MAJMUDAR J. ( 1 ) IN this petition under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution the petitioners have brought in challenge the order passed by the Deputy Secretary Revenue Department State of Gujarat in exercise of the power under Sec. 34 of the Urban Land (Celling and Regulation) Act 1976 (Urban Land Act for short ). A few facts leading to this petition required to be noted at the outset. ( 2 ) FOUR petitioners claim to be co-owners of immovable property situated at the junction of Kasturba Road and Shroff Road known as Mangal Niwas in Rajkot City. The said property is comprised of S. No. 870/1. There are structures on the road flanked by open land appurtenant to this structure. The said property originally comprised of 9757 sq. yds. It was purchased by petitioner No. 1 who is since deceased and who is represented by his widow jointly with his mother Smt. Manglagauri under an indenture dated 25-1-1935. Original petitioner No. 1 had one-half share therein and his mother Manglagauri had remaining one-half share therein. Both the petitioner No. 1 and Manglagauri were tenants in common having equal shares in this land. Development work viz. construction of structure on the land was carried on by petitioner No. 1 and Manglagauri by contributing expenses in equal share. Co-owner this land viz. Manglagauri died on 11-4-1973 having prior there to made and published her last Will and testament in Gujarati dated 1-6-1972. Under the said Will Manglagauri bequeated her share in the said property unto petitioner No. 2 her grand-son petitioner No. 3 being her great grand-son and petitioner No. 4 being her grand-daughter in proportion of 3/4 equally to each of the petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 and 1/4th to petitioner No. 4 Result was that on the death of Manglagauri on 11-4-1973 the property in question vested in four co-owners each having undivided shares as under: original Petitioner No. 1: 1/2 share. Petitioner No. 2: 3/16 share. Petitioner No. 3: 3/16 share. Petitioner No. 4: 1/8 share. On the death of Manglagauri her one-half share was mutated in the names of petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 mentioned in the Will. In the city survey inquiry held in respect of the said property in 1974 after due verification of the documents and after recording statements made by petitioners Nos. Petitioner No. 4: 1/8 share. On the death of Manglagauri her one-half share was mutated in the names of petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 mentioned in the Will. In the city survey inquiry held in respect of the said property in 1974 after due verification of the documents and after recording statements made by petitioners Nos. 2 3 and 4 the property was shown as belonging to the petitioners. The said order of city survey officer was dated 21 ( 3 ) THE Urban Land Act came into force on 18-2-1976 and it applied amongst other area to the city of Rajkot. On the appointed day the petitioners held the property as co-owners having specified shares in the property. In view of the provisions of Sec. 6 of the Act petitioner No. 1 on behalf of all the petitioners filed a return being form No. 1 under the said Section before respondent No. 3. In the said form one petitioner stated that the said property was held by them as co-owners i. e. tenants in common in specified shares as aforesaid. It was pointed out that holding of none of the co-owners exceeded the ceiling limit and none of them was holding any excess vacant land. Accepting their contentions the competent authority respondent No. 3 after inquiry closed the proceedings by an order at Annexure D dated 6 The said order was sought to be taken in suo motu revision by the second respondent on behalf of the State of Gujarat under Sec. 34 of the Urban Land Act. These revision proceedings were resisted by the petitioners one diverse grounds. It was submitted that proceedings were initiated after unreasonable delay and were required to be dropped. It was further contended that even on merits the order of the competent authority was quite legal and valid and required no interference. The second respondent however passed an order at Annexure E dated 2 taking the view that as the petitioners were co-owners having defeat shares in the property which was not divided by metes and bounds on spot they should be considered as body of individuals or association of individuals and not individuals themselves so far as proceedings under the Urban Land Act were concerned and having taken that view the second respondent set aside the order of the competent authority and remanded the proceedings for a fresh decision. It is this order which has been brought ill challenge by the petitioners in these proceedings. ( 4 ) MR. Bhatt for the petitioners raised the following contentions in support of the petition: (1) The suo motu revision proceedings were initiated after gross delay and in the meantime equities had changed and consequently the revision proceedings were required to be dismissed only on the ground of unreasonable delay; (2) Even on merits the order passed by the second respondent is patently erroneous as he has wrongly assumed that the petitioners who were co-owner having definite specified shares in the property in question cannot be treated as individuals under the Act as they had not separated their shares by metes and bounds by actual partition on spot. ( 5 ) IN support of this second contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1534 of 1978 decided by Kanade and Pandse JJ. on 14-7-1981. Reliance was also placed on a clarification issued by the Central Government in the Ministry of Works and Housing vide their file No. 2 19/78-UCO dated 14-6-1978 in connection with computation of ceiling limit of co-owners of vacant land and ceiling limit of members of a Joint Hindu Family for the purpose of the Act which clarification is printed in the book of Urban Land (Celling and Regulation) Act 1976 with Rules and forms by T. N. Shukla and K. C. Mohta 4 edition 1988 published by Kamal Law House. ( 6 ) MR. K. A. Mehta learned Asstt. Govt. Pleader on the other hand submitted that there was no unreasonable or gross delay on the part of respondent No. 2 in initiating revisional proceedings and even on merits the order of the revisional authority was quite justified. ( 7 ) HAVING given my anxious consideration to the aforesaid rival contentions canvassed by the learned Advocate of the respective parties I have reached the conclusion that this petition deserves to be allowed on the second contention raised by the learned Advocates of the petitioners. I have therefore not thought fit to examine the first contention about unreasonable delay involved in initiating revisional proceedings under Sec. 34 of the Urban Land Act. I will proceed on the assumption for the purpose of deciding contention No. 2 that revisional proceedings were maintainable. I have therefore not thought fit to examine the first contention about unreasonable delay involved in initiating revisional proceedings under Sec. 34 of the Urban Land Act. I will proceed on the assumption for the purpose of deciding contention No. 2 that revisional proceedings were maintainable. However question remains whether the impugned order at Annexure H can be justified on merits. Now it is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court this Court and other High Courts that when co-owners hold definite earmarked shares in a common property they can be said to be tenants in common. Their specified shares do not undergo fluctuation by addition to the group of co-owners or by deletion from the said group. If actual partition by metes and bounds takes place they do not remain co-owners but they become separate owners of separate parcels of land put in their possession but so long as that eventuality does not take place they remain tenants in common being co-owners of the specified shares. Merely because partition by metes and bounds does not take place on spot it cannot be said that the concerned co-owners are not owners of definite specified shares in the joint property. The second respondent in terms has held that all the petitioners were joint owners of this land having specified shares therein. But having reached that conclusion the next step taken by the respondent No. 2 was to the effect that because their shares were not separated by metes and bounds they ceased to be tenants in common and became association or group of individuals for the purpose of the Urban Land Act. This finding of respondent No. 2 is patently erroneous and contrary to the well established principles of law Section 3 of the Act lays down that except as otherwise provided in this Act on 8nd from the commencement of this Act no person shall be entitled to hold 0ny vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit in the territories to which this Act applies under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1. Ceiling is therefore fixed for holding of land by a person. Person is defined by Sec. 2 (1) to mean to include an individual a family a firm a company or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. (2) of Sec. 1. Ceiling is therefore fixed for holding of land by a person. Person is defined by Sec. 2 (1) to mean to include an individual a family a firm a company or an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. It is difficult to appreciate bow respondent No. 2 persuaded himself to hold the co-owners of well defined shares in a joint property ceased to be individuals holding specified shares of the property on the appointed day. Division by metes and bounds is not the requirement of law for considering holdings of the concerned individuals as per Sec. 3 of the Act. An individual may hold exclusively any vacant land or may hold vacant land in common with other co-owners but in specific shares. Merely because he holds some vacant land in specified shares jointly with other co-owners he does not cease to be individual qua his holding of vacant land in specified shares. The emphasis put by second respondent on actual division of land by metes and bounds for the purpose of applicability of Sec. 3 of the Urban Land Act is patently erroneous in law and cannot be justified. In fact the reasoning adopted by the second respondent for reaching his conclusion as aforesaid is clearly repelled by the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court referred to hereinabove Pandse J. in that case considered this very question and made the following pertinent observations following the decision of the Supreme Court in (1971) 82 ITR 828 in the case of Commissioner of Gift Tax Kerala v. R. Valsala Amma: it is well settled that where the property is held by tenants in common having defined share then the holders could not be treated as joint holders merely on the ground that the property is not divided by metes and bounds The assumption of the competent authority that as long as the property is not divided by metes and bounds. it is imperative to consider undivided holding as holding of a body individuals is clearly wrong. . . . . . On the first principle itself it is impossible to sustain the conclusion recorded by the competent authority. it is imperative to consider undivided holding as holding of a body individuals is clearly wrong. . . . . . On the first principle itself it is impossible to sustain the conclusion recorded by the competent authority. Apart from that fact the petitioners could not be termed as a person within the definition of that expression contained in Sec 2 (1) of the Act The expression Person Includes an individual a family a firm a company or an association or body or individuals whether Incorporated or not. In our judgment tenants in common cannot be treated as an association or body of Individuals i respectfully concur with the aforesaid reasoning of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. In view of this settled legal position the decision rendered by the second respondent in revisional proceedings cannot be sustained. But even that apart when we turn to the clarification issued by the Central Government in the Ministry of Works and Housing dated 14-6-1978 we find that whatever doubt might have lingered in the mind of the competent authority is set at rest by this clarification It is laid down in the said clarification that the Government of India had examined the following points: (i) whether in the case of co-owners of vacant land each co-owner is entitled to hold vacant land upto his ceiling limit or whether the co-owners jointly should be treated as a person and the holding of the co-owners of vacant land should be restricted to the ceiling limit on this point the following clarification is issued: the Government of India clarifies that :- if the co-owners have well defined shares they should be treated as individuals with reference to their defined shares on calculating the vacant land which they are entitled to hold under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976 In view of this clarification the reasoning adopted by the second respondent while deciding the revisional proceedings gets clearly misplaced even apart from the settled legal position as discussed by mo earlier. The clarification issued by the Central Government unfortunately does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the second respondent though it was issued as early as on 14-6-1978. I have not the slightest doubt that the said clarification was brought to his notice could never have persuaded him to pass the impugned order. The clarification issued by the Central Government unfortunately does not seem to have been brought to the notice of the second respondent though it was issued as early as on 14-6-1978. I have not the slightest doubt that the said clarification was brought to his notice could never have persuaded him to pass the impugned order. Thus on the basis of this clarification also the impugned order cannot be sustained. For all these reasons the second contention canvassed by Mr. Bhatt for the petitioner is accepted. Consequently. Rule issued in the petition is made absolute. The impugned order at Annexure H is quashed and set aside and the order of the competent authority at Annexure D dated 6-10-1980 is restored. Ad-interim relief stands vacated. In view of this. consequential notices issued to the petitioners as per Annexure T in the light of impugned order at Annexure H will also not survive and they will stand quashed. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute. .