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1990 DIGILAW 275 (GAU)

Bhuban Valley Tea Company v. Kulendra Kumar Kar

1990-12-20

J.M.SRIVASTAVA

body1990
This is plaintiff's second appeal. 2. The plaintiff appellant had filed suit for ejectment of the defendants from the premises in suit on the allegations, that the defendants were the employees of the plaintiff in the tea garden and had been allowed to stay in the premises in suit in the garden. The employment of the defendants had been terminated and they were liable to vacate the premises, but they had not vacated the premises. Hence, the suit. The defence was that the matter of termination of their service was pending before the Labour Tribunal and therefore the suit was not maintainable. The learned trial Court had framed necessary issues and had held that in view of the provision of Rule 66 of the Assam Plantations Labour Rules, 1966, hereinafter referred as the 'Rules', since the matter of termination of employment of the defendants was before the Industrial Tribunal, no relief could be given to the plaintiff. The suit was dismissed. In appeal, the learned appellate Court below took the view that even though the matter in the Industrial Tribunal had been decided against the defendants i. e. it was held that the termination of their employment was justified yet, siace the decision of the Tribunal had been rendered after the suit had been filed no cognizance of the decision of the Tribunal could be taken and the relief for ejectment of the defendants could not be given and accor­dingly, the appeal was dismissed. The appeal was, however, partly allowed for declaration of right, title and interest of the plaintiff. 3. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has come in appeal and Shri S. K. Senapati, learned counsel appearing on its behalf has submitted that the view taken by the learned appellate Court below was not justified and the relief for ejectment of the defendants could not be refused. 4. The respondents have not put in appearance. 5. I have considered the submissions on behalf of the appellant and the materials on record. 6. On the fact established, the employment of the defendants had been terminated by the plaintiff and the defendants were therefore liable to vacate the premises which they had been allowed to occupy as workers in the garden. 5. I have considered the submissions on behalf of the appellant and the materials on record. 6. On the fact established, the employment of the defendants had been terminated by the plaintiff and the defendants were therefore liable to vacate the premises which they had been allowed to occupy as workers in the garden. Since the workers had raised an industrial dispute and the matter was pending before the Industrial Tribunal, the defendants were protected in view of the provision of Rule 66 (1) (iii) of the Rules. The Industrial Tribunal had, however, upheld the termination of employment of the defendants and the matter had been finally decided by the Industrial Tribunal and as such the prohibition under Rule 66 (1) (iii) said above was not operative. 7. The only question which requires consideralion in this appeal is that whether the learned appellate Court below was justified in taking the view that since the decision of the Industrial Tribunal was rendered after the suit had been filed, it could not be taken into consideration, for grant of the relief prayed for. The suit had been filed on 14.8,1980. The Industrial Tribunal made award upholding the termination of services of the defendants on 15. 9. 1982. I see no reason why the fact that termination of the employment of the defendant had been upheld by the Industrial Tribunal, even though during the pendency of the suit or the appeal on 15. 9. 1982 cannot be or should not be taken into consideration for giving the relief to the plaintiff. The defendants occupied the premises in the garden only because they were workers in the garden. Their services had been terminated and they were liable to vacate the premises. Rule 66 (1) (iii) of the aforesaid rule only provided that during the pendency of the matter they were rot to be evicted. Once the matter was therefore adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal and finally decided though during the pendency of the suit, I see no reason why the defendants should continue to occupy the premises. 8. The Courts, including the appellate Court, do take cognizance of events happening after institution of suit. Once the matter was therefore adjudicated by the Industrial Tribunal and finally decided though during the pendency of the suit, I see no reason why the defendants should continue to occupy the premises. 8. The Courts, including the appellate Court, do take cognizance of events happening after institution of suit. Shri S.< K Senapati, learned counsel for the appellant has cited Pasupuleti Verkateswarlu vs. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770 where it was held that the Courts, including appellate Courts, do take cognizance of events happening after institution of suit. It was observed :- " It is basic to our processul jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding. Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lie has come to Court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the Tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justi­fies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision of fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice - subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can the Court contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice." 9. As said before the defendants who were workers of the plaintiff, after termination of their employment had no justification to stay in the premises which they had occupied. In the circumstances, therefore the final adjudication of the dispute by the Industrial Tribunal though during the pendency of the suit or appeal removed the bar under Rule 66 (1) (iii) of the Rules and consequently the plaintiff was entitled to the relief of ejectment prayed. 10, For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the suit for ejectment of the defendants-workers from the premises in suit is also decreed. No costs.