H. G. BALAKRISHNA, J. ( 1 ) IN all these cases, common questions of fact and law are involved and the impugned notices are identical in nature. Hence, these cases arc disposed of by a common order. ( 2 ) THE lands in question, stated to belong to the petitioners originally, were partof the lands of Kadalabal Village, Hospet Taluk, Bellary District of the erstwhile state of Madras. The case of the petitioners is that more than a century ago the lands were enfranchised by the erstwhile State of Madras under the Madras Enfranchised inams Act, 1862 and 1866 and therefore, they ceased to be Inam lands as far back as 1977 and 1978. The record of rights on which reliance is placed by the petitioners for the years 1982-83 disclose that the lands in question do not belong to the category of inam lands as could be seen from Annexures-A to E. These lands were formerly governed as unalicnated lands under Madras Land Revenue Code and after on 1-1-1965 by Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and so also thereafter. With the advent of Karnataka Certain Inams Abolition Act, 1977 (Karnataka Act 10/1978) which came into force on 8-5-1978, the respondents are the authorities concerned in regard to the implementation of the said Act. Respondent-3 issued notice No. LRM 92/1982, dated 15-1-1983 vide Annexure-F acting on the premise that the lands of the petitioners come within the sweep of the said Act and therefore that the petitioners are in illegal occupation of lands. According to the authorities, the lands came to be vested in respondent-1. The petitioners were directed to surrender possession of the lands within fifteen days, failing which, necessary action would be taken against the petitioners in accordance with provisions of the Act. According to the petitioners, they are all owners of the respective lands and they are in occupation and possession as well as cultivation of the same. The petitioners are justifying their occupation and possession on the ground that the revenue records clearly show that no part of the lands in question come under the purview of the Act and that these lands are private lands over which the respondents have no jurisdiction under the Act. In fact, the petitioners are questioning the impugned notices on the basis that the Act is totally inapplicable and therefore, the impugned notices are unjustified. In fact, the petitioners are questioning the impugned notices on the basis that the Act is totally inapplicable and therefore, the impugned notices are unjustified. ( 3 ) ARISING out of these facts is the question whether the petitioners are entitled tothe relief of quashing of notices dated 15-1-1983 under Annexures-F, J, L, N, Q, S, v, Y, Z-l, Z-2, Z-5 and Z-9 to Z-13 issued by respondent-3. ( 4 ) THERE can be no two opinion about the fact that the lands in respect of which the impugned notices have been served on the petitioners originally constituted integral part of the territory lying within the erstwhile State of Madras and were also governed by the Madras Act. On the admission of the petitioners themselves, more than a century ago, these lands were no doubt Inam lands, but subsequently enfranchised by the State of Madras under the Madras Enfranchised Inams Act, 1862 and 1866. There is no material to dispute the fact that the lands ceased to be Inam lands in the years 1977 and 1978 and the record of rights of the year 1982-83 substantiate the case of the petitioners under Annexures-A to E that these lands were no longer Inam lands. Thereafter, the lands came within the sweep of Madras Land revenue Code as unalienated lands and subsequently with effect from 1-1-1965 they came under the purview of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 and continued to be so. As already observed, the revenue records such as the record of rights clearly establish the fact these lands are not Inam lands and there are no other documents before me to disbelieve the claim of the petitioners. In these circumstances, it would be necessary to refer to the impugned notices in the form in which they have been issued. Since all the impugned notices are identical, I shall refer to the notice under annexure-Z 1. In these circumstances, it would be necessary to refer to the impugned notices in the form in which they have been issued. Since all the impugned notices are identical, I shall refer to the notice under annexure-Z 1. The said notice reads thus: ( 5 ) IN this notice which is addressed to K. Somappa, who is the petitioner in W. P. No. 3300/1983, the notice is purported to have been issued under Section 5 (1) and (3) of the Karnataka Certain Inam Abolition Act, 1977, by virtue of which it is claimed that the lands have become vested in the State of Karnataka and therefore, it is alleged that the petitioners are in illegal occupation of the land and therefore the occupants should vacate the land within a period of fifteen days. It is also mentioned in the notice that all the crops and trees standing on the land have become vested in the State Government. ( 6 ) SECTION 5 (1) and (3) of the Act provides:-"save as otherwise provided in this Act, with effect from and or the appointed date. (1) Every tenant of the Inamdar or holder of a minor Inam shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of lands in respect of which he was a tenant immediately before 1st day of March, 1974. xx xx xx. (3) Every Inamdar including the holder of a minor Inam, shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands it was personally cultivating immediately before the said date. "i do not find any support for the assumption that Section 5 (1) empowers the authority which has issued the notices to the petitioners to vacate the land. On the other hand, a reading of sub-section (1) of Section 5 shows that every tenant of the inamdar or a holder of minor Inam is entitled to be registered as an occupant of lands in respect of which he was a tenant immediately before 1st day of March, 1974. The interpretation would be that under this provision, a person claiming to be a tenant or inamdar or a holder of minor Inam is entitled to seek registration of occupancy right in respect of the lands tenanted by him immediately before 1st of March, 1974. I do not see the relevance of Section 5 (1) for purpose of issuing a notice of eviction by the Tahsildar. I do not see the relevance of Section 5 (1) for purpose of issuing a notice of eviction by the Tahsildar. ( 7 ) ACCORDING to sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, every Inamdar including the holder of a minor Inam, shall be entitled to be registered as an occupant of all lands personally cultivated by him before the said date. It is not clear in what context the notices make reference to sub-section (3) at all. It appears to me that authority issuing the notices has cither misdirected itself or has by oversight incorporated subsection (3) in the notices in question. Sub-section (3) of Section 5 is totally out of context in so far as the power of the authority is concerned in regard to eviction. Even assuming that the provision of law invoked in sub-section (3) of Section 5 of the Act, the power nevertheless resides in the Tahsildar for the purpose of evicting the petitioners who are in alleged occupation of Inam land and the point to be considered is whether the Tabsildar has adopted the necessary procedure which is contemplated under the Act before ordering eviction of the petitioners. ( 8 ) IT is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that it is necessary for the authority to determine whether or not the lands in question arc inam lands and whether these lands arc in unauthorised occupation of the petitioners. It is contended that in the absence of determination of these questions of fact, it is not open to the Tahsildar to serve the impugned notices on the petitioners and therefore, the impugned action is totally unjustified. ( 9 ) THERE is absolutely no evidence on record or material on record to show that there was a prior determination of the question whether or not the lands belong to the category of Inam lands and whether the petitioners have been in unauthorised occupation of the lands. No enquiry seems to have to have been held in this regard and the petitioners have a legitimate grievance before the Court in as much as no opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioners to establish that these lands are not Inam lands and that they arc not liable to be evicted from the lands and at least they are in lawful occupation of lands. ( 10 ) IT appears to me that the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners deserve to be accepted because eviction ofthc occupants of the lands under the Act, in order to be legitimate, pre-supposcs the existence of proved liability for eviction and the application of the Act in the facts and circumstances of the case, in which the petitioners are disputing the allegation that not only the lands are Inam lands, but also on the other land, are contending based on documentary evidence such as record of rights, that these lands are enfranchised lands and they arc now controlled and regulated by the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964. These are all facts which require investigation and verification. When an action is to be taken to evict the petitioners from the lands which they claim as belonging to them, substantive rights are involved and the Tahsildar - cannot afford lo lightly interfere with those rights. Apart from principles of natural justice, rules of fairness and reasonableness require that when civil consequences of very serious nature arc to ensue by the impugned action, the concerned authority should held an enquiry after notifying the persons who arc likely to be affected, and afford them a reasonable opportunity of hearing with liberty to adduce such evidence as they deem fit and dispose of the case on merits in accordance with law. It is only when the liability of the petitioners for eviction is established after due enquiry, the Tahsildar is competent to take such action as warranted under the provisions of the Act against the petitioners. I find from the material on record that it is not possible to reach a finding that such a procedure has been followed by the Tahsildar before he proceeded to issue the impugned notices. I have to presume that no enquiry was held, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioners and the impugned notices are the out-come of arbitrary exercise of power. When a statute confers power or discretion on the authority, whether the authority is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, the law presumes that it is intended to be exercised discretly and judiciously. From the nature of the notices, I am of the opinion that these notices are arbitrary and constitute patently a wrongful exercise of power by the Tahsildar. When a statute confers power or discretion on the authority, whether the authority is exercising judicial or quasi-judicial power, the law presumes that it is intended to be exercised discretly and judiciously. From the nature of the notices, I am of the opinion that these notices are arbitrary and constitute patently a wrongful exercise of power by the Tahsildar. ( 11 ) IN the above circumstances, I hold that the eviction notices which are assailed in these writ petitions arc unsustainable and are therefore, quashed. The writ petitions are allowed. ( 12 ) HOWEVER, liberty is reserved to the Tahsildar to hold a fresh enquiry affordinga reasonable opportunity of hearing to all the petitioners with liberty to adduce such evidence as they may deem necessary and dispose of the cases on merits and in accordance with law. Sri Srinivasa Murthy, learned Government Pleader, is permitted to file memo of appearance within two weeks from today. --- *** --- .