K. P. SINGH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is a landlords writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the 6th Additional District Judge, shahjahanpur, dated 15-7-1983 in Appeal No. 18 of 1983 Ram Swaroop v. Uttar Pradesh Rajya Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank. ( 2 ) THE petitioner had applied for enhancement of rent under Section 21 (8) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 against opposite party No. 1 on the ground that the Market value of the building in question was Rs. 1,80,000 and that the opposite-party No 1 was tenant of the building in question at the rate of Rs. 100/- as rent per month and should pay to the petitioner rs. 1,500/- monthly rent under the proviso to Section 21 (8) of the Act. ( 3 ) THE claim of the petitioner was contested by the contesting opposite party but the prescribed authority through its order dated 29-1-1983, contained in Annexure II attached with the writ petition, enhanced the rent to the tune of Rs. 350/- per month from monthly rent of Rs. 100/ -. Aggrieved by the order of the trial Court the petitioner had preferred an appeal which was decided by the Appellate Court through its judgment, dated 15-7-1983, contained in Annexure 4 attached with the writ petition. Aggrieved by tbe order of the appellate authority the petitioner has approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. ( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before me. Firstly, that the appellate authority has patently erred in setting aside the order of the prescribed authority in appeal preferred by the petitioner. According to the learned counsel when the opposite-party in the preseat writ petition had acquiesced to the order of the prescribed authority, the appellate authority had no jurisdiction to set aside the order passed by the prescribed authority in the facts and circumstances of the present case adverse to the petitioner. ( 5 ) SECONDLY, the opposite-party comes within the meaning of the "other authorities" mentioned under Article 12 of the Constitution therefore, the lower appellate Court has patently erred in holding that the provisions of Section 21 (8) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 are not attracted to the facts of the present case. ( 6 ) I bave examined the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. ( 6 ) I bave examined the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. It is true that the appellate authority has wrongly set aside the order of the prescribed authority enhancing tbe rent in favour of the petitioner specially when the contesting opposite party had not preferred any appeal 0r cross-objection against the order of the prescribed authority. The appellate authority in law could not pass any detrimental order to the appellant negativing the relief granted by the prescribed authority in the appeal filed by the petitioner appellant. To my mind, the appellate authority has exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of the prescribed authority which was favourable to the petitioner as the rent was enhanced to some extent. ( 7 ) AS regards the second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it is proper to quote Article 12 of the Constitution which reads as below : "in this part, unless the context otherwise requites, "the State" includes the Government and Parliament of India and the government and the legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the Territory of India or under the control of the Government of India," ( 8 ) SECTION 21 (8) of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 reads as below :" (8) Nothing in Clause (a) of sub-section (1) shall apply to a building let out to the State Government or to a local authority or to a public sector corporation or to a recognized educational institution unless the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the landlord is a person to whom clause (ii) or clause (iv) of the Explanation to sub-section (1) is applicable : provided that in the case of such a building the District Magistrate may, on the application of the landlord, enhance the monthly rent payable therefor to a sum equivalent to one-twelth of ten per cent of the market value of the building under tenancy, and the rent so enhanced shall be payable from the commencement of the month of tenancy following the date of the application : provided further that a similar application for further enhancement may be made after the expiration of a period of five years from the date of the last order of enhancement. " ( 9 ) THE perusal of the above provision indicates that the first proviso contemplates building let out to the State Government or to local authority of to a public sector corporation or to a recognized educational institution. The building in occupation of the contesting opposite-party cannot be said to be the building let out to the persons mentioned in the provision of section 21 (8) of the Act. Therefore, the conclusion of the lower appellate court regarding non-applicability of the aforesaid provision of Section 21 (8)of the Act appears to be correct on merits. ( 10 ) ARTICLE 12 of the Constitution specifically provides "other authorities" within the Territory of India or under the control of the government of India. In the aforesaid provision of Section 21 (8) of the act, the phrase other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India does not exist. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner seeking benefit of the aforesaid provision of the Kent Act is not acceptable to me because the opposite-party even if may be included within the term authorities contemplated by Article 12 of the Constitution, will not be covered within the provisions of Section 21 (8) of the Rent Act. The appellate authority has discussed various sub-clauses of Section 3 of the Rent Act under consideration and has rightly indicated that the opposite-party in this writ petition is not included within the persons mentioned in the provisions of Section 21 (8) of the Act. To my mind, the contention raised in this regard on behalf of the petitioner has no merits. ( 11 ) IT is well-known by now that in the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, a High Court does not issue futile writs nor it interferes with a wrong order if the wrong order has done substantial justice between the parties A High Court also does not issue writs if by quashing a wrong order another equally wrong order emerges. Viewing from the aforesaid angles, I find that the impugned order in this writ petition is not liable to be quashed. Viewing from the aforesaid angles, I find that the impugned order in this writ petition is not liable to be quashed. True, that the appellate authority has passed a detrimental order to the interest of the petitioner in the appeal filed by him but when the conclusions arrived at by the appellate authority are correct that the opposite-party is not included within the persons contemplated by the provisions of Section 21 (8) of the Act (Act no. 13 of 1972) the prayer for enhancement of rent made by the petitioner could not be granted by the prescribed authority. ( 12 ) FOR the foregoing discussion, the writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties are directed to bear their own costs. Petition dismissed. .