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1990 DIGILAW 26 (PAT)

Narain Singh v. Indu Gowala

1990-01-18

S.B.SINHA

body1990
Judgment S. B. Sinha, J. 1. This First Appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated 21-4-1981 passed by Sri Ram Charitra Sathi Subordinate Judge, Gumla in Title Suit No.49 of 1978. whereby and whereunder the said learned court dismissed the plaintiff-appellants suit. 2. The plaintiffs filed the aforementioned suit inter alia, on the ground that they took the settlement of the lands in question from one Sri Jamadar singh on 20-8-1950, and 5-9-1950 and 15-12-1951 and they have been in actual possession of the lands in question. 3. According to the plaintiffs, the defendant sought to disturb their possession resulting in a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The said proceeding under Sec.144 Cr. P. C. was converted into a proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C. by the learned Executive Magistrate, by an order dated 21-7-1975. 4. In the aforementioned proceeding allegedly, the plaintiff filed a show cause alleging, inter alia, therein that the lands in question were given in adhbatai by the then landlord and on the expiry of the period of lease, the lands in question was resumed by the then landlords who settled the said lands to them. It was further alleged that the entry in the record of rights to the effect that the right of the tenants was, Kaimi was wrong, 5. It was further alleged that in 1942 the land was given in Thika to rai Sahab Laxminarain and the right was given to him to settle it to the raiyats or to give it in Thika. It was further been alleged that about 25 years ago Rai Saheb had given the lands in raiyati Bandobasti to the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs are in possession of the land since then. 6. It has further been mentioned that a Mahabir Mindir was built on the land in question by Rai Saheb and he had made it Debottar and the plaintiffs are doing Bhog Niyog as Shabait of the deity. 7. In the said proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C. the lands in question were attached in terms of Sec.146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Magistrate who directed that the said attachment shall continue unless the cases of the respective parties be decided by a competent court of law. 8. 7. In the said proceeding under Sec.145 Cr. P. C. the lands in question were attached in terms of Sec.146 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the learned Magistrate who directed that the said attachment shall continue unless the cases of the respective parties be decided by a competent court of law. 8. On the other hand, the defendants-respondents case appears to be that in the revisional survey settlement record of rights, the lands in question were recorded in their names as Kaimi. It has further been mentioned that neither the ex-landlords Maharaja Kumar Baraj Jishore Nath Sahdeo nor Mokraj, angelo brothers, the mortagagee during Revisional Survey of 1933-34, nor the manager , wards and Enactment Estates nor Smt. Durga Prasad Kumari Devi nor her Son Kumar Tara Prasad Nath Sahdeo ever ousted the defendents and they had continued to be in possession of the said properties. 9. It has further been asserted that the lessee Rai Saheb Laxminarain of lalpur has also never ousted the said defendants. 10. It has further been alleged that the plaintiff has made a new casein the plaint with regard to alleged raiyati Bandobasti in their favour, inasmuch as, the said Story was not put forth by the plaintiffs in the mutation proceedings being case No. M-l, M-2, M-5 and M-6 of 1975-76. 11. The plaintiffs as noticed hereinbefore, put forth contradictory claims with regard to the sattlement in their favour. Whereas in para 2 of the plaint, the plaintiffs contended that one Jamadarsingh had made Settlement in their favour; in paragraph-5 of the plaint, the plaintffs alleged that in the show cause filed by them in procdeeding under section 145 of the Code of Criminal procedure it was their case that the lands in question were settled in their favour by Rai Saheb. 12. Further in para 6 of the plaint, the plaintiffs categorically stated that debottar was made by Raisahen himself in a portion of the property in dispute by constructing a Mahabir Mandir. 13. It is thus clear that the plaintiffs are not sure of the sources of their own title in relation to the aforementioned lands. 14. It may further be mentioned that if a Debottar has been created in favour of a deity, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to implead the said deity as a plaintiff or a defendant. 15. 13. It is thus clear that the plaintiffs are not sure of the sources of their own title in relation to the aforementioned lands. 14. It may further be mentioned that if a Debottar has been created in favour of a deity, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to implead the said deity as a plaintiff or a defendant. 15. The plaintiffs have also not filed the suit in their capacity as Shebait of the deity. 16. The plaintiffs however have sought to prove their possession by proving rent receipts which are Exts.1 series the registered deeds which are Ext.2 series and the Bunda purchases which is Ext.5. 17. So far as the Bunda purcha is concerned the same has no evidentiary value as the same is not a finally published record of rights. 18. As noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs-defendants case in paragraph 2 of the plaint is that the lands in question were settled in their favour on three different dates in favour of the plaintiffs by one Jamadar Singh. 19. That plaintiff No.1 deposing as P. W.1 had admitted that the settlet was made by the aforementioned Jamadar Singh. The said Jamadar singh was examined as aforementioned suit as P. W.8 In his deposition the said Jamadar Singh did not state that he had any authority to make any settlement on behalf of Rai Saheb Laxminarain. 20. Further from a perusal of the rent receipts, allegedly granted by the ex- landlord appears that the same had been granted in the name of all the plantiffs jointly However, in the rent receipts purported to have granted by the State of Bihar rents have been realised from different plaintiffs in receipt of different Khatasand receipts have been granted accordingly ; although nothing has been brought records of the suit to show that at any point of time, there bad been a partition by and between the plaintiffs m different names. 21. It further appears that even some rent receipts have been granted in the name of Sri Mahabir Swami (Hanumanjee): as is evident from Ext.1-A, ext.1/a-35 etc. Tn respect of Jamabandi np.34. The State has granted rent receipts purported to be begining from Sambat year 2011. 22. 21. It further appears that even some rent receipts have been granted in the name of Sri Mahabir Swami (Hanumanjee): as is evident from Ext.1-A, ext.1/a-35 etc. Tn respect of Jamabandi np.34. The State has granted rent receipts purported to be begining from Sambat year 2011. 22. However, from a perusal of the rent receipts, as contained in Ext.1/g to 1/k, it appears that the said rent receipts were purported to have been granted either in the year 1946 or 1986. It read in English, it may be read as 1986 but if read in Hindi, it may be read as 1946. Surprisingly enough, the first two dates mentioned in the said receipts i. e.9th February, 18th October and 9th January have clearly been mentioned in English. 23. Further, so far as rent receipts granted by the State of Bihar are concerned, the same having been granted without prejudiced in my opinion, the same although may be evidence of possession but thereby the right title and interest of the defendants cannot be disbelieved. 24. From a perusal of Ext. A, the Khatiyan it appears that therein the names of the defendants-predecessors-in-interest appeared and their right title and interest has been mentioned as kaimi raiyati. 25. Mr. P. K. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant raised a question that in view of the fact that the lands in question were recorded as Majhias lands the same being the privileged land of the landlord, no occupancy right could accrue in relation thereto in view of Section 43 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. 26. The learned counsel submitted that in this view of the matter, the defendant and or their predecessors-in-interest could not have acquired any occupancy right in relation to the lands in question. 27. Apart from the fact that the said statement of Sri Prasad does not appear to be correct, the same in my opinion is self defeating. 28. In terms of Sec.43 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, an embargo has been put upon a raiyat from acquiring a right of occupancy, if the land in question is the privilege land of the landlord as referred to in Clause (b) of section 118 thereof. 29. 28. In terms of Sec.43 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, an embargo has been put upon a raiyat from acquiring a right of occupancy, if the land in question is the privilege land of the landlord as referred to in Clause (b) of section 118 thereof. 29. In terms of Sec.118 (b) of the said Act, the lands which inter alia, are entered as Majhias or Bet-Kheta in any register prepared and confirmed under Chotanagpur Tenures Act, 1869, would be the landlords privileged lands. 30. Nothing has been brought on record to show that the lands in question although described as Majhias land in the revisional survey settlement record of rights were entered as such in the registers prepared and confirmed under the Chotanagpur Tenures Act, 1869. 31. In terms of provision of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, provisions have been made as to how a raiyat acquires a right of occupancy in respect of his land. 32. Section 43 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act carves out an exception to the said provision and by reason of the said provision, notwithstanding contained anything in part 4 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, the lands which are the privileged lands of the landlord within the meaning of the provisions thereof, no occupancy right can be acquired in relation thereto. 33. If this be the position, evidently no permanent settlement could have been made hy the ex-landlord in favour of the plaintiffs and even if any permanent settlement could be made thereby the plaintiffs could not have become raiyats having any occupancy right therein. 34. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the plaintiffs on their own showing do not stand on a better footing than the defendants. 35. In any event, the plaintiffs have utterly failed to prove that the lands in question had been entered in any register prepared and confirmed under the chotanagpur Tenure Act, and this have also failed to prove that the lands although termed as majhias lands in the revisional survey settlement record of rights would be the privileged land of the landlord within the meaning of section 43 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act. 36. 36. In such a situation, it must be held that the right of the defendants predecessors-in-interest in relation to the land in question being Kaimi in nature the said entry in the record of rights shall prevail over the alleged right of the landlord in relation to the lands in question allegedly being their privileged lands. 37. Further, as the Revenue authorities, while preparing the record of rights would be presumed to know law, apparent contradictory entries could not have been made by them. In such a situation, it must be held that the revenue authorities must have recorded the lands as having a Kaimi right of the defendants as because the said lands were not entered and confirmed in any register prepared under the Chotaaagpur Tenure Act 1869. 38. In this view of the matter, there can not be any doubt that the entries made in the record of rights, as a result whereof the defendants had been shown as Kaimi Raiyats in respect of land in question must be held to be valid in law. 39. In terms of Sec.23 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908, if a raiyat dies intestate, in respect of a right of occupancy, the same shall subject to any local custom to the contrary, descend in the same, manner as other immovable property. Thus, the recorded tenant having been a raiyati having an occupancy in respect to the lands in question, the same was heritable and thus the defendants became the raiyats having occupancy rights therein relation to the land in suit after the death of the recorded tenants. 40. It is true that the defendants have not been able to produce any rent receipts in respect of lands in question. However, from a perusal of Ext. A series, it is evident that whereas in respect of the some lands, half of the produce was to be paid as rent; the other lands were recorded as Belagan and kabil-lagan. 41. Section 3 (xxiii) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 reads as follows:- " "rent" means whatever is lawfully payable in money or kind by a tenant to his landlord on account of the use or occupation of the land held by the tenant, and includes all dues (other taan personal services) which are recoverable under any enactment for the time being in force as if they were rent. " 42. " 42. Thus, the rent may lawfully be payable either in terms of money or in kind by a tenant to his landlord. 43. In this situation, the evidence on the part of the defendants that till the vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar, they and/or their predecessors-in interest have been paying rent to the landlord in kind can not be disbelieved. 44. By reason of Sec.61 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, a provision has been made for commutation of rent payable in kind. In the facts and circumstance of this case, it is evident that as no such order has been passed for commutation of rent in terms of Sec.61 of the aforementioned Act, the defendants and/or their predecessors-in-interest did not and could not pay nny rent in kind to the State of Bihar. 45. So far as the other lands are concerned, as noticed hereinbefore, the same have been recorded as Belagan Kabillagan meaning thereby no rent in paid but in relation thereto rent could be assessed by the landlord or by the state of Bihar, as the case may be, for user and occupation of such land by the raiyat. For such a purpose, a proceeding was required to be initiated by the competent authorities so as to assess and determine the rent payable by the defendant in such case. 46. There is nothing to show that the State of Bihar and for that matter the ex-landlord determined the rent payable in relation to the lands held by the defendants, which have been recorded as Belagan Kabillagan. 47. Mr. P. K. Prasad has taken me through the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses for the purpose of showing that they have been able to prove possession in respect of lands in suit. 48. In terms of Sec.84 (3) of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, a presumption of correctness arises in relation to the entries made in the finally published record of rights. 49. Admittedly, the possession of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant was recorded in the said finally published record of right, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to plead and prove as to how and in what manner the said recorded tenant and/or their successors-in-interest discontinued to possess the said land or under what circumstances, the landlords came in khas possession thereof. 49. Admittedly, the possession of the predecessors-in-interest of defendant was recorded in the said finally published record of right, it was necessary for the plaintiffs to plead and prove as to how and in what manner the said recorded tenant and/or their successors-in-interest discontinued to possess the said land or under what circumstances, the landlords came in khas possession thereof. The plaintiffs neither in their pleadings nor by reason of the evidence adduced before the learned court below disclosed the year in which the landlord allegedly came in possession of the lands in suit. 50. It is now well known that in law, if the possession of a person is found at a particular point of time, a court is entitled to draw a presumption of continuity of possession both forward and backward. 51. Reference, in this connection may be made in Ambika Prasad Ihakur and others V/s. Ram Ekbal Rai, (AIR 1966 Supreme Court, 605 ). 52. In this situation, it was obligatory on the part of the plaintiffs to lead evidence for the purpose of rebutting the presumption arising in favour of the defendant so far as the entries made in the record of rights in their favour is concerned. 53. As noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs are not even sure as to who was their landlord and from whom they took settlement. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the plaint depict a contrary state of facts. 54. Before the learned trial court, the plaintiffs alleged that one of the original Hukumnama granted by the ex-landlord has been eaten by white ant. He has made this statement in para 3 of his evidence which however, only related to the land which was allegedly settled in his favour. However, in the said paragraph itself, he has stated that so far as the deeds of settlement of padmohan Singh and Jagannath Singh are concerned, the same have been deposited with Land Mortgage Bank at Patna as the said settlees had allegedly taken loan from the said Bank. 55. The plaintiffs have not made any attempt whatsoever to call for the said deeds from Land Mortgage Bank at Patna. 56. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs in their plaint did not allege that they took settlement of different portions of land separately. 55. The plaintiffs have not made any attempt whatsoever to call for the said deeds from Land Mortgage Bank at Patna. 56. Further, as noticed hereinbefore, the plaintiffs in their plaint did not allege that they took settlement of different portions of land separately. On the other hand, as noticed hereinbefore, from a perusal of Ext.1 series, it appears that the ex-landlord have granted a purported joint rent receipts in favour of all the plaintiffs. 57. It is, therefore, clear that the plaintiffs have utterly failed to prove their title by producing the basic documents in relation thereto. 58. P. W.2 Beni Madhav Singh could not state the number of raiyats in the village Salkiya nor could be disclose the name of any one of them. He even could not say anything about the boundaries of the disputed lands. 59. The said witness further admitted that one of the plaintiffs i e. Padmohan Singh is his maternal uncle and Maniram Singh is his own uncle. 60. P. W.3, although alleged that he is a resident of village Salkaya in his cross-examination, he admitted that he has got his house and land at some other village. He also could not say even the area of the land. He even could not say the name of the Zamindar of the village although, he alleged that the Zamindar have been in cultivating possession of the land in suit. He even contradicted the manner of possession of the plaintiffs inasmuch as at one place he stated that although, plaintiffs are in joint possession of lands whereas at the other place he stated that the plaintiffs have been cultivating their land separately. 61. P. W.4 Jagdish Roy, alleged, that the lands in suit were in cultivating possession of Rai Laxmi Narain aad he used to get the same cultivated through the plaintiffs, He admitted that he has no land near the land in suit. He could not state the plot number upon which the Mahabir Mandir is situate. He further admitted that he was called by Padmohan Singh for giving evidence and has also received money for the same. He further admitted that the plaintiffs told him as to what was the case about and as such he is tutored witness. 62. P. W.5 is the brother of the plaintiff and Munshi Singh and uncle of the Jagannath Singh. He further admitted that the plaintiffs told him as to what was the case about and as such he is tutored witness. 62. P. W.5 is the brother of the plaintiff and Munshi Singh and uncle of the Jagannath Singh. He stated that the Mahabir Mandir was constructed after the revisional survey, although, P. W.4 alleged that Mahabir Mandir was constructed much prior to the revisional survey. 63. The witness also categorically admitted in bis deposition that Narain singh told him before hand as to what to depose. He, however, could not say the Khata number, plot number or the area of any of the plots. 64. P. W.6 is Ramratan Das, He was aged about 40 years on the date of his deposition. He even could not state as to in whose name the entry made in the revisional survey settlement record of right is entered. He also could not say about the area of the Khata no.34. He further stated that the land of mahabirjee had been partitioned by and between the plaintiffs. 65. P. W.7 is Jatru Singh. This witness has also admitted that he was tutored by Narain Singh. P. W.8 Jamadar Singh, allegedly was an employee of durga Prasad, the Thekedar landlord of village Salkaya. He has also proved the Ext.1 to Ext.1/f, alleging that the same were in his own handwriting. However, from comparison of the handwriting and comparison of the signature of the rent receipts e. g. Ext.1/a, and 1/b on the one hand and other rent receipts on the other, it does not appear that the same have been written by the same person and bear the signature of the same person. He, in his evidence did not state that he had any right to grant settlement the land in question in favour of the plaintiffs, on behalf of the landlord or otherwise. 66. The learned court below has also taken into consideration the evidence of the aforementioned witness in great details and for good reasons disbelieved their testimonies. 67. On the other hand, the defendants have examined four witnesses. One of the defendants witness, namely D. W.4 was a Tahsildar of the ex-landlord. Even he supported the case of the defendant about their possession of land and cultivation thereof an Adhbatai. 67. On the other hand, the defendants have examined four witnesses. One of the defendants witness, namely D. W.4 was a Tahsildar of the ex-landlord. Even he supported the case of the defendant about their possession of land and cultivation thereof an Adhbatai. He further stated that the said lands were Kaimi lands of the defendant and he had been realising half produce of the aforementioned land on behalf of the landlord, from the defendants. 68. It further appears from his evidence that the entire village was given in Theka to Rai Laxminarain and thus the said Rai Laxmi Narain being merely a Thikedar could not have himself granted any settlement in favour of any person. 69. Taking thus all facts and circumstances of this case, and particularly, in view of the fact that the plaintiffs have categorically stated that they have taken settlement of tue land in question from one Jamadar Singh, who had admittedly no right to grant any settlement, in my opinion, no case for interference with the impugned has been made out. 70. Taking thus all facts and circumstances of this case, I am the view that there is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court is confirmed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs in this appeal. Appeal dismissed.