A. M. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) IN an earlier suit for partition instituted in 1952 between the defendants inter se, decrees for partition, both preliminary and final, were passed on compromise between the parties on the footing that the properties were secular and not Wakf Properties. Another suit by the defendants instituted in 1955 for a declaration that the alleged Deed of Wakf of 1936 in respect of the suit properties was null and void was, however, dismissed for default in 1968. ( 2 ) THE Commissioner of Wakf, the plaintiff-appellant, has now filed this suit mainly for a declaration that the compromise decree for partition passed in the Suit for partition of 1952 is null and void and the suit-properties which were dedicated by way of Wakf could, not stand mundanised or otherwise affected by the said decree for partition. ( 3 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit holding that the suit properties being wakf could not thus be disvested of their legal character by any partition-suit between interested private parties and declared the said decree to be null and void and of no effect. On appeal by the defendants, the appellate Court also held the suit-properties to be Wakf and thus immune from any onslaught by or under any partition decree on the footing of their being secular properties liable to partition by and between the alleged co-sharers or co-owners. But the appellate Court nevertheless allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit on the finding that the suit was not maintainable at the instance of the plaintiff, i. e. the Commissioner of Wakfs, under the provisions of Section 72 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934. Hence this second appeal by the plaintiff Commissioner. Let us, for the facility of discussion, reproduce the provisions of Section 72 of the Bengal Wakf Act, 1934, as it stood then, which is now renumbered as Section 72 (1) and reads as hereunder :-"lf there is no mutwali or the mutwali refuses or neglects to act in the matter within a reasonable time, the Commissioner may in his own name institute a suit or proceeding in Court against a stranger to the Wakf or any other person for the recovery of any wakf property wrongfully possessed, alienated or leased, to have any Wakf property discharged. of an encumbrance or obligation wrongfully created or to recover any money belonging to a Wakf". of an encumbrance or obligation wrongfully created or to recover any money belonging to a Wakf". In the instant suit, which has wended to this Court before us in this Second Appeal, there was apparently no prayer for recovery of possession of the suit properties. This led the appellate Court to conclude that the suit not being for recovery of possession was not maintainable under Section 72 at the instance of the Commissioner as the plaintiff and as the earlier decree for partition, however wrongful, could not in law be treated to have created any 'encumbrance' or any 'obligation' within the meaning of Section 72, the suit could not also be sustained under that Section as one "to have any Wakf property discharged of any encumbrance or obligation wrongfully created". With respect, we entirely disagree and we are afraid that the appellate Court resorted to too much literal approach to the provisions of the Section resulting in unwarranted circumscription of the provisions thereof and thus committed a substantial error of law. ( 4 ) AS we have very often said, gone are the days when we used to construe a legislative provision with a Lexicon in one hand and a Grammar in the other. Literal or Grammatical approach is now being steadily discarded in favour of purposive approach, and the former is made to yield place to the latter, whenever necessary, to achieve the clear and intended object of the legislative provision and for that purpose we unhesitatingly stretch the letters of the provisions to any extent except to the breaking point. Call it judicial activism. Judicial heroics or whatever you like; but as pointed by Beg. C. J. in the seven Judge Bench decision of the Supreme Court in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548 at p. 552, these have very often become necessary to make the stream of justice to flow with the necessary amplitude, plentitude and magnitude, when the law-making organ takes far too long to take the desired steps and "with the passage of time", "judges can more frankly step into the shoes of the Legislature" and that situation may very often arise Calling for "some Judicial heroics to cope with the difficulties raised. ". ( 5 ) SECTION 72 does not use the words "recovery of possession of any Wakf property", but "recovery of the Wakf property". ". ( 5 ) SECTION 72 does not use the words "recovery of possession of any Wakf property", but "recovery of the Wakf property". As already indicated, the concurrent findings of both the courts are that the suit-properties were and are Wakf properties. The partition decree in the suit of 1952 in respect of these properties, if allowed to stand, would obviously deprive the suit properties of their legal character as Wakf. The present suit by the Commissioner, therefore, seeking to get that decree declared null and void must be treated as one for the recovery of the Wakf properties from motivated mundanisation by interested persons. And all that Section 72 requires is a suit for the "recovery of the Wakf property", and not necessarily recovery of its possession also. Restoration of the suit-properties from the secularisation by the partition-decree to its original religious legal character as Wakf is, in our view, recovery of the Wakf properties for the purpose of Section 72, even if possession thereof is not sought to be recovered. ( 6 ) WE are also inclined to think that the expression "encumbrance" or "obligation" in Section 72 must have liberal meaning and not the technical meaning ascribed to it by the Tenancy laws or other laws relating to land or property. To encumber means to hamper, to impede and "encumbrance" should accordingly mean any burden or any impediment. Such burden or impediment may be by an inter vivos instrument or may also by a decree of the Court. Since the Appellate Court chose to be guided by the lexical meaning, we would like to point out that, as noted in Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edition, page 503), the expression incumbrance or encumbrance is wide enough to include any burden or liability or impediment created by judgments also. ( 7 ) THE appellate Court was of the view that "encumbrance" means "any burden or any interest created in limitation of the interest of the owner" and, therefore, any transaction not merely limiting, but totally extinguishing the interest, is not an encumbrance. This may be the one of the generally accepted connotations. But suppose in a case a mutwali illegally executes a deed of sale of the Wakf property, but the seller has not yet taken possession. This may be the one of the generally accepted connotations. But suppose in a case a mutwali illegally executes a deed of sale of the Wakf property, but the seller has not yet taken possession. The Commissioner, finding the Mutwali refusing or neglecting to act, sues the purchaser for setting aside the sale or declaring the same to be null and void, but does not sue for recovery of the possession as the purchaser has got none. According to the view of the appellate Court, the Commissioner would not be entitled to sue under Section 72 as he has neither sued for the recovery of possession, nor an outright safe is an encumbrance or obligation limiting the interest of the Wakf estate. We are wholly unable to subscribe to this view and we are of the view that the provisions of Section 72 must be given much wider connotation. We have no doubt that where, as here, a Wakf property has been sought to be denuded or divested of its religious character by any instrument, whether inter partes or curial, a suit to set aside the instrument or to have it declared null and void is very much a suit for the recovery of the Wakf property within the meaning of the Section. We are also inclined to hold that expressions "encumbrance ",and "obligation" as used in Section 72 are of much wider amplitude and any transaction or instrument which seeks to secularise and thus impede the administration of properties as Wakf creates some encumbrance or legal obligation on the Wakf property and a suit to have the same set aside or annulled is a suit "to have any wakf property discharged of such encumbrance or obligation". We have noted that in a Division Bench judgment of the Travancore-Cochin High Court in Moosan Aidravassu v. Mani, AIR 1957 Travancore Cochin 14, even prescriptive title by adverse possession was held to come within the expression "encumbrance" in the concerned enactment. ( 8 ) AT one stage we thought of adverting to the question as to whether the Commissioner as plaintiff in the suit ought to have asked for further reliefs in the nature of recovery or confirmation of possession and whether the suit could be assailed because of the provisions of Section 34 Specific Relief Act, 1963 for the plaintiff's failure to seek such further relief. But no such objection appears to have been raised in any of the Courts below and, therefore, cannot be allowed to be raised before us in Second Appeal, the reason being that if such objection was raised at the trial, the plaintiff, if so advised, might have prayed for necessary amendment. We cannot allow the defendants to non-suit plaintiff by alleging of some curable defect at this stage which can no longer be cured without unreasonable inconvenience. ( 9 ) ONE word more. The question as to whether the suit was barred by limitation was considered by the trial Court, though not pressed in the first appeal. The trial Court held the suit not to be barred by limitation relying on the provisions of Section 72 (2), inserted in 1973, when the instant suit instituted on 27-4-1971 was pending. Even if the provisions of Section 72 (2) would apply to the pending proceedings, those would be of no avail in the case at hand as they only provide that "notwithstanding anything contained in any law of limitation a suit or proceeding REFERRED TO in sub-section (1), other than a suit or proceeding to recover any money belonging to the Wakf, shall not be deemed to have become barred by limitation, if such suit or proceeding was not so barred before the 15th day of August, 1947". There could be no cause or scope or occasion to file the present suit before the 15/08/1947, and if no such suit could conceivably be filed before that date, the question of its not being barred before that date cannot obviously arise and the trial court obviously went wrong in invoking those provisions. As already noted, the question of limitation was not pressed in the first appellate Court nor has been urged before us. But even then, the pleadings clearly show that a suit by the defendants-respondents was filed in 1955, for declaration. that the Wakfnama of 1936 was null and void and the suit was eventually dismissed on 29-4-68. The present suit giving rise to this second appeal having been filed on 27-4-1971, was obviously filed even within the ordinary period of limitation of three years and was therefore not barred in any view of the matter. that the Wakfnama of 1936 was null and void and the suit was eventually dismissed on 29-4-68. The present suit giving rise to this second appeal having been filed on 27-4-1971, was obviously filed even within the ordinary period of limitation of three years and was therefore not barred in any view of the matter. ( 10 ) WE would accordingly allow the second appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dismissing the suit and the judgment and decree of the trial Court decreeing the suit would thus stand restored. No costs. AMULYA KUMAR NANDI, J, I agree. Appeal allowed.