JUDGMENT K.C. Agrawal, A.C.J. - This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by Vijay Kali Shanker Mishra challenging the recovery of Rs. 1,75,553/- from the petitioner as the shortfall between the prices of the shops in question at the re-auction and those at the auction held earlier in favour of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner participated in the auction held on 21st March, 1986 for the year 1986-87 for retail vend of bhangin the district of Mirzapur and was the highest bidder for the various shops, details of which are given below : - Shop : Bid : 1. Vindhyachal Rs. 84,000 00 2. Obra Group Rs. 2,10,000.00 3. Dudhi Group Rs. 1,08,000.00 4. Robertsganj Group Rs. 2,38,000.00 5. Renukoot Group Rs. 3,00,000.00 The petitioner deposited ?th of the licence fee and also the licence fee for the months of April, May and June, 1986. The petitioner was given provisional licence to sell bhang at the places mentioned above The petitioner has claimed that on account of non-supply of bhang by the Excise Department, he could not do the business he was entitled to The petitioner expressed his desire to withdraw from his bids and stopped depositing the license fee The petitioner was declared to be defaulter and the shops were re-auctioned on 24th October, 1986. There was a shortfall of Rs. 1,75,553/- between the prices offered by the petitioner and those fetched at the re-auction The Collector issued a recovery certificate for recovery of the shortfall against the petitioner The Tahsildar was taking steps to recover the amount of the shortfall when the present petition was filed mainly on three grounds : (1) As the bid had not been approved by the Excise Commissioner the entire proceedings for recovery, against the petitioner were void. (2) No concluded contract between the petitioner and the Excise Department had taken place and as such the shortfall could not be recovered as arrears of land revenue, (3) In the absence of a concluded contract, even a suit for recovery of the shortfall would not be maintainable. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and are of the opinion that none of the points has any merit. 4. 3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and are of the opinion that none of the points has any merit. 4. In pursuance of the provisions of Section 41 (1) (c) of the U.P. Excise Act, 1910, the Excise Commissioner, U.P. with the previous sanction of the State Government, framed the U.P. Excise (First Amendment) Rules, 1984. Section 41 (1) (c) of the Act is of the wide amplitude conferring power on the Excise Commissioner to make rules laying down the manner of fixation of fee payable for any license. The amending Rules of 1984 were published in the U.P. Gazette on 5-3-1984 in accordance with Section 77 of the Act. Section 77 lays down : - "All rules made and notifications issued under the Act shall be published in the official Gazette, and shall have effect as if enacted in this Act from the date of such publication or from such other date as may be specified in that behalf." In view of Section 77 of the Act and general principles applicable to interpretation of statutes as set out in the State of U.P. and others v. Babu Ram Upadhya, AIR 1961 SC 751 , the amending rules should, for purposes of construction and obligation, be treated as if they were in the enabling Act and would be of the same effect as if contained in the Act. 5. The amending Rules of 1984 have brought out drastic changes. Rule 6 provides that final acceptance of the bid is subject to sanction by the Excise Commissioner. The effect of the bid, before it is confirmed by the Excise Commissioner, has been given in clause (7) of Rule 6, which reads : - "(7) Every person bidding will be held to his bid whether it be highest or not and all such bids shall remain valid till the final decision of the Excise Commissioner or for a period of sixty days whichever is earlier." 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on the State of U.P. v. Kishori Lal Minocha, AIR 1980 SC 680 , contended that as no concluded contract between the State and the auction bidder had come into existence on account of the auction having not been approved by the Excise Commissioner, therefore, there was no liability in the auction purchaser for payment of the shortfall. At the time when the aforesaid decision was given, clause (2) of Rule 357 of the Excise Manual, on which the Judgement of the court was based, read : - "(2) The final acceptance of any bid is subject to the sanction of the Excise Commissioner." The court held that in the absence of sanction of the Excise Commissioner, the bid could not be said to have been finally accepted. The admitted position in that case was that the bid offered by the respondent had not been sanctioned by the Excise Commissioner. Taking that fact into account, the Supreme Court held that no concluded contract between the parties to make the auction purchaser liable for the alleged loss had been arrived at. For this view, reliance had been placed by the Supreme Court on Union of India and others v. Bhimsen Walaiti Ram, AIR 1971 SC 2295 . In State of Madhya Pradesh and another v. Firm Gobardhan Dass Kailash Nath, AIR 1973 SC 1164 , the Supreme Court took the same view. In none of these cases, the Supreme Court was concerned with the proposition of law that arises before us on account of the modification and alteration in the rules made by the amending Rules of 1984. These decisions are, therefore, of little assistance to the petitioner. 7. In view of clause (7) of Rule 6 of the U.P. Excise (First Amendment) Rules, 1984, the auction purchaser and the Excise Department would have the relationship of promissor and promissee and would be bound by the obligations and rights accruing under the contract irrespective of the fact that the auction had not been approved by the Excise Commissioner. By the fact that the license was provisionally granted, it must be held that the terms and conditions, on which the agreement was arrived at, were binding on the parties from the outset, though the same were subsequently to be replaced by a more formal contract. From the circumstance that the petitioner started operating the License, it is clear that the petitioner undertook the obligations flowing under the agreement immediately. 8. In Cheshire and Fifoots Law of Contract, 10th edition, page 38, it has been observed. From the circumstance that the petitioner started operating the License, it is clear that the petitioner undertook the obligations flowing under the agreement immediately. 8. In Cheshire and Fifoots Law of Contract, 10th edition, page 38, it has been observed. "The inclination of judges, whenever possible and especially in commercial transaction, to find the existence of a contract is further evident in their readiness to assume that the acceptance of an offer may have a retrospective effect. It may then serve to clothe with legal force the conduct of parties who have acted on the faith of this assumption. Few such cases, indeed, are to be found in the reports. But there seems no reason to doubt that in law as in common sense an acceptance may thus legitimate the past. The question was discussed by Megaw J. in Trollope and Colls Ltd. v. Atomic Power Constructions Ltd, (1962) 3 All ER 1035". In our view, the parties in the case before us had been conducting their transactions with one another on the assumption that a contract would ultimately be entered into on the lines known to both the parties. This part of our Judgement covers the major points - submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner before us. 9. The only other thing that remains to be considered is about the liability of the petitioner to pay the shortfall. In the State of U.P. v. Kishori Lal Minocha, AIR 1980 SC 680 , the Supreme Court found that the auction purchaser was not liable to pay the shortfall on account of the fact that no concluded contract had been arrived at and also due to the reason that Rule 357 of the Excise Manual did not provide for recovery of the shortfall as arrears of land revenue. The court found that 5th clause of Rule 357, which dealt with the entitlement of the State to recover from the defaulter the shortfall, had not been published in the official Gazette as required by Section 77 of the Act. The Supreme Court observed : - "That being so it must be held that there was no law under which the respondent could be asked to make amends for the shortfall." In the instant case, the position is different. The Supreme Court observed : - "That being so it must be held that there was no law under which the respondent could be asked to make amends for the shortfall." In the instant case, the position is different. Rule 6 of the amending Rules of 1984 has been published in the official Gazette as required by Section 77 of the Act and it provides for recovery of the shortfall as arrears of land revenue. Clause (11) of Rule 6 provides that. "All monetary losses resulting from reaction or alternative arrangements or from the license remaining unsold for want of bidders shall be recoverable from the original auction purchaser as arrears of land revenue." The aforesaid provisions in the Rules has been made to achieve the purpose mentioned in the enabling Section of the Act. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner had placed reliance on Dhunmun Ram alias Badri Prasad v. State of U.P. and others, 1979 UPTC 1033, Dwigvijay Singh v. District Magistrate, Hamirpur and others,Civil Misc. Writ No. 1824 of 1976 decided on 2-4-1980 and Ram Swarup and others v. The District Magistrate/Collector, Hamirpur and others, Civil Misc. Writ No. 60 of 1976, decided on 12-8-1980. None of these cases is helpful in deciding the controversy before us. We have distinguished these cases in Hakim Singh v. State of U.P. and others, Civil Misc. Writ No. 943 of 1988 decided on 7-12-1989. 11. In Devendra Pratap Singh and another v. State of U.P. and another, Civil Misc. Writ No. 843 of 1989 decided on 17-4-1989, a Division Bench of this Court has held that recovery of the shortfall as arrears of land revenue was justified on the basis of the rules which have been relied upon by the State Government before us. 12. In the result, the petition fails and is dismissed with costs.