JUDGMENT A.S. Anand, C.J. 1. The only meaningful question requiring consideration in this writ appeal is whether the petitioner who had the benefit of an assignment of some urban land from the State is liable to be assessed to Urban Land Tax under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in respect of the assigned land. 2. The appellant was the petitioner in W.P.No.3474 of 1979. He called in question an order of assessment under the Act in respect of land to the total extent of 150.70 acres out of which 149.60 acres had been acquired by the Government from third parties and assigned the appellant-company. The remaining 1.10 acres had been purchased by the appellant-company privately. Upon being called to pay Urban Land Tax as per the assessment order in ULT 6/85 dated 29-6-1976, the appellant preferred an appeal to the Tribunal. Vide judgment dated 27.9.1978 the Tribunal set aside the assessment order passed by the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Ambattur, and remitted the case back for fresh disposal in the light of, G.O. Ms. No.2625 dated 27.12.1976 On remit, the Assistant Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Ambattur, passed fresh order in ULT Np. 165/77 dated 10th June, 1979 after exempting 3 grounds from levy of tax for the belt area and also reduced the rate of tax from 2.5% to 2% on the ground that the appellant's holdings exceeded 20 grounds. This order was called in question through W.P.3474 of 1979 and on being unsuccessful the present writ appeal has been filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 8lh March, 1983. 3. Before the learned single Judge, only two points were raised on behalf of the writ petitioner-appellant. The first point that was canvassed before the learned single Judge was that where the land was required for a public purpose, the appellant-company to whom that land was assigned, would be entitled to the exemption under Section 29(g) of the Act. The second point that was raised before the learned single Judge was about the value of the land for the purposes of levy of tax under the Act. The second point that was raised before the learned single Judge was about the value of the land for the purposes of levy of tax under the Act. It was urged on behalf of the petitioner appellant that since in the order of alignment it had been stated that upon resumption the Government will pay only less 15% awarded for compulsory acquisition, the value should be arrived at on that basis and not on the estimated market value of the land in question. Both the contentions failed before the learned single Judge. 4. Learned Counsel for the appellant reiterated both these objections and has also raised an additional point in the appeal. Permission to raise the additional point had been granted by a Division Bench of this Court during the course of hearing of this writ appeal by that Bench. The additional point canvassed by learned Counsel for the appellant is that since the land had been assigned by the Government to the appellant-company and a right of resumption had been retained in the deed of assignment itself, the appellant-company could not be considered to be an "owner" under the Act and therefore the land assigned by the Government was not liable to be assessed to Urban Land Tax. 5. Before coming to the last point raised by learned Counsel for the appellant, we would like to deal with the two earlier submissions which were raised before the learned single Judge and have been reiterated before us. 6. Section 29(g) of the Act lays down that in respect of any urban land used for public purposes, provided no remuneration is derived from, such user, the provisions of the Act shall not apply. The submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is that, since the land in. question was acquired by the Government under the Land Acquisition Act on the basis that the Government considered that it was necessary to so acquire it for a public purpose and subsequently the land was assigned to the appellant-company, the appellant was entitled to the exemption under Section 29(g) of the Act. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, contended that the 'public purpose' contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act has an altogether different connotation than the one contemplated by Section 29(g) of the Act in so far as the grant of exemption is concerned. 7. Indeed, the Government-vide G.O. Ms. The learned Government Pleader, on the other hand, contended that the 'public purpose' contemplated by the Land Acquisition Act has an altogether different connotation than the one contemplated by Section 29(g) of the Act in so far as the grant of exemption is concerned. 7. Indeed, the Government-vide G.O. Ms. No. 2949, Department of Industries, Labour and Co-operation, dated 7-9-1957, after examining the request of the appellant for acquiring private land in Ambattur for the construction of the factory, considered that the establishment of the factory was necessary to ensure a regular and uninterrupted supply of rubber tyres to consumers in South India and that the acquisition of the land for the factory was considered to be for a 'public purpose' and therefore the Government decided to acquire it invoking the urgency provisions. That, however, would not imply that the land is being 'used' for a public purpose under the Urban Land Tax Act and entitled to be exempted from payment of tax. What is essential for the purpose of claiming exemption under Section 29(g) of the Act is that the land must, be used for a 'public purpose' and subject to the further restrictions that no rent is charged and no remuneration is derived from such user. Therefore, if after the acquisition, the land is not used for a public purpose, there is no warrant for the contention that exemption under Clause (g) of Section 29 would be available to such land since the land had been acquired for a public purpose. It is not disputed that after the land was assigned to the appellant-company, it was being used for the factory which is running a commercial venture and is certainly engaged in 'remunerative' business. Reading in the context in which Section 29(g) appears, the purpose which is sought to be achieved under Section 29 of the Act for exempting certain categories of land, it becomes abundantly clear that what is countenanced by it is the 'use' to which the land has been put. Reading in the context in which Section 29(g) appears, the purpose which is sought to be achieved under Section 29 of the Act for exempting certain categories of land, it becomes abundantly clear that what is countenanced by it is the 'use' to which the land has been put. If the land was being used for a public purpose like the maintenance of a public park, a playground for the children, a school, a hospital, a destitute home, an orphanage and the like, then, subject to the restrictions contained in the clause itself, exemption would be available, but it would not be available where the use to which the land has been put is not for a 'public purpose'. The learned single Judge, in the circumstances, rightly repelled the submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner-appellant on that score and for what we have noticed above we have not been persuaded to take a contrary view. The first ground as raised by learned Counsel, therefore, fails and is rejected. 8. So far as the second argument is concerned, namely, about the valuation of the land for the purposes of determination of the tax payable under the Act, the learned single Judge, after referring to Clause (3) of the assignment deed, opined that for the purpose of determining the liability for assessment, it would be the market value as on 1-7-1963 which should form the basis. For arriving at this conclusion the learned single Judge relied upon the provisions of Section 5-A of the Act, which is the charging section. That section is unambiguous and supports the conclusion arrived at by the learned single Judge. The submission by learned Counsel for the appellant was that since power of resumption had been retained under Clause (3) of the assignment deed, the payment contained in that clause itself should be treated as the valuation and not the market price as on 1-7-1963. The contingency contemplated by Clause (3) of the assignment deed, i.e., resumption of land by the Government, has not arisen in the instant case. Had the land been resumed, there would have been no question of it being subjected to tax under the Act in view of the provisions of Section 29 of the Act. The contingency contemplated by Clause (3) of the assignment deed, i.e., resumption of land by the Government, has not arisen in the instant case. Had the land been resumed, there would have been no question of it being subjected to tax under the Act in view of the provisions of Section 29 of the Act. It is only because there has been no resumption and the appellant continues to enjoy the assignment of the land that he has been assessed to urban land tax under the Act for that land. For purposes of determining the amount of urban land tax, therefore, the market value as on 1st July, 1963, as contemplated by Section 5-A(2) of the Act would be determinative. The second ground of attack, therefore, also fails. 9. We shall now consider the third submission, which, as already noticed, was neither raised in the writ petition nor before the learned single Judge during the arguments, nor even in the grounds of appeal. It was, however, permitted to be raised subsequently and we have heard learned Counsel for the parties at length. 10. Learned Counsel for the appellant submitted that since the liability to pay tax under the Act is on an owner, an assignee of the land acquired by the Government, does not come within the definition of 'owner' as contained in the Act. According to the learned Counsel, the right of resumption contained in the assignment deed puts a cloud on the right of ownership of the appellant and therefore the assessment order is bad in law. In support of his submission, he has relied upon a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (Swamikkannu, J.) in Sundaram Fasteners Ltd v. The Asst. Commissioner of Urban Land Tax (1989) I M.L.J. 72. In that case, the promoter of a group of companies applied to the Government of Tamil Nadu for acquisition and assignment of lands for the establishment of factories for the manufacture of automobile components and ancillary items. The Government agreed and took proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act and after acquiring the lands assigned them in favour of the company. One of the conditions of the assignment was that the lands were liable to be resumed by the Government on certain contingencies. The liability of the Government in case lands were resumed was also spelt out in the deed of assignment. One of the conditions of the assignment was that the lands were liable to be resumed by the Government on certain contingencies. The liability of the Government in case lands were resumed was also spelt out in the deed of assignment. The Urban Land Tax Authority assessed the lands to tax at the market value of the lands and proposed to levy tax. An appeal to the Tribunal against the proposed assessment failed and the orders were questioned through' the writ petition. It was held by the High Court that the relationship between the petitioners and the Government on the basis of the deed of assignment did not bring the petitioners within the definition of 'owners' as per Section 2(10) of the Act and in view of the clause relating to resumption, Swamikkannu, J held that the ownership vested with the Government and since the Government was exempted from payment of urban land tax by virtue of the provisions of the Act, the assignee would not be saddled with the liability to pay tax under the Act. This judgment undoubtedly supports the submissions of learned Counsel for the appellant. 11. In reply, the learned Additional Government Pleader submitted that the law laid down in Sundaram Fasteners' case (1989) I M.L.J. 72 was not correct and that merely because there was a clause for resumption it did not imply that the appellant was not an 'owner' within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Act. According to him, the assignee is an 'owner' if the land which is assigned to him for specific purpose is used for that purpose, that it is only for violation of the terms and conditions of assignment that the power of resumption can be exercised by the Government and that clause does not put any cloud on the ownership rights of the assignee 'in respect of the assigned lands and that he is for all intent and purposes the 'owner' of the land. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Government Pleader has relied upon a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (Nainar Sundaram, J) in Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. Madras v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by The Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras and Anr. W.P. No. 4348 of 1980 decided on 11.9.1986. In support of his submission, the learned Additional Government Pleader has relied upon a judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court (Nainar Sundaram, J) in Hindustan Teleprinters Ltd. Madras v. The State of Tamil Nadu represented by The Commissioner of Urban Land Tax, Madras and Anr. W.P. No. 4348 of 1980 decided on 11.9.1986. In that case, the petitioner therein had the benefit of an assignment of urban land from the State. The company had been assessed to urban land tax under the provisions of the Act in respect of the assigned land. The order of assessment was impeached principally on the ground that the assignee was not an 'owner' within the meaning of Section 2(10) of the Act and that in view of the clause authorising resumption, the assignee of the land did not acquire the status of an 'owner'. Nainar Sundaram, J. repelled the contention and held that the conditions imposed in the deed of assignment, including the condition of resumption, did not militate against the concept of the assignee being the owner of the land for the purposes of the Act. The Court opined: The conditions imposed do not militate against the concept of the assignee being the owner of the land for the purposes of the Act. Owner is a general term and it means proprietor. The proprietary right may stand circumscribed by certain limitations and restrictions by the very grant. But, still the grantee of the assignee fulfils the character of owner. May be, the assignment is defeasible in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of assignment. But, on that account and until that happens, it is not possible to take away the assignee from the concept of owner under the Act. Clause 6 of the assignment specifically casts an obligation on the assignee to pay all taxes, rates, cesses, etc. which may be levied by the State, or Central Government or Local Bodies, or any other agency appointed by the Government for the administration of the developed plots. This judgment supports the view taken by the learned single Judge, impugned in this appeal, and appears to be in conflict with the judgment rendered by Swamikkannu, J (supra). which may be levied by the State, or Central Government or Local Bodies, or any other agency appointed by the Government for the administration of the developed plots. This judgment supports the view taken by the learned single Judge, impugned in this appeal, and appears to be in conflict with the judgment rendered by Swamikkannu, J (supra). It would, however, be relevant to point out that there is no reference to the judgment of Nainar Sundaram, J, in the later judgment delivered by Swamikkannu, J. and it appears that the same was not brought to brother Swamikkannu, J.'s notice. 12. Section 29(a) of the Act provides that none of the provisions of the Act would apply inter alia to any urban land owned by the State or the Central Government. That means that no urban land tax can be levied on the land which is owned by the State or the Central Government. Therefore, if the 'owner' of the land is the 'Government', the liability of paying tax cannot be fastened on it. Who then in law is the 'owner' of the land acquired by the Government at the request of party to whom it is subsequently 'assigned', after receipt of payment for the purposes of the tax liability under the Act? 'Owner' is defined by Section 2(10) of the Act and reads as follows: 'Owner' includes (i) any person (including a mortgagee in possession) for the time being receiving or entitled to receive, whether on his own account or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager or receiver for another person or for any religious or charitable purposes, the rent or profits of the urban land or of the building constructed on the urban land in respect of which the word is used; (Emphasis supplied). (ii) any person who is entitled to the kudiwaram in respect of any inam land but does not include (a) a shortriemdar; or (b) any person who is entitled to the melwaram in respect of any inam land but in respect of which land any other person is entitled to the kudiwaram. Explanauon-For the purposes of Clause (9) and Clause (10) inam land includes lakhiraj tenures of land and shrotriem land. A careful reading of the definition shows that it is an inclusive definition. Explanauon-For the purposes of Clause (9) and Clause (10) inam land includes lakhiraj tenures of land and shrotriem land. A careful reading of the definition shows that it is an inclusive definition. It is also wide in its amplitude and any person, who for the time being receives or is entitled to receive the rent or profits of the land or of the building constructed on the urban land would be deemed to be an "owner". The definition of an 'owner' under Section 2(10) of the Act, thus, travels beyond the dictionary meaning of an 'owner' for the purpose of fastening the liability to pay urban land tax under the Act Any person receiving or entitled to receive the rent or profits of that land for the time being would be an 'owner' for the purpose of tax liability under the Act. 13. Section 5 of the Act provides that there shall be levied and collected for every falsi year commencing from the date of commencement of the Act, a tax on each urban land from the "owner" of such urban land at the rates specified in the Schedule. 14. Whether an assignee of land from the Government would be covered by the definition of an "owner" under the terms of the deed of assignment, would depend upon the nature of rights which an assignee acquires with regard to receiving the benefit profits out of the land or the building constructed thereon including the right to receive or being entitled to receive the rent, to the exclusion of all others including the assignor. The mere power of the Government to resume land in the event of any of the conditions of the assignment being violated, would not, by itself, take out the assignee from the definition of an 'owner' if there has been a transfer of interest of the land to him absolutely entitling him to for a limited period. It was primarily because of the limited period of assignment that the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the possession had only been given in favour of the company therein for 'enjoyment' and therefore "entire elements that are available to recognize ownership" could not be said to have been transferred in favour of the company. Moreover, there is nothing in the judgment to show whether the assignee had undertaken to pay all taxes etc. under the deed of assignment either. Moreover, there is nothing in the judgment to show whether the assignee had undertaken to pay all taxes etc. under the deed of assignment either. The Bench also did not consider the import of the expression "for the time being receiving or entitled to receive" occurring in Section 2(10) of the Act. Reliance placed on the Madhya Pradesh High Court judgment, which is clearly distinguishable was thus not proper. 15. Swamikkannu, J. also relied upon a judgment of a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Victoria P.H.T. Board v. A.C. of Urban Land Tax 1977 I M.LJ. 294 That judgment also is distinguishable and could not be relied upon to support the view of the learned Judge. In Victoria P.H.T. Board's Case (supra), the Division Bench found on the basis of the admission in the counter affidavit that the Municipal Corporation continued to be the 'owner' of the Land in question. On the basis of that admission the Bench found that the Trust Board was only a lessee of the corporation and since the corporation itself was not liable to pay tax in view of the exemption clause contained in Section 29 of the Act, the liability under the charging Section 5 of the Act could not be extended in respect of that land, to the lessee of the corporation. 16. In Hindustan Teleprinters' Case (supra) Nainar Sundaram, J., after extracting the operative portions of the deed of assignment, and, in particular, the clauses relating to resumption, the tax liability of the assignee and after referring to the definition of the expression 'owner' as occurring in Section 2(10) of the Act, held that the conditions imposed including the condition of resumption, did not militate against the concept of the assignee being the 'owner' of the land for the purposes of the Act. It was held: Owner is a general term and it means, proprietor. The proprietary right may stand circumscribed by certain limitations and restrictions by the very grant. But, still the grantee or the assignee fulfils the character of owner. May be the assignment is defeasible in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of assignment. But, on that account and until that happens, it is not possible to take away the assignee from the concept of owner under the Act. But, still the grantee or the assignee fulfils the character of owner. May be the assignment is defeasible in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of assignment. But, on that account and until that happens, it is not possible to take away the assignee from the concept of owner under the Act. The learned Judge (Nainar Sundaram, J.) thereafter referred to Clause 6 of the deed of assignment, which cast an obligation on the assignee to pay all taxes, rates and cesses which may be levied by the State or Central Government or Local Bodies or any other agency appointed by the Government for the administration of the developed plots, and held that the liability of the assignee to pay the tax under the Act was, in any case, unavoidable in view of the obligation cast on the assignee by Clause 6 of the deed of assignment itself. 17. The judgment in Hindustan Teleprinters' Case (supra) which had been delivered much earlier, on 11th September, 1986, does not appear to have been brought to the notice of Swamikkannu, J. while dealing with Sundaram Fasteners' Case (supra), as no reference to it is found in that judgment. 18. Keeping in view the definition of an 'owner' as noticed herein above, we are of the opinion that this inclusive definition brings within its fold all such persons who for the time being receive or are entitied to receive whether on their own account, or as agent, trustee, guardian, manager, or receiver, for another person, the rent or profits of the urban land. The expression 'Owner' as occurring in Section 2(10) of the Act, is quite wide in its amplitude and is not restricted in the sense it is used either under the Contract Act or under the Transfer of Property Act or in the dictionary. The mere clause of resumption in the deed of assignment, in our opinion, is not sufficient to lake out the assignee from the concept of an 'owner' of the land/or the purposes of the Act. The imposition of the conditions including the condition of resumption in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of assignment do not militate against the concept of the assignee being the 'owner' of the land for the purposes of Section 5 of the Act. The imposition of the conditions including the condition of resumption in the contingencies contemplated in the deed of assignment do not militate against the concept of the assignee being the 'owner' of the land for the purposes of Section 5 of the Act. Since the definition of owner is an inclusive one, and not an exhaustive one, and states that even a mortgagee in posession under the definition would be included in the definition of an 'owner', there appears to be no justification to treat an 'assignee' not to be an 'owner', where his right to receive the rent or derive profits from the urban land or the building constructed thereon for the time being is unfettered, notwithstanding the existence of the "resumption" clause in the deed, which clause as already observed does not militate against the concept of ownership for the purposes of the Act and does not cast any cloud on the present rights of an assignee to receive or be entitled to receive for the time being, the rent or profits in respect of the land or the building constructed thereon. 19. Considered thus, in our opinion, the judgment of Swamikkannu, J. in Sundaram Fasteners' case (supra) does not only state the proposition too broadly, but also does not lay down the correct law. The view expressed by Nainarsundram, J. in Hindustan Teleprinters' Case (supra) on the other hand, in our opinion, is the correct exposition of the law on the subject. 20. Coming now to the facts of the instant case, there is no dispute, and indeed there cannot be any, that the Government acquired the land in question at the request of the appellant herein. From the documents and the record, it is also established that the entire cost of acquisition including the pay and allowances and pensionary contributions of the staff and all other charges had to be borne by the company and credited to the Government. This is evident from a plain reading of paragraph (3) of G.O. Ms. No. 3483, Ind. (special) dated 10.7.1962 as well as from paragraph 4 of G.O. Ms. No.2949 Department of Industries, Labour and Co-operation, dated 7th September, 1957. The resumption clause in the deed of assignment only circumscribes the use of the proprietary rights of the appellant by certain limitations and restrictions. No. 3483, Ind. (special) dated 10.7.1962 as well as from paragraph 4 of G.O. Ms. No.2949 Department of Industries, Labour and Co-operation, dated 7th September, 1957. The resumption clause in the deed of assignment only circumscribes the use of the proprietary rights of the appellant by certain limitations and restrictions. That it is the appellant who for the time being is entitled to receive the rent or profits in respect of the assigned land or the building constructed thereon, notwithstanding the 'resumption' clause in the deed, is not disputed or denied. The right of 'resumption' which may render the assignment defeasible cannot, till that contingency arises, Jake out the assignee from the concept of being an 'owner' under the Act, and he would continue to enjoy the rent or profits of the urban land or the buildings constructed thereon till the contingency would arise. The legislature had, therefore, designedly used the expression 'for the time being' receiving or entitled to receive the profits or rents etc. to describe an owner who would be fastened with the tax liability under the Act. 21. It would also be relevant at this stage to note that under Section 7 of the Act, every owner of urban land who is liable to pay urban land tax, has to submit a return within a specific period in respect of each urban land. That return has to contain the following particulars: (a) name of the owner of the urban land; (b) the extant of the urban land; (c) the name of the division or ward and of the street, survey number and sub-division number of the urban land and other particulars of such urban land; and (d) the amount which in the opinion of the owner is the market value of the urban land:-Provided that in the case of an owner of urban land in any area in respect of which a notification under Clause (b) of Sub-section (2) of Section 1 is published, the return referred to in this section shall be furnished within one month from the date of the publication of such notification or within such further time as the Government may, by notification specify. 22. The appellant-company, in the instant case, had furnished their returns for the purposes of assessment of the urban land tax. 22. The appellant-company, in the instant case, had furnished their returns for the purposes of assessment of the urban land tax. From the order of assessment, impugned in the writ petition, it transpires that the appellant had recorded against the column of "owner of the urban land" its own name. 23. Again, in the appeal which was filed by the appellant before the Urban Land Tax Tribunal (Sub Court) against the order of assessment, it submitted written arguments. Paragraph 1 of the written arguments which are styled as "objections to the order of assessment" read as follows: (This appears at page 47 of Vol. I of the Typed sets) Before arriving at the market value of THE PROPERTY OWNED, BY DUNLQP INDIA LIMITED, Ambattur, the background of the lands acquired by the Government and sold to Dunlop India Limited should be borne in mind. (Emphasis supplied). A bare reading of the above paragraph shows that-the appellant has not only admitted that the property in question was "owned" by the appellant but also that the Government had "Sold" the property in question to the appellant after acquiring it. It also transpires from a perusal of the record, that the patta of land in question has been recorded in the revenue records in favour, of the appellant-company. 24. In the face of all these factors, we fail to understand how it is permissible for the appellant to now contend that it is not the 'owner' of the land in question for the purposes of the tax liability under the Act, though it continues to enjoy all the rights which an owner has for the time being as envisaged by Section 2(10) of the Act. 25. Thus, considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that the appellant squarely falls within the definition of an 'owner' under Section 2(10) of the Act and is liable to pay the urban land tax in respect of the assigned land. The appellant was rightly assessed to pay the urban land tax in respect of the assigned land and the order of the assessing authority which was upheld by the tribunal as well as by the learned single Judge calls for no interference at all. 26. The writ appeal therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.