Judgment :- Petitioner (a tenant of building) claimed among other things, that he has protection against eviction, since he continues in occupation under a lease arrangement Which was created before 1-4-1940. After shuttling up and down between Rent Control Court, Appellate Authority and Revisional Court for a period, which stretched well over twelve years, parties have reached the High Court in this Original Petition filed by the tenant under Art.227 of the Constitution. The point which was urged in this Original Petition centers round the decision of the lower authority regarding tenant's claim of protection based so.ll (17) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short' the Act'). 2. The respondent-landlord filed a petition before Rent Control Court for eviction on the ground that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation. The tenant resisted it on many grounds including a claim of kudikidappu right for which the dispute remained in the Land Tribunal for A while on reference made by the Rent Control Court under S.125(3) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. All the remaining questions have been resolved and one that survives now is the claimer of protection under S.11(17) of the Act. The case, at one stage, reached the District Court in revision from where it was pushed back to the Rent Control Court. The proceedings again mounted up to higher forums and reached the District Court. On a second time the District Court remanded it but not down to Rent Control Court. The Appellate Authority then found that the tenant's father had taken the building on lease prior to 1-4-1940. The said finding was enough to non-suit the landlord in this case. However, the finding did not last long as the District Court, in revision, set it aside. The said order of the District Court is in challenge in this Original Petition. 3. The said finding was enough to non-suit the landlord in this case. However, the finding did not last long as the District Court, in revision, set it aside. The said order of the District Court is in challenge in this Original Petition. 3. 8.11(17) of the Act reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in this section a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from 1st April 1940 as a tenant, shall not be liable to be evicted for bona fide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him, provided that a landlord of a residential building shall be entitled to evict such a tenant of that building if the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application to the Rent Control Court for being put in possession of the building, and requires the building bona fide for his own permanent residence or for the permanent residence of any member of his family or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." 4. Though the building in this case is a residential one, the landlord did not claim relief on any of the premises envisaged in the second limb of the sub-section, namely, its proviso.. He disputes the tenant's contention that the building was let out before the crucial date i.e., 1-4-1940 though he did not say as to when the lease commenced. He acquired the ownership of the building only in 1976 and even at that time the building was outstanding on lease with the tenant. However, he disputed the tenant's claim that the lease originated prior to the crucial date. The tenant claimed in his objections that the lease commenced in January 1940. Ext.B1 is a receipt dated 1-10-1961 and Exts.B2 to B8 are extracts of property tax assessment register of Cochin Corporation, none of which helps the court to decide the crucial question. Ext.B9 is a certificate issued by the Commissioner of Cochin Corporation to the effect that records relating to the period prior to Ext.B2 are not available in the office of the Corporation. Ext.B9 is a certificate issued by the Commissioner of Cochin Corporation to the effect that records relating to the period prior to Ext.B2 are not available in the office of the Corporation. The documents produced by the tenant help him, if at all they can be acted on, to trace tenancy as far back as 1946. Ext.A5 is a receipt, the genuineness of which was seriously disputed by the tenant and the courts below have refused to act on it. The date of the receipt is 23-1-1944. Even if Ext. A5 can be used for the advantage of the tenant, it takes the tenancy back up to the year 1944. The tenant, as R.W.I, has stated that the building was rented out to his father in the year 1940. None else has given evidence on that aspect. 5. S.11(17) though framed in the form of a non-obstinate provision, is in practical sense a proviso to S.11(3) of the Act. The first limb of sub-section (17) confers a special right on the tenant whose occupation in the building could be traced to a date antecedent to 2-4-1940 and who continues in occupation when eviction is demanded. Whoever claims such a right has to plead necessary facts and prove the same to the satisfaction of the Rent Control Court. There must be satisfaction that the tenancy originated either on the crucial date or on any previous date. Hardship of the tenant to prove the said fact is not a substitute for proof, nor does it relieve him of his burden. The protection envisaged in the sub-section being special and exceptional to such a tenant, with its consequence of foreclosing the landlord's right to avail himself of a ground which even a restricting legislation like the Rent Control Act has granted, the tenant's burden to prove that the tenancy originated on or before the crucial date cannot be lightly discharged. Perhaps the instrument of lease itself is good evidence to prove this fact. In the absence of such instrument, receipt acknowledging payment of rent on a prior date or entry in the local body's record may help the tenant to satisfy the court on this score. If this point is sought to be established through oral evidence alone, the testimony of witnesses must be such as to install confidence in the court's mind about its truth. If this point is sought to be established through oral evidence alone, the testimony of witnesses must be such as to install confidence in the court's mind about its truth. But tenant cannot simply say, as he tried to say in this case, that since the landlord did not prove the date of commencement of the lease, the date suggested by the tenant must be treated as established. No such rule can be laid down or recognised regarding proof of facts to be established. Mere assertion of a fact in the written objections filed by the tenant is no substitute for proof, even if the landlord has not specifically pleaded any date or month or even year of commencement of lease. It is well neigh settled that the law of pleadings cannot be enforced with all its rigour in proceedings under the Act. 6. In a similar case M.P. Menon, J. has observed in Rebecca Thomas v. Joseph (1981 KLN 512) thus: "As I have indicated earlier, sub-section (17) is designed to give some additional protection to certain classes of tenants and in that sense, it operates as a proviso to S.11 (3). If that be so, the burden of pleading and proving that he was in continuous occupation from 1940 was on the tenant; he circumstance that the landlord was not aware of the position was itself insufficient to treat it as having been proved". 7. True, the tenant as R.W.1 has said that the lease had commenced in the year 1940. But one cannot overlook the fact that R.W.1 would have born only a decade after the crucial date as could be inferred from the age given by him in the proceedings. Evidently he has no direct knowledge regarding any state of affair, which prevailed in 1940. His evidence on that score is therefore nothing better than hearsay and hence it is no evidence. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that since the evidence helped the tenant to prove the age of tenancy right up to the year 1944, a presumption may be drawn that the state of things remained like that during preceding years also and thus the tenant's version could be accepted. Presumption, of course, aids the court in coming to conclusions based on either admitted facts or admissible evidence. But no presumption can be drawn from a presumption. Presumption, of course, aids the court in coming to conclusions based on either admitted facts or admissible evidence. But no presumption can be drawn from a presumption. The fact presumed should have direct relation with the fact established. If the connection is too remote or uncertain, court should refrain from resting on such presumption. S.114 of the Evidence Act empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact "which it thinks likely to have happened", regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business in their relation to facts of the particular case. Illustration (d) to S.114 reads thus: "The court may presume, that a thing 01 state of things which has been shown to be in existence within a period shorter than that within which such things or state of things usually cease to exist is still in existence". The Supreme Court recognised the principle that though Illustration (d) mentions about presumption of future continuance, the court will be justified in drawing an inference of the existence of a thing or state of things backwards. Their Lordships observed in Ambika Prasad v. Ram EkbalBai (AIR 1966 SC 605) thus: "If a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed in Illus. (d) to S.114. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised both in India. This is rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances". 9. Presumption of fact is usually drawn by court when it has the assurance of its existence with a reasonable degree of certainty. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances". 9. Presumption of fact is usually drawn by court when it has the assurance of its existence with a reasonable degree of certainty. When existence of the fact or thing is in issue, prior existence of it, in human experience is inferrable from proof of its existence at a particular point of time, in the same way as its continued existence for some length of time. But the degree of proximity of this prior existence as well as continuity depends on facts and circumstances of each case. If there is evidence that a mountain was in existence at a particular time, inference that the mountain remained like that for a century before also is perfectly permissible in the realm of presumption. Instead of a mountain, if the subject is a hillock the presumption backward can be stretched up to, say a few years. But if the subject is a soap bubble it would be inept to presume that the bubble remained like that even half an hour prior to the time. Hence there cannot be any inflexible rule of presumption regarding the space of time during which it would have existed earlier. A backward presumption regarding existence of lease even for a few months prior to the date of proof of its existence may not be sound in law. Here the presumption is sought to be stretched backwards up to a long period of more than four years on the assumption that Ext. AS can be used to the advantage of the tenant. Such a presumption is unreasonable and hence cannot be drawn in law. 10. Learned counsel lastly contended that the District Judge has exceeded his jurisdiction by interfering with fact-finding made by the Appellate Authority. The District Judge, as Revisional Authority, had jurisdiction to examine the legality, propriety and correctness of the order passed by the Appellate Authority. As the Appellate Authority had arrived at a finding without any evidence, the revisional authority was within his jurisdictional limit when he interfered with it. In the result, Original Petition is dismissed.' No costs.