R. C. LAHOTI, J. ( 1 ) THE accused / petitioner is one of the two charged with offences under Sections 304-B and 306 I. P. C. The two accused are respectively mother-in-law and the husband of the unfortunate bride Smt. Suneeta, who has died of poisoning within two years of the date of her marriage. ( 2 ) THE sole contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges under Section 304-B and 306 I. P. C. are contradictory with each other, the two cannot be tried at a time; and that a charge under Section 304-B, I. P. C. cannot be framed when the allegation is that the victim had committed suicide. In short, it is submitted that charge under Section 306 I. P. C. having been framed, the charge under Section 304-B, I. P. C. was prima facie misconceived and hence is liable to be quashed. ( 3 ) THE prosecution alleges and there is material available in the challan papers pointing out to the fact that the bride was subjected to continued ill-treatment amounting to cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry and that she died an unnatural death, the cause being poisoning. The charge under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code has been rightly framed. ( 4 ) SECTION 304-B was introduced in the Penal Code by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. The opening clause of subsection (1) of Section 304-B reads as under. "where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. . "a bare reading of Section indicates that its applicability would be attracted not only when the death is 'caused' by some one, but also when the death "occurs'' unnaturally. If occurrence of death is preceded by cruelty or harassment by in-laws for or in connection with dowry demand and if the connection between the two can be established, mere occurrence of death is enough though death may not have been "caused" by the in-laws. This interpretation has at least two internally built-in clues in the language of Section 304-B. If at all applicability would have been intended to be attracted on death being caused by some one else than the victim, then there was no necessity of using the word 'occurs' in context with death other than under normal circumstances. This interpretation has at least two internally built-in clues in the language of Section 304-B. If at all applicability would have been intended to be attracted on death being caused by some one else than the victim, then there was no necessity of using the word 'occurs' in context with death other than under normal circumstances. If at all the framers of the law would have intended the liability to be fixed on the person actually causing the death, there would have been no necessity of using the language "and such husband or relatives shall be deemed to have caused her death" at the end of sub-section (1) of Section 304-B, I. P. C. It suggests that the framers intend and contemplate the liability of occurrence of death being fastened on the in-laws, though they did not in fact cause the death, by creating a fiction. Creating such circumstances as compel a person to choose the death, as the only way of getting out of misery would also attract the applicability of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. ( 5 ) A Division Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Public Prosecutor v. Tota Basava Punniaiah, 1989 Cri LJ 2330 supports the above said view. ( 6 ) AT the stage of framing a charge, this Court would not interfere if there is material available for presuming that the accused has committed an offence of which he is charged with. ( 7 ) THE revision is held to be without any merit. It is accordingly dismissed. Revision dismissed. .