Judgment This is an appeal by the tenant-defendant in a suit brought for eviction under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 (for short as Act) on grounds of default, subletting and reasonable requirement for own use and occupation as well as for building and re-building. 2. The appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 29.8.83 and 2.9.83, respectively, passed by Additional District Judge, Second Court, Bankura, affirming that of the trial court viz. Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, Bankura. 3. The case of the plaintiffs in brief was that they purchased the suit premises described in plaint schedule on 17.3.67, when the defendant was in possession of the same as a tenant, at a monthly rental of Rs.150/- payable according to Bengali Calendar month. After purchase the defendant acknowledged the plaintiffs as landlords and went on paying rent till Magh, 1374 B.S.; but made default in payment thereafter since Falgoon 1374 B.S. It was alleged that the defendant inducted several persons as sub-tenants in the suit premises without prior consent in writing of the landlord. The plaintiffs wanted to start a business of their own in the suit premises after purchase by raising structures thereon for which they determined the tenancy of the defendant serving notice upon him. As the defendant-appellant failed to comply with the same, they were compelled to file the suit on 25.1.71 in the 1st Court of Munsif, Bankura which was transferred ultimately to the court of Additional Sub-ordinate Judge, Bankura. 4. The defendant-appellant entered appearance on 25.2.71. On 25.3.71, be filed two separate applications under Sections 17(2) and 17(2A) of the said Act which were dismissed by the learned Additional Sub-ordinate Judge who beard such applications on 15.2.72. 5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the defendant-appellant moved this Court and obtained a Civil Rule No. 485 on 20.2.73, which however, was discharged on 3.8.73. Meanwhile an application under Section 17(3) of the said Act was filed by the plaintiff respondents for striking out the defence of the defendant-appellant against delivery of possession of the suit premises which was allowed on contested bearing by the trial Court on 7.2.75. The defendant-appellant moved this Court again and obtained a Rule on 18.4.75 which was also disposed of by this Court on 29.4.75, upholding the order of the trial Court but directing it thereafter to proceed in accordance with the law. 6. The defendant-appellant moved this Court again and obtained a Rule on 18.4.75 which was also disposed of by this Court on 29.4.75, upholding the order of the trial Court but directing it thereafter to proceed in accordance with the law. 6. The trial Court thereafter framed as many as 8 issues including the alleged tenancy of the defendant-appellant of the suit premises under the plaintiff-respondents and if be was a defaulter in payment of rent as alleged by the plaintiff-respondents and further if the defendant had sublet a portion of the suit permises to different persons, and the plaintiff-respondent was entitled to get a decree for eviction on grounds of reasonable requirements for own use and occupation and other grounds as alleged. 7. The trial Court held that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as it was held by that court in a proceeding under Sections 17(2) and 17(2A) or the Act, which was also endorsed by this Court. The defendant-appellant was found to be a defaulter for which his defence against delivery of possession was struck out by a revious order 6.3.75 in a petition under Section 17(3) of the Act which was also upheld by this Court. The trial Court also found that the defendant-appellant had sublet the suit premises without written consent of the plaintiff, landlords and thereby quite apart from the ground or default passed a decree for eviction also on ground of subletting. The plaintiff-respondents having not made out in their pleading any case of their having reasonably suitable accommodation anywhere else, their prayer for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirements for their own use and occupation was turned down by the trial Court. 8. The learned Additional District Judge, Bankura, who heard the appeal being preferred by the defendant-appellant approved and affirmed the findings made by the trial judge and thereby dismissed the same. In other words, the trial judge decree the plaintiff's suit for ejectment on the ground of subletting and default and rejecting thereby she ground of reasonable requirement and the same was confirmed by the 1st appellate court. 9. The findings of the lower appellate court have been assailed by Mr. In other words, the trial judge decree the plaintiff's suit for ejectment on the ground of subletting and default and rejecting thereby she ground of reasonable requirement and the same was confirmed by the 1st appellate court. 9. The findings of the lower appellate court have been assailed by Mr. S.P. Roychowdhury appearing for the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as tenant) on several grounds: Firstly, it has contended that the finding on the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties made by the trial Court in an interlocutory proceeding under Section 17(2) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act (for short Act) is not a finalty on the matter and the same can be challenged on appeal against the decree under Order 43, Rule IA of the Civil Procedure Code. Secondly, it has been urged that the question of relationship can still be re-agitated as the petition under Section 17(2) of the said Act was dismissed on the point of limitation. Thirdly, that the Courts below did not apply their mind to such question on the materials on record and relied simply on the finding already made in the proceeding under Section 17(2) of the Act and as such it requires reconsideration. Fourthly, it bas been urged that the courts below did not apply their mind to all the aspects on the question of subletting which also deserve reconsideration in the light of observations made by the Supreme Court in various decisions. 10. The first three grounds relate to the similar vital question of relationship between the parties. It is needless to say, no decree of ejectment can be passed in a proceeding under the Act, unless there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. 11. As we have already seen the plaintiffs came out with a case that they had purchased the suit premises on 17.3.67 and that at the time of their purchase, the defendant-appellant was in possession of such premises as a tenant therein, at a monthly rental or Rs.150/- payable according to the Bengali Calendar. 11. As we have already seen the plaintiffs came out with a case that they had purchased the suit premises on 17.3.67 and that at the time of their purchase, the defendant-appellant was in possession of such premises as a tenant therein, at a monthly rental or Rs.150/- payable according to the Bengali Calendar. It was their further case that the defendant was informed of such purchase by the plaintiff-respondents by a registered notice and that the defendant-tenant acknowledged the same and went on paying rent till the month of Magh, 1374 B.S. and became a defaulter in respect thereof since the month of Falgoon, 1374 B.S. The defendant-tenant in his written statement denied the same alleging that the plaintiffs were strangers to such premises and at the same time be filed two applications on 25.3.71, under Sections 17(2) and 17(2A) of the Act, disputing such relationship between them. Apart from the question of such relationship, amount of rent payable, payment of Rs.1650/- to Sadhan Chandra Dey, younger brother of the plaintiff No. 1, allegedly the real owner of the suit premises, and the further questions if such application were made within time were all investigated in details on evidence by the trial Judge. Evidence both oral and documentary was adduced by both the parties on specific points in the nature of issues being framed and questions raised and adverted to by the parties and addressed by the judge at that time. The trial judge in consideration of the evidence led by the parties, and on detailed discussion of the same came to the finding that there was such relationship though the defendant-tenant was not entitled to the relief’s as prayed for, as because such petition were made out of time. In short, such petitions were rejected on 15.12.72. The defendant-tenant moved this court in revision but failed to obtain any relief, as because the order of the trial judge was confirmed on 3.8.73 by this Court. The net result, therefore, is that the finding of the trial Court that there is relationship of the landlord and tenant between the parries, stands. 12. Together with this, we further find that the plaintiffs made an application under Section 17(3) of the Act for striking out the defence against delivery of possession which was allowed by the trial Court by his order dated 7.2.75. 12. Together with this, we further find that the plaintiffs made an application under Section 17(3) of the Act for striking out the defence against delivery of possession which was allowed by the trial Court by his order dated 7.2.75. The defendant-appellant undisputedly also moved this Court against that order in revision which, however, was disposed of by this Court on 29.4.75, upholding such finding to strike out the defence, but directing the trial Court to proceed with the suit in accordance with the law as laid down by the Special Bench in the case (1) Gurudas Biswas v. Sibsankar Sil and Others reported in AIR 1977 Calcutta, page 110. 13. It is in the background of all such facts and circumstances, we are to consider the questions that have been raised on behalf of the defendant-appellant in this second appeal. Regarding the finally on the question of relationship between the parties, and other allied mailers decided in a proceeding under Section 17(2) of the Act, the position of law though it might have same what fluid has now crystalised and it can be said with an amount of certainty that such findings are final only for the purpose of such application and not for the purpose of the suit unless any material issue is also taken up for determination along with such application and that issue is fully and effectively determined along with such application. Reference has been made in this connection to the Division Bench decision of this Court, in the case (2) Nanda Gopal Das v. Rabindra Nath De & Another reported in 1987 Vol. 1 CHN, page 362. In coming to the decision on this point their Lordships relied upon to two earlier Bench decisions of this Court viz. (3) Ashalata Mitra v. A.D. Viz. (56 CWN 692 & 694) and (4) Aloka Gupta v. Inspector General (66 CWN 302). It was clearly held in those cases that decisions or findings arrived at under an application thereunder are only for the purpose of the application and it never takes the place of final decision. But situation may arise, where, as here, the observations made in that decision in Nonda Gopal Das v. Robindra Nath De (Supra), following the earlier Bench decisions will be highly relevant. But situation may arise, where, as here, the observations made in that decision in Nonda Gopal Das v. Robindra Nath De (Supra), following the earlier Bench decisions will be highly relevant. It was held that in coming to such findings relating to questions of relationship, rate of rent and default, when full opportunities are given to the parties to adduce evidence and the matter is decided fully and finally on such evidence, it becomes a matter of substance rather than of form. In that event, even though no issue is struck in formal frame, nevertheless, such an issue is considered and determined in all its substance as parties participated therein and contested the proceeding as they would have done under a formal issue in the final proceeding. In laying down such proposition of law their Lordships under scored the importance of deprecating technicalities in the judicial process emphasing thereby the importance of substance taking precedence over mere form. Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in (5) Pratap Singh v. Srikrishna Gupta reported in AIR 1956 SC page 140 at 141, and that of the Privy Council in (6) Mussumat Mitra v. Syed Fuzl it was observed in that connection that "it would be putting high premium on technical formality to overturn a decision solely on the ground that an issue was not formally framed or labeled as such even though the same has really been fully and effectively determined with the parties participating there in with full knowledge and no failure of justice appears to have been caused on chat score." 14. In the instant case parties were given full opportunity by the trial Judge to adduce evidence on the point of relationship, the amount of rent and other allied questions. On a careful perusal, there can be no manner of doubt that though not labeled as such, the trial Judge discussed and carefully weighed the evidence in respect the points framed and thereby came to his decision on the same. It is the definite and conclusive finding of the trial Judge on the basis of the evidence of the plaintiffs as corroborated by his witnesses that the defendant paid rent to the plaintiffs. It is the definite and conclusive finding of the trial Judge on the basis of the evidence of the plaintiffs as corroborated by his witnesses that the defendant paid rent to the plaintiffs. Quite apart from the evidence led during such proceeding, we find further from the evidence adduced during the final hearing of the suit that evidence of the plaintiffs (P.W. 1) realising rent from the defendant-tenant goes unchallenged in cross-examination. This is further proved by the defendant's signature in rent counter-foil, Exbt.-I series which were exhibited without any objection. Nothing prevented therefore the defendant-tenant not only to cross-examine the witnesses of the plaintiffs during final hearing of the suit but also to demolish the case of the plaintiffs on evidence and to assert that they are not entitled to any decree on the basis of the evidence recorded by the trial Court. 15. This question of relationship was also vehemently agitated before the first appellate court and for cogent reasons the said court found such relationship established between the parties and rightly negatived the various incidental objections that were raised at such hearing. Moreover, the trial Court not only overruled the plea of the defendant-appellant that there was no relationship between the parties but also found that the defendant-tenant was not entitled to any relief as the petition itself under Sections 17(2) and 17(2A) was filed out of time. There can be no substance in the argument that finding on the question of relationship and other associate questions would be meaningless as the petition itself has been found to be filed out of time. The position would have been different if the petition had been disposed of only on the point of limitation without deciding the other questions by the trial Court. But this is not so. Although, this Court disposed of the matter on the point of limitation in revision, the finding of the trial Court in the proceeding under Section 17(2) stands as they are and that is also confirmed during the final hearing of the suit by trial Court as well as in regular appeal by the first appellate court. When this court affirmed the finding of the trial Court in revision moved by the tenant-appellant, it casts and creates a paramount duty upon the tenant-appellant to displace that finding either in course of that revision petition or during the final hearing of the suit. When this court affirmed the finding of the trial Court in revision moved by the tenant-appellant, it casts and creates a paramount duty upon the tenant-appellant to displace that finding either in course of that revision petition or during the final hearing of the suit. The decision referred to and relied upon in this connection, on behalf of the appellant, as reported in 48 Indian appeal, page 49 at page 55, is of no help to the tenant-appellant. Fact remains therefore, the question of relationship between the parties and other allied matters as decided in the proceeding under Section 17(2), (2A), were not only confirmed by this Court in revision but were also found in favour of the plaintiff-landlords in course of final bearing of the suit as well as in regular appeal before the first appellate court. 16. Fact also remains that the defence of the defendant-tenant against delivery of possession was struck out in further proceeding under Section 17(3) of the Act in 1975. The same was also confirmed by this Court. The defendant-tenant thereby was found to be a defaulter. Nevertheless, be had the right and was entitled to cross-examine the plaintiffs witnesses and to address argument on the basis of plaintiffs case. The defendant-tenant was given ample opportunity to do the same by the trial Judge in course of final bearing of the suit itself. 17. So, the cumulative effect of the orders passed by the trial Judge in various proceedings under Section 17 as confirmed by this Court in revision, comes only to this that the defendant-tenant should have only the right to cross-examine the witnesses of the plaintiffs and not to lead any evidence and thereby travel beyond the very limited objective of pointing out the falsity of weaknesses of the plaintiffs' case. In other words, the scope of defence of the defendant-tenant under such circumstances becomes very narrow and even in the guise of cross-examining the plaintiffs' witnesses, he would not be permitted to travel beyond this legitimate scope and to convert itself virtually into a presentation of the defendant's case either directly or in the form of suggestions put to the plaintiffs' witnesses. Reference may be made in this connection upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo, reported in AIR 1989 SC page 162. 18. Reference may be made in this connection upon the decision of the Supreme Court in (7) Modula India v. Kamakshya Singh Deo, reported in AIR 1989 SC page 162. 18. With regard to the 4th ground, assailing the judgment on the point of subletting, the contention of Mr. Roychowdhury, is that the first appellate court bas not applied its mind while approving or confirming the finding of the trial Court on such point. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs as made out in paragraph 5 of the plaint, that the defendant-appellant has inducted Rameswar Sen, Subal Chandra De and Narayan Chandra Dutta, in portions of the suit premises as sub-tenants and without prior consent in writing of the plaintiff-landlords and as such has made himself liable to eviction on the ground of subletting. The defendant-tenant has denied the same. The defendant-tenant has no doubt admitted the presence of these persons in the suit premises but he has questioned the nature of allegation regarding sub-tenancy, stating that all these persons are his dependents engaged by him as licensees to sell different articles in small sheds (gumties) in such premises. It is the case of the defendant that Rameswar Sen is his nephew. The trial Court, on evidence, has disbelieved such case of the defendant and came to the finding that the defendant-tenant has actually sublet portions of the suit premises in favour of the different persons and this finding has been confirmed by the appellate court without going into the reasons in detail. The question is, if such persons who are actually occupying the suit premises are licensees as alleged by the defendant or are really the sub-tenants as it is the case of the plaintiff-respondents. 19. It is a settled principle of law that to prove tenancy or sub-tenancy, two ingredients must he established: Firstly, the tenant or sub-tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly, that right must be in lieu of payment of some monetary consideration or rent. 20. 19. It is a settled principle of law that to prove tenancy or sub-tenancy, two ingredients must he established: Firstly, the tenant or sub-tenant must have exclusive right of possession or interest in the premises or part of the premises in question and secondly, that right must be in lieu of payment of some monetary consideration or rent. 20. Sub-tenancy has not been defined in the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act but Section 105 of the T.P. Act defines a sub-lease as a lease of immovable property as a transfer of right to enjoy such property for a certain time, express of implied, or imperpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised or of money, a share of scrops, or service or other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or in specified actions to the transferer by the transferee who accepts the transfer on such terms. The question whether there is a sub-tenancy or licence and parting with the possession in the particular case must depend upon quality of occupation given to the licensee or the transferee. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub-tenancy or parting with possession. The mere fact of letting other persons into possession by the defendant and permitting them to use the premises for their own purposes, is not, so long the defendant retains the legal possession himself. Parting with possession means legal possession by one in favour of the other by giving him and exclusive possession to the ouster of the grantor. In the instant case, it appears from the evidence on record that Rameswar Sen is running a grocery in a portion of the suit premises. The same is evidenced by the separate trade licence standing in the name of the transferee. It is further evidenced by Exbts.-7 and 7A, the Municipal Assessment Registrar. The case of the defendant, that he is the nephew of the defendant has also been disbelieved by the trial Court. Moreover, Rameswar Sen cannot be the nephew of the defendant Guiram Pal. The defendant-tenant has therefore failed to explain satisfactorily the possession of so many persons in the suit premises including that of Rameswar Sen who is running a grocery shop in such premises. There is no concrete evidence on record to show, however, payment of any consideration, or price or rent in lieu of occupation of portions of these premises by these persons. There is no concrete evidence on record to show, however, payment of any consideration, or price or rent in lieu of occupation of portions of these premises by these persons. But law is clear on the point that if exclusive possession is established, and the version of the tenant as to the particulars and incidents of transaction is found unacceptable, it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with monetary consideration in mind. If any authority is needed, we may refer to the decision reported, in (8) AIR 1988 Supreme Court, page 1845. Therefore, if all such tests of subletting are applied to the facts of the instant case, there can be no manner of doubt as found by both the courts that the defendant-tenant has actually sublet portions of the suit premises for which he is liable to eviction. It is true that the first appellate court has not discussed in detail in coming to his finding on this point but as because sufficient materials are there on record, such a conclusion as arrived at by that court, is irresistable. 21. This being a concurrent finding of fact of both the courts below should not ordinarily be interferred with by this Court unless such finding is manifestly unjust or it is shown that the courts below misdirected themselves in rendering such finding of fact, which can be assailed as perverse. There is nothing on record to show, nor pointed out as such by the learned Advocate for the appellant showing such finding as manifestly unjust or perverse. The plaintiff-respondents are therefore entitled to get a decree for eviction also on this ground. The findings made by the courts below arc therefore upheld. 22. The result is therefore the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. The judgment and decree of the court below are hereby affirmed. No order is made as to costs. On the submission made by the learned Advocate for the appellant, operation of the decree be stayed for a period of two months from this date. Certified copy of the judgment, decree and of this order if applied for, be given expeditiously.