JUDGMENT B.L.Yadav, J. 1. By the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the orders dated 4-9-85 and 8-12-82 passed by Sri G. D. Dubey, the then District Judge, Ballia and the Vth Additional Munsif, Ballia, allowing the application under Order 21 Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (for short the Code), directing the applicant petitioner to be detained in civil prison for a period of one month, as the petitioner has disobeyed the orders of the court by placing Palani on the land in dispute, in a suit for demolition of construction which was decreed against him. 2. The factul matrix of the case is that a decree for demolition of construction was obtained by respondent no. 2 Khedan and that decree was put in execution and the petitioner judgment debtor was directed to remove the construction, and was further restrained from interfering with the possession of decree holder, who alleged to have obtained the possession on the spot and the petitioner raised the Palani thereafter. Consequently he has violated the orders of the court within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 32 (1) of the Code. The trial court and the appellate court, under the impugned orders, directed the petitioner to be sent to civil prison for a period of one month. Against these orders the present petition has been filed. Sri C. K Rai, learned counsel for the petitioner urged that it has been found by the courts below that the said Palani was not raised by the petitioner, but by one Khedaru, who has not been made a party to the petition, even though the decree holder, respondent no. 3 knew it from before and that he has not raised any Palani on the land in dispute after the execution of decree, nor he has wilfully disobeyed the decree or the order. It was further urged that under the impugned orders the petitioner was held to have disobeyed the decree and the order in favour of respondent no. 3, but the same cannot amount "to wilful disobedience", as was enjoined by sub-rule 1 of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code. Unless the "disobedience" has been proved to be "wilful", no imprisonment can be awarded. 3. Sri S. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3, but the same cannot amount "to wilful disobedience", as was enjoined by sub-rule 1 of Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code. Unless the "disobedience" has been proved to be "wilful", no imprisonment can be awarded. 3. Sri S. N. Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent no. 3, on the other hand, urged that the courts below have held the petitioner to be guilty of disobedience of the decree and order and that itself was sufficient, and in any case the findings indicated that the petitioner has wilfully disobeyed the orders. 4. The relevant statutory provisions of Order 21 Rule 32 (1) is set out below : "Where the party against whom a decree for the specific performance of a contract, or for restitution of conjugal rights, or for an injunction, has been passed, has had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has 'wilfully failed to obey it", the decree may be enforced (in the case of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights by the attachment of his property or, in case of a decree for the specific performance of contract, or for an injunction) by his detention in civil prison, or by the attachment of his property, or by both". A bare reading of the aforesaid provision would indicate that in order to award punishment for disobedience of an injunction by directing the detention of petitioner in civil prison, it must be proved that the petitioner has "wilfully failed to obey" the decree or the order. It is to be noticed that the expression is not 'failed to obey', but 'wilfully failed to obey'. 5. The maxim "Actus Legitimi Non Recepiunt Modum" indicates that when the doing of anything has been indicated to be done in a particular manner sanctioned by law, then the thing cannot be done in a different way. As the punishment, against a person who has wilfully disobeyed the decree or order, is criminal, not only the act but also the intent must be present. It is for this purpose that the word 'wilful' has been employed. The other maxim "Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea" means intent and act both must concur to constitute a crime, without intent no offence. In other words, not only the decree order must be disobeyed but the same must be "wilfully disobeyed". It is for this purpose that the word 'wilful' has been employed. The other maxim "Actus Non Facit Reum Nisi Mens Sit Rea" means intent and act both must concur to constitute a crime, without intent no offence. In other words, not only the decree order must be disobeyed but the same must be "wilfully disobeyed". The intention of the judgment debtor must be to disobey the decree". The word 'wilful' has not been statutorily defined in the Code, consequently, there is no option but to look to the dictionary meaning of the word 'wilful'. In case the word 'wilful' would have been defined statutorily, there was no necessity to look to the dictionary meaning. But when there is no such definition or interpretation, the court may take the aid of dictionary to ascertain the meaning of the word in common parlance In doing so, however, the court must bear in mind that a word is used in different senses according to its context and a dictionary gives all the meanings of a word and the courts would, therefore, have to select a particular meaning which would be relevant to the context in which it has to interpret the word -See State of Orissa v. Titaghar Paper Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1985 SC 1296 at page 1328, para 89. 6. Samuel Johnson, the great dictionary maker and a great English poet, critic and essayist, has said about the meaning of a particular words in dictionary as follows : "Dictionaries are like watches, the worst is better than none and the best cannot be expected to go quite true. Every honest lexicographer agrees knowing that no matter how keenly he strives to make his book go true he would inevitably lose the battle with what might be called linguistic indeterminacy. Since in determinacy will be the prime fact of his professional life, he will often be tempted to deny and resent like the grammarians of the 17th and 18th century as the radical instablity of languages." According to Black's Law Dictionary, the word 'wilful' means proceeding from conscious motion of the will, intending result which actually come to pass, designedly, intentional and not accidental or involuntary an act is done wilfully, if done voluntarily and intentionally and with specific intent to do something the law forbids. According to New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of English language, 'will' means determination and 'wilful' means by intention, not accidental. 7. Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary indicates if you can do something at will, you can do it when you want and as much as you want and to do certain act without will means if you are determined to do something and if you do something without will, you do it with lack of enthuisasm and energy and if you will something to have happened, you make it happen or try to make it happened by using mental efforts rather than physical means. According to Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary, the word 'wilful' means governed only by once will, obstinate done intentionally. 8. In order to ascertain the correct intention of the legislature as expressed through the language used, it is necessary that the provisions of Rule 32 (1) of Order 21 have to be read as it is intended to be so. IN the instant case, just disobedience of the decree or order is not sufficient. The legislature has employed the words 'wilful disobedience'. IN other words, the disobedience must be wilful, intentional, with deliberate object to disobey it. This is statutory offence which is sought to be made out under Rule 32 of Order 21 of the Code. In 21 American Jurisprudence, Second Edition, para 91 the principles of construction with reference to criminal intent has been indicated as follows : "Whether the statutory language does not clearly indicate whether the intent is an element of the offence, the question is whether the legislature has made the act criminal without regard to criminal intent. The law on this question is neither settled nor static. In determining the question, the general rules of statutory construction are followed and the controlling factor is the intent of legislature. The element of statutory offence is a matter of construction to be determined from the language of the statute in view of its manifest purpose and design." (See Morissette v. United States, 242. U. S. United States Supreme Court Reports, 246). 9. It is, therefore, the intention of legislature which is to be ascertained. The intention is obvious by the use of word 'wilful' before the word 'disobedience'. 'Wilful' has been made the condition precedent to constitute an offence. U. S. United States Supreme Court Reports, 246). 9. It is, therefore, the intention of legislature which is to be ascertained. The intention is obvious by the use of word 'wilful' before the word 'disobedience'. 'Wilful' has been made the condition precedent to constitute an offence. What is required is that it must be proved as to whether the act has been done wilfully or not. 10. In case the submissions of the learned counsel for respondent no. 3 are to be accepted that disobedience itself is sufficient to constitute the offence, that would not be a correct approach. There is a maxim "A verbis Legis Non-est Recedendum", which means from the words of law there must be no departure. IN case the submission of the learned counsel for the respondents is accepted, that would normally make departure from the words used. Further there is another principle of interpretation that there must be textual and contextual interpretation. The entire provisions have to be read together, particularly the provisions of a section and no words must be deemed to have been used by the legislature in a superfluous way, nor any part of the statute can be assumed to have been used with a view to make it otios. Every word has to be given a meaning and no word can be left out, nor it can be assumed that the legislature has used a particular word without necessity. IN other words, I am of the considered opinion that it is only wilful disobedience and not any other disobedience which can constitute the offence. The disobedience being wilful, has to be positively proved. Earlier the expression 'contempt of court' was not defined. IN the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, 'contempt of court' means civil contempt or criminal contempt. Under Section 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, civil contempt has been defined to mean wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree or order or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. In Sebestain M. Hongary v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1026, it has been held that wilful disobedience to a writ issued by a court constitutes civil contempt, though mere failure to obey a writ may not constitute civil contempt depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. In Sebestain M. Hongary v. Union of India, AIR 1988 SC 1026, it has been held that wilful disobedience to a writ issued by a court constitutes civil contempt, though mere failure to obey a writ may not constitute civil contempt depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 11. In the present case the Munsif has just recorded a finding at page 27 in his judgment that the Palani has not been raised by Anant, the petitioner but by Khaderu, (the petitioner's mother's sister's son, and by implication it has been assumed that Palani was raised by the petitioner. The District Judge also agreed with the conclusion of the learned Munsif and he also did not consider the exact provisions of Rule 32 (1) of Order 21. No attention was paid either by the District Judge or by the Munsif as to what were the exact provisions in order to constitute an offence or in order to lead to the breach or disobedience of an order or decree. Just disobedience would not constitute an offence nor the petitioner can be sent to prison, rather the findings of the learned Munsif and the learned District Judge must have been that the petitioner has "wilfully disobeyed the order", and the decree passed against him. I have perused the impugned orders and also perused the evidence furnished by the petitioner, i.e. statement of Khedan, respondent no. 3 and the statement of Anant, the petitioner, and I am of the view that there was no evidence led to prove that the disobedience was wilful nor any such finding has been recorded under the impugned orders. 12. The matter can be viewed from another angle. The petitioner has got constitutional protection under Article 21 of the Constitution in respect of his life and personal liberty. Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to the procedure established by law. The expression 'life and personal liberty' has been explained in a catena of decisions. In the present case suffice it to say that the petitioner cannot be deprived of his fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty without the procedure established by law and such procedure has been indicated in Order 21 Rule 32 (1) of the Code. The expression 'life and personal liberty' has been explained in a catena of decisions. In the present case suffice it to say that the petitioner cannot be deprived of his fundamental right of protection of life and personal liberty without the procedure established by law and such procedure has been indicated in Order 21 Rule 32 (1) of the Code. I am, therefore, of the considered opinion that just disobedience to an order, injunction or decree is not sufficient, rather the same must have been alleged and proved and the court or authority must record a clear finding that there was "wilful disobedience", before the petitioner or any other person could be sent to civil prison. In the present case neither it was positively averred nor proved nor any such finding has been recorded that the petitioner has wilfully disobeyed the order or injunction against him. Applying the priori and posteriori reasonings, I am of the considered opinion that the impugned orders suffer from error apparent on the face of record and the same cannot be sustained. 13. In the result, the petition succeeds and is allowed with costs. The impugned orders dated 8-12-82 and 4-9-85 are hereby quashed. Execution application would, however, not be deemed to have been dismissed. The same may proceed under the modes permissible under law, but not by attachment of property of petitioner.