S. Haque, J — By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitoner Smti. Aparna Roy Choudhury assails the orders of termination of the service with effect from 1.7.82 comm­unicated vide letter No. RCLP/82/83 dt. 27.8.82 of the Secretary of the Railway Colony L. P. School, New Gauhati. The petitioner was appointed as an Assistant Teacher in the Railway Colony L. P. School, New Gauhati by the Secretary of the Managing Committee vide his letter No. NC/AC dt. 7.8.1973 (Annexure 'A' to writ petition). The school was taken over by the Government in 1979 under the Assam Elementary Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1974 read with A. E. E. (Provincialisation) Rules, 1977 with one teacher Smti, Basanti Bhowmik. The petitioner was retained in the service of the school. In about last week of May, 1982, the petitioner prayed for maternity leave for 90 days with effect from 1st day of June, 1982 and she was verbally told by the Headmis­tress to avail the leave on and from 1.6.82. A son was born to her on 12.7.82 and she was discharged from Medical College Hospital on 14.7.82. Her salary for the month of June, 1982 was not paid. Her maternity leave was curtailed and she was allowed to join service on the reopening of the school after Summer Vacation on 13.8.82. She expressed surprise for curtailment of leave and non-payment of salary vide letter dt. 17.7.82 (Annexure-D), but finally decided to join on 13.8.82 against medical advice vide her letter dt. 11.8.82 (Annexure-E). She reported for duty on 13.8.82, but the school authority did not allowed her to resume duties. The lawyer of the petitioner served a notice on the Secretary dt, 19.8.82 demanding the salary for the month of June and July, 1982 (Annexure 'F' notice dt. 19.8.82). The Secretary replied to that notice vide later dt. 27.8.82 stating that petitioner's services had already been terminated with effect from 1.7.82 on the ground of frequent absentism without information for longer period and absence from duty without information from 1.6.82 (Annexure-'G' reply of Secretary dt. 27.8.82) The petitioner further states that she was entitled under the law to have maternity leave with full pay and was on leave from 1.6.82 and the allegation of absentism from duty from 1.6.82 was incorrect, Shri Deepak Sarkar, a Teacher of the school by his letter dt. 27.8.82) The petitioner further states that she was entitled under the law to have maternity leave with full pay and was on leave from 1.6.82 and the allegation of absentism from duty from 1.6.82 was incorrect, Shri Deepak Sarkar, a Teacher of the school by his letter dt. 30.8.82 (Annexure-H) invited petitioner's husband to discuss with the Secre­tary and Headmistress of the School and by urging upon to give up her claim of salary for leave period only when she would be allowed to resume duty. She refused to oblige such pressure. She by letter dt. 6.10.82 demanded a copy of the termination order and the resolution of the Managing Committee and also prayed for revocation of the termination order and to pay her salary from June, 1982 upto date (Annexure-1 dt. 6.10.82). Secretary received the letter on 8.10.82 but took no action and so a reminder dt. 16.11.82 was issued (Annexure-J), but her request was not complied with. The petitioner filed appeal/application on 3. 12. 82 before the Deputy Inspector of Schools with copy to D.P.I., Kahilipara, Director of Elementary Education, Kahilipara, but they took no action, nor the appeal was disposed of. Then petitioner preferred appeal before the Assam Administrative Tribunal, being Case No. 76 ATA of 1983, but the appeal was dismissed on the ground that she was not a civil servant as her services were not provincialised (Annexure-'L' dated 15.12. 84 order of A. A. T.). It is alleged that the termination of service on the charge of absence was a penalty and as such the authorities acted illegally and in excess of jurisdiction in inflicting punishment without affording her any opportunity of hearing in violation of principles of natural justice. The respondents have not filed affidavit-in-opposition controverting the statements of the petitioner in spite of notices duly served upon them. However, learned Government Advocate, Miss U. Baruab re­presented the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 and submitted at the hearing. She submits that the services of the petitioner was solely oa the contract with the respondent No. 4, Managing Committee of the School represented by the Secretary and her remedy was in civil Court and not by a writ petition for issuance mandamus on the school authority and that the respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 was not in anyway responsible for the action of the respondent No. 4. Learned counsel Mr. Learned counsel Mr. B. C. Das for the petitioner submits that as soon as the venture school was provincialised, the Managing Committee of the School becomes a statutory body under the A. E. E. (Provincialisation) Act, 1974 and Rules 1977, and it is controlled by the respondents No. 1-3 and the Committee for any action in school affair must get their approval. It is submitted that the petitioner possessed all the qualification and so she was retained in the service when the school was provincialised in 1979 under the Act with the conditions under Rule 5 (iii) of the Rules 1977. Mr, Das fairly submits that the school was provincialised in 1979 only with one teacher and retaining service of the petitioner and thereby the petitioner is not a civil servant to claim the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution, but she cannot be deprived of the principles of natural justice while she was penalised by termination of service and that too at the stage while she was availing maternity leave to which she was lawfully entitled under the law with full salary. He further, submits that although her service initially based on contract, but after provincialisation, the control was by a statutory body (Managing Committee) and when right has been infringed she acquires right to seek invocation of Article 226 and that mandumus would be appropriate under the circumstances and situation. In support of submissions, he refers the cases (1) Mrs. Sivanorul vs. State of Tamil Nadu Secretary Education reported in Services Law Reporter 1986 (11 Vol. XXXVIII page-765 (2) Shri Anadi Kukta Sadguru vs. V. R. Radani & others reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607 . The petitioner was serving since 1973 and in 1979 while the school was provincialised her service was retained in terms of condition under Rule 5 (iii) of the Rules, 1977 as she possessed such qualifi­cation under that rule. She was availing maternity leave since 1. 6. 82 to which she was entitled under the law. It was really very sad as to how the Secretary of the Managing Committee curtailed her maternity leave and directing her to report for duty on 13. 8. 82 the reopening day after the Summer Vacation. She was availing maternity leave since 1. 6. 82 to which she was entitled under the law. It was really very sad as to how the Secretary of the Managing Committee curtailed her maternity leave and directing her to report for duty on 13. 8. 82 the reopening day after the Summer Vacation. But she obeyed and report having no alternative and even at the risk of personal health and of the baby and t> avoid entering into dispute with the school authority as her service/livelihood was involved, but the school authority refused her to resume duties and denied to pay her salaries. The school authority perhaps could realise the fault at one step and so approached her through the letter of Shri Deepak Sarkar allowing her resuming duties on condition to forgo the salaries for the leave period. She had rightly and justly rejected such proposal. The allegations and grounds for termination on frequent absentism without information for longer period and absenting duty without information since 1. 6. 82 as made by the Secretary in his letter/reply dated 27. 8. 82 were unfounded on the face of the statements in the writ petition which are uncontroverted by the respondent No. 4, Managing Committee of the School represented by the Secretary. The Secretary even denied her the copy of the termination order or resolution of the Managing Committee in that regard in spite of demanding it by her letter dated 6. 10. 82 and reminder dated 16. 11. 82. These only exposed the acts of arbitrariness on the part of the Secretary/Man aging Committee in the matter of terminating her service. Once the school is provincialised and services of some of teachers retained for their qualifications under Rule 5 (iii) of the Rules, and the Managing Committee becoming a statutory body since provincialisation, the actions of the Managing Committee/ (or by the Secretary representing it) under Rule 8 of Part-II of the Rules, 1977 would be equally applicable in respect of the teachers who are provin­cialised and those whose services are retained. The Managing Committee can not act whimsically with the retained teachers because their term for provincialisation may come in near future. A whim­sical action of termination of service of a teacher service since 1973, retained in service when school was provincialised, without giving an opportunity of hearing or a show cause was too much for law to tolerate. The Managing Committee can not act whimsically with the retained teachers because their term for provincialisation may come in near future. A whim­sical action of termination of service of a teacher service since 1973, retained in service when school was provincialised, without giving an opportunity of hearing or a show cause was too much for law to tolerate. It is true that initially her service was on contract with the school authority. But as soon as the school is provincialised and the Managing Committee becomes a statutory body controlled by the respondents No. I, 2 and 3, this nature/character of the contract changes even her service is not provincialised with the provincialisatiou of the school, but retained under the provision of the Rules framed under the Act by which the school is provincialised. The educational code gives right to the petitioner to the post/service she held since 1973. Although a contract was initially entered, nature of the contract changed by operation of law by retaining the services of the petitioner with provincialisation of the school, the Court should not deny relief under Article 226 merely on the ground that matter initially was, within the realm of contract. The rights acquired by the educational code, those rights must be enforced. The Managing Committee of a provincialised school is very much amenable to writ jurisdiction. (Principles in 1985 (1) SLR 765 followed). We find no force in the submissions of Miss U. Baruah whereas the submissions of Mr. B. C. Das carry force. As regards issuance mandamus by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India to any other person or authority performing public duty other than statutory authority and instrumentalities of State, the Supreme Court has recently held in the case reported in AIR 1989 S C 1607 as follows :- "If the rights are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue, if the management of the college is purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. These are two exceptions to mandamus. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. Article 226 confers wide power on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. But once these are absent and when the party has no other equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. The law relating to mandamus has made the most spectacular advance. Article 226 confers wide power on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to "any person or authority". It can be issued to for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose”. The term ''authority” used in Article 226, in the context must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enfor­cement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory autho­rities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other persons or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied. It may be pointed out that mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into watertight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Tech­nicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226". It is now clear that the relief sought for by the petitioner on the background stated above a writ under Article 226 is maintainable for issuance of mandamus. It is a case in which injustice was caused and rectification becomes imperative. Mr. Tech­nicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226". It is now clear that the relief sought for by the petitioner on the background stated above a writ under Article 226 is maintainable for issuance of mandamus. It is a case in which injustice was caused and rectification becomes imperative. Mr. Das has rightly pointed out that she being not a full fledged civil servant, the provisions of Article 311 may not be operative, but the nature of the service and the length thereof demand an opportunity of hearing or a show cause notice prior to the action taken, and for such non compliance there was violation of natural justice. We fully agree and endorse the proposition of Mr. Das. There was clear violation of natural justice on the part of the respondent No. 4 by enforcing injustice to the petitioner in terminating her service. The act/ order of termination was arbitrary and illegal. The petitioner is entitled to re-instatement with all arrear salaries. This writ petition is allowed. The order of termination of the services of the petitioner communicated by the Secretary of the Managing Committee of the Railway Colony L. P. School, New Gauhati vide his letter reply dt. 17.8.82 (Annexure 'G') is hereby quashed and it is ordered that the petitioner shall be treated to be in service without break and shall be entitled to all arrear salaries and allowances admissible under the Rules with effect from 1st day of June, 1982. Accordingly, we direct the respondent No. 4 the Managing Committee and its Secretary of the School to reinstate the petitioner arid allow her to resume her duty forthwith and all her arrear salaries be paid within a period of 3 (three) months. Accor­dingly, the rule is made absolute. We allow a cost of Rs. 250/- as counsel's fee to the petitioner payable by the respondent No. 4.