S. D. JHA, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal by the tenant against concurrent decree of eviction of two Courts below under S. 12 (1) (a) r/w S. 13 (6) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter called, 'the Act') was admitted for final hearing by order dated 8-7-85 on the following substantial question of law :- whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the same, the Court below has erred in holding that the plaintiff has made out a case for eviction on the grounds specified in S. 12 (1) (a) of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961, in view of the fact that the notice demanding arrears of rent was not in respect of the entire leased premises? ( 2 ) THE plaintiff filed suit against defendant/appellant claiming eviction from the suit accommodation from the suit accommodation on grounds set out under S. 12 (1) (a) of the Act arrears of rent and clause (c) nuisance. The defendant in her written statement stated that the tenanted premises consisted not only of one room but besides the room OSARI AND CHOUK. Tenancy and its commencement and the boundaries of the suit accommodation as set out in the plaint were admitted, demand of arrears of rent and its payment in respect of demand was denied. Nuisance was denied. It was submitted that suit was filed to get increased rent. ( 3 ) THE trial Court by order dated 12-4-83 acting under S. 13 (6) of the Act struck out defendant / appellant's defence because of her failure to file statement as to deposit of rent and record showing that she had not deposited full arrears of rent. The Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 12-8-83 decreed the plaintiffs suit for eviction on grounds under S. 12 (1) (a) and (c) of the Act. In appeal by defendant-tenant, the first Appellate Court VIIth Addl. District Judge, Indore by judgment decree dated 29-1-1985 set aside the finding of the Trial Court under clause (c) of S. 12 (1) nuisance but upheld the same under S. 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Hence, the present appeal. In appeal by defendant-tenant, the first Appellate Court VIIth Addl. District Judge, Indore by judgment decree dated 29-1-1985 set aside the finding of the Trial Court under clause (c) of S. 12 (1) nuisance but upheld the same under S. 12 (1) (a) of the Act. Hence, the present appeal. ( 4 ) AT the hearing of the appeal Shri S. K. Nigam learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, decree under S. 12 (1) (a) passed by the two Courts below against the defendant / appellant could not be sustained. In support of his argument Shri S. K. Nigam relied on the following decisions: - 1. Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas ( AIR 1980 SC 587 ). 2. Harjeetsingh v. Mohammad Nayeem (1981 MPRCJ Note No. 4) 3. Dashrathsingh v. Jhaboo (1980 JLJ Note No. 63) 4. Sita v. Sikharam (1979 JLJ Note No. 20 ). Shri S. S. Samvatsar learned counsel for the respondent urged that condonation of default in making deposit under S. 13 (6) or as required under S. 12 (1) (a) is a matter of discretion of the Court and the exercise of discretion by the Court in the matter was not a substantial question of law within the meaning of S. 100, C. P. C. for the argument he relied on Reserve Bank of India v. R. G. Morey 1976 Lab IC 575. ( 5 ) FROM the substantial question of law reproduced above the crux of the substantial question as formulated is that notice demanding arrears of rent was in respect of part of leased premises whereas eviction was claimed of the entire leased-premises. Shri Nigam's argument based on decisions referred to above as would be presently shown, are not in conformity with the substantial question of law formulated in appeal. Even if the argument is taken into consideration it does not help the appellant. ( 6 ) SHYAMCHARAN Sharma's case (supra) also reported in 1980 MPLJ 325 deals with discretion vested in the Court to condone default in deposit of rent required under S. 13 (6) of the Act. Dashrathsingh's case (supra) lays down that where dispute as to rent is raised in written statement, in absence of enquiry defence cannot be struck off. Harjeet Singh's case (supra) and Sita v. Sikharam (1979 JLJ Note No. 20) are also to the same effect. Dashrathsingh's case (supra) lays down that where dispute as to rent is raised in written statement, in absence of enquiry defence cannot be struck off. Harjeet Singh's case (supra) and Sita v. Sikharam (1979 JLJ Note No. 20) are also to the same effect. As for Shyamcharan's case (supra) the discretion vested in the Court under S. 13 (6) to condone default would have to be judicially exercised considering the facts and circumstances of the case. Reference has already been made to order dated 12-4-83 passed by the Trial Court striking out defence for non-compliance of S. 13 (6) of the Act. The first Appellate Court has discussed the question in paras 11, 12, 13 and 14 in its judgment. In para 14 as to compliance of S. 13 (1) of the Act, deposits made by the defendant/appellant between 10-5-73 to 27-1-83 have been listed. The first Appellate Court has detailed as to how the defendant was irregular in deposit of rent and had not complied with requirement of S. 13 (1) of the Act. The correctness of the details given by the first Appellate Court have not been challenged before this Court. In this Court statement showing payment from 21-1-85 to 11-7-89 totalling Rs. 810/- has been filed by the appellant. Even this would show that the appellant has not been regular in making deposits. On 21-1-1985 a deposit of Rs. 240/ was made followed by another deposit of Rs. 20/- for two months on 13-3-85. Thereafter while regular deposits are made between April, 1985 to Sept. , 1985 a deposit of Rs. 10/- is made on 29-10-85 i. e. after the stipulated date. Similar deposit of Rs. 10/- is made on 30-1-86. There is no deposit in February, 1986. Other deposits on 30-1-86, 30-7-86 and on 20-11-86. There is another deposit made on 30-1-89 of Rs. 10/ -. Apart from the irregular deposits made, and observed by the first Appellate Court even in this Court, the appellant has not been regular in making deposit according to her own list. In the circumstances, while this Court certainly has discretion to condone the default. In view of the persistent irregularity in making deposits it would not be judicially prudent to exercise discretion in favour of the appellant in condoning the delay in deposits and defaults in violation of S. 13 (6) of the Act. In the circumstances, while this Court certainly has discretion to condone the default. In view of the persistent irregularity in making deposits it would not be judicially prudent to exercise discretion in favour of the appellant in condoning the delay in deposits and defaults in violation of S. 13 (6) of the Act. The finding of the first Appellate Court on this account must be upheld. ( 7 ) THE next ground urged by Shri Nigam is that the notice demanding eviction on the ground of arrears related not to the entire accommodation but only to a part of it i. e. the room and not OSARI and CHOUK attached to it. The ground is mentioned only to be rejected. The ground was not agitated before the Trial Court or the first Appellate Court. Notice Ex. P/2, no doubt, mentions a room in House No. 4, Barabhai, Indore, but receipt of this notice was denied by the defendant. The plaint besides stating that tenancy was about the room also gave boundaries of the same in para 1 of the plaint and this description was admitted by the defendant. The written statement further stated that the area within the boundary was the subject-matter of tenancy lease. It is not the defendant's case that OSARI and CHOUK were beyond the boundary. Considering all this as also the fact that ground as to misdescription in the notice was not urged before the Trial Court or the Appellate Court, it cannot be allowed to be urged at the second appeal stage. ( 8 ) SHRI Nigam then next attempted to argue the dispute related to only part of tenanted accommodation and not whole of it and as such suit was not maintainable. For this argument he relied on Chimanlal v. Mishrilal, AIR 1985 SC 136 . What has been stated above about the notice would be equally applicable to this contention. As already stated this ground was not urged before the lower courts and in absence of clear pleadings and evidence cannot be allowed to be urged particularly when no such question of law was formulated at the admission of the appeal. Shri Nigam cannot be allowed to urge such grounds. ( 9 ) FINDING no force in the appeal, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Shri Nigam cannot be allowed to urge such grounds. ( 9 ) FINDING no force in the appeal, the appeal is dismissed with costs. The appellant is, however, granted two months' time to vacate the premises and hand over possession of the same to the landlord / respondent. Appeal dismissed. .