Judgment :- The auction purchaser is the petitioner. 2. The property in dispute measuring 3 acres 63 cents in extent comprised in Sy. No. 2/2 of Vallikunnu Village which belonged to the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, was attached under S.36 of The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, 1968, for short The Revenue Recovery Act, on the requisition of the Kerala Financial Corporation to whom the predecessor-in-interest of the additional fourth respondent, owed monies due under a loan transaction. 3. The property later was notified for sale by public auction and the sale as per the notification, was scheduled to take place on 26-10-1988. The upset price was shown as Rs.S, 80,200/-. The sale had to be adjourned more than once for want of bidders and the property was ultimately sold on 23-2-1989. The petitioner was the highest bidder and therefore he was directed to deposit the bid amount in terms of the conditions stipulated in the notification. The petitioner accordingly deposited the bid amount and applied for confirmation of the sale. As there was no response from the authorities concerned, the petitioner moved this Original Petition for the following reliefs: - "(a) Issue a writ of mandamus, order or direction, directing the respondents to issue orders confirming the sale held on 23-2-89 in pursuance of Ext.P 1 in conformity with S.54 of the Act and take further steps as provided under Ss.56 to 58 of the Act; (b) Issue a writ of mandamus, order or direction, directing the respondents to issue orders confirming the sale, grant the certificate of sale and put in possession of the property purchased by the petitioner in auction held on 23-2-1989 in pursuance of Ext.P1; (c) Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direct which this Hon'ble Court deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case; and (d) Award costs". 4. During the pendency of the Original Petition the third respondent passed Ext.P8 order setting aside the sale. The petitioner thereafter got the Original Petition amended and thus Ext.P8 is under challenge. 5. The reason noted in the order, Ext.P8s to set aside the sale is this: - "Sub-section (4) of S.49 of the R.R. Act provides among other things that if the date of the adjourned sale is beyond sixty days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be, served and published as if it were the original sale. 5. The reason noted in the order, Ext.P8s to set aside the sale is this: - "Sub-section (4) of S.49 of the R.R. Act provides among other things that if the date of the adjourned sale is beyond sixty days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be, served and published as if it were the original sale. The words used are "original sale" and not previous sale. In the present case the date of original sale is 26-10-1988. The period of sixty days from the date of original sale expired on 25-12-1988. Therefore for the sale on 4-1-1989 on or 23-2-1989, denovo proceedings should have been taken in serving and publishing notice as contemplated in S.49(4) of the Act. In the present case, no notice is seen to have been served on the parties concerned, regarding the sale proposed to be conducted on 4-1-1989 or on 23-2-89. The sale is vitiated due to non-compliance of the procedure in the statute. Therefore the sale is liable to be set aside. In the result, in exercise of the powers conferred under the proviso to S.54 of the R.R. Act, the sale is set aside and the records are returned to the Deputy Tahsildar (RR), KFC, Malappuram". The question thus arising for consideration is: Was the third respondent justified in setting aside the sale on the ground that the sale was conducted without proper notice. The answer to this question depends upon the construction of sub-section (4) ofS.49. It reads: - "49. Procedure for sale of immovable property-Immovable property attached under this Act may be sold in accordance with the following provisions, namely: - 4. The officer conducting the sale may, in his discretion, adjourn the sale to a specified day and hour, recording his reasons therefore. If the date to which the sale is so adjourned is within sixty days of the original sale, notice of the adjourned sale shall be published in the taluk and village offices concerned, in the office of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the property is situate and also on some conspicuous part of the immovable property brought to sale. If the date of the adjourned sale is beyond sixty days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be served and published as if it were the original sale". If the date of the adjourned sale is beyond sixty days of the original sale, fresh notice shall be served and published as if it were the original sale". From the plain language employed in the Section it must be held that no sale, which takes place beyond sixty days of the original sale, would be valid unless fresh notice was served and published, as if' the said sale was an original sale. Here admittedly the sale took place on a date beyond sixty days. On a perusal of the files, it can however, be seen that no fresh notice as envisaged under sub-section (4) proceeded the sale. The sale for this reason alone must be declared to be an invalid sale. The counsel for the petitioner nonetheless argued that, since the sale took place on a date which was fixed on a date which fell within sixty days of the original sale fresh notice cannot be insisted upon. He in this connection made reference to the first limb of sub-section (4) of S.49. This limb provides that, if the date to which the sale is adjourned is within the sixty days of the Original sale, it is enough if the notice of the adjourned sale is published in the taluk and village offices concerned, in the office of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the property is situate and also on some conspicuous part of the immovable property brought to sale. This procedure has been complied with while adjourning the sale to 23-2-1989, the counsel submits. I am not impressed by this argument. A sale can be adjourned from time to time without insisting upon a fresh notice provided the sale takes place on an adjourned date which falls within sixty days of the original sale. But when once the sale is adjourned to a date beyond sixty days of the original sale, the sale will not be a valid one unless it be, that it was proceeded by a fresh notice contemplated under the last sentence in the section. The sale here, inasmuch as the same took place on a date beyond sixty days of the original sale, has rightly been declared by the third respondent, as an invalid sale. 6. The sale here, inasmuch as the same took place on a date beyond sixty days of the original sale, has rightly been declared by the third respondent, as an invalid sale. 6. A question however, would arise and it is this: Whether the third respondent has the power to make such a declaration in the absence of a proper application under S.52 by the owner of the property or a person claiming an interest in the immovable property or an application contemplated under S.53. The counsel for the petitioner argued that the third respondent could take cognizance of the issue only if the same is brought before him by the application contemplated under Ss.52 or 53. It is all the more so because an order setting aside the sale can be passed only on the applicant establishing the grounds enumerated under Sections 52 and 53. This argument at the first blush is attractive but if we refer to the proviso to S.54 it can be seen that the Collector has got suomotu power to set aside the sale if the Collector has reason to think that the sale has not been conducted properly, a ground different from the grounds stated in Ss.52 and 53. It may be relevant in this context to refer to S.54. It reads: - "54. Order confirming or setting aside sale: On the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale, if no application to have the sale set aside is made under S.52 or S.53 or if any such application has been made and rejected, the Collector shall make an order confirming the sale: Provided that if the Collector has reason to think that the sale ought to be set aside notwithstanding that no such application has been made or on grounds other than those alleged in any application which has been made and rejected, he may, after recording his reasons in writing, set aside the sale". The power envisaged under the proviso, the Collector can exercise when the files pertaining to the auction sale are placed before him for the purpose of confirmation of the sale. S.54 as such would suggest that the Collector is bound to make an order confirming the sale if no application to have the sale set aside is made under Ss.52 or 53, or if any such application has been made and rejected. S.54 as such would suggest that the Collector is bound to make an order confirming the sale if no application to have the sale set aside is made under Ss.52 or 53, or if any such application has been made and rejected. The proviso however empowers the collector to set aside the sale after recording his reasons in writing although no application either under S.52 or 53 has been made etc. This power can be exercised even on grounds other than those enumerated under S.52 or S.53. (See the ruling of this court in Joseph v. Thahsildar, South Wynad,(ILR 1980 (2) Ker.650). On going through the order I am convinced that the third respondent has given cogent reasons to set aside the sale. 7. The learned counsel then contended that Ext.P8 order is one passed without notice to him. It is relevant in this context to note that it is not the case of either the third respondent or the other contesting respondents that Ext.P8 was passed after notice to the petitioner. The learned Government Pleader however, argued that the scheme of the proviso is such that it is not necessary to give notice either to the purchaser in the auction or to the owner of the property or a person interested in the property before an order there under is passed. If that be the position, it is further contended, there is little scope to interfere with Ext.P8 order on the ground that it was one passed without notice to the petitioner. This argument is without substance. It is true that the proviso does not contemplate notice to the parties whether he be the auction purchaser, owner of the property etc. before an order there under is passed. The third respondent functioning as a quasi-judicial authority under the proviso however, is bound to issue notice to all interested parties before the order there under is passed, because the order he would pass, would bring in its trail civil consequences. The petitioner who has parted with his money under the belief that his bid is likely to be confirmed would definitely be affected by the order. So is the case with the owner of the property. An order setting aside the sale therefore cannot be passed without notice to persons whose rights are likely to be affected by the order. The petitioner who has parted with his money under the belief that his bid is likely to be confirmed would definitely be affected by the order. So is the case with the owner of the property. An order setting aside the sale therefore cannot be passed without notice to persons whose rights are likely to be affected by the order. For this reason Ext P5 is liable to be set aside. I accordingly set aside the same and remand the proceedings initiated by the third respondent under the proviso to S.54 for a denovo consideration and disposal. The third respondent shall give the petitioner as also the Kerala Financial Corporation, the fifth respondent and the fourth respondent, the legal heir of the borrower an opportunity of being heard before the matter is finally disposed of. 8. It has been brought to my notice that the Collector by Ext. P10 has directed the Deputy Tahsildar (RR) K.E.C. Malappuram to exclude the house and its surroundings extending 15 cents from the auction. The building and the appurtenant land measuring 15 cents directed to be excluded from the auction, form part of the property, the predecessor-in-interest of the additional fourth respondent had mortgaged to the Kerala Financial Corporation. This portion is equally liable for the loan amount. The Collector has no power or authority to issue such a direction excluding this portion from the auction. Ext. P10 directing of the Collector therefore is set aside. The learned counsel for the additional fourth respondent submitted that since there is no prayer in the O.P. seeking the vacation of that order, this court may not interfere with the same. I cannot agree. An order passed without jurisdiction or in violation of principles of natural justice, though not challenged specifically, will be obliterated by the High Court by orders/ directions issued in the exercise of its visitorial jurisdiction recognized under Article 227 of The Constitution. The above submission of the learned counsel therefore is rejected. However this is a case where the following direction requires to be issued. The excluded portion with the building need be sold only in the event of the sale proceeds from the sale of the remaining property are not sufficient to satisfy the demand, the KFC has raised against additional 4th respondent. The O.P. is disposed of as above.