KA. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision Petition is preferred against the order dated 21-2-1987 passed by the learned I Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore in M. A. No. 258/1986. That appeal is preferred against the order dated 5-11-1986 passed by the Tahsildar, Bangalore north Taluk, Bangalore in HOA Nos. 1 and 2/1986-87. ( 2 ) THE learned I Additional City Civil Judge has held that the appeal preferred by the 1st respondent against the aforesaid order of the Tahsildar is maintainable and has accordingly directed the appeal to be heard on merits. ( 3 ) THE learned Single Judge has referred the Civil Revision Petition to a Division Bench on the ground that in the facts and circumstances of the case and as the appeal m. A. No. 258/1986 arises out of the proceeding instituted or initiated pursuant to the order of the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 3543/1986, its effect and if necessary even its correctness may have to be examined. Therefore, learned Single judge has thought it fit to refer the case to a Division Bench under Section 9 of the karnataka High Court Act, 1961. ( 4 ) THE one and the only question that arises for consideration is as to whether the appeal M. A. No. 258/1986 preferred under Section 3 (2) of the Karnataka Village offices Abolition Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') against the order passed by the Tahsildar, Bangalore North Taluk in Case Nos. KOA 1 and 2/1988-89 regularising his transaction of sale dated 11-3-1970 alienating the land bearing Survey no. 62 of Sane Guruvanahalli Village, Yeshwanthapur Hobli, Bangalore North taluk, measuring 1 acre 21 guntas, is maintainable. ( 5 ) THE Court below has held that the appeal is maintainable. On going through the order of the learned trial Court, it is not possible to state that the learned trial judge has come, to a particular conclusion and has held on a particular ground the appeal is maintainable. He has only referred to the contentions urged on both sides and has ultimately held that the appeal is maintainable under Section 3 (2) of the Act. Therefore, we do not gel any assistance from the order of the learned trial Judge in deciding the point raised for determination. He has only referred to the contentions urged on both sides and has ultimately held that the appeal is maintainable under Section 3 (2) of the Act. Therefore, we do not gel any assistance from the order of the learned trial Judge in deciding the point raised for determination. ( 6 ) THE facts necessary for the purpose of deciding the aforesaid point arc as follows: the land in question bearing Survey No. 62 of Sane Guruvanahalli, is governed by the provisions of the Act. The land in question and also land bearing Survey No. 55 measuring 3 acres 36 guntas of the same village have been alienated in favour of the petitioner by the husband of respondent-2. Sri Narasaiah, Sri Narasimha Murthy the husband of the second respondent and Sri S. K. Lakshminarasappa were the brothers being the sons of Narasaiah who died in the year 1975. Narasimha Murthy died in the year 1971. The lands bearing Survey Nos. 62 and 55 of Sane guruvanahalli being the lands appurtenant to the village office, belonged to the ancestors of Narasaiah, Narasimha Murthy and S. K. Lakshmi Narasappa. Narasimha murthy was discharging the functions of the village office on the date of coming into force of the Act. He alienated the aforesaid two lands on 11-3-1970 in favour of the petitioner Sri B. Rudraiah. After the coining into force of the Act, there were proceedings for regrant of the lands in question. The Act abolished village offices and vested the lands in the State Government and also permitted for the regrant of the lands to the holders of the village offices and other persons enumerated in the Act. Sri Prahlada Rao son of Narasaiah, Sri Narasimha Murthy and Sri S. K. Lakshmi narasappa applied for regrant of the lands in question. We need not refer to the details of the proceedings because those details are stated in the order of the tahsildar. There was a regranl of the aforesaid lands under Section 5 of the act made jointly in favour of Prahlada Rao, Narasimha Murthy and S. K. Lakshminarasappa. But that proceeding was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Assistant commissioner. Thereafter, power of the Assistant Commissioner was transferred to the Tahsildar. Therefore, on remand, the Tahsildar again considered the matter. But that proceeding was set aside and the matter was remitted to the Assistant commissioner. Thereafter, power of the Assistant Commissioner was transferred to the Tahsildar. Therefore, on remand, the Tahsildar again considered the matter. By that time, Narasimha Murthy was no more and therefore Smt. Kittamma was brought on record as the widow of Narasimha Murthy. After the remand also, the Tahsildar made regrant jointly in the name of Prahalada Rao, Smt. Kittamma and Lakshmi narasappa. Being aggrieved by the order regranting the lands jointly, Smt. Kittamma preferred an appeal before the City Civil Court under Section 3 (2) of the Act. That appeal also was dismissed. There was a Writ Petition No. 20197 of 1984 filed before this Court which was subsequently converted as C. R. P. No. 309/1985. This Court also confirmed the order of the City Civil Court and dismissed the Civil Revision petition. Aggrieved by the order of this Court, there was a Special Leave Petition filed by Smt. Kittamma before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed. Thus, the proceeding initialed under Section 5 for rcgrant of the aforesaid lands has ended in regranting jointly in favour of Prahalada Rao, Smt. Kittamma and Sri S. K. Lakshmi Narasappa and the same has become final. ( 7 ) THE Revision Petitioner being the alienee of the lands, sought for regularisation of the same in the light of the Division Bench decision of this Court in Lakshmana gowda v State of Karnalaka and Others, 1981 (1) Kar. L. J. P. 1. Without considering that application there was an order of eviction passed by the Tahsildar. Therefore, the revision Petitioner challenged the order of eviction before this Court in Writ Petition no. 3543/1986. Respondents-1 to 3 herein, though originally were not parties to the writ Petition, but subsequently they came to be impleaded and Writ Petition was disposed of on the following terms:"the case of the petitioner is that he has purchased the lands in question bearing Sy. Nos. 62 and 55 of Sane Guruvanaballi Village, Ycshwanthapur hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, under a registered sale deed, on 11-3-1970. These lands arc governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. The further case of the petitioner is that on the abolition of the village offices, the lands have also been regranled. Nos. 62 and 55 of Sane Guruvanaballi Village, Ycshwanthapur hobli, Bangalore North Taluk, under a registered sale deed, on 11-3-1970. These lands arc governed by the Karnataka Village Offices Abolition Act, 1961. The further case of the petitioner is that on the abolition of the village offices, the lands have also been regranled. The further case of the petitioner is that having regard to the Judgment of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda v State of Karnalaka and. Others reported in 1981 (1) Kar. L. J. 1, the transaction of sale is entitled to be regularised on receiving 15 limes the assessment of the lands in question. If that be so, it is open to the petitioner to make an appropriate application before the 4th respondent who shall decide the same in accordance with law and take steps to make necessary entries in the Record of Rights pursuant to the decision within 3 months from the date of filing. "thus, this Court quashed the order of eviction and directed the Tahsildar to consider the request of the petitioner for regularisation of the sale and also permitted rcspondents-1 to 3 herein to raise all such contentions which were available to them and the tahsildar to consider the same. ( 8 ) THE contention of respondents-1 and 3 was that as Narasimha Murthy had only one-third share in the lands, he could not convey title by way of alienation to larger share than what he had in the lands. Therefore, Sri B. Rudraiah, the alienee could claim only one-third share and could have the sale transaction regularised only in respect of one-third share. This Court in Writ Petition No. 3543/1986 did not decide this question and it was left open to be decided by the Tahsildar. 8. 2. After the Writ Petition was decided, the Tahsildar by the order in question dated 5th November, 1984, has sanctioned the sale. In other words, regularised the sale deed dated 11-3-1970 in so far as Survey No. 62 of Sane Guruvanahalli measuring 1 acre 21 guntas. Aggrieved by that, respondent-3 has preferred appeal in the city Civil Court under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The learned I Additional City Civil judge by order dated 21 st February, 1987 has held that the appeal is maintainable. Aggrieved by that, respondent-3 has preferred appeal in the city Civil Court under Section 3 (2) of the Act. The learned I Additional City Civil judge by order dated 21 st February, 1987 has held that the appeal is maintainable. ( 9 ) IT is contended by Sri H. R. Venkataramaiah, learned counsel for the 3rd respondent that regularisation of the transaction of sale falls under Section 3 (1) (c) or (d) of the Act, therefore, the appeal under Section 3 (2) of the Act is maintainable. ( 10 ) EVENOTHERWISE, it is contended that as this is a case in which litigation has been going on for more than two decades and as the matter is before a Division bench, all the questions arising in the proceeding may be considered, because all the parties concerned are before the Court in order to put an end to the litigation, and keeping this in view, the case has been referred by the learned Single Judge to a division Bench. ( 11 ) AS far as the first contention is concerned, it is not possible to accept. It is relevant to notice that the alienation in question took place after the coming in to force of the Act and before the coming into force of Karnataka Act No. 13/1978. As to what would be the right of such alienee has been considered by the Division bench of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda v State of Karnataka, 1981 (1) Kar. LJ. 1. Relevant portion of the Judgment is as follows:-"65. We have already held that though the holder or the authorised holder of a service Inam Land got title to such land only when it was actually regranted to him under Section 5 or 6 of the Principal Act, such title related back to the date of coming into force of thai Act. From this, it would follow that if he purported to alienate such land before it was regranted to him, but after the Principal Act came into force, the doctrine of feeding the grant by estoppel embodied in Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act, would apply and the title he subsequently acquired on such rrgrant of that land, would enure to the benefit of his alienee who would get a good title to such land after such regrant to his alienor. There is also no good reason why the benefit of Section 43 should be denied to such alienee when the Principal Act did not prohibit the holder or the authorised holder of a Service Inam Land from transferring his interest or right therein after it was resumed and before it was regranted to him. "66. Hence, our answer to the question is that if the holder or the authorised holder of a Service Inam Land had alienated it after the Principal Act came into force and before it was regranted to him under Section 5 or 6 of the Principal Act, the alienee acquired a title to that land after such regrant to his alienor. xxx xxx xxx. 76. Original sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Principal Act provided, inter alia that a Service Inam Land regranted under sub-section (1) of that Section was not transferable without the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner and that such sanction should be granted only on payment of an amount equal to 15 times the amount of full assessment of the land. The position was the same in regard to lands regranted under Section 6 of the Principal Act. As to what is the consequence of a transfer of a land regranted under Section 5 or 6 of the Principal act without obtaining the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, was the subject of considerable debate. The learned Advocate General contended that such transfer was void because the condition precedent for such transfer, namely, obtaining the previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner, had not been satisfied. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the requirement of such previous sanction was not mandatory but was only directory, that a transfer made in contravention of such requirement, was not void and that on payment of 15 times the full assessment, the defect due to not obtaining such previous sanction, would be cured. 77. To decide which of the above rival contentions should be accepted, we have to examine the object of original sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the principal Act. Once village offices were abolish, lands attached thereto ceased to be emoluments of such offices. No public policy was involved, in our opinion, in prohibiting transfer of such lands after abolition of village offices. Once village offices were abolish, lands attached thereto ceased to be emoluments of such offices. No public policy was involved, in our opinion, in prohibiting transfer of such lands after abolition of village offices. Under original sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Principal Act, the Deputy Commissioner had no option but to grant such previous sanction to the regrantee of a land under section 5 or 6 of that Act, if he had paid an amount equal to 15 times the full assessment of the land. The provisions in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of that Act envisaged conferment of title to Service Inam Lands upon regrantees, i. e. , holders, authorised holders or unauthorised holders at concessional prices if they wanted to retain those lands for themselves without the right to alienate them and at higher prices if such regrantees desired to have those lands together with the right to alienate them. Thus, in imposing a restriction on alienation of lands by the grantees under the said provisions, the legislature did not intend to prohibit totally regrantees from alienating the rcgranted lands. The only object of sub-section (3) of Section 5 of that Act, which was made applicable to subsequent alienations by all types of. regrantees, was to collect higher prices for the lands regranted if the regrantees wanted to have the right of alienating such lands. Hence the omission to obtain the previous sanction of the Deputy commissioner under original sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Principal Act did not, in our opinion, render void a transfer of a land regranted under Section 5, or 6 or 7 of the Principal Act prior to 7-8-1978, but such transfer can be regularised by paying to the Government an amount equal to 15 times of full assessment of that land. " ( 12 ) SUB-SECTION (3) of Section 5 of the Act, as it stood prior to Karnataka Act 13/1978 did provide for alienation of the lands regranted on obtaining previous sanction of the Deputy Commissioner on payment of the amount equivalent to 15 times the full assessment of the land. The Karnataka Act 13/1978 drastically amended subsection (3) of Section 5 of the Act. The Karnataka Act 13/1978 drastically amended subsection (3) of Section 5 of the Act. Sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as amended by Karnataka Act 13 of 1978 prohibits transfer of the regranted land otherwise than by partition among the members of the Hindu Joint family, for a period of 15 years from the commencement of Karnataka Act 13 of 1978. But in this case, we are not concerned with the position emerging after the coming into force of the karnataka Act 13/1978 because the alienation in question had taken place prior to the coming into force of the Karnataka Act 13/1978 and after the coming into force of the Act. The position of the sale of land governed by the Act, effected before the coming into force of the Karnataka Act 13/1978 is considered in Lakshmana gowda's case. Therefore, in the light of the decision in Lakshmana Gowda's case, this Court while deciding W. P. No. 3543/1986, after referring to the decision in lakshmana Gowda's case, directed the Tahsildar to consider the request for regulation of the transaction of sale dated 11-3-1970. Thus what is stated above makes it clear that the order of regularisation or in other words, order according sanction for the sale of regranted land is the one which falls under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as it stood prior to coming into force of the Karnataka Act 13/1978. If that be so, it does not fall under Section 3 (1) of the Act. Consequently, it follows that the appeal filed under Section 3 (2) of the Act, cannot be held as maintainable. The question as to whether the Revision Petitioner was an authorised holder or an unauthorised holder did not arise. The question was only as to whether having regard to the sale deed executed by Narasimha Murthy alienating the aforesaid two lands after the coming into force of the Act and before the coming into force of the Karnataka Act 13/1978 was entitled to be regularised under sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act as it stood on the date of sale and on the date of rcgrant. ( 13 ) THE next question does not really arise in view of the conclusion reached by us. However, learned counsel for respondent-3 has seriously pursuaded the contention. Therefore, we consider it necessary to consider that question also. ( 13 ) THE next question does not really arise in view of the conclusion reached by us. However, learned counsel for respondent-3 has seriously pursuaded the contention. Therefore, we consider it necessary to consider that question also. Now, while referring the matter to a Division Bench, learned Single Judge has stated the reasons as follows :-". . . . . . ON a careful perusal of the said Lakshmana Gowda's case referred to in the said decision, it discloses that the transaction of sale is entitled to be regularised on receiving 15 times the assessment of the lands in question and it is not clear from the said decision that an application is contemplated to be filed before the Tahsildar. 4. In the circumstances, as the appeal in M. A, No. 258 of 1986 arises out ofproceeding pursuant to an order made by this Court in W. P. No. 3543 of 1986, its effect and if necessary even its correctness may have to be examined. 5. IN that view of the matter, 1 think it is appropriate that this matter should bereferred to a Division Bench under Section 8 of the Karnataka High Court Act. "during the course of the argument, Sri H. R. Venkataramaiah, learned counsel for the third respondent made it clear that this Court in Writ Petition No. 3543 of 1986 did not decide the contentions of the parlies and it only directed the Tahsildar to consider all the contentions of the parties while considering the request of the petitioner for regularisation of the sale in the light of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmana Gowda's case. Further, this is a Revision Petition filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against an order passed by the lower Court in an appeal preferred before it. In such a proceeding, even if it is referred to a Division bench, it is not open to a Division Bench to go into the correctness of the order passed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution even if it is passed by a learned Single Judge. In such a proceeding, even if it is referred to a Division bench, it is not open to a Division Bench to go into the correctness of the order passed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution even if it is passed by a learned Single Judge. The order passed under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution can be corrected either in an appeal preferred against that order or in a Review Petition preferred against the very order or by a superior Court and not in a subsequent proceeding coming under a different jurisdiction. Therefore, even if it is one of the reasons given in the order of reference, it does not extend the scope of the case that is referred to a Division Bench. The case that is referred to a Division Bench is a revision Petition preferred against an order passed by the lower Court holding that the appeal preferred under Section 3 (2) of the Act is maintainable. Therefore, the contention that the correctness of the order passed in Writ Petition No. 3543 of 1986 is also required to be gone into, cannot be accepted. ( 14 ) THE last contention is that as the litigation is going on between the parties for the last two decades, in order to put an end to the litigation, the Division Bench may exercise all the inherent powers and decide all the controversies between the parties and put an end to the litigation, It is also not possible to accept this contention and hold that a mere fact that the case is being considered by a Division Bench and all the parties are before the Court will not enable the Court to consider all other controversies between the parties which do not really arise in the instant Civil revision Petition. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be exercised by clutching at the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that in this proceeding, this Court can go into the question as to whether the regularisation of the sale made in respect of the entire land is valid in law. The inherent jurisdiction of the Court cannot be exercised by clutching at the jurisdiction. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that in this proceeding, this Court can go into the question as to whether the regularisation of the sale made in respect of the entire land is valid in law. The proper remedy open to the petitioner is to challenge the order of the Tahsildar under Articles 226 and 227 of the constitution as the order is the one passed under Section 5 (3) of the Act as it stood before the coming into force of Karnataka Act 13/1978. For the reasons stated above, this Revision Petition is allowed. The order dated 21st February, 1987 passed by the I Additional City Civil Judge, Bangalore in M. A. No. 258/1986 is set aside. The appeal M. A. No. 258/1986 filed before the trial Court is dismissed as not maintainable. It is made clear that this order shall not be construed as coming in the way of respondent-3 to challenge to correctness of the order passed by the Tahsildar in HOA nos. 1 and 2 of 1986-87 dated 5-11-1986 by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The contentions of both sides having a bearing on the merits of the order of the Tahsildar are left open. --- *** --- .