JUDGMENT - M.S. DESHPANDE, J.:---By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the petitioner, challenges the order dated 2nd March, 1981 discharging him from his employment without payment of compensation under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and seeks reinstatement with backwages. 2. The petitioner was appointed on 22nd August, 1966 as a Clerk with the State Bank of India. He was charge sheeted on 23rd April, 1979, the charges being that he had is collusion with a borrower induced the Manager of Digras Branch of the State Bank of India to grant advances to various relations and servants of that borrower and for these advances, the borrower Shri Rathod was the guarantor, the object of the petitioner being to advance the interests of the said Shri Rathod. The second charge was that he had accepted gratification from various borrowers for arranging to have their loans sanctioned. The petitioner filed his reply on April 30, 1979 and the Enquiry Officer made a report after holding the enquiry that the charges were partly established. A notice to show cause why the petitioner's services should not be terminated was issued on 7th January, 1980 and after considering the petitioner's reply dated 4th February, 1980, an order came to be passed on 2nd of March, 1981 by the respondent No. 2 Regional Manager, State Bank of India, Region VII, Nagpur. The order was to the effect that the charges against the petitioner had been proved and on account of the gravity of misconduct a decision was taken to dismiss the petitioner from the Bank's service, but, after considering the petitioner's age and for giving him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself in life, a lenient view was taken and so he was discharged from the bank's employment with effect from the date of receipt of the letter. He was to be paid one month's salary and allowances in lieu of notice. The petitioner appealed to the respondent No. 1 who by the order dated 22nd September, 1981, dismissed the appeal. The petitioner challenged these orders on various grounds. He was to be paid one month's salary and allowances in lieu of notice. The petitioner appealed to the respondent No. 1 who by the order dated 22nd September, 1981, dismissed the appeal. The petitioner challenged these orders on various grounds. However, by an amendment ground No. XI came to be incorporated in the petition and this ground alone is being pressed to the exclusion of all the other grounds raised in the petition, the contention briefly being that an order of discharge made in pursuance of clause 10(c) of para 521 of Sastry Award does not amount to a discliplinary action and would therefore come within the purview of "retrenchment" as defined in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and it was therefore obligatory on the respondents to pay compensation as contemplated by section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. It was urged that since this was not done, the action taken against the petitioner was illegal and he was entitled to be reinstated with full backwages. 3. The learned counsel for the respondents did not dispute that action as contemplated under para 521 of the Sastry Award was taken, but he contended that in view of the amendment in the definition of "retrenchment" in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, by incorporating a new clause (bb) the position is that the termination of the service of the workmen as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, would be excluded form the definition of `retrenchment' and therefore, the termination would be valid. It was also urged that this amendment was declaratory of the law as it stood earlier and would be retrospective in its operation and therefore, the petitioner would not be entitled to any relief. 4. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the amendment incorporated by clause (bb) in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act was remedial in nature and would operate only prospectively and since the amendment came to be incorporated w.e.f. 18-8-1984, it would not apply to the termination effected prior to the amendment. 5. 4. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that the amendment incorporated by clause (bb) in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act was remedial in nature and would operate only prospectively and since the amendment came to be incorporated w.e.f. 18-8-1984, it would not apply to the termination effected prior to the amendment. 5. But for the position of law as arising from the amendment incorporated by inserting clause (bb) in section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the present controversy would be governed by the ratio of the Division Bench decision in (Workmen of State Bank of India, Gadchiroli Branch v. Presiding Officer Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2 and another)1, 1990 Mh.L.J. 516 : 1990(1) Bom. C.R. 650, to which one of us (Ghodeswar, J.) was a party. Sub-para (c) of clause (10) of para 521 of Sastry Award provides as follows: "(c) In awarding punishment by way of disciplinary action, the authority concerned shall take into account the gravity of the misconduct, the previous record, if any, of the employee and any other aggravating or extenuating circumstances that may exist. Where sufficiently extenuating circumstances exist, the misconduct may be condoned and in case such misconduct is of the "gross type he may be merely discharged, with or without notice or on payment of a month's pay and allowances, in lieu of notice. Such discharge may also be given where the evidence is found to be insufficient to sustain the charge and where the Bank does not, for some reason or other, think it expedient to retain the employee is question may longer in service. Discharge is such cases shall not be deemed to amount to disciplinary action." This Court took the view in that case that under sub-para (c) of clause 10 of para 521, such discharge shall not amount to disciplinary action against the delinquent employee and in this contingency, the misconduct as provided by para 521 shall stand condoned. After giving the expression "condoned" its proper meaning, it was observed that the discharge of the employee under these provisions would not be by way of punishment and the discharged employee would be entitled to the protection of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act and is the event of its intraction, he would be entitled to reinstatement as well as backwages. 6. 6. Shri Modak, the learned Counsel for the respondent contended that the position arising from the amendment of clause (oo) of section 2 of the Industrial Dispute Act was not considered by this Court in that case and since in his submission, the amendment was merely declaratory in nature, would have retrospective operation and if the discharge was in pursuance of the terms of the contract or settlement under the Sastry Award, that discharge would not amount to retrenchment. 7. The meaning to be given to the term "retrenchment" was considered in several decisions of the Supreme Court, the last one being II SVLR (L) 298 (The Punjab Land Development Reclamation Corporation Ltd. Chandigarh v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Chandigarh)2, where it was observed as follows: "When we analyse the mental process in drafting the definition of "retrenchment" in section 2(oo) of the Act we find that firstly it is to mean the termination by the employer of the service of a workmen for any reason whatsoever. Having said so the Parliament proceeded to limit it by excluding certain types of termination namely, termination as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The other types of termination excluded were (a) voluntary retirement of a workman, or (b) Retirement of the workmen of reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workmen concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf or (c) termination of service of a workman on the ground of continued ill health. Had the Parliament envisaged only the 2/3 question of excluding (a), (b), (c) above. Had the Parliament envisaged only the 2/3 question of excluding (a), (b), (c) above. The same mental process was evident when section (oo) was amended inserting another exclusion of clause (bb) by the amending Act 49 of 1984, with effect from 18-8-1984 "termination of the service of workmen as a result of non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workmen concerned on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein." At page 336 of the report, the Supreme Court has observed : The definition has used the word "when a statute says that a word or phrase shall "mean" note merely that it shall "include" certain things or acts," the definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition" (Per Esher, M.R., Gough v. Gough (1891) 2 QB 665). A definition is an explicit statement of the full connotation of a term". At page 342, the Court lays down after considering the reasonings, principles and precedents to the definition in section 2(oo) of the Act that "retrenchment" means that termination of the employer of the service of workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. 8. At one stage, Shri Modak urged that the three categories (a), (b) and (c) which orginally stood, were only illustrative of the exceptions, but it is difficult to accept this submission because the sweep of the language of the main provision which excluded only three categories and the three categories cannot therefore be regarded as illustrative. They could be the only three categories which would be expected from or omitted from the expression "retrenchment". 9. Reference was made to (1975) II L.L.J. 352, (Rustam and Hornsby (i) Ltd. v. T.B. Kadam)3, where the Supreme Court was considering section 24 introduced by the amendment which came into force on the 1st of December 1965. It was introduced by Act 18 of 1957 which came into force on 1st of December 1965 by which dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or otherwise termination of an individual workman came to be deemed to be an industrial dispute. It was introduced by Act 18 of 1957 which came into force on 1st of December 1965 by which dismissal, discharge, retrenchment or otherwise termination of an individual workman came to be deemed to be an industrial dispute. The considerations which weighed for holding that section 2-A operated retrospectively were that on the day on which reference came to be made in that case, an industrial dispute as defined under section 2-A did exist; that normally the dispute regarding an individual workman was not an industrial dispute unless it was sponsored by the Union to which he belonged or a group of workmen; that all that section 2-A had done was that by legislative action such a dispute was deemed to be an industrial dispute even where it was not sponsored by a labour union or a group of workmen; that by two earlier decisions, it was established that the test for the validity of a reference under section 10 was whether there was in existence a dispute on the day the reference was made and there was no question of giving retrospective effect to the Act, and also that the definition could as well have been made part of clause (k) of section 2 instead of being put in as a separate section. In that decision, reference was also made to the observations in (Chemicals and Fibres of India Ltd. v. D.G. Bhoir)4, (1975) II L.L.J. 169. It is in this context that the content of the provision sought to be brought in by introducing section 2-A would have to be considered in contradistinction of the amendment sought to be introduced by incorporating clause (bb) to section 2(oo). Section 2-A provided that : "Where any employer discharges, dismissed, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment of termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workmen nor any union of workman is a partly to the dispute." The Supreme Court observed that the amendment made no distinction as to when the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment of termination was brought about and full effect had to be given to the deeming provisions. No such words which would have justified giving retrospective operation to clause (bb) are to be found and having regard to the observations of the Supreme Court in (1990) II SVLR (L) 272, it is apparent that all other categories except those covered by clauses (a), (b) and (c) had been included in the definition of "retrenchment". 10 Reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents on the aims and objects of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1984, and it was urged that the Amending Act sought to amend the Act of 1947 mainly to clarify certain doubts expressed by courts on the validity of certain provisions of that Act, and in order to provide that the various sections of the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1982 can be notified for enforcement separately and with effect from different dates, the amendment is also made to section 1(2) of that Act. The objects and reasons do not refer to the decisions which created doubts about the validity of the provisions and identify the provisions regarding which the doubts had to be clarified. With respect to the amendment to section 2, it was only stated that section was being amended to-exclude from the definition of "retrenchment" termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment on its expiry and of the termination of such contract in accordance with the provisions contained therein. Even this part of the objects and reasons did not mention that the exclusion which was to be brought about by clause (bb) was to be made retrospective as was mentioned in the objects and reasons of the Act which introduced section 2-A in the Industrial Disputes Act. The object and reasons for the amending Act therefore, would not lend any assistance for inferring that clause (bb) was to operate retrospectively. 11. Reference was made to A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 12, (The Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen etc.)5. The observations in para 12 however do not support the contention of Shri Modak because the Court observed : ".... 11. Reference was made to A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 12, (The Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen etc.)5. The observations in para 12 however do not support the contention of Shri Modak because the Court observed : ".... The statement of objects and reasons is not admissible, however for construing the section for less can it control the actual words used." The following passage from Craies on Statute Law, Fifth Edition, pages 56 and 57 were quoted there with approval : "For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to be set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such as Act contains a preamble, and also the word "declared" as well as the word "enacted". A remedial Act, on the contrary, is not necessarily retrospective; it may either enlarging for restraining and it takes effect prospectively, unless it has retrospective effect by express terms or necessary intendment." In that case, the Supreme Court has held that sub-section (1) of section 10 of the Banking Companies Act, 1949 did not purport to explain any former law or declare what the law has always been and it was an ordinary remedial piece of legislation. In order to support his submission that the Act was not declaratory and therefore, retrospective Shri Manohar relied on the observations in (M/s. Utkal Contractors Joinery (P) Ltd. and others v. State of Orissa)6, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2310 to the effect that the validity of the statutory notification cannot be judged merely on the basis of statements of objects and reasons accompanying the Bill. Nor it could be tested by the Government Policy taken from time to time. The executive policy of the Government, or the statement of objects and reasons of the Act or Ordinance cannot control the actual words used in the legislation, while reiterating the statement of the law in this respect in the Central Bank of India v. Their Workmen, etc, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 12, (Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd, Baroda v. R.V. Krishnarao)7, 1989 Lab. I.C. 1914. I.C. 1914. We must notice that until the clause (bb) was introduced by the Amending Act of 1984, the interpretation placed on the term "retrenchment" by the Courts was holding the field for several decades and continues to hold the field in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in (1990) II SVLR (L) 272 which was decided on 15th May, 1990, that `retrenchment' means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. Once the categories covered by clause (bb) are found to have excluded from the definition of "retrenchment" until it was inserted by the amending clause (bb) in the face of the judicial interpretation, for several decades, it is difficult to hold, in the absence of express words in the Amending Act or the amended provision that the amendment was only declaratory in nature. Such an inference would not follow even by necessary implication. We are supported in the view that we are taking by a Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court in (Arunkumar v. Union of India)8, 1986 Lab.I.C. 251 and the decision in Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., Baroda v. R.V. Krishnarao, 1989 Lab.I.C. 1914. In the latter, it was observed that such a substantive provision imposing additional restriction on the meaning of the term "retrenchment" cannot be construed to be retrospective by necessary intendment. It being purely a remedial measure and seeking to displace series of decisions of the Supreme Court on the point must be held to be prospective in nature and will apply to only these terminations which take place after this provision was brought on the statute book. A learned Single Judge of this Court in (Dilip Hanumantrao Shirke v. Zilla Parishad, Yavatmal)9, 1989 Mh.L.J. 794 pointed out that sub-clause (bb) in addition to the three already existing, takes out a class of employment from the definition of "retrenchment" and that class is where the termination of service is on account of non-renewal of a service contract between the workmen and the employer or where contractual employment comes to an end on the basis of stipulating contained therein. In the learned Judge's view, the exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been enjoying earlier to the amendment. In the learned Judge's view, the exception as contained in sub-clause (bb) will have to be strictly construed as it takes away certain rights of workmen which such workmen have been enjoying earlier to the amendment. We respectfully agree with the view taken in these decisions and we find it impossible to hold that clause (bb) inserted by Act 49 of 1984 is either declaratory in nature or retrospective in its operation. The petitioner's case would therefore fall squarely within the ratio of the decision in 1990 Mh.L.J. 516, Workmen of State Bank of India, Garhchiroli Branch v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 2, and another and we must hold that since the provisions of section 32-F of the industrial Disputes Act were not complied with while discharging the petitioner, the termination came within the meaning of the term "retrenchment" under section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act. 12. Shri Modak for the respondents contended that if we were to hold that the termination of the petitioner was illegal and inoperative we may instead of reinstating the petitioner, grant compensation because of the observations of the respondents at the conclusion of the enquiry that he was guilty of mis-conduct. We may point out that the authorities themselves acting under Para 521 of the Sastry Award had condoned the alleged mis-conduct. Shri Modak referred us to the law as laid down in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 111, (O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Ltd.)10. This decision was considered in A.I.R.. 1988 S.C. 286 (M.K. Agrawal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank)11, and the Court observed that it is well settled that the Court can in appropriate case decline reinstatement and the principle is not in doubt but its application in a given case would require the balancing of diverse and confliction interests and claims. No circumstances have been stated in the return filed by the respondents which would justify our refusing to grant reinstatement. The petitioner was working only as a Clerk in the establishment of the respondents and was not entrusted with any managerial functions not held at job of very high responsibility. No circumstances have been stated in the return filed by the respondents which would justify our refusing to grant reinstatement. The petitioner was working only as a Clerk in the establishment of the respondents and was not entrusted with any managerial functions not held at job of very high responsibility. In M.K. Agrawals's case, the allegations against his were quite serious of acts of bad faith including that he was not disbursing from the loans granted to the gramin borrowers the full sanctioned amounts, but was helping himself to some portions of it and that he had refused to accept the second set of keys of the cash chest from another official who was in custody of the keys and who was not attending the Bank that day, as a result of which the cash could not be opened on a working day. The normal rule in the absence of circumstances which would show that the petitioner had disentitled himself from claiming reinstatement, would be to grant reinstatement. Having regard to the nature of the duties, the petitioner has to perform we find that he can be entrusted with such duties for which he may be found suitable. The petitioner gave his age in the petition as 35 years and is still young. By now, he would have put in about 24 year of service and it would be difficult, though not impossible, for him to get suitable employment at this stage. We, find that the respondents are not right in asking that the petitioner should not be reinstated. 13. With regard to the backwages, we must take note of the position that though the respondents did not act upon the finding that the petitioner was guilty mis-conduct, in view of the respondents, the mis-conduct proved was sufficient to warrant his discharge though the petitioner had questioned the grounds on which this conclusion was reached. Having regard to all these factors, we direct that the petitioner be reinstated with half backwages from the date of his termination until reinstatement, with continuity of service. Rule made absolute in these terms. The parties will bear their own costs. Rule made absolute. -----