JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The State has prayed for cancellation of bail granted to the opposite party on the ground that bail was granted on mistaken statement made by the counsel for the State. This case is a classic example as to how unsavory circumstances are created on account of submissions made by the State's counsel without proper application of mind and/or without proper instructions. 2. The opposite party (described hereafter as 'the accused') was arrested on 7-4-1990 for alleged commission of offences punishable under the provisions of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short 'the Act'). The allegations are of very serious nature and it transpires from the record that the Petitioner, his son-Prasanna Kumar Mohanty, and one Tara Prasad Mohanty, were found to be in possession brown sugar and charas. The accused moved for bail before the Sessions Judge, Puri, which was rejected. He moved an application for bail in this Court which was registered as Criminal Misc. Case No. 527 of 1990. The case was listed on 13-6-1990, when it was adjourned to 20-6-1990. On that date, the learned Counsel for the State made a statement purported to be on the basis of instructions received that though the accused had been arrested there was no case instituted against him. In view of this peculiar statement, the accused was granted bail. Subsequently on 25-6-1990, an application was filed to modify the order dated 20-6-1990 on the ground that the statement made be the counsel for the State was erroneous, as in tact the accused had been arrested in connection with 2(a) CC Case No. 192 of 1990 and abundant materials on record clearly establish the complicity of the accused in the offences as alleged. On that date, as an interim measure, it was directed that the matter was to be placed on 29-6-1990 and the accused was not to be released until further orders. Subsequently, another application was filed for cancellation of bail granted on the ground that before the order dated 25-6-1990 could be communicated, the accused had been enlarged on bail pursuant to the order dated 20-6-1990. Subsequently, another application was filed for cancellation of bail granted on the ground that before the order dated 25-6-1990 could be communicated, the accused had been enlarged on bail pursuant to the order dated 20-6-1990. It has been stated by the learned Counsel for the State that as a matter of abundant caution, and to meet the preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the accused about the maintainability of an application for cancellation of bail in a disposed of case, the case under consideration has been filed. It is pleaded on behalf of the State that bail was granted without consideration of relevant materials and there was no consideration of the merits of the case and there being abundant materials to show that the accused was guilty of serious offences cancellation of bail is warranted. 3. The accused has appeared through counsel and has filed objection to the petition for cancellation of bail. 4. The application for cancellation of bail is resisted primarily on the ground that cancellation of bail once granted amounts to a review and unless there are supervening circumstances the Court should be slow to direct cancellation. It has also been pleaded that there has been infraction of several statutory safeguards provided in the Act and there is no likelihood of any conviction of the accused even if he faces a trial. Additionally it has been submitted that a co-accused has been released on bail by application of the Provision of proviso (a) to Section 167(2), Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short 'the Code') on account of non-submission of the prosecution report within the statutorily fixed period. The assertion of contravention has been stoutly denied by the learned Counsel for the State who asserts that all requisite statutory requirement s; have been complied with. 5. The law bails, like any other branch of law, has its own philosophy, and occupies an important place in the administration of justice and the concept of bail emerges from the conflict between the police power to restrict the liberty of a man who is alleged to have committed a crime and the presumption of innocence in favour of the alleged criminal. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt. The granting of bail in the case of a non-bailable offence is a concession allowed to an accused person. An accused is not detained in custody with the object of punishing him on the assumption of his guilt. The granting of bail in the case of a non-bailable offence is a concession allowed to an accused person. In the case of a bailable offence, ball can be obtained as of right u/s 436(1) of the Code subject to restrictions u/s 436(2). In Sections 437(5) and 439(2) a discretion is given to the Court concerned to direct that any person who had been released on bail be arrested and committed to custody. The power of cancellation to take back in custody an accused who h 15 been enlarged on bail has to be exercised with care, caution and circumspection. It is easy to reject a bail application in a non-bailable case than to cancel a bail granted, as cancellation of bail necessarily involves review of a decision already made and existence of supervening circumstances is a desirable requirement before exercise of the power. See State (Delhi Administration) Vs. Sanjay Gandhi. But as observed by this Court in the case of Chhaila Pradhan and State of Orissa Vs. Bansidhar Pradhan and two Ors. and Bhagaban Pradhan and Others it is not imperative that there must be supervening or additional circumstances to vest jurisdiction on the Court to cancel a bail granted. In State Vs. Jaspal Singh Gill bail was cancelled not on account of supervening or addition circumstances, but taking into consideration the gravity of the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused. 6. While considering an application for bail, detailed discussion of the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits is to be a voided. This requirement stems from the desirability that no party should have the impression that his case has been pre-Judged. Existence of a prima facie case is only to be considered. Elaborate analysis or exhaustive exploration of the merits is not required. See Niranjan Singh and Another Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others. The view of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh's case (supra) has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Chhaila Pradhan's case (supra). The contention relating to non-observance of statutory requirement, therefore, loses significance. 7. Elaborate analysis or exhaustive exploration of the merits is not required. See Niranjan Singh and Another Vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote and Others. The view of the Supreme Court in Niranjan Singh's case (supra) has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Chhaila Pradhan's case (supra). The contention relating to non-observance of statutory requirement, therefore, loses significance. 7. Where the offence is of serious nature the assertion of grant of bail has to be decided keeping in view the nature and seriousness of the offence, character of the evidence and amongst others the larger interest of public. See AIR 100 S.C. 625 State of Maharashtra v. Anand Chintaman Dighe. 8. There was no occasion to look into the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case, because bail was granted on the submission of the learned Counsel for the State that there was no case instituted against the accused. On consideration of the materials adduced, it is crystal clear that a prima facie case exists to show involvement of the accused in the alleged offences. Situation here is akin to those under consideration in Durel Behera Vs. Suratha Behera and Another. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court that where bail has been granted on an untenable ground, plea that there was no misuse of privilege of bail loses significance. Therefore, I find scope for interference in the matter. Keeping in view the stringent provision of the Act which provides for an inference of guilt unless contrary is proved by the accused, legislative intent is that persons accused of committing offences under the Act are to be seriously dealt with and therefore, unless compelling circumstances are shown, bail not to be granted. In this connection, Section 37 of the Act, as amended by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act No. 2 of 1989) is relevant. It reads as follows: 37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. In this connection, Section 37 of the Act, as amended by the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 1988 (Act No. 2 of 1989) is relevant. It reads as follows: 37. Offences to be cognisable and non-bailable. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognisable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless, (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or any other law fur the time being in force on granting of bail. The provision mandates that bail is not to be granted unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence, in case it carries custodial sentence of five years or more. The term 'believe', in the sense it is used in Section 37 of the Act, essentially means logical confidence or rational convict ion. It introduces a very high degree of satisfaction fast-rooted in terra firma, from doubt as the truth of the fact perceived and believed. See AIR 1979 S.C. 1574 Chandran v. The State of Madras. There is no scope of such belief presently. In that backdrop also there seems to be enough reason for cancelling the bail granted. 9. Non I shall deal with the submission relating to' release of the co-accused. An order for release under Proviso (a) to Section 167(2) of the Code has been termed as an order on default. It is a release on bail on default of the prosecution in not filing the charge-sheet or prosecution report, as the case may be, within the prescribed period. The right to bail u/s 167(2), Proviso (1) thereto, is absolute. There is no discretion of the Court involved and it is a legislative command. It is a release on bail on default of the prosecution in not filing the charge-sheet or prosecution report, as the case may be, within the prescribed period. The right to bail u/s 167(2), Proviso (1) thereto, is absolute. There is no discretion of the Court involved and it is a legislative command. At that stage merits of the case are not examined. See Rajnikant Jivanlal and Another Vs. Intelligence Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi. As observed by the apex Court in the case of Raghubir Singh and Others Vs. State of Bihar the prosecution has option to seek cancellation of bail after the defect of on-filing of charge sheet within the stipulated time is cured, on the ground that the accused has committed a non-bailable offence and that it is necessary to arrest him and commit him to custody in Rajanikant's case (supra), the Delhi High Court had cancelled bail granted to the accused therein, with reference to Proviso (a) Section 16(2), after submission of charge-sheet, when an application for cancellation of bail had been moved. There also the accused were facing trial for offences under the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the order of cancellation. The Court while upholding the cancellation observed that the accused cannot claim any special right to remain on bail if the investigation revealed that the accused had committed serious offences. The accused cannot derive any support from, the release of co-accused. It is unfortunate that the investigating agency has given scope for such release. More serious the offence, more desirable it is to have investitive action with promptitude Any lethargic and lackadaisical action is likely to carry stigma of soft padding the drugread death peddlers. Such action is indefensible. 10. Logical disposition of this application is cancellation of bail granted to the opposite party accused by order dated 20-6-1930 in Criminal Misc. Case No. 527 of 1990. He is directed to surrender before the learned Sub-divisional Judicial Magistrate, Puri on or before 31-7-1990, failing which the latter shall proceed against the accused, and his sureties accused to law without making any reference to this Court. The criminal misc. case is allowed. Final Result : Allowed