G.G. Sohani, C.J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal is from the judgment and decree dated 6th January 1988 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil First Appeal no. 13/78 (R). 2. The appeal arises out of a suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent for specific performance of contract. Briefly, the plaintiff's case was that on 5th February, 1971 the defendant executed an agreement (Ext. 1) agreeing to sell the property described in that agreement to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 40,000/-, that the defendant received a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards the price payable under the agreement and that the defendant had agreed to execute the deed of sale and register the sale deed within a year of the date of the execution of the agreement to sell. The plaintiff averred that the defendant failed to execute the deed of sale and get it registered even though the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform her part of contract. The plaintiff therefore, sent the notice (Ext. 3) to the defendant but as the defendant failed to execute the deed of sale in favour of the plaintiff, the plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance of the contract. The suit was resisted by the defendant inter-alia, on the ground that the defendant had never agreed to sell any property to the plaintiff but had merely taken a loan of Rs. 10,000/- from the plaintiff, that the agreement of sale was a device to circumvent the provisions of law and that the defendant bad never intended to sell her property for a sum of Rs. 40,000/- which was far below the market value. It was also averred that the defendant being a pardanashin lady had signed the agreement without understanding the contents of the document under undue influence of the plaintiff's husband who was a family physician of the defendant. The trial court found after appreciating the evidence on record that the agreement (Ext. 1) was executed by the defendant after knowing the contents thereof and was not vitiated by undue influence. It was also held that the defendant had failed to perform her part of the contract when the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform her part of contract. The trial court accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit. 1) was executed by the defendant after knowing the contents thereof and was not vitiated by undue influence. It was also held that the defendant had failed to perform her part of the contract when the plaintiff had always been ready and willing to perform her part of contract. The trial court accordingly decreed the plaintiff's suit. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court the defendant preferred an appeal before this Court. A learned Single Judge of this Court affirmed the findings of the trial court. The learned Single Judge held that the letter (Ext. A) written by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant soon after the execution of the agreement to sale, merely stipulated, that if within a period of one year the defendant repaid the amount of Rs. 10,000/-with interest, then the plaintiff would accept that amount and would not enforce the agreement to sell. The learned Single Judge held that within the period specified in Ext. A, no amount was tendered to the plaintiff by the defendant and the plaintiff became entitled to a decree for specific performance of the contract. It was also held that the agreement (Ext. 1) was not executed with a view to avoid any provision of Money Lender's Act. In this view of the matter the learned Single Judge dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the- judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge, the defendant has preferred this L. P. A. 3. Mr. Kameshwar Prasad, learned counsel for the appellant contended that the learned Single Judge has erred in holding that Ext. 1 was executed by the defendant agreeing to sell the property in question. It was contended that the Ext. 1 was a document which merely evidenced a loan transaction. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the agreement was not vitiated by undue influence exerted by the plaintiff's husband who was the family physician of the defendant. It was contended that the Ext. 1 was a document which merely evidenced a loan transaction. It was also contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the agreement was not vitiated by undue influence exerted by the plaintiff's husband who was the family physician of the defendant. It was further contended that the consideration stipulated in the agreement was far below the market value of the property and in any event, under the provisions of Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, the Court should not have exercised its discretion in favour of the plaintiff' because from the material on record it was established that the plaintiff had taken an unfair advantage over the defendant and that conduct of the plaintiff in not referring to Ext. A in the plaint disentitled her to the relief of Specific Performance. In reply the learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent supported the findings arrived at by trial court and the learned Single Judge and contended that there was no material whatsoever to substantiate the plea of undue influence. It was also contended that there was absolutely no evidence to indicate that the market value of the property in question was far above the price stipulated by the agreement Ext. 1. It was also contended that the trial court as well as learned Single Judge had exercised their discretion in favour of the plaintiff judicially and not arbitarily and that no also was made out for interference in a Letter Patent Appeal. 5. In view of the contentions advanced before us, the first question for consideration is whether Ext. 1 is an agreement to sell the property in question. The intention of the parties is normally to be gathered by tile words used in the document itself. In the instant case, from a perusal of the document (Ext. 1) there is no manner of doubt that it was an agreement executed by the defendant to sell the property in question to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 40,000/-. It was contended that soon after Ext. 1 was executed, the plaintiff had written a letter to the defendant under taking to receive within a period of one year the amount of advance with interest and therefore the agreement Ext. 1 stood annulled. the contention can not be upheld. The letter (Ext.A) merely varies the terms of the agreement Ext. It was contended that soon after Ext. 1 was executed, the plaintiff had written a letter to the defendant under taking to receive within a period of one year the amount of advance with interest and therefore the agreement Ext. 1 stood annulled. the contention can not be upheld. The letter (Ext.A) merely varies the terms of the agreement Ext. 1 to this extent only that if within a period of one year the defendant pays the amount advanced to her with interest the plaintiff would not enforce the agreement to Sell Ext. 1. It is not and could not be disputed before us that the defendant did not tender any amount to the plaintiff within a year as stipulated in the letter (Ext. A). In point of fact in the written statement the defendant has not even averred that the defendant had tendered any amount to the plaintiff as stipulated by Ext. A and that the agreement Ext. 1, therefore, became inoperative. In our opinion, therefore, the trial court as well as the first appellate court were right in holding that Ext. 1 was an agreement to sell, that it was not annulled and that the plaintiff was entitled to enforce that, agreement. 6. It was then contended that the agreement (Ext. 1) was vitiated by undue influence. Our attention was invited to the statement of the defendant wherein she had deposed that the plaintiff's husband was her family physician. We asked the learned counsel for the appellant to point out as to whether there was any evidence to indicate that at the relevant time the defendant was being treated by the plaintiff's husband or that the defendant was in such a state of health that she could not freely exercise her will. The learned counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that there was no suet material. It has come on record that at the time of execution of Ext. 1, the son of the defendant who had signed the document as a witness was carrying on business at Dhanbad, Bokaro, Nagpur and Madhya Pradesh as a contractor and was about 40 years old at that time because his age as per his deposition recorded on 26.6.1977 was about 46 years. There is nothing to indicate that independent advice from her son was not available to the defendant. There is nothing to indicate that independent advice from her son was not available to the defendant. Our attention was invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in 1963 SC 1203 and it was contended that the burden to prove that the defendant had executed Ext. 1 after understanding the nature of transaction was on the plaintiff. In the instant case, however, the plaintiff has established that the defendant had executed the agreement Ext. 1 after understanding the nature of transaction. As regards plea of undue influence we may usefully refer to the following observations of the Supreme Court in 1967 SC 878 at page 881. "Before, however a court is called upon to examine whether undue influence was exercises or not, it must scrutinise the pleadings to find out that such a case has been made out and that full particulars of undue influence have been given as in the case of fraud See Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This aspect of the pleading was also given great stress in the cases of Ladli Prasad Jaiswal, (1964) 1 SCR 270 : ( AIR 1963 SC 1279 ) above referred to in that case it was observed (at p. 295) (of SCR) at p. 1288 of AIR. "A vague or general plea can never serve this purpose the party pleading must therefore be required to plead the precise nature of the influence exercised the manner of use of the influence, and the unfair advantage obtained by the other." The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the written statement was subsequently amended by the defendant and plea of undue influence was raised. But merely raising a general plea is not sufficient as observed by the Supreme Court in 1967 SC 878. The defendant bas neither pleaded nor has brought any material on record to indicate the precise nature of influence exercised the manner of use of the influence and the unfair advantage obtained by the plaintiff. Moreover, as already observed, the son of the defendant who was carrying on business as a contractor was present at the time of the agreement of sale. Moreover, as already observed, the son of the defendant who was carrying on business as a contractor was present at the time of the agreement of sale. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the son of the defendant was merely interested in the amount advanced by the plaintiff but there is nothing to indicate that the son of the defendant was only interested in receiving some amount and was not interested in protecting the interest of his mother and his own interest. Under the circumstances, the trial court as well as well as learned Single Judge were right in holding that Ext. 1 can not be held to be vitiated by undue influence. 7. The next question then that arises for consideration is whether the trial court and the learned Single Judge erred in exercising their discretion under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act, in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for specific performance. It is well settled that the discretion to be exercised by the Court u/s 20 should not be arbitrary. In the instant case there is no evidence to indicate that at the material time the market value of the property agreed to be sold by the defendant to the plaintiff was far above the stipulated price. There is no evidence to indicate that the terms of agreement (Ext. 1) gave any unfair advantage to the plaintiff over the defendant. The contention that the conduct of the plaintiff disentitled half to a decree for specific performance can not be upheld. All that was pointed out was that the plaintiff had not disclosed the fact that soon after the agreement she had executed the letter (Ext. A) in favour of the defendant agreeing to receive the amount with interest if paid within a year from the date of agreement. It is however, not disputed that at the time when the suit was instituted the period of one year mentioned in Exhibit 1 was over and that the defendant had never banded over any amount to the plaintiff in terms of Ext. A. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to refer to Ext. A in her plaint. A. Under the circumstances, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to refer to Ext. A in her plaint. In our opinion, the trial court as well as learned single Judge have not erred in decreeing the plaintiff's suit for specific performance after appreciating the entire material on record in the light of the well settled principles of law governing a suit for specific performance. No case in our opinion, has been made out for interference with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Single Judge. 8. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case parties shall bear their own costs of this appeal. I agree. Appeal dismissed.