppel. 25. Upon a consideration of the decisions relied upon by the parties, we find that if the amendment of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act, 1941, effect in 1987 has imposed any additional burden on the E.C. holders, the same came be challenged on other considerations, if available, but not on the plea of promissory estoppel. The submission that the Government is bound to honour its promise by not demanding turnover tax from the E.C. holders also cannot be accepted because the Revenue and its officers are as such bound by the law as enacted, as the applicants are. The Government cannot be prevented by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel from demanding and collecting turnover tax from E.C. holders if the law so permits. (See also Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram Kumar AIR 1976 SC 2237 ). 26. Upon a reference to the Supreme Court decisions referred to above, Mr. Somen Bose contended that the argument of the respondent that there cannot be estoppel against the statute, is misconceived in the facts and circumstances of the case. (See also Excise Commissioner, U.P. v. Ram Kumar AIR 1976 SC 2237 ). 26. Upon a reference to the Supreme Court decisions referred to above, Mr. Somen Bose contended that the argument of the respondent that there cannot be estoppel against the statute, is misconceived in the facts and circumstances of the case. While the law is made by the Legislature, it is the executive which implements it. If the executive, branch of the Government, in enforcing such law makes a promise that they shall not implement the law against the person who had altered his position because of a representation given to him by the executive, then the executive shall be bound by the representation and shall not enforce or impose sales tax. In the cases of Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills [1979] 44 STC 42 (SC), State of Bihar v. Usha Martin Industries Ltd. [1987] 65 STC 430 (SC) and Vij Resins Private Ltd. v. State of Jammu and Kashmir AIR 1989 SC 1629 there seems to be no representation by the Government that they would not enforce the existing law. In fact, there could be no such representation because a citizen is as must bound by the law as the Government is bound to enforce it. So, if the law is good and valid, the Government cannot be estopped from enforcing the law on the basis of a prior executive policy decision. If the Legislature in its wisdom enacts a provision which runs counter to a certain representation made by the executive branch prior to the enactment, the party acting on the representation cannot insist that the law shall not be enforced. 27. Apart from the question of promissory estoppel the applicants have raised a more substantial question, namely, whether they are entitled to the benefit of exemption from turnover tax during the period they were holding eligibility certificates and whether the benefit of exemption can be revoked retrospectively by amending section 6B(2) of the BFST Act. The turnover tax was imposed by section 6B of the BFST Act. The liability arises if the totality of gross turnover exceeded the amounts specified in the Act. The liability is to pay, in addition to the tax payable by him under section 5 and section 6(c), a turnover tax at the rates specified in sub-section (3) on such part of his turnover as specified in sub-section (2). 28. The liability arises if the totality of gross turnover exceeded the amounts specified in the Act. The liability is to pay, in addition to the tax payable by him under section 5 and section 6(c), a turnover tax at the rates specified in sub-section (3) on such part of his turnover as specified in sub-section (2). 28. Sub-section (2) of section 6B provides that the turnover tax shall be levied on that part of the gross turnover of a dealer during any period which remains after deducting therefrom his turnover during the period on - (a) to (d) ............. (e) sales of goods which are generally exempt from tax under sub-clause (vi) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 5; (f) .............. (g) such other sales as may be prescribed. This was the law as it stood prior to the amendment in 1987 whereby clause (e) referred to above was omitted. 29. On the provisions of section 6B(2), as it then stood, a single Bench of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Krishna Laminating Industries v. State of West Bengal reported in [1987] 20 STA 35 observed as follows : "Rule 3(66) may not grant a general exemption but section 6B(2)(e) has exempted all sales that are prescribed by the rules. The proviso to section 5(2)(a)(vi) lays down certain conditions which are required to be fulfilled in order to obtain exemption in the special cases mentioned in the proviso. The turnover of the new unit will not, therefore, qualify for inclusion in the taxable turnover. There is thus no reason to deny the benefit of rule 3(66) to the applicants because of the language in section 6B(2)(e)." Sub-clause (e) does not say that sales of goods which are generally exempt from tax under rule 3 will alone qualify for exemption. It was, therefore, held that bearing in mind the special exemptions in the proviso to section 5(2)(a)(vi) it is clear that the general exemptions spoken of by section 6B(2)(e) can only refer to those exemptions which do not come within the ambit of the proviso to section 5(2). It was, therefore, held that bearing in mind the special exemptions in the proviso to section 5(2)(a)(vi) it is clear that the general exemptions spoken of by section 6B(2)(e) can only refer to those exemptions which do not come within the ambit of the proviso to section 5(2). A different note was, however, expressed by S. Chatterjee, J., in the case of S.P. Electronics v. State of West Bengal being C.O. No. 17653 W of 1988 [Reported in [1991] 82 STC 16 (Cal) supra] a copy of which was produced on behalf of the respondents during the hearing of the present applications. The ultimate finding was that the writ petitioners were not entitled to the declaration as to the Amendment Act being ultra vires as asked for in the case. The Amendment Act referred to, is the amendment effected in 1987 by which clause (e) of section 6B(2) was deleted. 30. Mr. B. C. Dutta, appearing for the applicants in RN-375 (T) of 1989, took a point that the amendment is hit by article 304 (b) of the Constitution of India and in support thereof, relied on a decision in the case of Calcutta Country Spirit Opium and Drug Association Ltd. v. State of West Bengal reported in [1974] 34 STC 161 (Cal). In the particular facts of that case it was held that section 3(5) of the West Bengal Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1972, created an imposition which directly restricted and impeded the free-flow of trade and the requirement of the proviso to article 304(b) not having been complied with, the proviso was ultra vires the Constitution. But the facts of that case were different. The petitioners in that case were licensees in respect of sale of country spirit, amongst other articles. The petitioners contended that the sales made by them as licensees was not a sale within the meaning of the Sale of Goods Act and that the tax levied under the section imposed a restriction on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse and no previous sanction of the President under article 304(b) or no subsequent assent under article 255 having been taken, was unconstitutional. It was held that the sale was a sale in the legal sense, but on the other point, it was found as a fact that the gross profit left to the petitioners in respect of the business carried on by them (they could not sell at any price higher than the price fixed by the licensing authority), varied between 5.7 per cent and 7.8 per cent. In such circumstances, it was held that the imposition of sales tax at 6 per cent would render the business so unprofitable that no one could carry on the business unless one could pass on the tax to the customers which, however, was prohibited under the rules. In such a situation, it was held that the imposition directly restricted and impeded the free-flow of trade and the requirement of the proviso to article 304(b) not having been complied with, the provision was ultra vires the Constitution. The decision in this case depended largely on the factual position that the petitioners could not sell at a competitive price in order to earn some profit and that the extent of profit was so negligible that the imposition of further tax amounted to a restriction on the trade. In the cases before us, the factual position is different, and hence, the decision can have no bearing on the issue involved. 31. There was a lot of controversy with regard to the use of the expression "sales of goods which are generally exempt from tax" as used in erstwhile clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act. 32. Mr. R. N. Bajoria, appearing for the applications in RN-275 (T) of 1989, did not challenge the prospective operation of the new amendment but contended that by reason of deletion of clause (e) the applicant is deprived of the exemption under rule 3(66) also. Precisely, his contention is that he cannot take advantage of clause (g) of section 6B(2) which refers to "such other sales as may be prescribed". It is contended that the sales as may be prescribed, as referred to in clause (g), cannot be availed of by the applicant because it does not relate to any prescription made under rule 3 of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules. His argument is that the prescription for the purpose of clause (g) is contained in rule 3(2A) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules. His argument is that the prescription for the purpose of clause (g) is contained in rule 3(2A) of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules. The applicant does not come under any of the sales referred to therein. Hence, it is argued that the applicant by reason by the deletion of clause (e) becomes disentitled to claim of exemption even under rule 3(66) during the period he holds the eligibility certificate. We are, however, unable to agree with this contention. Rule 3 provides that in calculating the taxable turnover a dealer liable to pay tax under section 4 or 8(3) of the Act, may deduct from his gross turnover the following items enumerated thereafter. Then comes rule 3(66) which relates to sales by a newly set up small-scale industry subject to the dealer fulfilling certain conditions enumerated in rule 3(66) and the proviso thereto. Since the rule relates to liability to pay tax under section 4 or 8(3) of the Act, the contention that the applicant would be deprived of the benefit of the rule 3(66) as well by reason of ommission of clause (e) of section 6B(2) does not stand to reason, because section 6B relates to imposition of turnover tax which is not contemplated by rule 3. Section 5(2)(a)(vi) which was referred to in clause (e) of section 6B(2) and has now been deleted also, speaks of such other sales as may be prescribed. The prescription in section 5(2)(a)(vi) is in respect of the liability to pay tax under section 4 or section 8(3) of the Act and not in respect of section 6B of the Act. Therefore, it is not possible to agree with the view that the omission of clause (e) has deprived the applicant of the benefit of rule 3(66) as well. 33. It was then argued that the expression "sales of goods which are generally exempt" has a special meaning. The expression has nowhere been defined or explained in the BFST Act. But the expression has been used in section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Being a cognate Act, reference was made to it in order to find out the meaning of the expression. It was contended that the expression did not cover the exemptions granted under rule 3(66). But the expression has been used in section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. Being a cognate Act, reference was made to it in order to find out the meaning of the expression. It was contended that the expression did not cover the exemptions granted under rule 3(66). In support of this reliance was placed on the case of Himachal Conductors Private Ltd. v. Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner reported in [1978] 42 STC 440 (HP). It was held in the facts of that case that requirement of the industry to get itself registered with the Industries Department for earning exemption from local sales tax and that the incentive rules did not prescribe any condition or circumstance which might bring the petitioner under the explanation to section 8(2A) of the Central Act. Reliance was also placed in the case of Rapidur (India) Private Limited v. Union of India reported in [1985] 59 STC 165 (Bom). This was a case where the petitioners being a registered small-scale industry and having their sales totally exempt from local sales tax, claimed exemption from Central sales tax also in respect of their turnover relating to inter-State sales of their goods under section 8(2A) of the Central Sales Tax Act. The plea having been rejected by the tax officer, it was held on a writ petition that the exemption granted to registered small-scale industries, which petitioners admittedly were, from the State sales tax for a specified period, was general and could not be said to have been granted under specified circumstances or specified conditions. The next case relied on in this connection, Pradeep Rubber Industries v. State of Bihar reported in [1986] 61 STC 402 (Pat), also relates to demand of Central sales tax and the generality in the nature of exemption granted under section 8(2A) of the Central Act. This decision, in our view, does not wholly support the contention of the applicants. The decision was rendered applying the ratio enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1976] 38 STC 108. In the latter decision it was held by the Supreme Court that where the exemption from taxation is conferred by conditions or in certain circumstances, there is no exemption from tax generally within the meaning of section 8(2A) of the Central Act. In the latter decision it was held by the Supreme Court that where the exemption from taxation is conferred by conditions or in certain circumstances, there is no exemption from tax generally within the meaning of section 8(2A) of the Central Act. The goods should be totally exempt from tax under the State Act before similar exemption from the levy of Central tax can become available. 34. In the cases before us the goods in which the applicants are dealing, are not themselves exempt from tax. They are exempt only at the hands of the E.C. holders, and the E.C. holder is entitled to the exemption only on their performance of certain conditions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the sales referred to in rule 3(66) or in the erstwhile clause (e) of section 6B(2), are of goods generally exempt from tax. They are exempt only at the hands of some of the dealers depending on the performance or existence of the conditions laid down in the proviso to rule 3(66). Consequently, no analogy can be drawn from the interpretation of the expression "generally exempt" as in section 8(2A) of the Central Act. It is not possible to say that the goods are totally exempt from tax under the State Act as was the case in Indian Aluminium Cables Ltd. v. State of Haryana [1976] 38 STC 108 (SC). 35. It has been contended on behalf of the Revenue that the amendment effected in 1987 by deleting clause (e) of section 6B(2) of the BFST Act, is merely clarificatory in nature. An amendment is said to be clarificatory or in the nature of a minor repair when the language or phraseology used in the Act creates some ambiguity or confusion and it is felt necessary to remove the defect or lacuna. For reasons we shall presently discuss, we are in agreement with the contention of the Revenue that the amendment is merely clarificatory in nature. 36. Under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the BFST Act "taxable turnover" is to be computed for the purpose of sections 4 and 8(3) after certain deductions from the gross turnover. The deductions are enumerated in different clauses of section 5(2). Item (vi) of section 5(2)(a) refers to "such other sales as may be prescribed". 36. Under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the BFST Act "taxable turnover" is to be computed for the purpose of sections 4 and 8(3) after certain deductions from the gross turnover. The deductions are enumerated in different clauses of section 5(2). Item (vi) of section 5(2)(a) refers to "such other sales as may be prescribed". The prescription contemplated is contained in rule 3 of the Bengal Sales Tax Rules, 1941, which provides for certain deductions in computing the taxable turnover of a dealer liable to pay tax under section 4 or 8(3) of the Act. In the normal course, therefore, the exemptions prescribed in the rule 3 are not to be taken into account for the purpose of computation of turnover tax under section 6B. But so long as clause (e) of section 6B(2) was not omitted by the amendment in 1987, section 5(2)(a)(vi) came to be considered for the purpose of turnover tax by way of reference and consequently rule 3, having been prescribed under section 5(2)(a)(vi), also came to be considered under section 6B(2)(e). Even at the cost of repetition it may be worthwhile to quote section 6B(2)(e) as it stood prior to amendment, namely, "sales of goods which are generally exempt from tax under section 5(2)(a)(vi)". It is clear that the erstwhile section 6B(2)(e) never contemplated all sales of goods which were exempted under section 5(2)(a)(vi). It conceived of exemptions from turnover tax in respect of those sales of goods which were "generally exempt" under section 5(2)(a)(vi). Any construction which will render the word "generally" infructuous or meaningless, cannot be accepted because the Legislature is presumed to use every word in a statute with some meaning or significance. We have already seen in the foregoing paragraph 34 that rule 3(66) which is the sheet anchor of the applicants for claiming exemption from turnover tax under section 6B, does not generally exempt sales of goods. The exemption contemplated in rule 3(66) is conditional or dependent upon performance or fulfilment of certain specific conditions laid down therein. That being so, although rule 3(66) is a part of rule 3 which was prescribed under section 5(2)(a)(vi), it cannot be said to be contemplated by section 6B(2)(e) as "generally exempt". 37. Rule 3 comprised as many as 108 sub-rules till 31st May, 1987. Sales of goods under some of those sub-rules were generally exempt, as no condition was attached thereto. 37. Rule 3 comprised as many as 108 sub-rules till 31st May, 1987. Sales of goods under some of those sub-rules were generally exempt, as no condition was attached thereto. But other sub-rules, like rule 3(66) do not generally exempt such sales of goods because conditions have been attached thereto. In support of the contention that the impugned amendment of 1987 by which clause (e) of section 6B(2) was omitted was merely clarificatory or in the nature of a minor repair, the learned State Representatives pointed out that with effect from 1st June, 1987, by the same amendment Act, 44 items which originally found place in different sub-rules of rule 3, were transferred from rule 3 to Schedule I which contains the list of tax-free goods under section 6. Upon a reference to section 6B(2)(d) which exempts sales of goods declared tax-free under section 6, it will be clear that by transferring sales which were generally exempt, to Schedule I, the Legislature sought to clarify the position that the remaining items of this rule were not "generally exempt". Moreover, since such transfer of those 44 items from rule 3 to Schedule I was prospective in effect, the Legislature, it was pointed out by the learned State Representatives, inserted clause (4) in rule 3(2A) and declared that sales of goods in respect of the said 44 items up to 31st May, 1987, were to be exempted or deducted for the purpose of computation of turnover in relation to turnover tax under section 6B. This, in our view, affords a clear pointer to the legislative intent, indicating that the amendment by which clause (e) was deleted, and at the same time several items of rule 3 were transferred to Schedule I, was intended or meant to remove the controversy that might arise in interpreting erstwhile clause (e). The simultaneous deletion of clause (e) and incorporation of several items of rule 3 into Schedule I clearly suggest that rule 3 had earlier provided for exemption both in respect of generally exempt and conditionally exempt sales. Which is generally exempt and which is not, has been further clarified to remove any kind of confusion. Accordingly, we find that sales of goods contemplated by rule 3(66) are not generally exempt within the meaning of section 6B(2)(e). Which is generally exempt and which is not, has been further clarified to remove any kind of confusion. Accordingly, we find that sales of goods contemplated by rule 3(66) are not generally exempt within the meaning of section 6B(2)(e). It may be relevant to mention at this stage that section 6B(2)(g) which relates to "such other sales as may be prescribed", has no relation to rule 3 or rule 3(66). Rule 3(2A) is the rule which has been prescribed under section 6B(2)(g). There is no scope for controversy about it, because rule 3(2A) starts with the words "for the purpose of clause (g) of sub-section (2) of section 6B, the following sales are prescribed." 38. That being the position, during the period section 6B(2)(e) stood in the statute book namely, up to 31st May, 1987, the applicants did not enjoy any exemption from payment of turnover tax because of rule 3(66). The present applications under consideration, are themselves evidence of the fact that there was some confusion over the construction of section 6B(2)(e), vis-a-vis, rule 3(66). Therefore, we must uphold the contention of the respondents that the amendment by which clause (e) of section 6B(2) was omitted with effect from 1st June, 1987, was merely clarificatory in nature or was in the nature of a minor repair in order to remove the lacuna. 39. Learned Advocates, appearing for the different applicants, did not attack the amendment in so far as its prospective operation from 1st June, 1987, is concerned. The amendment was attacked as ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution in so far as its retrospective operation is concerned. No argument was advanced challenging the amendment as ultra vires article 19. It is settled law that if a Legislature is competent to enact a law falling within an entry in the respective legislative list of the Constitution, then it has plenary and unrestricted power including the power to legislative with retrospective operation subject only to the other provisions in the Constitution such as articles 14 and 19. As regards prospective operation of the amendment of 1987 which omitted section 6B(2)(e), we find that it was perfectly valid and no unconstitutionality has been brought to our notice. 40. As regards prospective operation of the amendment of 1987 which omitted section 6B(2)(e), we find that it was perfectly valid and no unconstitutionality has been brought to our notice. 40. The foundation of the argument on behalf of the applicants challenging the retrospectivity of the 1987 amendment deleting section 6B(2)(e) is that such deletion resulted in withdrawing the exemption from turnover tax under section 6B which was otherwise available as long as clause (e) was in the statute book. The argument of the learned Advocates on behalf of the applicants, has proceeded on the assumption that by refusing to grant exemption, as claimed, a new tax has in effect been introduced or imposed with retrospective operation. Reliance was placed by the applicants on a decision of the Supreme Court in D. Cawasji & Co. v. State of Mysore reported in [1985] 58 STC 1 (SC). It was held in that case that it may be open to the Legislature to impose a levy of tax at a higher rate with prospective operation, but levy of tax at a higher rate, amounting to imposition to tax, with retrospective operation has to be justified on proper and cogent grounds. Following the said decision, it was observed in the case of Ambae Picture Palace v. Entertainment Tax Officer reported in [1986] 162 ITR 772 (AP) that whenever the validity of a retrospective provision is considered, it should be found whether such provision defeats reasonable expectations of those who are affected by the statute. The retrospective operation must have to be justified on proper and cogent grounds. The applicants also cited the case of the State of Gujarat v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni AIR 1984 SC 161 in which it was held that the Legislature is undoubtedly competent to legislate with retrospective effect to take away or impair any vested right acquired under existing laws, but since the laws are made under a written constitution, neither prospective nor retrospective laws can be made so as to contravene the fundamental rights. The law must satisfy the requirements of the Constitution taking into account the rights of the parties as on today. Past virtue cannot be made to wipe out the present vice by making retrospective laws. 41. The respondents cited the decision in Basappa and Bros. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1971] 27 STC 241 (Mys) which is distinguishable on facts. Past virtue cannot be made to wipe out the present vice by making retrospective laws. 41. The respondents cited the decision in Basappa and Bros. v. Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [1971] 27 STC 241 (Mys) which is distinguishable on facts. In that case it was held that retrospective operation given by the impugned amendment did not constitute an unreasonable restriction on the freedom guaranteed by article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. In the present case the only challenge thrown against the retrospective operation of the impugned amendment is under article 14 of the Constitution. The respondents also cited the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income-tax v. National Taj Traders reported in [1980] 121 ITR 535. It does not really come in aid of the Revenue because it was held that all parts of sections have to be considered together so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute. Likewise, the respondents relied on the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. [1979] 43 STC 158. It was held in that case that Legislature which is competent to levy a tax prospectively is equally competent to levy the same retrospectively. In that particular case the court held that the amendment of the definition of "dealer" in the Haryana General Sales Tax Act was primarily to remove an ambiguity created in the statute by interpretation and to provide for the lacuna which had allowed taxable items to escape revenue levy. The retrospective operation in that case was held to be within the rule of small repairs and within the ambit of constitutionality. The respondents also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krishnamurthy and Co. [1973] 31 STC 190. In that case the Supreme Court held affirming the decision of the Madras High Court, that the language used by the Legislature in the impugned provision was found by the High Court to be inappropriate for levying tax for sale of non-lubricant mineral oils and the Amendment Act was passed to rectify and remove the defect in the language found by the High Court in the decision reported in [1968] 21 STC 227 (Mad.) (Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Madras). of India Ltd. v. State of Madras). In that case, however, retrospective operation was for a short period. 42. The respondents also relied on the decision in the case of Misrilal Jain AIR 1977 SC 1686 . It was held in that case that article 304(b) of the Constitution does not require that laws passed under it must always be prospective. 43. Upon a consideration of the decisions referred to above, we are of the view that the E.C. holders were not entitled to the benefit of deducting the sales under rule 3(66) for the purpose of computation of their turnover for turnover tax under section 6B, unless those sales related to the goods otherwise exempted under section 6B(2)(e). They were not enjoying any such benefit merely for the sake of Rule 3(66) from the inception of the provisions relating to turnover tax. The contention on behalf of the applicants that now they are unable to claim deductions from assessments under the Income-tax Act or that the returns were not filed in that manner, cannot by itself afford a sufficient ground for holding that sales under rule 3(66) were "generally exempt" or that omission of section 6B(2)(e) by amendment in 1987 was bad in so far as the amendment was given retrospective operation. We have already held that the amendment did not seek to impose any new tax but merely clarified the position that sales effected by E.C. holders did not come within the meaning of sales which are generally exempt. The benefit of exemption available to them was conditional. The amendment did not more than clarify the position. 44. We, therefore, hold that the Amendment Act of 1987 in so far as it deleted section 6B(2)(e) of the BFST Act, 1941, is a valid piece of legislation, both in respect of prospective operation and in respect of retrospective operation. The challenge under article 14 does not stand any scrutiny because there is nothing which imposes a fresh tax and nothing which can be called unreasonable within the meaning of article 14. 45. In view of the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in any of the applications. They are liable to fail and hereby dismissed. The challenge under article 14 does not stand any scrutiny because there is nothing which imposes a fresh tax and nothing which can be called unreasonable within the meaning of article 14. 45. In view of the foregoing reasons, we do not find any merit in any of the applications. They are liable to fail and hereby dismissed. The amounts deposited by some of the applicants under protest and such amounts as have been deposited by way of security, should be adjusted against the demand for turnover tax and we direct accordingly. 46. We make no order as to costs. P. C. BANERJI (Technical Member). - I agree. L. N. RAY (Judicial Member). - I agree. Applications dismissed.