Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. This second appeal arises out of a judgment and decree dated March 23, 1988, passed by Sri S. Narayan, 1st Additional District Judge, Dhanbad, in Title Appeal No, 268 of 1986 whereby and whereunder the said learned court reversed the judgment and decree dated April 29, 1986, passed by Sri A.D.P. Singh, Additional Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, Dhanbad, in Title Suit No. 47 of 1984. 2. The facts of the case lie in a very narrow compass. 3. The plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit for a declaration of title and confirmation of possession and/or in the alternative recovery of possession from one pucca and khaparapose house standing over plot No. 260 of Mouza Bhandaridih, P.S. Katras, Dist. Dhanbad. 4. The plaintiff had further prayed for a declaration that the deed of sale dated March 10, 1950, allegedly executed by Lalu Mian in favour of the said defendant in relation to the aforementioned properties is illegal and a spurious document. 5. The plaintiff alleged that one Mariyarn Bibi, mother of the plaintiff, took settlement of five katthas of land bearing plot No. 260 appertaining to khata No. 3 of Mouza Bhandaridih, by reason of a registered deed of settlement dated March 10, 1950, and came into possession thereof, It has further been asserted that the aforementioned Mariyam Bibi constructed a house over a portion of the aforementioned land being three kathas in area and began to live there with her family members. 6. Admittedly, Mariyam Bibi died in the year 1973 leaving the plaintiff as her only daughter and the aforementioned Lalu Mian, her husband, and as such the plaintiffs share in her property is 3/4ths. 7. According to the plaintiff, there had been a partition between her and Lalu Mian as a result whereof, three kathas of land with house fell to the share of the plaintiff and two Kathas of parti land fell to the share of Lalu Mian. Lalu Mian executed a deed of sale dated February 9, 1983, in favour of one Nabisa Khatoon and thereafter he left the village and began to live at his father-in-laws place at Chirua. 8. Lalu Mian executed a deed of sale dated February 9, 1983, in favour of one Nabisa Khatoon and thereafter he left the village and began to live at his father-in-laws place at Chirua. 8. It has further been asserted that, however, the defendant was allowed to live in one of the rooms of the disputed property by Mariyam Bibi some time in the year 1970 and in lieu thereof she used to assist her in her domestic affairs. After the death of Mariyam Bibi, the plaintiff allowed the defendant to live in the suit house as a licensee. 9. It is further the case of the plaintiff that despite the requests made in this regard, the defendant did not vacate the suit premises and, as such, the plaintiff had to file the aforementioned suit, 10. On the other hand, the case of the defendant-appellant is that Lalu Mian acquired the aforementioned property in the year 1950 in the name of his wife, Mariyam Bibi, and he constructed the house in question and it was further alleged that Lalu Mian inducted various tenants in the suit premises and that the defendant was one of his tenants. 11. It has further been alleged that Lalu Mian sold the suit premises in her favour by reason of three registered deeds of sale dated January 3, 1984. 12. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the trial court has framed the following issues, which are as follows : "(1) Is the suit as framed maintainable ? (2) Has the plaintiff got any cause of action for the suit ? (3) Is the suit bad for non-joinder of parties ? (4) Is the court fee paid sufficient ? (5) Has the plaintiff got any right, title and interest in the suit properties ? (6) Are the three sale deeds dated January 3, 1984, alleged to have been executed by Lalu Mian in favour of the defendant genuine, valid and for consideration and binding upon the plaintiff ? (7) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as claimed ? (8) To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?" 13. (6) Are the three sale deeds dated January 3, 1984, alleged to have been executed by Lalu Mian in favour of the defendant genuine, valid and for consideration and binding upon the plaintiff ? (7) Is the plaintiff entitled to a decree as claimed ? (8) To what relief or reliefs, if any, is the plaintiff entitled ?" 13. The learned trial court dismissed the aforementioned suit holding, inter alia, therein that Mariyam Bibi was the benamidar of Lalu Mian, and, as such, he had the authority to execute the aforementioned deed of sale dated January 3, 1984, in favour of the defendant. 14. On appeal, the learned court of appeal below held that the defendant has not been able to discharge the onus of proof to show that Mariyam Bibi was the benamidar of her husband, Lalu Mian. 15. According to the learned court of appeal below, the defendant in her written statement did not raise any plea with regard to the benami nature of transaction of the said property. 16. Mr. N.K. Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the substantial question of law formulated by this court in its order dated September 2, 1988, is not relevant and the following substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal: (i) Whether the learned court of appeal below committed an error of record in holding that the defendant in her written statement did not set up the plea of benami and thus it came to a wrong finding that Mariyam Bibi was not the benamidar of Lalu Mian ? 17. Having regard to the fact that the aforementioned question arises on the face of the judgment of the learned court below, I permitted Sri Prasad to argue the aforementioned point. 18. Mr. Prasad drew my attention to para 9 of the written statement and submitted that from a perusal thereof, it would be evident that the defendant had raised the necessary plea of the benami nature of the transaction by Lalu Mian in the name of his wife, Mariyam Bibi. 19. According to learned counsel, the learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that Lalu Mian was the real owner of the property and constructed the suit premises and, as such, Mariyam Bibi was merely his benamidar. 19. According to learned counsel, the learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that Lalu Mian was the real owner of the property and constructed the suit premises and, as such, Mariyam Bibi was merely his benamidar. Such a finding of fact has wrongly been reversed by the learned court of appeal below only on the ground that the defendant had not made the necessary averments in her written statement in relation thereto. Learned counsel appears to be correct. 20. Paragraph 9(a) of the written statement reads as follows ; "Lalu Mian had a wife named Mariyam Bibi. Lalu Mian acquired the properties in 1950 in the name of his wife, Manyam Bibi. The expenses were borne by Lalu Mian and thus it was in fact benarni in the name of his wife but in reality he was the owner of the properties." 21. From a perusal of the aforementioned paragraph, it is evident that the defendant raised the question of benami in her written statement. It was thus incumbent upon the learned trial court of appeal below to consider the aforementioned fact and thereafter come to the conclusion as to whether in fact Lalu Mian purchased the aforementioned property in the name of his wife or not. 22. Mr. T.K. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, submitted that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumari V/s. Prem Behari Khare [1989] 177 ITR 97, the question of benami loses all its importance, inasmuch as, this appeal being a continuation of the suit, it would not be permissible to the plaintiff to raise the question of benami in view of Sec. 4 of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act (45 of 1988) (hereinafter called and referred to as "the Act"). 23. Mr. T.K. Das submitted that in Mithilesh Kumaris case [1989] 177 ITR 97, the Supreme Court has clearly held that Sec. 4, Sec. 2(a) and Sec. 3 of the aforementioned Act will have retrospective effect and retrospective operation in view of the fact that the said statute is a disqualifying one and as a result thereof the plaintiff becomes disentitled to file a suit for a declaration that the purported transaction was a benami one. 24. Learned counsel further submitted that Sub-sec. 24. Learned counsel further submitted that Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act does not come to the aid of the plaintiff, inasmuch as the said provision has been enacted only for the purpose of saving such person from penal consequences who has purchased the properties in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter. 25. Learned counsel further submitted that Sec. 4 of the said Act stands independent of Sec. 3 thereof. In other words, learned counsel submitted that Sec. 4 of the said Act is a complete code by itself and has nothing to do with Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 thereof. 26. The President of India, in exercise of its power conferred upon him in Article 123(1) of the Constitution of India, promulgated an Ordinance on May 19, 1988, known as the Benami Transactions (Prohibition of the Right to Recovery of Properties) Ordinance, 1988, by reason whereof an embargo was put on persons to claiming a right in a property held benami and for matters connected therewith and incidental thereto. The aforementioned Ordinance was later on repealed and replaced by a parliamentary Act known as the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1983 (Act 45 of 1988). 27. Sec. 2(a) of the said Act defines "Benami transaction" in the following terms (see [1988] 174 ITR (St.) 37) : benami transaction means any transaction in which property is transferred to one person for a consideration paid or provided by another person. 28. Sec. 3 provides for prohibition of benami transactions in the following terms : "(1) No person shall enter into any benami transaction. (2) Nothing in Sub-sec. (1) shall apply to the purchase of property by any person in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the said property had been purchased for the benefit of the wife or the unmarried daughter. (3) Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under this section shall be non-cognizable and bailable." 29. (3) Whoever enters into any benami transaction shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years or with fine or with both. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), an offence under this section shall be non-cognizable and bailable." 29. Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Act, reads as follows : (1) No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. (2) No defence based on any right in respect of any property held benami, whether against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person, shall be allowed in any suit, claim or action by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. (3) Nothing in this section shall apply, -- (a) where the person in whose name the property is held is a coparcener in a Hindu undivided family and the property is held for the benefit of the coparceners in the family ; or (b) where the person in whose name the property is held is a trustee or other person standing in a fiduciary capacity, and the property is held for the benefit of another person for whom he is a trustee or towards whom he stands in such capacity." 30. In Mithilesh Kumaris case [1989] 177 ITR 97, the Supreme Court was concerned with a case where the plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that certain properties standing in the name of the defendant were benami in nature. 31. However, the Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision itself has held that Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 provides for an exception. 32. If the contention of Mr. Das is accepted, in my opinion, the same shall make the provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act as mere surplusage. 33. It is now well known that the statute should be read as a whole. Mr. (2) of Sec. 3 provides for an exception. 32. If the contention of Mr. Das is accepted, in my opinion, the same shall make the provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act as mere surplusage. 33. It is now well known that the statute should be read as a whole. Mr. Das, however, submitted that whereas Sec. 3 provides for a prohibition in relation to a benami transaction, Sec. 4 thereof, inter alia, prohibits a contention or a defence either by the plaintiff or the defendant based on any right in respect of any property held benami. 34. According to learned counsel, therefore, Secs. 3 and 4 of the aforementioned Act do not deal with the same subject-matter. In my considered opinion, the submission of learned counsel does not appear to be correct. As noticed hereinbefore, the said Act itself has been enacted to prohibit benami transaction and the right to recover a property held benami. It is therefore, clear that a right to recover property held benami presupposes the previous benami transaction as unless and until a transaction itself takes place, the question of recovering the property on the basis of such transaction would not arise. 35. Further, such a construction will lead to an absurdity in the sense that whereas a claim or a defence in a suit in relation to a right to recover a property held benami would become barred in relation to a benami transaction which takes place after the coming into force of the aforementioned Act, if the plaintiff or defendant can show that he comes within the purview of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 thereof. 36. (2) of Sec. 3 thereof. 36. The very fact that in Mithilesh Kumaris case [1989] 177 ITR 97, the Supreme Court held that the said Act will have retrospective operation as it seeks to do away with a claim or defence that the property held by a person is benami, The said Act brings within its sweep a transaction which took place prior to the coming into force of the said Act as also the transaction which may take place after the coming into force of the said Act, as will be evident from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Mithilesh Kumaris case [1989] 177 ITR 97, 108 : "However, Sec. 4 clearly provides that no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie, by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property. This naturally relates to past transactions as well. The expression any property held benami is not limited to any particular time, date or duration. Once the property is found to have been held benami, no suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect thereof shall lie." 37. It is true that Sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 4 of the said Act does not bring within its fold the exceptions provided for under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 expressly, but as the law itself, which was enacted for the purpose of suppressing a mischief, in my opinion, it will lead to an absurdity if such an exception is denied to a person in a suit where a past benami transaction is in question. 38. Thus, in a case of this nature, in my opinion, Secs. 3 and 4 of the said Act will have to be read together and it must be held that Sec. 4 derives its colour from Sec. 3 in relation to such transactions which have been saved in a limited way by reason of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act. 39. Further, in my opinion, as Sec. 3 is prospective in nature, a transaction contemplated under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act. 39. Further, in my opinion, as Sec. 3 is prospective in nature, a transaction contemplated under Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act, on its own force, shall exclude the applicability of Sec. 4 of the Act in relation to the transaction which had already taken place. 40. It is now well known that in order to interpret a statute, where the provisions thereof are ambiguous, a contextual meaning has to be given thereto. 41. Reference in this connection may be made to Reserve Bank of India V/s. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. [1987] 61 Comp Cas 663 , 692 ; [1987] 1 SCC 424, where, in paragraph 33, it has been held by the Supreme Court as follows : "Interpretation must depend on the text and the context. They are the bases of interpretation. One may well say if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Neither can be ignored. Both are important. That interpretation is best which makes the textual interpretation match the contextual. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. With this knowledge, the statute must be read, first as a whole and then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word, If a statute is looked at, in the context of its enactment, with the glasses of the statute-maker, provided by such context, its scheme, the sections, clauses, phrases and words may take colour and appear different than when the statute is looked at without the glasses provided by the context. With those glasses we must look at the Act as a whole and discover what each section, each clause, each phrase and each word is meant and designed to say as to fit into the scheme of the entire Act. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. No part of a statute and no word of a statute can be construed in isolation. Statutes have to be construed so that every word has a place and everything is in its place. It is by looking at the definition as a whole in the setting of the entire Act and by reference to what preceded the enactment and the reasons for it that the court construed the expression prize chit in Srinivasas case [1981] 51 Comp Cas 464 (SC) and we find no reason to depart, from the courts construction." 42. It is now well known that for the purpose of construing a statute, the purpose of the Act and the legislative intent must receive the foremost consideration of the court. 43. Reference in this connection may be made to Vatan Mal V/s. Kailash Nath [1989] 3 SCC 79. 44. It is now well settled by various decisions of the the Supreme Court of India that Parliament is presumed to know the law existing at the time of enacting the statute, 45. It is now well settled that in India, acquisition of a property by a husband in the name of his wife has been a common feature. However, such type of acquisition of property by the husband in the name of his wife could have been for the purpose of entering into a benami transaction or for the purpose of making a grant of such a property to his wife. 46. It is now well settled that if a person raises a plea that an apparent state of affairs is not the real state of affairs or the apparent owner is not the real owner, the onus of proof to prove the necessary ingredients of a benami transaction lies upon the person who set up such a plea. 47. However, in a case where a plea is raised that such an acquisition was made by the husband for the benefit of his wife, i.e., by way of gift or grant, the burden of proof shifts to the other side. 48. While interpreting the provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act, one cannot lose sight of the settled law in this regard. 49. 48. While interpreting the provision of Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act, one cannot lose sight of the settled law in this regard. 49. Reference, in this connection may be made to CED V/s. Aloke Mitra [1980] 126 ITR 599, 612, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows : "The law in this matter is not in doubt and is authoritatively stated by a long line of decisions of the Privy Council starting from the well known case of Gopeekrist Gosain V/s. Gungapersaud Gosain [1854] 6 M.I.A. 53 to Sura Lakshmiah Chetty V/s. Kothandarama Pillai [1925] LR 52 I.A. 286 ; AIR 1925 PC 181 and of this court in Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. V/s. CIT [1957] 31 ITR 28 ; AIR 1957 SC 49 . As observed by Knight Bruce L. J, in Gopeekrist Gosains case, the doctrine of advancement is not applicable in India so as to raise the question of a resulting trust. When a property is purchased by a husband in the name of his wife, or by a father in the name of his son, it must be presumed that they are benamidars, and if they claim it as their own by alleging that the husband or the father intended to make a gift of the property to them, the onus rests upon them to establish such a gift. In Sura Lakshmiah Chettys case, AIR 1925 PC 181, 182 the law was stated with clarity by Sir John Edge in these words : There can be no doubt now that a purchase in India by a native of India of property in India in the name of his wife unexplained by other proved or admitted facts is to be regarded as a benami transaction by which the beneficial interest in the property is in the husband although the ostensible title is in the wife. It is but axiomatic that a benami transaction does not-vest any title in the benamidar but vests in the real owner. When the benamidar is in possession of the property standing in his name, he is in a sense the trustee for the real owner ; he is only a name-lender or an alias for the real owner. It is but axiomatic that a benami transaction does not-vest any title in the benamidar but vests in the real owner. When the benamidar is in possession of the property standing in his name, he is in a sense the trustee for the real owner ; he is only a name-lender or an alias for the real owner. In Petherpermal Chetty V/s. Muniandy Servai [1908] LR 35 IA 98 ; ILR 35 Cal 551, the Judicial .Committee quoted with approval the following passage from Maynes Hindu Law, 7th Edn., para 446 (ILR 35 Cal at 558) : Where a transaction is once made out to be a mere benami, it is evident that the benamidar absolutely disappears from the title. His name is simply an alias for that of the person beneficially interested. The cardinal distinction between a trustee known to English law and a benamidar lies in the fact that a trustee is the legal owner of the property standing in his name and the cestui que trust is only a beneficial owner, whereas in the case of a benami transaction the real owner has got the legal title though the property is in the name of the benamidar. It is well settled that the real owner can deal with the property without reference to the latter. In Gur Narayan V/s. Sheo Lal Singh [1919] LR 46 IA 1 ; AIR 1918 PC 140, the Judicial Committee referred to the judgment of Sir George Farwell in Mst. Bilas Kunwar V/s. Desraj Ranjit Singh [1915] LR 42 IA 202 ; AIR 1915 PC 96, where it was observed that a benami transaction had a curious resemblance to the doctrine of English law that the trust of the legal estate results to the man who pays the purchase-money, and went on to say (49 IC, at page 5, col. 1) : ... the benamidar has no beneficial interest in the property or business that stands in his name ; he represents, in fact, the real owner, and so far as their relative legal position is concerned, he is a mere trustee for him. 1) : ... the benamidar has no beneficial interest in the property or business that stands in his name ; he represents, in fact, the real owner, and so far as their relative legal position is concerned, he is a mere trustee for him. In Guran Ditta V/s. Ram Ditta [1927] 55 I A 235 ; AIR 1928 PC 172, the Judicial Committee reiterated the principle laid down in Gopeekrist Gosains case [1854] 6 M I A 53 (PC), and observed that in the case of a benami transaction, there is a resulting trust in favour of the person providing the purchase money. A benamidar has no interest at all in the property standing in his name. Where the transaction is once made out to be benami, the court must give effect to the real and not to the nominal title subject to certain exceptions. In Mullas Hindu Law, fourteenth edn. p. 638, four exceptions to the normal rule are brought out. But these exceptions are not material in this case. One of the exceptions enumerated therein is that where a benamidar sells, mortgages or otherwise transfers for value property held by him without the knowledge of the real owner, the real owner is not entitled to have the transfer set aside unless the transferee had notice, actual or constructive, that the transferor was merely a benamidar. The principle is embodied in Sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section makes an exception to the rule that a person cannot confer a better title than he has. The section is based on the well-known passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Ramcoomar Koondoo V/s. Mac-queen [1872] IA Supp. The principle is embodied in Sec. 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. The section makes an exception to the rule that a person cannot confer a better title than he has. The section is based on the well-known passage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Ramcoomar Koondoo V/s. Mac-queen [1872] IA Supp. 40, at page 43 : It is a principle of natural equity, which must be universally applicable, that where one man allows another to hold himself out as the owner of an estate and a third person purchases it for value from the apparent owner in the belief that he is the real owner, the man who so allows the other to hold himself out shall not be permitted to recover upon his secret title unless he can overthrow that of the purchaser by showing, either that he had direct notice, or something which amounts to constructive notice, of the real title, or that there existed circumstances which ought to have put him upon an inquiry that, if prosecuted, would have !ed to a discovery of it. A benamidar is an ostensible owner and if a person purchases from a benamidar, the real owner cannot recover unless he shows that the purchaser had actual or constructive notice of the real title. But from this it does not follow that the benamidar has real title to the property, he is merely an ostensible owner thereof." 50 The provision in relation to a burden of proof is a procedural law. Such procedural laws in the Evidence Act and other Acts are well known and Parliament may, regard being had to the nature of the statute, make law relating to the presumption which may be raised by a court of law including that a particular fact, if established, shall be a conclusive proof of a relevant fact. 51. Reference in this connection may be made to Sodhi Transport Co. V/s. State of U. P., AIR 1986 SC 1099 . 52. In this situation, Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 of the said Act has to be interpreted as thereby now a statutory presumption has been raised to the effect that if a person makes a purchase in the name of his wife or unmarried daughter, it should be presumed that such a transaction has been entered into for the benefit of the wife or unmarried daughter of such person. However, the presumption so raised in law is a rebuttable presumption. Thus, Parliament has recognised the doctrine of advancement. 53. Taking thus all facts and circumstances of this case in my opinion, in a case of this nature, where a husband has purchased a property in the name of his wife and raised a substantial structure thereupon, Parliament did not intend to bar a remedy or a defence. 54. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below cannot be sustained inasmuch as, it was required of him to take into consideration the reasonings adopted by the learned trial court and meet the same. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned court of appeal below has committed an error of record in holding that the defendant in her written statement did not raise the question of benami. 55. In this situation, in my opinion, there is no other option but to allow the appeal and to remit the case to the learned court of appeal below for a fresh decision in accordance with law. 56. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.