JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwal, J. - There is a group of petitions filed by a number of employees and officers of the State of Uttar Pradesh challenging the orders of termination passed by the State Government prematurely terminating their re-appointments made for different fixed periods by the State Government under Reg. 520 of the Civil Service Regulations. 2. In Writ Petition No. 24586 of 1989, Smt. Kumud Lata Singh v. State of U.P., and in Writ Petition No. 24661 of 1989, Shiva Dutt Mishra v. The State of U.P., counter and rejoinder affidavits have already been exchanged and, as such, the learned counsel for the petitioners in these two cases and the learned counsel for the petitioners in other petitions agreed that these two petitions be treated as the leading cases wherein all the relevant facts have already come on the record. The parties further agreed that since counter affidavits have already been filed by the State Government in these two petitions and the matter is of urgency, the petitions he disposed of finally at this stage. Consequently, we have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners in these petitions and other connected petitions as well as the learned counsel on behalf of the State Government. 3. In order to examine the questions involved in the present petitions, it is necessary to state facts in relation to both the leading petitioners, which have given rise to the question of law involved in the present petitions. 4. Writ No. 24580 of 1981) has been filed by Smt. Kumud Lata Singh. On 30th November. 1989. she retired as Additional director of Education (Women) on attaining the age of superannuation. On 30th November, 1989, the State Government, in exercise of the powers conferred upon it under Regulation 521) of the civil Service Regulations (hereinafter referred to as the Regulations) passed an order re-employing the petitioner for a period of one year on the aforesaid post. One of the terms of the re-appointment was that the services of the petitioner can he terminated by the State Government at any time without notice. 5. The petitioner took over charge in pursuance of her re-appointment on the post of the Additional director of Education ( Women). On 14th December, 1989, an order was issued by the State Government terminating the re-employment of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to hand over charge. 5. The petitioner took over charge in pursuance of her re-appointment on the post of the Additional director of Education ( Women). On 14th December, 1989, an order was issued by the State Government terminating the re-employment of the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to hand over charge. It is this order dated 14th December. 1989. terminating the petitioner's re-employment, which has been challenged by means of the present writ petition. 6. The case of the petitioner, as set up in the petitions, is that the termination order. which has been passed against her is politically motivated. She was re-employed by the State Government when the Congress was in power and the termination order has been passed immediately after the formation of the Janta Dal Government on 5th December, 1989. In effect, the case of the petitioner is that the order of termination passed against her was not at all due to any public interest, but the sole consideration for passing the termination order was political and, as such, the main challenge of the petitioner is that the order in question is purely arbitrary. 7. Writ 24661 of 1989 has been filed by Shiva Dutt Mishra. Shiva Dutt Mishra is it Class I officer in the Transport Department of the State holding the post of a Deputy Transport Commissioner. The petitioner attained the age of 58 years on 2nd October, 1988, and was working, at that time. as Secretary. Slate Transport Authority. Initially, the petitioner was granted one year's re- employment under Regulation 520 of the Regulations. He took overcharge on the post of Secretary, State Transport Authority. with effect from 3rd December. 1988. in view of the re-employment made by the State Government. In the petition. it has been slated that by an order dated 31st October, 1989. the State Government further granted re- employment to the petitioner for a further period of one year from 3rd December. 1989, to 2nd December, I'$)0. This order has been attached as Annexure 4' to the writ petition. In this order, it was specifically provided that the re-employment can he terminated at any time without notice. This re-employment was made on the post of Secretary, Stale Transport Authority. 1989, to 2nd December, I'$)0. This order has been attached as Annexure 4' to the writ petition. In this order, it was specifically provided that the re-employment can he terminated at any time without notice. This re-employment was made on the post of Secretary, Stale Transport Authority. On 7th December, 1989, the Secretary to the Chief Minister issued a letter to all the Principal Secretaries/Secretaries to the various departments requiring them to send it report in regard to all the persons re- employed and who were working in the said departments. It was been thereafter asserted that on 12th December, 1989, an order has been passed by the State Government terminating the petitioner's services. It is this order of the Government. which has been impugned in the present writ petition. In this petition also, it has been challenged that the order of termination is wholly arbitrary and is politically motivated. The challenge to the impugned order is on similar grounds which have been made in the petition filed by Smt. Kumud Lata Singh. 8. The main argument made on behalf of the petitioners in this group of petitions are as under : 1. The order of re-employment having been passed individually in respect of each petitioner under Reg. 520 of the Regulations, the termination orders could not have been passed by one executive fiat. The contention is that each case should have been individually considered and then alone, orders of termination could have been passed. 2. The re-employment having been made under Reg. 520 of the Regulations on public grounds, the termination orders also could only he made on public grounds and not otherwise. 3. The orders of termination are politically motivated and arbitrary. The policy of the State Government is wholly unreasonable and unsustainable in law. 4. The orders of re-employment could not he terminated at will unless there was a cause for the said termination. 5. Even if there was it policy of the State Government to terminate the re-employments made by the State Government, the State policy could only he given effect to prospectively and not retrospectively. 9. 4. The orders of re-employment could not he terminated at will unless there was a cause for the said termination. 5. Even if there was it policy of the State Government to terminate the re-employments made by the State Government, the State policy could only he given effect to prospectively and not retrospectively. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State Government have, however, urged that the termination orders terminating the re-employments have been passed in pursuance of it policy decision taken by the State Government that all re-employments be terminated: the only exception having been made in respect of those cases which are covered by the Government Orders dated 61h May, 1982, and 20th July, 1983, which are in respect of teachers to whom National and State awards have been given or where the officers are entrusted with duties which cannot he abandoned midway. It has been further urged that a policy decision has also been taken to the effect that no further extension or re-employment should he granted to Government servants who have attained the age of superannuation. It is urged that this Government policy has been taken in public interest as the extension and re-employment adversely affected the promotion of the officers and employees who are in regular service. This caused stagnancy in the regular cadre and, consequently, disgruntlement and decline of intention to work. In effect, the submission is that the Government policy has been adopted in public interest and in the interest of administration. It is further urged that this Government Policy is not politically motivated, as urged, and that the re- employments have been terminated in accordance with the conditions on which the re-employments had been granted and in terms of the provisions of the U. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules, 1975. 10. In order to consider various submissions made by the parties it is necessary to quote Reg. 520 of the Civil Service Regulations : "An officer who is in receipt of a superannuation or retiring person shall not be re-employed or continue to he employed in service paid from general revenues or from a local fund, except on public grounds. 10. In order to consider various submissions made by the parties it is necessary to quote Reg. 520 of the Civil Service Regulations : "An officer who is in receipt of a superannuation or retiring person shall not be re-employed or continue to he employed in service paid from general revenues or from a local fund, except on public grounds. Sanction to re-employment or extension of the terms of employment may he given as follows : (i) By the Government of India in the Administrative Department concerned, when the pensioner served before retirement in a Gazetted appointment directly under the Government of India or belonged to an Imperial Service or Imperial Branch of any Service, or was an officer who, before, retirement, held a post usually filled by officers of an Imperial Service or Branch: (ii) In other cases, by the State Government under whose administration the pensioner is re-employed: (iii) By any authority subordinate to a State Government to whom the State Government may delegate its powers under this article in respect of pensioners re-employed in establishments under the control of such authority. 11. Under the above Regulation an officer who is in receipt of superannuation or retiring person is not entitled to be re-employed or continued to be employed except on public grounds. This regulation in fact creates a prohibition for re-employment of a superannuated officer except on public grounds. The re-employment to be made under these regulations is not as a matter of course. On a reading of these regulations it is apparent that the powers have to be exercised when public interest so demands. All the petitioners of these petitions and the other group of petitioners who are before us have been re-employed under the above Regulation. This Regulation does not provide as to how the services of an officer who was re-employed can be terminated before expiry of the period for which he has been re- employed. 12 In the writ petition filed by Snit. Kumud Lata Singh a supplementary counter affidavit of P.N. Srivastava who is Under Secretary in the State Government posted in the Education Department has been filed on behalf of the State Government. In this supplementary counter affidavit it has been stated that it was in pursuance of a policy decision of the State Government that re-employment of the petitioners have been terminated. In this supplementary counter affidavit it has been stated that it was in pursuance of a policy decision of the State Government that re-employment of the petitioners have been terminated. In paragraph 4 of this supplementary counter affidavit it has been specifically averred in regard to this Government policy and it has been further stated therein that only exceptions have been made in respect of those cases which are governed by the Government Orders dated 6th May, 1982 and 26th July, 1983 which are in respect of teachers to whom National and State Awards have been given or where the officers are entrusted with duties which cannot be abandoned midway. In paragraph 6 of the petition it has been specifically denied that this Government Policy is politically motivated or is mala fide taken with the object to undo the acts of the previous Government which was in power till 29th November, 1989. In paragraphs 6 and 7 to 11 of this supplementary counter affidavit details have been given which led to the formation of the Government policy to terminate the officers who have been re- employed and whom extension of service had been granted. These facts have been given to show that in fact this question was under consideration even while the previous Government was in power but ultimately the decision has been taken by the present Government in power. It has been specifically stated that the process for re-considering the question of re-employment and extension commenced in the month of August, 1989 in view of a news item appearing in Indian Express news-paper, of 14th July, 1989. On 7th August, 1989 the Personnel Department, of the State prepared a report giving detailed reasons as to why it was not desirable to grant re-employment and extensions. This note dated 7th August, 1989 refers to the earlier Government orders dated 25th October, 1980 and 22nd July, 1987 which dis-approved the re-employment and extension of services and it was further stated that the grant of re- employment and extension was in the interest of administration as it caused dis-satisfaction amongst the officers and employees who were still in their tenure of service. The extension and re-employment adversely affected the promotion of the officers and employees who were in regular service and this caused stagnancy in the regular cadre and consequently disgruntlement and decline of intention to work. The extension and re-employment adversely affected the promotion of the officers and employees who were in regular service and this caused stagnancy in the regular cadre and consequently disgruntlement and decline of intention to work. Mention was also made that this also increased financial burden and adversely affects the appropriate cadre management. 13. This note dated 7th August, 1989 was duly processed at different levels of the Government and ultimately it was also placed before the Chief Minister. The Secretary to the Chief Minister sent back the file along with the note dated 15th September, 1989 to the Personnel Department asking Personnel Department to make a detailed reference to the Government orders and relevant provisions so that the matter may be considered by the Cabinet of Ministers in the State. 14. In pursuance of the direction issued by the Secretary to Chief Minister another detailed note was prepared in September, 1989. The matter could not be placed before the Cabinet as general elections were notified on 23rd October, 1989 and since the matter pertined to the policy of the Government it was not considered by the then Cabinet of Ministers. It has been further stated in paragraph 10 of the supplementary counter affidavit that this matter was placed before the Cabinet after formation of 'Janta Dal' Government on 11th Dec., 1989. On this date the Cabinet accepted the proposal of the Personnel Department and took a policy decision that all the cases of re-employment and extension of services of the State Government employees be brought to an end and that as a matter of policy no further extension or re-employment should be granted. In paragraph 11 it has been specifically stated that the policy decision which has been taken by the Government is based on the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of the State, it is a well considered decision and is in the interest of the Administration. 15. It is, therefore, clear on record that, in fact termination of re-employment of all the petitioners in these two leading petitions as well petitioners in other group of petitions was taken on the basis of the Government policy which was approved by the Cabinet on 11th December, 1989. 15. It is, therefore, clear on record that, in fact termination of re-employment of all the petitioners in these two leading petitions as well petitioners in other group of petitions was taken on the basis of the Government policy which was approved by the Cabinet on 11th December, 1989. It is pertinent to note here that after the policy decision was taken by the State Government, the Chief Secretary of the State on 14th December, 1989 issued a circular that those officers who have been re-employed their services shall be terminated in public interest in view of the policy decision taken by the State Government. 16. In State of Assam v. Premadhar Baruah, AIR 1970 SC 1314 : 11970 Lab IC 1067) Hon'ble Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the effect of Fundamental Rule 56(a) which enables the Government to retain the Government servant in service after he attains the age of superannuation. Fundamental Rule 56(a) for the sake of convenience is quoted below : "56(a) - Except as otherwise provided in other clauses of this rule, the date of compulsory retirement of a Government servant other than a Government servant in inferior service is the date on which he attains the age of 58 years. He may be retained in service after the date of compulsory retirement with the sanction of the Government on public grounds, which must he recorded in writing, but he must not be retained after the age of 60 years except in very special circumstances." 17. This rule is pari materia with Regulation 520 of the Civil Service Regulations. This rule relates to extension of service while Regulation 520 deals with the re-employment after superannuation. In both the rules extension or re-employment is granted after superannuation on public grounds. 18. In the above case Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically held that retention of Government servant in service after he attains the age of superannuation does not create any right in the Government servant to continue in service after the age of superannuation. The Government could retain Government servant beyond the age of superannuation. The Government has also discretion to withdrawn such retention in service because retention does not confer any right on the Government servant (emphasis supplied) - In this case consequently Hon'hle Supreme Court laid down a clear dictum that the mere fact that a person has been retained viz. The Government could retain Government servant beyond the age of superannuation. The Government has also discretion to withdrawn such retention in service because retention does not confer any right on the Government servant (emphasis supplied) - In this case consequently Hon'hle Supreme Court laid down a clear dictum that the mere fact that a person has been retained viz. by extension of service or by re-employment after superannuation does not confer any right on the Government servant and it is at the discretion of the Government to withdraw such retention. This principle has been approved recently by the Supreme Court in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Jag Mohan Lal, AIR 1989 SC 75 ) : (1989 Lab IC 1134). It has been observed as follows (Para 8) : "It seems to us that the High Court has misconstrued the legal right claimed by the respondent. The right to get extension of service beyond the age of superannuation has received consideration of this Court in several cases. In State of Assam v. Basanta Kumar Das, (1973) 3 SCR 158 ; AIR 1973 SC 1252 : (1973 Lab IC 920) after reviewing almost all the earlier decisions Kailash Chandra v. Union of India, (1962) I SCR 374 : AIR 1961 SC 1346 ; B.N. Mishra v. State, (1965) 1 SCR 693 : AIR 1965 SC 1567 ; and State of Assam v. Premadhar, (1971) 1 SCR 503 : AIR 1970 SC 1314 : (1970 Lab IC 1967), this Court said (at p. 165) (of SCR); (at p. 1256 of AIR) : at p. 924 of Lab IC). "A Government servant has no right to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation and if he is retained beyond that age, it is only in exercise of the discretion of the Government xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx the fact that certain persons were found fit to be continued in service does not mean that others who were not so found fit had been discriminated amongst. Otherwise the whole idea of continuing only efficient people in service even after they had completed 55 years becomes only meaningless." 19. Otherwise the whole idea of continuing only efficient people in service even after they had completed 55 years becomes only meaningless." 19. In Manager Government, Branch Press v. D. S. Billiappa, AIR 1979 SC 429 : (1979 Lab IC 146) the question came up for consideration as to whether one of the terms of the contract embodied in the letter of appointment that the services were temporary and were liable to he terminated at the will and pleasure of the appointing authority without reason and without notice, was valid or not. While considering this provision the Supreme Court took the view that in spite of this term the services of an employee can only he terminated for a reason otherwise the action of the employer was liable to be held as arbitrary. In effect, the decision was that the termination simpliciter in terms of the employment can be made only for a reason that is for a cause. 20. In Ajai Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Schravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487 Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) speaking for the Court opined that "where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14, and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment". 21. In view of this decision if the termination of employment is made without any reason or cause it would be held to be arbitrary and consequently violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 22. Learned counsel for the petitioners has cited a single Judge decision of this Court delivered by Hon'hle Satish Chandra, J. (as he then was) in S.P. Agarwal v. State of U.P., 1970 All LJ 351 wherein the question arose as to whether an order of termination can be passed without any reason and arbitrarily in the case of panel lawyer appointed by the Government for a fixed tenure. In this case Hoh'ble Satish Chandra, J. took a view while considering the scope and effect of Article 16 of the Constitution of India that if in a particular case Government acts contrary to its own rules then it would he incumbent upon the Government to show that the order of termination was passed on some good reason and was not arbitrary else it would be held to be discriminatory. We respectfully agree with this view. 23. In view of the above discussion we are consequently of the opinion that even if under the terms of the employment the employer can terminate the services of an employee before the expiry of the period for which he was appointed then too this provision has to be for a reason or a cause otherwise the action of the Government would he clearly arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. 24. In the light of the above position of law we have to examine the facts of the present case as stated above. The case of the State Government is that the termination orders have been passed because of it policy decision taken by the State Government on 11th December, 1989. The learned counsel for the petitioners have challenged this policy decision as being heinu mala fide and politically motivated. 25. In Col. A. S. Sangwan v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 1545 : (1981 Lab IC 831) the scope of Article 73 of the Constitution of India which gives the extent of the executive powers to the Union was considered by the Supreme Court, Similar powers of the State Government are contained in Article 162 of the Constitution of India, and it was observed by Hon'ble Krishna Iyer, J. as he then was) as follows that p. 1546 of AIR) : "The executive power of the Union of India, when it is not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide and pursuant to its power it can make executive policy of Defence, courts should he cautious although courts are not powerless. The Union of India having framed a policy relieved itself of the charge of acting capriciously or arbitrarily or in response to any ulterior considerations so long as it pursued it consistent policy. Probably the principles of equality which interdicts arbitrariness prompted the Central Government to formulate its policy in 1964. The Union of India having framed a policy relieved itself of the charge of acting capriciously or arbitrarily or in response to any ulterior considerations so long as it pursued it consistent policy. Probably the principles of equality which interdicts arbitrariness prompted the Central Government to formulate its policy in 1964. A policy was formulated is not good for ever; it is perfectly with in the competence of the Union of India to change it, rechange it, adjust it and readjust it according to the compulsions of circumstances and imperatives of national considerations. We cannot, as Court, give directives as to how the Defence Ministry should function except to state that the obligation not to act arbitrarily and to treat employees equally is binding on the Union of India because it functions under the Constitution and not over it." 26. In a very recent case of Supreme Court Hon'ble Sahyasachi Mukherji. J. delivering the judgment for the Court in M/s. Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Post of Bombay, AIR 1989 SC 1642 has held that if a Government policy or action even in contractual matters fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness it would be unconstitutional. He has relied upon two earlier decisions of the Court in Kashturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1980 SC 1992 and R.D. Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628 . It has been further opined by Hon'ble Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. as follows in the above case (at p. 1650 of AIR) : "Learned Addl. Solicitor General is right, in our opinion, in that we cannot really substitute a decision reached by a fair procedure keeping the policy of the respondent in mind by a different decision only on the ground that the decision which appeals to the court is a better one. Reliance was placed on the observations of Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 1 WLR 1155. In our opinion it is necessary to remember that judicial review in the words of Lord Brightman in that case, is not concerned with the decision making process. As observed by Prof. Dias in 'jurisprudence' (5th Edn. In our opinion it is necessary to remember that judicial review in the words of Lord Brightman in that case, is not concerned with the decision making process. As observed by Prof. Dias in 'jurisprudence' (5th Edn. at p.91) unless the restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court would under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, he itself guilty of usurping power which does not belong to it. It is, therefore, necessary to bear in mind the ways and means by which the court can control. In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the observations of Lord Justice " Templement in re Preston v. I.R.C., (1985) 2 WLR 836 and the observations of Lord Justice May in Regina v. Chief Constable of the Merseyside Police, (1986) 2 WLR 144 . It is not within the preview of it court to substitute a decision taken by a constituted authority simply because the decision sought.to he substituted is it better one. Learned Addl. Solicitor General, in our opinion, is therefore right in contending that the appellant should not he allowed to contend that the decision of the Bombay Port Trust to allot the plot to the major holder is not one of the feasible means of achieving the objective of development. It was not open to the appellant to contend that the Bombay Port Trust could have framed a better policy in a way in which both the goals, development and non-eviction of existing tenants could have been achieved." 27. In view of the above decisions, therefore, what we have to examine is as to whether Government policy satisfies the test of reasonableness or not. It is not possible for this Court to substitute its decision simply because the Court is of the opinion that some other policy would have been the better one. In the instant case as we have already stated the facts in detail which clearly establishes that the Government policy is clearly in the interest of administration. This exercise of power of re-employment and extension was being utilised in a manner which was adversely affecting the promotions of the officers and causing stagnency in the regular cadre and it was creating disgruntlement and decline of intention to work by officers and employees of the Government. This exercise of power of re-employment and extension was being utilised in a manner which was adversely affecting the promotions of the officers and causing stagnency in the regular cadre and it was creating disgruntlement and decline of intention to work by officers and employees of the Government. A policy decision taken in the interest of administration cannot be said to be arbitrary or unreasonable. The question whether such a policy should be adopted or not was under consideration of the Government since the year 1980. The first Government order was issued on 25th October, 1980 which was also against granting re-employment and extension of service. This was reiterated by the Government order dated 22nd July, 1987 and ultimately it was on a consideration of these Government orders :hat the Cabinet took decision on 11th December, 1989. In the circumstances, it could not be possibly said that the policy decision taken by the Government was politically motivated or was in any way mala fide taken with the only aim to terminate the services of those persons re-employed by the previous Government. The fact that a policy decision has been taken also to the effect hat re-employment and extension of service hall not be granted in future shows the policy decision is neither arbitrary nor mala fide. According to the Government policy the present Government also will not re-employ give extension as a matter of course. In our opinion, consequently it cannot be said hat the policy decision of the Government terminate the services of the persons who ere re-employed after superannuation is unreasonable or arbitrary. The mere fact that a Government servant has been re-employed in service does not confer any right on the Government servant when the reemployment is made after superannuation. The termination orders passed for a reason and cause against the petitioners in these petitions and in regard to the petitioners in the group of petitions cannot, therefore, be said to be invalid in law. 28. In Dr. D. C. Saxena v. State of Haryana, (1987) 3 SCC 251 : (1987 Lab IC 1018), similar question arose whether the services of the Chairman of Haryana Board of School Education could be terminated before the expiry of the period for which he was appointed. 28. In Dr. D. C. Saxena v. State of Haryana, (1987) 3 SCC 251 : (1987 Lab IC 1018), similar question arose whether the services of the Chairman of Haryana Board of School Education could be terminated before the expiry of the period for which he was appointed. In that case there was a specific term in the contract of service that the services of the Chairman can he terminated at any time by the Government. The Hon'ble Supreme Court after examining the facts of that case took a view that the termination of the Chairman was as a result of the policy decision taken by the Government to bring a new class of Chairmen in the different boards of the State. The principle laid down in this case fully applies to the facts of the present case also. In the instant case also the services of the re-employed persons have been terminated in terms of the conditions of their employment due to the policy decision taken by the Government that is for a cause. 29. In the light of the above decision we will consider each of the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. So far as the first contention is concerned in our opinion this does not have any substance. The termination order in the instance case was not made arbitrarily by one executive fiat. It was made on the basis of the policy decision taken by the State Government which we have held to be valid. Under para 520 of the Regulation re-employment is made on public grounds. If a re-employment is made on public ground it can also be terminated on public grounds. The State Government took a policy decision to terminate the re-employments in public interest and consequently it cannot be said that the termination orders were invalid. No rule or regulation has been pointed out to us to show that it was necessary that each case should have been individually considered and then alone termination order could be passed. In our opinion, this submission does not have substance in a case where the termination order has been passed on the basis of a policy decision taken by the State Government. The petitioners did not have any right to be retained in service. It was entirely at the discretion of the Government to terminate their services for a reason that is for a cause. The petitioners did not have any right to be retained in service. It was entirely at the discretion of the Government to terminate their services for a reason that is for a cause. 30. In connection with this submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners particular reference has been made to a case of Madhav Rao Scindia v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 . Reliance has been placed on para 50 of the judgment in which it has been observed while construing Article 366(22) that however, wide that power, it does not extend to withdrawing recognition of all the Rulers by a mid night order. 31. It was on the basis of this observation of the Hon'ble- Supreme Court that the arguments have been made that all the termination orders could not be passed by one executive fiat. In our opinion this argument is wholly misconceived. The Hon'ble Supreme Court had made the above observations in view of the interpretation which is, put on Article 366(22) of the Constitution of India wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court took a view that the President had to take a decision in regard to each case individually. This is not a case here. There is no right of the petitioners who are re- employed persons to continue in employment. The continuance was at the pleasure of the Governor within the constitutional limits. The termination is for a cause and a reason and as such we do not find any merit in the first submission raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 32. In regard to the second contention raised by the petitioners we have already held that the termination of the petitioners was in public interest on the basis of a policy decision taken by the Government. In the circumstances this too in our opinion does not have any force. 33. In regard to the third and fourth submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners we have already discussed the relevant factors in regard to this submission earlier. We are clearly of the opinion that the orders of termination were not politically motivated or arbitrary. The policy of the Government is reasonable and sustainable in law and the termination orders have been passed for a cause. In the circumstances there is no force in both these submissions made by the learned counsel. 34. We are clearly of the opinion that the orders of termination were not politically motivated or arbitrary. The policy of the Government is reasonable and sustainable in law and the termination orders have been passed for a cause. In the circumstances there is no force in both these submissions made by the learned counsel. 34. In regard to the last and fifth submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioners this submission is wholly misconceived. Once a decision was taken to terminate the re-employments the question of retrospectivity does not arise at all. The decision was to terminate the services of re- employed persons. 35. Learned Standing Counsel in support of the order of termination have placed before us I J. P. Temporary Government Servants (Termination of Service) Rules. 1975. He has relied upon clause (4) of the said Rules which reads as follows : "'(4). Notwithstanding anything in these rules, the tenure or continuance of engagement or employment of the following categories of persons shall be governed by the terms of their engagement or employment, and nothing in these rules.shall be construed to require the giving to them, or by them of one month's notice or pay or penalty in lief-. thereof before the termination of their engagement of employment (a) persons engaged on contract: (b) persons not in whole time employment of Government; (c) persons paid out of contingencies; (d) persons employed in a work-charged establishment; (e) persons reemployed after superannuation: (f) persons employed for it specified period whose services stand determined on the expiry of t hat period: (g) persons employed for it specified period on condition that the period may he curtailed at anytime: (h) persons appointed in short term arrangements or vacancies whose services stand determined on the expiry of the arrangements or vacancy." 36. Clause (4) read with sub-clause (c) of the said Clause quoted above clearly lays down that those persons who are reemployed after superannuation shall be construed not to require the giving to them or by them of one month's notice or pay or penalty in lieu thereof. Clause (4) read with sub-clause (c) of the said Clause quoted above clearly lays down that those persons who are reemployed after superannuation shall be construed not to require the giving to them or by them of one month's notice or pay or penalty in lieu thereof. In view of these rules also the petitioners being reemployed persons after superannuation were liable to be terminated under the terms of their appointment which closely contains a term that the services or reemployed could be terminated any time without any notice in this view of the matter also we do not find any invalidity in the impugned orders placed against the petitioners. 37. In the end one more argument was raised in one out on the group of petitions that in a case where in the term of reemployment there is no term entitling the employer to terminate the services of the re-employed persons prematurely, then in such, a case termination order could not have been passed, We not agree. We have already held above that the mere fact that a person has been retained by reemployment after superannuation does not confer any right on the Government servant and it is at the discretion of the Government to withdraw such retention. In the circumstances in the mere fact that there is no term in the contract for termination of the services of re-employed person prematurely does not debar the Government to terminate the services of the Government servant before the time for which reemployment had been granted after superannuation. 38. After filing of these petitions and other group of petitions, the interim order were passed by this Court directing that the petitioners shall he permitted to work till the end of the date of their reemployment. The petitioners who approached this Court and took the interim orders from this Court and continued to work because of the interim orders passed by this Court shall he paid their salary till 28th February, 1990). This order we pass in the interests of justice. 39. With the above observations the petitions are dismissed. The parties are directed to bear their own costs.