Judgment G.G. Sohaui, C.J. & S.N. Jha, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 14.7.1987 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 1022 of 1986 (R). 2. The material facts giving rise to this appeal, briefly, are as follows: Respondent No.1, who was working as a Superintending Engineer in the employment of the appellant, which is a Government Company, intimated to the Company by the letter dated 29.5.1986 (Annexure-1) that he was tendering his resignation and was giving one month's notice by that letter. However immediately after sending the letter (Annexure-1), Respondent no. 1 sent another letter dated 5.6.1986 (Annexure-2) withdrawing his resignation. On 18.7.1986 the appellant Company informed .Respondent no. 1 that his resignation was accepted from the actual date of release by the Unit. As the appellant insisted on accepting the resignation in spite of the fact that it was withdrawn by respondent no. 1 before the expiry of the period of notice, respondent no. 1 filed a petition before this Court under, Article 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of acceptance passed by the appellant be quashed. The claim of Respondent no. 1 was resisted by the appellant Company but the learned Single Judge held that before the resignation could be operative it was withdrawn by respondent no. 1 and hence the appellant could not accept it. In this view of the matter, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ application and quashed Annexures 3 and 4. Aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred this appeal. 3. Shri K.D. Chatterjee, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that the appellant was not amenable to the writ jurisdiction as it was not a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, that one month's notice could be waived by the appellant Company, that it was so waived and that the resignation which was accepted became operative from the date when that letter accepting the resignation was put in course, of transmission to Respondent no. 1. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the resignation could not have been accepted by the appellant. In reply, Shri Debi Prasad the learned counsel for Respondent no. 1. The learned counsel for the appellant therefore contended that the learned Single Judge erred in holding that the resignation could not have been accepted by the appellant. In reply, Shri Debi Prasad the learned counsel for Respondent no. 1 contended that the appellant was a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, that the resignation submitted by Respondent no. 1 could not have been accepted by the appellant before the expiry of the period of one month's notice and that the learned single Judge was, therefore, right in holding that the appellant Company could not have acted on the letter sent by respondent no. 1 purporting to resign after the expiry of the period of one month's notice as the resignation was withdrawn before the expiry of the period. 4. The first question for consideration whether the appellant Company is amenable to the writ jurisdiction. In this connection we may refer to the averment made by respondent no. 1 in paragraph 4 of the petition under Article 226. It was averred that the appellant is a Government Company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and is controlled by the Government and is an instrumentality of the Union of India. In the counter affidavit these facts have not been specifically denied. We may in this connection refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & another Vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another (A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1571) wherein it has been held that if there is an instrumentality or agency of the State which has assumed the garb of a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act, it does not follow that it ceases to be an instrumentality or agency of the State. Following that decision, the appellant Company, in our opinion, must be had to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 5. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the appellant could have waived the period of notice and accepts the resignation of respondent no. 1 as soon as it was received by the appellant. We may in this connection, refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in, Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal (A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1083): "As we have already mentioned, resignation is a voluntary Act, of an employee. 1 as soon as it was received by the appellant. We may in this connection, refer to the following observation of the Supreme Court in, Punjab National Bank Vs. P.K. Mittal (A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1083): "As we have already mentioned, resignation is a voluntary Act, of an employee. He may choose to resign with immediate effect or with a notice of less than three months if the bank agrees to the same. He may also resign at a further date on the expiry or beyond the period, of three months but for this no further consent of the bank is necessary. The acceptance of the argument of Dr. Anand Prakash would mean that, even though an employee might express a desire to resign from a further date, the resignation can be accepted, even without his wishes, from an earlier date. This would not be the acceptance of a resignation in the terms in which it is offered. It amounts really to forcing a date of termination on the employee other than the one he is entitled to choose under the regulations." In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, it must be held that when an employee intimates that resignation would become effective Oil expiry of the period of notice, then the acceptance of resignation by the employer from an earlier date is illegal. Under the circumstance, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, has not committed any error in holding that the resignation submitted , by Respondent no. 1 could not have been accepted by the appellant company because before the expiry of the period of notice as it was withdrawn vide Annexure-2 by respondent no. 1. 6. The appeal, therefore, fails and is accordingly dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs.250/-. 7. The interim order of stay passed on 24.8.1987 is vacated. Appeal dismissed.