ORDER Balanarayana Marar, J. 1. Revision is against an order in execution. Respondent decree holder filed E. P. 55/86 in O. S.265/73 before Munsiff's Court, Tirur on 25th May 1976. Judgment debtor contended that the decree is barred by limitation. The executing court found in favour of respondent and hence the revision by judgment debtor. 2. The decree was passed on 5th March 1974 granting the defendant liberty to pay the decree amount in monthly instalments, the first instalment payable on 5th April 1974 and with a default clause that in case one instalment is defaulted the entire decree amount shall be payable in lump. The execution petition was filed on 24th May 1986. The question arises as to whether the petition is within time. 3. It is not disputed that the judgment debtor defaulted to pay even the first instalment thereby enabling the decree holder to realise the entire decree amount in a lump. The first instalment was payable on 5th April 1974. The period of limitation for execution of any decree is 12 years under Art.136 of the Limitation Act and time begins to run when the decree becomes enforceable. In a case where the decree directs payment of money to be made on a certain date or at recurring periods period begins to run when the default in making such payment takes place. In other words the period in this case begins to run from 5th April 1974. In computing the period of limitation the date from which such period is to be reckoned shall be excluded under S.12 of the Limitation Act. Excluding the date from which each period is to be reckoned time begins to run from 6th April 1974. The period of 12 years will expire on 5th April 1986 on which date the court closed for mid summer vacation. It is contended by learned counsel for decree holder that the petition could have been filed on the next day and since the vacation commenced from that day the petition was filed on the reopening day. But it has to be noted that the period expired on 5th April 1986. That is the decree has got barred by mid-night of that day. The petition filed on the next day will be clearly barred by limitation. But it has to be noted that the period expired on 5th April 1986. That is the decree has got barred by mid-night of that day. The petition filed on the next day will be clearly barred by limitation. The last day of limitation being 5th April 1986 respondent was bound to file that application on that day and by the mid-night of that day the period of 12 years expires and there is no live decree to be executed on the next day. Then alone can the decree holder get the period covered by the vacation excluded so as to enable him to file the petition on the reopening day. 4. In this connection learned counsel for revision petitioner draws attention to the decision reported in 1913 I. C. 547 (N. G. A. Poyin v. Mishannu). In that case the period commenced from 8th of May 3907. The court was considering the period of limitation for filing a suit on a promissory note dated 7th May 1907. The suit was instituted on 9th May 1910. Excluding the date of execution of the pronote the period of three years was calculated from 8th May 1907 onwards. It was held that the third calendar year expired at midnight of 7th May 1910. The next day was a Sunday and the suit had been filed on Monday the 9th May, 1910. It was held that the suit had become barred on the morning of the 8th of May, 1910. The calculation of 12 year period has to be made on the same basis. If that be so, the decree has become barred by midnight of 5th April 1980. The decree holder was not therefore entitled to file the execution petition on the next day and the period of vacation from 6th April 1986 onwards will not come to his rescue. The decree in this case had therefore become barred and the executing court was not right in permitting the decree holder to execute the decree. 5. Learned counsel for decree holder has a contention that the judgment debtor had been permitted to pay the decree amount in instalments with a default clause and as such the period of limitation for each instalment has to be calculated. According to him only the first instalment would be barred by the time the execution petition was filed. 5. Learned counsel for decree holder has a contention that the judgment debtor had been permitted to pay the decree amount in instalments with a default clause and as such the period of limitation for each instalment has to be calculated. According to him only the first instalment would be barred by the time the execution petition was filed. He has cited several decisions in support of his contention. In the decision in Ranglal Agarwalle and others v. Syamlal Tamuli and others AIR 1946 Calcutta 600. It was held that an instalment decree containing a default clause, consists really of three parts. First, there is the part which declares the amount due. That binds the decree holder and the judgment debtor. Second, there is the part providing for payment of instalments and it is for the benefit of the judgment debtor. Thirdly, there is the part providing that in case of a default, the whole of the balance shall become due and that is for the benefit of the decree holder. It was held that the option to execute the entire balance amount in case of default of payment of instalments must be deemed to have been exercised when there is no evidence of waiver. In a case where the decree holder applies for realisation of the instalments alone rather than the entire amount even though he was entitled to realise the amount in lump that is indicative of waiver of his option. In that case it was held that an execution petition for realisation of the instalments which fell due within three years of the date of the application, the same was within, time and governed by Art.182 (7) of the Limitation Act. 6. I am also referred to the decision in Bomatu Bhadu Ghatole and others v. Govardhandas Nanabhai Gujarathi and others AIR 1936 Bombay 268 where it was held: "Where a decree for money is made payable in Instalments and in default of payment of any instalment the whole of the decree becomes payable immediately, it is open to the decree holder to apply, even after three years from the date of the default, to recover such of the instalments as have become due within three years of the date of his application." Similar is the view taken by the Rajastan High Court in Misri Lal v. Budhraj AIR 1963 Raj. 145 wherein it was held that an application for enforcement of the payment of the instalments which fell due within three years will not be barred though the application for the enforcement of the default clause may be barred. In these decisions the applicability of Art.182 of the Limitation Act of i 908 had come up for consideration and it was held that such of the instalments which are within a period of three years before the filing of the petition could be claimed by the decree holder. The question that arises for consideration here is whether the decree holder has waived the option which he could have exercised on default of one instalment. This is the first execution petition filed by the decree holder and there is no indication therein that he had waived the option. No claim had been made earlier for the defaulted instalments. If that be so that could have been relied on by the decree holder to show that he had waived the option in which case he could request for calculation of a period of 12 years from the date stipulated for payment of each instalment. Not only that the decree holder had not moved the executing court for realisation of any of the instalments which, fell due he claimed right to execute the decree in a lump in the execution petition. That is indicative of his intention to exercise the option to realise the decree amount in a lump. As held by this Court in Krishnan Madhavan v. Narayanan Jayadevan and another AIR 1974 Kerala 18 the intention to waive the right must be manifest by the pleadings. Waiver being a mixed question of law and fact the decree holder has to allege and prove it. There is no such allegation nor any proof. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for decree holder are therefore of no help to him to contend that the instalments which fell due within a period of 12 years before the filing of the execution petition could be realised by the decree holder. 7. Executing court appears to have placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1938 Madras 323 Kotta Annapurnamma v. Makku Venkamma. It was held therein that the provisions of Art.182 should receive a fair and not too technical construction. 7. Executing court appears to have placed reliance on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1938 Madras 323 Kotta Annapurnamma v. Makku Venkamma. It was held therein that the provisions of Art.182 should receive a fair and not too technical construction. It was further held that its language ought not to be strained in favour of the judgment debtor who has not paid his debt and the words should be liberally interpreted in favour of the decree holder. In that case the application for execution was within time since it was filed within three years of the order passed on a previous application which fulfilled the requirements of Art.182 (5) of the then Limitation Act. Considerable change has been made in the Limitation Act, 1963 and on the expiry of a period of 12 years from the date of the decree the decree gets barred whereby the judgment debtor is relieved of all the liabilities under the decree. The question of straining the provisions of the act in favour of the judgment debtor does not therefore arise. In the present case the decree holder has not chosen to move the executing court for a period of 12 years. He got the decree barred by his own inaction. Having not waived the option given to him under the decree the entire decree amount has fallen due on 5th April 1974 and the period of 12 years calculated from that date expires on 5th April 1986. The decree is therefore clearly barred by limitation. In the result the revision is allowed and the order of the executing court is set aside and the petition for execution is dismissed. In the circumstances no costs.