JUDGMENT Ram Nandan Prasad, J. - The prayer in all the three applications is to quash the entire proceedings of G. R. Case No. 2543/82 / T. R. Case No. 33/85 relating to Chapra G. R. P. S. Case No. 70 dt. 7-10-82) pending in the court of the Special Judge (E. C. Act), Saran, at Chapra and as such they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. The Inspector of Police, C.I.D. (Food), Chapra, filed a written report at Chapra G. R. P. S. on 7-10-82. On the basis of which the Chapra G. R. P. S. Case, No. 70/82 was instituted. The written report states that the informant while engaged in the investigation on Chapra G. R. P. S. Case No.1 dt. 1-11-78 detected that during the period April to June, 1978, 23, 232 quintals of Arhar Dal had been booked from Chapra Railway Station under 387 railway receipts to different places in South India. It is alleged in the written report that these bookings had been done by so called agents of 1411 firms which were bogus and which were not actually in existence and which neither had licence under the Foodgrains Licensing Order nor were registered in the Commercial Taxes Department. The allegation in the written report is that the bookings of huge quantity of Arhar Dal during the aforesaid period was in contravention of the direction of the Collector as contained in his letter no. 1758 supply dt. 9-8-77 whereby he asked the railway authorities to note down the full particulars and address and licence number of persons and firms booking the goods from Chapra Railway Station to different destinations in the country. Admittedly, at the relevant time, Tarapado Ghosh (petitioner in Cr. misc. 9828/85) was posted as the Goods clerk at the Chapra Junction Railway Station goods godown, and the Gajadhar Ram and Rameshwar, Ram (petitioners in Cr. misc. 10352/85) were posted respectively as Goods Superintendent Grade-1 and Goods Superintendent Grade-2 at the Chapra Railway Station and the allegations against these railway employees are that they in conspiracy and collusion with the persons who acted as agents of the fake firms booked the consignments of Arhar Dal to various destinations in South India during the relevant period. Bidya Sharma and Upendra Sharma (petitioners in Cr. misc. 2247/86) are said to be two of such agents. Bidya Sharma and Upendra Sharma (petitioners in Cr. misc. 2247/86) are said to be two of such agents. After completing investigation the police submitted charge-sheet against all these petitioners and after taking cognizance the learned Special Judge framed charges under Section 468 of the India Penal Code and Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) against the aforesaid five petitioners after rejecting the petition in which prayer had been made for discharge on the ground that no offence at all had been made out against them. 3. The following contentions have been raised on behalf of the petitioners:- (i) The Special Judge has no jurisdiction to try the cases under the Essential Commodities Act of a period prior to 1-9-82 because it is from that date that the Special Judge's court under Section 12AA of the Act was created by amending Act, 18/81. (ii) At the relevant time there was no notification or direction restricting, the movement of pulses (Arhar) from Bihar to any other State either under the Act or under any other law. The goods were booked by complying with the rules and regulations of the railway and there is no allegation that any provision of the Railways Act or any rules governing the booking of consignments has been violated. (iii) The Collector had no jurisdiction to issue any direction regarding booking of consignments of pulses from Chapra to outside destination and in any view of the matter non-compliance of the same cannot give rise to any offence under the Act. Further all the railway receipts in question were validly and genuinely written out and hence there is no question of committing any forgery in writing out the railway receipts or other documents relating to the booking of the consignments. Under these circumstances no offence at all is made out against the petitioners. (iv) As regards the railway employees, Tarapado Ghosh, Gajadhar Ram and Rameshwar Ram, the alleged acts were done by them in course of discharge of their official duty of booking consignments from Chapra Railway Station for being transported by the railway and since no sanction had been obtained, the cognizance as well as the trial is illegal and without jurisdiction. 4. 4. The learned State Counsel had very fairly conceded that since the alleged occurrence had taken place in the year 1978, the Special Judge is not competent to deal with or try the case in question. That being so, it must be held that the proceedings in the court of the Special Judge relating to the case in question being without jurisdiction have to be quashed. 5. The second and third contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners are interlinked and I will not deal with them together. The Bihar Foodgrains (Movement Control) Order, 1957 had been in operation for several years but this Control Order was rescinded with effect from first day of October, 1977 by the Central Government's Notification No. S. O. 696 (E) 30th September, 1977. This fact is accepted by the learned State Counsel. Therefore, admittedly during the time of occurrence i.e. April to June, 1978 there was no Control Order under the Act to restrict the movement of foodgrains from Bihar to any outside place. It follows, therefore, that if pulses were booked from any place in Bihar, which in the present case is Chapra, to any destination outside the State no offence arises on this account. There being no restriction on the movement of foodgrains from inside the State to any place outside, the persons who booked the Arhar Dal from Chapra to several places in the South cannot be said to have violated any Control Order and as such there is no question on this account of any offence having been committed under Section 7 of the Act. Again the bookings were done by preparing railway receipts and other necessary documents and there is nothing to show that any false or bogus entries were made. As such there is also no basis for saying that any forgery has been committed by any of the petitioners. The learned State Counsel submitted that although there may not have been any Control Order under the Act still the Collector had issued certain instructions to guard against what he called excessive or improper booking of Dal outside Bihar. As such there is also no basis for saying that any forgery has been committed by any of the petitioners. The learned State Counsel submitted that although there may not have been any Control Order under the Act still the Collector had issued certain instructions to guard against what he called excessive or improper booking of Dal outside Bihar. The learned State Counsel had no answer to the contention on behalf of the petitioners that such directions could not be regarded as direction under the Act or any Control Order issued therein and that such directions from the Collector were merely administrative directions and their non-compliance cannot give rise to any offences. The prosecution also has not been able to show that on the basis of the instructions issued by the Collector, the Railway Authorities themselves had given any direction to the railway staff for restricting the booking of Arhar Dal from Chapra Railway Station. Orders which will have statutory force are issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the Act. Section 3 provides that the Central Government for the purpose of maintaining or regulating supply and distribution of essential commodities may issue necessary orders in this regard and Section 5 permits the delegation of the power of issuing such notifications on the State Government or such officer or authority subordinate to the Central Govt. or the State Government as may be specified in the direction. The prosecution has not been able to show that after rescinding of the Control Order by Notification no. S. O. 696 (E) dt. 30-9-1977, any authorisation had been issued either by the Central Government or State Government empowering the Collector to issue directions or Orders under the Act or the rules made thereunder. Obviously, therefore, the Collector was not competent to issue any statutory order under the Act or the rules. Therefore, at the most, instructions issued by the Collector were merely administrative orders which had no legal binding force. It has also been submitted on behalf of the three petitioners who are railway employees, that while booking the Arhar Dal they had complied with all the rules and regulations of the railway in this regard and since no violation of any such rule has been pointed out, no offence whatsoever is made out for booking the consignments of the Dal from the Chapra Railway Station. I find force in this contention. I find force in this contention. Since there was no Control Order either prohibiting or restricting the booking of consignments of Arhar Dal from inside the State of Bihar to any place outside the State, the bookings of the consignments made by the petitioners obviously cannot give rise to any offence either under the Act or under Section 468 of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, the contentions put forward on behalf of the petitioners in this regard must be upheld. 6. We now come to the last point raised on behalf of the petitioners, namely, the point of lack of sanction. It is not disputed that no sanction has been obtained for the prosecution of three of the petitioners who are railway employees and are thus public servants. It has been urged on their behalf that by booking the railway consignments at the request of the consignor, these three railway employees were only acting in discharge of duty and, therefore, in view of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure without previous sanction of the competent authority neither cognizance can be taken against them for the alleged offence nor any trial can proceed for the same. Subsection (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is relevant for considering this point is as follows:- "When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction ........." The learned State Counsel accepts that the three railway employees are public servants but he submits that Section 197 (i) will be applicable to only such a public servant who is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government. He was asked to indicate as to who is the competent authority to remove the three petitioners, who are railway employees, from service but he failed to provide a clear cut answer. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of these petitioners that they are all railway employees and can be removed by only the railway administration. He was asked to indicate as to who is the competent authority to remove the three petitioners, who are railway employees, from service but he failed to provide a clear cut answer. On the other hand, it was urged on behalf of these petitioners that they are all railway employees and can be removed by only the railway administration. Railway administration has been defined in sub-section (6) of Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act and railway servant has been defined in sub-section (7) of Section 3 of the Indian Railways Act as follows:- "Sub-section (6) of Sec. 3 of the Indian Railways Act.- "railway administration", or "administration", in the case of a railway administered by the government means the manager of the railway and includes the government, and in the case of railway administered by a railway company, means the railway company; Sub-Sec. (7).- "railway servant" means any person employed by a railway administration in connection with the service of a railway; Since "railway administration" also means the manager of the railway it was submitted by the learned State Counsel that the position is not clear as to whether the concerned three railway employees are removable only by the government or by the manager. I do not think that there is any force in this contention. Though earlier there used to be private companies operating railway in some parts of the country, now it is not so and the railway is now operated by the Central Government through the Ministry of Railways. Obviously, therefore, the concerned three petitioners are employees of the Central Government. Article 77 of the Constitution of India provides that all executive action of the Government of India shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the President and the President shall make rules for convenient transaction of the business of the Government of India. Obviously, therefore, the manager of a railway while conducting any business of the railway administration, functions in accordance with rules made in this regard and thus he is an instrument of the Central Government. So even if the contention of the learned State Counsel be accepted that the concerned three petitioners who are railway employees, could be removed by the manager of the railway, it would still mean removal by the government and not by any private agency. So even if the contention of the learned State Counsel be accepted that the concerned three petitioners who are railway employees, could be removed by the manager of the railway, it would still mean removal by the government and not by any private agency. In my opinion, therefore, there is also no substance in the contention which has been raised by the learned State Counsel in this regard. However, as I have already indicated above, if the question of sanction is kept aside, the proceedings are incompetent and unsustainable on other grounds as has already been indicated earlier. 7. For the reasons stated above, I find the entire proceedings in G. R. Case No. 2543/82 pending in the court of the Special Judge, E. C. Act, Saran, is without jurisdiction. Accordingly, I hereby quash the entire proceeding of this case. The application thus stands allowed.