R. K. Maniiana, J — This is an appeal from the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge/Additional Deputy Commissioner Shillong in T.C.A No (T)/77 allowing the appeal from the judgment and decree of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner Shillong passed in T.S. Case No. 23 (T) 1973. 2. The plaintiff instituted the suit against the defendants for declaration that she is the legal heiress of her father Late U. Khraw Tariang in respect of the suit properties. The case of the plaintiff is that the suit properties were acquired by her father U.Khraw Tariang during his life time. After his death the plaintiff is entitled to the suit properties left by her father as she is the only heiress. The defendants resisted the suit stating, inter alia, that according to Pnar custom the plaintiff is not the heiress of late U. Khraw Tariang. The properties purchased by U. Khraw were divided and given to many members of his family by a written document dated 2. 2. 72 including the plaintiff, and those which were not divided are to be inherited by his. family female relatives according to the Pnar custom. The trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff. On appeal by the defendants, the decree and judgment were set aside by the lower appellate Court. 3. The trial Court has held, inter alia, that the plaintiff is the heiress of the suit properties, the suit properties were purchased by late U. Khraw Tariang for the maintenance of his daughter ( the plaintiff) and her children, the deed dated 22.2.72 was invalid for want of registration and other reasons given in the judgment, and grant of succession certificate stall tot operate as-res judicata on the question of title in the suit. The lower appellate Court has held that the plaintiff is not the heiress of late Khraw., the suit properties were not purchased by Khraw for the maintenance of the plaintiff and her children. Rut he generally agreed with the findings of the trial judge that the deed dated 22.2.72 w is illegal. However, on perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, we find that the appellate Court has not discussed about the custom prevailing amongst the Pnar tribe and the res judicata. Rut he generally agreed with the findings of the trial judge that the deed dated 22.2.72 w is illegal. However, on perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate Court, we find that the appellate Court has not discussed about the custom prevailing amongst the Pnar tribe and the res judicata. Therefore, the only points for determination in this appeal are what is the rule of inheritance according to Pnar custom and whether the suit is barred by res judicata. 4. The question which arises for consideration is whether the order of grant of succession certificate will operate as res judicata on the question of title in the suit cut of which the present appeal arises. Section 11 relates to the suits. The 'suit' is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, In Hansaraj vs. Deharadun, AIR 1933 PC 63 (64), the Privy Council observed that the word 'suit' ordinarily means, and apart from same context must he taken to mean, a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint. Section 26, CPC provides that- every suit shall be instituted by the presentation of a plaint or such other manner as may be prescribed. A plaint means statement of claims presented or tendered to the Court complying with the rules contained in Orders 6 and 7, CPC. Orders 6 and 7, CPC lay down the particulars to be contained in a plaint or requirements of a plaint. In a suit a decree is to be passed and the decree is defined in section 2(2), CPC. Merely because the proceeding for grant of succession certificate are to be regulated by section 373 of the Indian Succession Act read with section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it shall not have the traits and trappings of a suit. The enquiry for the grant of succession certificate is a summary one. Sections 381 and 387 of the Indian Succession Act, if read together, makes it clear that grant of succession certificate does not establish the title of the grantee. The succession certificate is only an authority to collect debt or debts on behalf of persons entitled thereto. The question of title never falls for decision by any Court which grants succession certificate. Therefore, the adjudication in a proceeding for grant of succession certificate will not operate as res judicata on the question of title. 5. The succession certificate is only an authority to collect debt or debts on behalf of persons entitled thereto. The question of title never falls for decision by any Court which grants succession certificate. Therefore, the adjudication in a proceeding for grant of succession certificate will not operate as res judicata on the question of title. 5. As regards the custom, it is stated at the bar that Pnar tribe is a matriarchal society, that is to say - the woman is the bead of the family and rules the family and the descent and inheritance are traced through female line according to custom. Therefore, en the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the questions for determination with regard to the self acquired property by a male Pnar by mechanical arts or otherwise by his own exertions during the subsistence of the marriage are :-Whether a husband can have 01 own no property and that the wealth which he earns is acquired for his female MASTER, namely his wife, to whom he belongs according to Pnar custom ? Whether, under the Pnar customary law, such a property will be husband's absolute personal property having his right of disposal during his life time independently without the control of the wife ? What is the rule of inheritence of such a property according to the Pnar custom ? 5A. At this stage, it will be helpful to refer to the following decisions of the Privy Council and of the Supreme Court- (a) In Hurpurshad vs. Sheo Dyal, (1877) 26 WR 55 : (1875-76) 3 IA 259 at page 285, the Privy Council has held : "A custom is a rule which in a particular family or in a particular district, has from long usage obtained the force of law. It must be ancient, certain, and reasonable, and being in derogation of tie general rules of law, must be construed strictly.” (b) In Rama Rao vs. Rajas of Pittapur, AIR 1918 PC 81, the Privy Council has observed : "When a custom or usage, whether in regard to a tenure or a contract or a family right, is repeatedly brought to the notice of the Courts of a country, the Courts may hold that custom or usage to be introduced into the law without the necessity of proof in each individual case. It becomes in the end truly a matter of process and pleading." (c) In Ujagar Singh vs. Mst. Jeo, AIR 1959 SC 1041 , the Supreme Court while proving the decision of the Privy Council in Raja Rama Rao vs. Raja of Pittapur, AIR 1918 PC 81, has observed s "When a custom has been so recognised by the Courts, it passes into the law of the land and the proof of it then become unnecessary under S. 57(1) of the Evidence Act." (d) In RBSS Mnonalal vs. S. S. Rajkunar, AIR 1962 SC 1493 , the Supreme Court has held : "It is well settled that where a custom is repeatedly brought to the notice of the Courts of a country, the Courts may bold that custom introduced into the law without the necessity of proof in each individual case. Venkanta Mahipati Gangadhara Rama Rao vs. Raja of Pittapur, 45 Ind App 148 : (AIR 1918 PC 81)." (e) In the State of Bihar vs. Subodh Gopal, AIR 1968 SC 281 , the Supreme Court has observed : "A custom is a usage by virtue of which a class of persons belonging to a defined section in a locality are entitled to exercise specific rights against certain other persons or property in the same locality. To the extent to which it is inconsistent with the general law, undoubtedly the custom prevails. But to be valid, a custom must b; ancient, certain and reasonable, and being in derogation of the general rules of law must be construed strictly", (f) In Sirmomani vs. Hemkumar, AIR 1968 SC 1299 , the Supreme Court has held : "It is Will established that a custom must be provel to be ancient, certain and reasonable if it is to be recognized and acted upon by Courts of law and being in derogation of the general rules of law the custom must be construed strictly. (See Hurpurshad vs. Sheo Dyal (1875-76) 3 IA 259)". (See Hurpurshad vs. Sheo Dyal (1875-76) 3 IA 259)". (j) In Kaliamma vs. Jarraudin AIR 1973 SC 1134 the Supreme Court has observed : "While it is true that this community is a very small community found within a small local area and the cases that are likely to arise in that community, which will reach the Courts may not be many, we cannot merely on that ground ignore the well established principle that before a custom can be held as having been proved merely on the basis of earlier decisions, those decisions should have been based on evidence adduced in respect of the cases." 6. The position of law as regards the custom may now be summarised as follows. A custom is a rule which in a particular family or in a particular district, has from long usage obtained the force of law. It must be ancient, certain, and reasonable, and being in derogation of the general rules of law, must be construed strictly. In order that a custom may have the force of law, it is essential that it should be ancient, certain, invariable and reasonable. When a custom has been recognised by the Court, it passes into the laws of the land and proof of it then become unnecessary under section 57 (1) of the Evidence Act. It may be added here that it must not be opposed to morality and public policy and it must not also be expressly forbidden by the legislature. Where the proof of a custom rest upon a limited number of instances of a comparatively the recent date, the Court may hold the customs proved. A judgment relating to the existence of the custom is admissible to corroborate the evidence to prove such a custom in another case. 7. In Lakshmidhar Misra vs. Raogalal, AIR 1950 PC 56, the Privy Council has held that the custom is a mixed question of law and fact. The question of law is whether such a custom is to be recognised or not on the facts decided. No issue relating to the custom has been framed. The evidence on record would not te sufficient to the questions. In such a situation, we are inclined to remit the case to the lower appellate Court for disposal of the appeal afresh with a direction to decide only the custom alleged by the defendants. 8. No issue relating to the custom has been framed. The evidence on record would not te sufficient to the questions. In such a situation, we are inclined to remit the case to the lower appellate Court for disposal of the appeal afresh with a direction to decide only the custom alleged by the defendants. 8. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge / Additional Deputy Commissioner Shillong are set aside and the case is sent back to the lower appellate Court for disposal of the appeal afresh in the light of the observations and direction made above within six (6) months from to day. For the complete adjudica­tion, parties shall be given opportunity to produce additional evidence only on the point of customary laws and if necessary additional issue may also be framed and parties may be allowed to adduce evidence. The records of the Courts below shall be sent back immediately. The appellant is directed to appear before the learned lower appellate Court on 28.12.90 for the purpose of receiving directions of that Court as to further proceeding in appeal. No costs.