Having lost in both the Courts below, the present second appeal has been filed by the defendant. Briefly stated facts are as follows : 1. Plaintiff, the owner of the suit land, mortgaged it to late Sarbeswar Saikia for a sum of Rs. 1,500/-on 7.9.65 by executing a registered deed. There was a condition in the deed that the mortgage money will be paid within 2 years. According to the plaintiff, he approached the mortgagee with the amount after the expiry of the above period of 2 years. But the mortgagee refused to comply. On the other hand on 14.6.71 and 20.1.72 mortgagee sold the land to the defendant Nos. Hand 13. Hence, the suit was filed for redemption of the mortgage property against the heirs of late Sarbeswar and the purchasers of the said namely, defendant Nos. 12 and 13.Hence Suit has been contested by all the defendants and the legal heirs of Sarbeswar has denied the allegations regarding offer of the amount by plaintiff and according to them the land was mutated in the name of the mortgagee and thereafter it was sold to the defendant Nos. 12 and 13. It has been pleaded that the plaintiff relinquished all the right, title and interest over the suit land and suit is barred by limitation. It has also been alleged that before the land was sold to the defendant Nos. 12 and 13 the plaintiff was asked and he gave consent for the aforesaid sale. Defendant Nos. 12 and 13 have supported the other defendants and have pleaded that as the land stood in revenue record in the name of the mortgagee, they purchased the land by the above two registered sale deeds and got their names mutated in the revenue records. 2. The learned trial Court framed as many as 7 issues and both the Courts below ejected the plea that the suit is barred by estoppel inasmuch as the learned Courts did not accept the story of the defendants that plaintiff gave his consent for the sale of the land to defendant Nos. 12 and 13. This being the finding of facts arrived at by the learned Courts below, on taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, it is not called for any interference by this Court. 12 and 13. This being the finding of facts arrived at by the learned Courts below, on taking into consideration the entire evidence on record, it is not called for any interference by this Court. The learned lower appellate Court has also held that the period of 2 years fixed for the payment of the amount in the mortgage deed is a clog on the equity of redemption and as such the said clause is bad in law. According to the learned lower appellate Court the suit is covered by Article 61 of the Limitation Act and as such it was filed within time. Accordingly, both the Courts below decreed the suit for drawing up a preliminary decree. 3. The question that needs consideration is whether the above clause of payment of the money is a clog on the equity of redemption and if so whether it is void. The common law principle of the clog on the equity of redemption has been made a statutory provisions by incorporating it in section 60 in the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. From the various laws laid down by the English Court and also our High Courts and Supreme Court, the provision has been summarised by learned Author in Lahiri's Book on the Transfer of Property Act, at page 361 (10th Edition) which runs as follows : "This right of redemption is an essential attribute of a mortgage; it is inherent in the thing itself, and any provision inserted in the mortgage to defeat the right is void as a clog on the equity. But it may be destroyed by (1) a conveyance of the right of redemption by the mortgagor to the mortgagee; (2) a sale of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee under a power of sale; (3) a decree for foreclosure or sale by the Court; (4) lapse of time under the Limitation Act.” 4. But it may be destroyed by (1) a conveyance of the right of redemption by the mortgagor to the mortgagee; (2) a sale of the mortgaged property by the mortgagee under a power of sale; (3) a decree for foreclosure or sale by the Court; (4) lapse of time under the Limitation Act.” 4. Clause (a) of Article 61 of the Limitation Act, 1963 provides for period of limitation of filing of suit by a mortgagor to redeem or recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and the aforesaid period is 30 years and according to the clause (b) of the Article 61 the period of limitation is 12 years for a suit to recover possession of immovable property mortgaged and afterwards transferred by the mortgagee for a valuable consideration and the starling point of limitation for the aforesaid period of 12 years is the date on which the plaintiff comes to know of the said transfer. 5. The learned lower appellate Court was of the opinion that in the case in hand clause (a) of Article 61 of the Limitation Act applies and accordingly held that the suit is not barred by limitation as it was filed within 16 years from the date of execution of mortgage deed and due date for repayment of the amount accrued on and from 7.9.67. This finding of the learned lower appellate Court cannot be faulted. 6. Even if it is considered I .at it comes under clause (b) of the said Article 61, the suit is within time as it was filed within 12 years from the date of the execution of the first sale deed which was 14.6.71. The present suit was filed on 30.4.83. 7. Admittedly there was no conveyance of the right of redemption by the plaintiff to the mortgagee and there 'was also no decree for fore­closure or sale by the Court. Suit is also not barred by lapse of time under the Limitation Act. Though plea taken by the defendant was that the sale was made with the approval of the plaintiff, this plea has been rejected. There is no dispute that no power for sale was executed by the plaintiff to the mortgagee to sale the suit property. In view of the circumstances, I hold that the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property has not been destroyed in the case in hand. 8. There is no dispute that no power for sale was executed by the plaintiff to the mortgagee to sale the suit property. In view of the circumstances, I hold that the right of the mortgagor to redeem the property has not been destroyed in the case in hand. 8. The mortgagor has been given a statutory right to redeem the property within a period of 30 years or 12 years depending on the circum­stance of the case as per Article 61 of the Limitation Act. This statutory right cannot be restricted, but it may be destroyed under the three conditions as stated above. So, in the case in hand the clause regarding repayment of money within 2 years will amount to clog on the equity of redemption as after the period of 2 years the mortgagor cannot redeem the property which is against his statutory right. 9. Mr. Deka, learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the suit is not maintainable as there is no prayer for cancellation of the two sale deeds executed in favour of defendant Nos. 12 and 13. In reply. Mr. Chetia, learned counsel for the respondents has drawn my attention to paragraph 7 of the written stat merit wherein the purchaser of the land have clearly stated that the land was purchased only after obtaining consent of the plaintiff. In other words the purchaser of the land knew that the land was mortgaged. According to Mr. Chetia as the plea regarding maintainability was not t ken as would appear from the written statement more particularly para 7 of the joint written statement, it cannot be taken at this stage. I find considerable force in the submission of Mr. Chetia and hold that the contention of Mr. Deka has no force. I further hold that the suit is definitely maintainable as it a suit for redemption of the mortgage. 10. Regarding submission of Mr. Deka that without declaration of right, title and interest by the plaintiff the suit is not maintainable in view of section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, I may say that this is not a suit against a trespasser, but a suit against a subsequent purchaser of the mortga­ged property and in such a suit, such prayer for decree for declaration is not necessary. The defendants purchased the land knowing fully well that it was a mortgaged property. 11. Mr. The defendants purchased the land knowing fully well that it was a mortgaged property. 11. Mr. Deka has also laid emphasis on the fact that the property was mutated in the name of mortgagee and subsequently in the name of the purchasers. Mere mutation in the revenue record cannot give title and as such contentious of Mr. Deka has no force. 12. Mr. Deka has posed a question that if the suit is decreed, what would happen to two sale deeds executed by the mortgagee. It is a settled law that a sale deed can confer only so much of the right and title that the seller had at the time of execution of the sale deed. As the two sale deeds in question were executed by the mortgagee, he transferred only his right of that of mortgagee and he cannot confer full and absolute title on the purchasers. The question of Mr. Deka is answered accordingly. For what has been stated above, I do not find any merit in the present appeal and accordingly it is dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs of this appeal.