JUDGEMENT The petitioner's appeal against the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Wai, has been dismissed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Satara on 23rd August 1988. Aggrieved by that order this revision application has been filed in this court. 2. The petitioner is a driver by profession and was at the material time i.e. on 5th August 1486 at about 1-15 p.m. proceeding towards Bangalore by Pune Bangalore Highway. The prosecution alleged that he suddenly applied breaks as a result of which the bus which he was driving turned turtle i.e. it faced exact opposite direction and dashed against an electric pole. As a result of this some of the passengers were injured. A report was lodged at the police station by the conductor of the bus and after investigating into the same, a chargesheet came to be filed. The learned Magistrate tried the petitioner in a summary trial No. 538 of 1986 on the charges u/Ss. 279, 337 and 338 of the I.P.C. and S.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 3. Before the learned Magistrate one of the passengers Shri Deshpande was examined in addition to one Baburao. The statement of the accused u/S.313, Cr. P.C. was duly recorded and after considering the material that was placed before him, which included the panchanama of the scene of offence, the learned Magistrate convicted the petitioner as stated above and sentenced him to imprisonment for a period of two months u/Ss. 279, 337 and 338, I.P.C. and imposed a fine of Rs. 1000 and u/S.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act directed him to pay a fine of Rs.100. 4. The learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner and the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor have been heard by me in this matter. 5. On behalf of the petitioner it was urged by Mr. Bandiwadekar that there was no material before the learned Magistrate who recorded the order of conviction. According to him it was a case of sheer accident or at the most slight error of judgment on the part of the driver of the vehicle. He submits that there was no evidence about rashness and negligence on the part of the S.T. bus driver. According to him it was a case of sheer accident or at the most slight error of judgment on the part of the driver of the vehicle. He submits that there was no evidence about rashness and negligence on the part of the S.T. bus driver. As against this the learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the evidence which has been led before the court was good enough to conclude that the driver of the S.T. Bus was rash and negligent. 6. The passenger Shri Deshpande during the course of his evidence stated that the bus was proceeding at a normal speed, there was light showering at about 1 a.m. at night. A truck with full lights came from the opposite side and the driver of the S.T. bus i.e. accused-appellant-petitioner, applied breaks immediately and it is at that time the S.T. bus turned to right side and dashed on the electric pole. It thereafter took a complete turn in the reverse direction. He further stated that because of this his nephew and some other passengers received minor injuries. During the course of cross-examination it has been elicited that the vehicle from the opposite direction was travelling along the middle of the road. He has further admitted that it was correct that it being midnight passengers were resting beyond these two statements in the cross-examination nothing more has been elicited from this lone eye witness to the incident. It was alleged on behalf of the petitioner that there was no fault on the part of the driver inasmuch as the vehicle coming in the opposite direction was coming with full head light and was being driven along the middle of the road. He submits that therefore there was no option for the driver but to apply breaks and since there was light showering the vehicle slipped. It is worth noting what the accused petitioner had to state in his examination u/ S. 313 of the Cr. P.C. He states that the evidence was false when he was specifically asked about the evidence given by the eye witness. Lastly he states that there was light showering and suddenly one truck came from the opposite side and he suddenly applied breaks and therefore the S. T . Bus slipped and turned in opposite direction and the truck went away. Lastly he states that there was light showering and suddenly one truck came from the opposite side and he suddenly applied breaks and therefore the S. T . Bus slipped and turned in opposite direction and the truck went away. It is therefore evident that it is the case of application of breaks, no matter the reasons for the application of breaks that the bus turned and dashed against the electric pole and turned in the reverse direction. Justification for application of the breaks is to my mind really absent. It is common knowledge that the driver of the vehicle should know that if there is light shower and the road is wet it became slippery and sudden application of breaks is bound to make the vehicle skid. Passenger loaded bus was the one which he was driving. Therefore in my opinion it is this action on the part of the driver of the vehicle that must be considered. 7. It is to be noted that the panchanama Exhibit 10 which has been duly admitted by the petitioner's counsel in the court below shows that the road was straight at the material point of accident. The road was north-south. The width of the tar road was about 23 feet. At the western side of the tar road there was another newly constructed tar road of about 10 feet in width. At the eastern side, there was a kachha road of 9 feet. It is, therefore, not the width of the road or the truck being driven along the middle of the road that has compelled the driver of the bus to apply the breaks suddenly. So far as the head lights are concerned, it is seen that a truck with full speed was coming from opposite direction and he should have noticed its lights from sufficient distance. Besides this as is evident that the vehicle being driven at a low speed and that being so, it would have been possible for him to control the vehicle and stop in even at the spot. In my opinion it is application of the breaks that has been responsible for the skidding of the vehicle. This is described by the learned counsel for the petitioner as an error of judgment. In my opinion it is a case of negligence in that behalf and not mere error of judgment. In my opinion it is application of the breaks that has been responsible for the skidding of the vehicle. This is described by the learned counsel for the petitioner as an error of judgment. In my opinion it is a case of negligence in that behalf and not mere error of judgment. Both the courts below have accepted the evidence of Shri Deshpande and other material i.e. panchanama and sketch and have come to the conclusion that there was rashness and negligence on the part of the driver. I would, however, say that it was not a case of rashness but surely of negligence and squarely covered by the provisions of Ss.279 and 337 of the I.P.C. 8. I may mention here that the learned Magistrate has convicted the petitioner u/S. 338 of I. P. C. but there is no evidence of any grievous hurt being caused to any one as a result of the act of the petitioner. In that event conviction u/S. 338, I.P.C. will have to be set aside. I would therefore uphold the conviction u/Ss. 279 and 337 of I.P.C. and S. 116 of the Motor Vehicles Act. So far as the sentence is concerned the learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this was his first offence. Considering the age, character and antecedents of the present petitioner, the learned Magistrate should have given him the benefit u/S.360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. He submits that it was obligatory upon the learned Magistrate to record reasons for not giving that benefit to the petitioner. In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of this court reported in 1984 Mah LJ 472 Constancio Figueiro of Guirim Bardez. Goa v. State. The submission that in every case coming before the Court, a report of the Probation Officer should he called for, does not find support in this ruling. If the case is attracted by S.360 Cr. P.C., then alone it is necessary for the Judge to assign reasons for not invoking the provisions of S.360, Cr. P.C. For attracting the provisions of S. 360, Cr. P.C., the Court has to find out whether having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the accused should be given the benefit of that provision. P.C. For attracting the provisions of S. 360, Cr. P.C., the Court has to find out whether having regard to the age, character or antecedents of the offender and to the circumstances in which the offence was committed, the accused should be given the benefit of that provision. The Court has to act under it and if the Court wants to depart from it and not inclined to give this benefit, then it has to assign reasons. But if the Court is of the view, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the circumstances under which the offence has been committed, that the provisions of S.360, Cr. P.C. could not be resorted to, then the Court is not to assign reasons u/S.361, Cr. P.C. 9. In this case, both the Courts below have come to the conclusion that having regard to the gravity of the offence, the provisions of S. 360 are not attracted and I do not think sitting in revision I should take a different view. 10. However, so far as the substantive sentences imposed upon the petitioner are concerned, I have no hesitation in confirming that part of the order. It has been stated by the learned counsel that the petitioner has a long span of service of about 19 years and this was his first accident which he had the misfortune to meet with. He is 46 years of age as has been described in the petition. He has regular employment in the S.T. and has a family to maintain. According to the learned counsel's calculation the petitioner has already undergone imprisonment from 6th September 1988 to 13th September 1988. He has paid the fine imposed in the lower court. In the circumstances while maintaining the conviction u/ Ss.279 and 337 of the I.P.C. and u/S.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, I direct that the sentence undergone from 6-9-1988 to 13-9-1988 is sufficient to meet the ends of justice. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. Bail Bond to stand cancelled. Order accordingly.