JUDGMENT L. Manoharan, J. - The first question for determination in this appeal is about its maintainability. The impugned judgment was rendered under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (for short 'the Act'). 2. The case in brief is as follows : The tender made by the respondent for construction of work in connection with a Compressor House, MCC Utility Plants, Equipment supports and Pipe Bridges etc. was accepted by the appellant, and the respondent executed the work as per the work order dated 28-3-1974. According to the appellant, there was considerable delay in completing the work. After completion of the work disputes arose. The claims made by the respondent were rejected by the appellant. The appellant made counter claims which were rejected by the respondent. The disputes were therefore referred to arbitration. 3. Appellant nominated one arbitrator and the respondent nominated another arbitrator. The arbitrators entered on the reference, and passed a non-speaking award on 6-11-1986. 4. Respondent filed O.P. (Arb.) 69/1986 under Section 17 of the Arbitration Act for passing a decree in terms of the award. 5. On receipt of the notice from court, appellant filed objections contending inter alia, that the respondent is not entitled to the relief prayed for. The court passed the impugned judgment accepting the award. 6. Appellant's contentions are two fold; first is that the Arbitrators should have rendered separate awards for separate claims instead of a consolidated award for all the claims. Second is that the Arbitrators were not competent to award interest. 7. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the appeal is not maintainable, since no petition to set aside the award was filed. According to the counsel the judgment appealed against cannot be treated as one "refusing to set aside the award" within the meaning of Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act without seeking to set aside the award by filling an application for the said purpose Chapter VI of the Arbitration Act which deals with "Appeals" contains only Section 39. The relevant portion of Section 39 reads : "39. Appealable orders. The relevant portion of Section 39 reads : "39. Appealable orders. - (1) An appeal shall lie from the following orders passed under this Act (and from no others) to the court authorised by law to hear appeals from original decree of the court passing the order : An order - (vi) Setting aside or refusing to set aside an award : The argument of respondent's learned counsel is that only of there was a proper legal motion before the court could there be occasion for refusal to set aside the award within the meaning of Section 39(1)(vi). An application for setting aside the award is contemplated under Section 31 of the Act. A combined reading of Sections 30 and 33 will show that an application has to be filed for setting the award on the grounds mentioned in Section 30. In context it is necessary and useful to read Section 17. As per the said Section, a judgment in terms of the can be pronounced only after expiry of the time prescribed for making an application for setting aside the award, or after such applications having been made has been refused. An application of having to set aside the award on any of the grounds specified in Section 30 of the Act is Section 30 begins by stating that, an award shall not set aside except on one or more of the grounds mentioned therein. From an order refusing to set aside an award an appeal can be maintained under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. 8. It was pointed out by the counsel for the appellant that, the appellant had filed objections before the trial court and the said objections can be treated as the application for setting aside the award. Reliance was placed on the decision in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal (AIR 1967 SC 1233). In the said decision the Supreme Court held : "It may be conceded that there is no special form prescribed for making such an application and in an appropriate case an objection of the type made in this case may be treated as such an application, if it is filed within the period of limitation. But if an objection like this has been filed after the period of limitation it cannot be treated it is so treated it will be barred by limitation". 9. But if an objection like this has been filed after the period of limitation it cannot be treated it is so treated it will be barred by limitation". 9. Therefore, the objections in appropriate cases can be treated as the application to set aside the award provided that such objections were filed in time. The period of limitation prescribed for application to set aside an award as per Article 119 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is 30 days from the date of acceptance of the notice. Therefore, the application to set aside the award on ground covered by Section 30 of the Act has to be filed within 30 days of the acceptance of the notice. In the decision in Madan Lal's case (cited above) it is also observed by the Supreme Court : "There can be no doubt on the scheme of the Act that any objection even in the nature of a written-statement which falls under S. 30 cannot be considered by the court unless such an objection is made within the period of limitation (namely, 30 days), though if such an objection is made within limitation that objection may in appropriate cases be treated as an application for setting aside the award" 10. The notice under Section 14(2) of the Act was accepted by the appellant on 27-11-1986 whereas the objections were filed only on 12-1-1987. Thus the objections, even if treated as the application under Section 33 of the Act having been filed beyond 30 days of service of notice are beyond time and hence on grounds covered by Section 30 of the Act, the appellant Cannot have the award set aside. If that is so, the impugned judgment cannot be treated as one falling under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. 11. But it was contended by the counsel for the appellant that, the court can suo motu set aside the award on grounds other than those mentioned under Section 30 of the Act and that an order passed in exercise of suo motu powers can also be treated as an order falling under Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. In support of the said argument then learned counsel relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in P. Multi & Sons v. K.P. Exporting Co. (AIR 1976 Kerala 3). In support of the said argument then learned counsel relied on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court reported in P. Multi & Sons v. K.P. Exporting Co. (AIR 1976 Kerala 3). A reading of the said decision shows that, the appellant therein applied to set aside the award and also filed objections against passing judgment on the award. Since the application to set aside the award was filed out of time, the trial court rejected the same. But the court considered the objections, on merits and found that were no grounds to set aside the award suo motu and consequently the court passed a decree in terms of the award. In the judgment it is mentioned that the trial court stated in the order passed under Section 17 that there were no grounds to set aside the award. In such circumstances, it was held that the order would come within the scope of Section 39(1)(vi) of the Act. 12. In para 4 of the impugned judgment, it is stated thus :- "Both sides did not want to adduce any evidence and it is freely agreed at the time of argument that the award being not a speaking one but a one line award, this court cannot sit in judgment on the correctness thereof and that this court therefore has necessarily to pass a decree in terms of the award". When such is the character and nature of the impugned judgment, it can hardly be said that the court refused to set aside the award, or that the impugned judgment is one that refused to set aside the award. On the other hand the judgment shows that the same was rendered on agreement of parties. A statement made by the learned Sub-Judge to the aforesaid effect as to what transpired in court cannot be ignored. In such circumstances the judgment in a question cannot come under Section 39 of the Act, and hence we hold that the appeal is not maintainable. In the result the appeal is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.