M. B. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) BEING aggrieved and dissatisfied by the judgment and decree dated 23/01/1990 by the District Judge Surendranagar is Regular Civil Appeal No 107 of 1986 the appellants original defendants have filed this second appeal. ( 2 ) THE respondent (plaintiff) had filed Regular Civil Suit No 75 of 1984 before the Civil Judge (J D ) Surendranagar against the appellants for recovering the possession of the suit premises which consist of one room admeasuring 15 X 13 situated at Joravarnagar. It was contended by the plaintiff that deceased Jamnadas Chaturbhai was a tenant of the said premises He had expired on 21/02/1953 without leaving any near relatives on the death of the tenant the appellant (defendants) trespassed upon the said premises and took possession of it That suit was dismissed by the learned Judge by holding that the defendants were near relatives of the deceased Jamnadas and they were residing with him to three months prior to his death and therefore they would be tenants of the suit premises Against that judgment and decree the respondent preferred the afore- said appeal before the District Judge Surendranagar who arrived at the conclusion that the case of the defendants that they have derived their tenancy rights under Sac 5 (11) (c) of the Bombay Rent Act after the death of deceased tenant Jamnadas cannot be believed because they were not residing with the deceased tenant prior to three months of his death. The learned Judge considered the fact that the say of the defendants that they resided with the deceased Jamnadas is totally false and baseless in view of the evidence which he has discussed in his judge ment He therefore allowed the appeal and decreed the plaintiffs suit ( 3 ) MR. Bavishi learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants vehemently submitted that the defendants should be considered as family members of deceased Jamnadas For this purpose he has relied upon the following pedigree which is gives in the appeal memo : @@@ bogha Naran Gokal Chatur Ranchhod Jamnadas -- (Deceased Orig. tenant) Khemchand Natvarlal Madhuben Rajendra Lalit (Defts. Nos. Bavishi learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants vehemently submitted that the defendants should be considered as family members of deceased Jamnadas For this purpose he has relied upon the following pedigree which is gives in the appeal memo : @@@ bogha Naran Gokal Chatur Ranchhod Jamnadas -- (Deceased Orig. tenant) Khemchand Natvarlal Madhuben Rajendra Lalit (Defts. Nos. 1 to 3 respectively) According to his submission as the defendants are nephews of the deceased they should be considered as family members of the deceased and therefore they are protected under Sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act @@@ ( 4 ) IN my view this submission cannot be accepted Section 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act stipulates the case of the death of the tenant in whose favour statutory tenancy would be transmitted. It does not provide that the statutory tenancy would be inherited by the heirs of the deceased but protection of the Rent Act is granted to a person who is member of the tenants family and is residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months immediately proceeding the death of the tenant. This would be clear from sec. This would be clear from sec. 5 (11) (c) of the Rent Act which roads as under ( 5 ) IN this Act unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context- xx xx xx xx (11) tenant means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includesxx xx xx xx (C) (1) In relation to premises let for residence ary member of the tenants family residing with the tenant at the time of of within three months immediately preceding the death of the tenant as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court and (11) in relation to premises let for business trade or storage any member of the tenants family carrying on business trade or storage with the tenant In the said premises at the time of the death of the tenant as may continue after his death to carry on the business trade or storage as the case may be in the said premises and as may be decided in default of agreement by the Court (underlines added)FROM this Section it is apparent that in relation to premises let for residence any member of the tenants family residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months immediately preceding the death of the tenants would be the tenant of the premises of winch the deceased was the tenant. Therefore for becoming a tenant under Sec. 5 a person must satisfy two criteria (i) he must be member of the tenants family and (ii) he should be residing with the tenant at the time of or within three months immediately preceding the death of the tenant. The aforesaid Section nowhere provides that the heirs of the deceased would be tenants as per the provisions of the Personal Law applicable to the deceased tenant. ( 6 ) THEREFORE the first question in this case would be whether the appellants are family members of the deceased tenant Jamnadas. It is an admitted fact that the appellants are distant relatives of the deceased Jamnadas as per the pedigree mentioned in the previous paragraph. Even if broader meaning to the word family is given by no stretch of imagination it can be said that persons who are related to the deceased by fourth or fifth degree will be members of his family. Even if broader meaning to the word family is given by no stretch of imagination it can be said that persons who are related to the deceased by fourth or fifth degree will be members of his family. The present appellants are not the descendants of the deceased. ( 7 ) HOWEVER Mr. Bavishi the learned Advocate for the appellants vehemently relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Baldev Sahai v. R. C. Bhasin AIR 1982 SC 1091 and submitted that the word family should be gives wider meaning so as to Include any person descending from the common ancestor In my view no such law is laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case In that case the Court considered the question whether mother and brother who were left behind by the tenant who shifted permanently to Canada followed by his wife and children could be evicted on the ground that neither the tenant for any member of his family has been residing in the premises for the period of six months immediately before the date of the filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof se provided under Sec. 14 (1) (d) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 The Court held that the word family has to be given not a restricted but a wider meaning so as to include not only the head oft the family but all members or descendants from the common ancestors who are actually living with the same head The term family must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include nest relations of the head of the family The relevant discussion is as under20 If this was the intention of the legislature then clause (d) of Sec. 14 (1) of the Act could not be interpreted in a manner so as to defeat the very object of the Act. It is well settled that a beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed to as to advance the object of the Act and curing any lacuna or defect appearing in the same There are abundant authorities to show that the term family must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the bead of the family. It is well settled that a beneficial provision must be meaningfully construed to as to advance the object of the Act and curing any lacuna or defect appearing in the same There are abundant authorities to show that the term family must always be liberally and broadly construed so as to include near relations of the bead of the family. 21 In Hiralal v. Banarasi Dass 1979 (1) Rent L R 466 (Delhi) even the learned Judge who decided that case had observed at page 472 that the term members of the family on the facts and circumstances of the case should not be given a narrow construction. 22 In Govind Dass v. Kuldip Singh AIR 1971 Del 151 a Division Bench of Delhi High Court consisting of H. R. Khanna C. J. (as be term was) and Prakash Narain J while recognising the necessity of giving a wide interpretation to the word family observed as follows (at p. 153): i hold that in the section now under consideration the word family Includes brothers end sisters of the deceased living with her at the time of her death. I think that that meaning is required by the ordinary acceptation of the word in this connection and that the legislature has used the word family to introduce a flexible and wide term23 Mrs. G. V. Shukla v. Shri Prabhu Ram Sukhram Dass Ojha (1963) 65 Pun. LR 56 Mahajan J (as he then was) observed as fellows: therefore it must be held that the word family is capable of wider interpretation but that interpretation must have solution to the existing facts and circumstances proved on the record in each case. 24 Even as fat back as 1930 Weight J. In Price v. Gould (1930) 143 LT 333 (a Kings Bench decision) bed clearly held that the word family included brothers and sisters ard in this connection observed as follows: i find as a fact that the brothers and sisters were residing with the deceased at the time of her death It has been laid down that the Primary meaning of the word family is children but that primary meaning is clearly susceptible of wider interpretation because the cases decide that the exact scope of the ward must depend the context and the other provisions of the will or deed in view of the surrounding circumstances. Thus in know v. Teed (1870-23 LT 303. LR 9 Eg 622) it was held that the word family could be extended beyond not merely children between beyond the statutory next of kin. It is true that in the said decision the Court has held that a conspectus of the connotation of the term family which emerges from reference to the dictionaries clearly shows that the word family has to be given not a restricted but a wider meaning so as to include not only the head of the family but all members or descendants from the common ancestors who aro actually living with the same head From this Mr. Bavishi submitted that as the appellants are descendants from tie common ancestors therefore the appellants would be the family members of the deceased Jamnadas In my view this contention cannot be accepted Merely because the word common ancestors is used in the said judgment it would not mean that distant nephews or cousins should be considered as family members By spending Sec. 5 (11) (c) the Legislature stepped in and provided a special mode of succession to the tenancy rights or lease hold rights to the extent of irremovability from possession to these who were in need of it but has limited it to the members of the tenants family Normally family includes parents spouse brothers sisters sons or daughters or in some cases widow of a pre-deceased son or the issues of the pre-deceased sons but by no stretch of imagination it can be held that the distant nephews would be the family members howsoever broad meaning is given to the word family Hence the contention of the learned Advocate for the appellants cannot be accepted that the appellants are the family members of the deceased Jamnadas who was a tenant of the suit room ( 8 ) FURTHER in this case the appellate Court after considering the entire evidence has arrived at the conclusion that the appellants wore not residing with the tenant at the time of or within throe months immediately preceding the death of the tenant This finding cannot be said to be in any way illegal which calls for interference in second appeal The learned Judge has discussed the entire oral evidence for arriving at the said conclusion and the said reasons are not required to be reiterated in this second appeal ( 9 ) IN this view of the matter there is no substance in this second appeal and it it dismissed ( 10 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellants submitted that two months time be giver for vacating the promises It is ordered that the decree shall not be executed upto 21/04/1990 appeal dismissed summarily. .