JUDGMENT 1. 1. The petitioner Samarath Lal, who was appointed as a Casual Labourer in November, 1986 by the respondents has filed this writ petition against his termination Order Ex. 2 dated 30-9-1989, whereby his services were ordered to be terminated on the ground that be was found guilty of the offence Under Section 4/2 of the Rajasthan Prohibition Act, 1969 (for short 'the Act'). 2. The contention of the petitioner is that earlier his services were terminated on 1-2-1981 but the Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur (here in after referred to as 'the Tribunal') by its Award dated 25-11-83 ordered for his reinstatement with continuity of his service and he was ordered to be paid full back wages upto May, 1981. 3. It is alleged that after the aforesaid Award, the respondents sought character verification of the petitioner from the Police and it was informed by the Police that the petitioner has been convicted of an offence Under Section 4/2 of the Act somewhere in the year 1978 and he has been ordered to be released on probation. On the basis of the aforesaid adverse character informations, the services of the petitioners have been terminated vide Order Ex. 2 dated 30th September, 1989. 4. It may be stated here that the Rajasthan Prohibition Act, 1969 was probably withdrawn some where in the year 1981. It has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that when the Act was not in force then the termination based on the conviction recorded, Under that Act is not sustainable and is illegal and arbitrary According to the petitioner, this termination has been effected in violation of the principles of natural justice as he has not been, afforded an opportunity of hearing before passing his termination order. Even in the year 1978, when the petitioner was convicted of the aforesaid offence, he was in the employment of the respondents and, thereafter, he has served the respondents for about 11 years and, therefore, that conviction cannot be made a ground for his termination as it is based on extraneous considerations. He has submitted that how the necessity arose for verification of his character and antscodants after completion of 13 years of his services with the respondents. Taking of liquor is no offence. He was punished simply because he was found loitering on the road after taking wine and that is no offence involving turpitude. 5. He has submitted that how the necessity arose for verification of his character and antscodants after completion of 13 years of his services with the respondents. Taking of liquor is no offence. He was punished simply because he was found loitering on the road after taking wine and that is no offence involving turpitude. 5. A reply to the show cause notice has been filed on behalf of the respondents in which it has been claimed that this writ petition is not maintainable because Section 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 excludes the jurisdiction of this Court. Section 25 of the aforesaid Act provides that on and from the date from which any jurisdiction, powers and authority become exercisable Under this Act by a Tribunal in relation to recruitment and matter concerning recruitment to any service or post of service, matters concerning members of any service or persons appointed to any service or post; no court except the Supreme Court shall have or be entitled to exercise any jurisdiction powers or authority in relation to such recruitment or matters concerning such recruitment or such service matters. According to the respondents, the petitioner being in civil services of the Union of India and retrenchment being service matter, only the Administrative Tribunal has jurisdiction to entertain and redress such a grievance and hence this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this writ petition. 6. I have heard Mr. D.K. Parihar, the learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. G.N. Mathur the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents and have carefully gone through the record of the case. 7. Mr. G.N. Mathur, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that this writ petition is not maintainable as this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this case because it should ultimately go the Central Administrative Tribunal. In this respect, my attention was drawn to a decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal, New Delhi in the case of Rehmat Ullah Khan v. Union of India [(1989) 10 Administrative Tribunals Cases-656 (FB)] , wherein it has been held that the Casual Labourers and daily rated employees are included in the expression of Civil Services as defined in Section 14(1)(a) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 and, therefore, they being members of the Civil Service, their service matters should be heard by the Central Administrative Tribunals. According to the 'Tribunal, 'Service' is performance of Labour for benefit of another or at another's comment; the occupation, condition, or status of a servant'. Thus, 'Civil Service' in its enlarged sense, means all service rendered to and paid for by State or Nation by political sub-division thereof other than that pertaining to naval or military affairs It was in this context that the Tribunal came to the conclusion that grievances of the Casual Labourers can only be redressed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. 8. Mr. D.K. Parihar, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has, how ever, contended that the Casual Labourers are not holders of the posts in any Civil Service. Article 311 of the Constitution is not applicable to them and, therefore, when they are not holders of posts, they cannot be considered to be members of a service. He has submitted that the case of the petitioner is ousted from the purview of the Central Administrative Tribunal. In this respect, he has placed reliance on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra, AIR 1967 Supreme Court 884 , where in their Lordships have observed in para 10 of the judgment as Under: "In the context of Articles 309, 310 and 311, a post denotes an Office. A person who holds a civil post Under a State holds 'Office" during the pleasure of the Governor of the State, except as expressly provided by the Constitution, see Article 310. A post Under the State is an Office or a position to which duties in connection with the affairs of the State are attached, an office or a position to which a person is appointed and which may exist apart from the indecendently of the holder of the post, Article 310(2) contemplates that a post may be abolished and a person holding a post may be requited to vacate the post and it emphases the idea of a post existing apart from the holder of the post. A post may be created before the appointment or simultaneously with it. A post is an employment, but every employment is note post. A Casual Labourer is not the holder of a post A post Under the State means a post Under the administrative control of the State. A post may be created before the appointment or simultaneously with it. A post is an employment, but every employment is note post. A Casual Labourer is not the holder of a post A post Under the State means a post Under the administrative control of the State. The State may create or abolish the post and may regulate the conditions of service of persons appointed to the post." 9. According to Mr. Parihar, a Casual Labourer is not holder of a post. He has no right to continue on the post. It may be true that he may rendered some sort of services to the State for the payment of the wages but Articles 309, 310 and 311 of the Constitution do not apply to them and when a Casual Labourer is not holder of a part then his retrenchment will be governed by the Industrial Disputes Act rather than Civil Services Rules of the State. Thus, the grievances of the Casual Labourer cannot be retrenched by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In this respect, Mr. Parihar has placed reliance on two decision of Himachal Pradesh High Court in Jagdev Singh v. State of HP [1988 Lab.IC 1088) and Prem Chand v. State of HP (1988 Lab IC 1094) . 10. In Jagdev Singh's case (supra), it has been observed that the words 'civil service' and 'civil post' as used in Article 311(1) of the Constitution are the same and the expression 'a member of a civil service' and 'holds a civil post' are similar in substance to, if not exactly identical with, the words 'appointed to any civil service of the State or any civil post Under the State' used in Section 15 of the Act. The protection of Article 311(2) of the Constitution is not available to a daily rated workmen. It was further observed as Under: "Before a person can be regarded as holding a civil post Under the State, that is, as holding an office or a position not connected with defence but to which duties in connection with the affairs of the State are attached, such post has to be created and it must exist apart from the holder thereof. Such creation may be before the appointment or simultaneously with it. Such creation may be before the appointment or simultaneously with it. A post is undoubtedly in employment but every employment is not a post, Therefore, a Casual Labourer is not the holder of a post." In Jagdev Singh's case has been followed in Prem Chand's case (supra). 11. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the decision of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Jagdev singh's case and Premchand's case (supra). These two decision are based on the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Assam's case (supra) and, therefore, in the light of these authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships of the Supreme Court and Himachal Pradesh High Court, I am unable to accept the view propounded by the Central Administrative Tribunal in Rehmat Ullah Khan's case (supra), How ever, that decision is not binding on this Court. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection raised by Mr. G.N. Mathur, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that this writ petition not maintainable as the jurisdiction of this Court in such matters is barred by the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 is not sustainable and hence it is rejected. 12. In this case, the petitioner is in service of the respondents since 1975. It appears that while he was in service in the year 1978; he has been held guilty of an offence Under Section 4/2 of the Act. He admitted his guilt and, therefore, he was convicted of the aforesaid in offence and was released on area tien. He was found loitering on the road after taking wine. This is not an offence involving moral turpitude. The liquor is consumed by, by end large, by all and sundry. How ever, what is prohibited is that one should not import or export or produce the illicit liquor. In this case, the petitioner has not indulged in importing or exporting or producing the illicit liquor. Hence, he has not committed any offence which may involve any mortal turpitude as he has only been found loitering on the road after taking liquor. He has already been punished for that mistake. In this case, the petitioner has not indulged in importing or exporting or producing the illicit liquor. Hence, he has not committed any offence which may involve any mortal turpitude as he has only been found loitering on the road after taking liquor. He has already been punished for that mistake. After his conviction, he has been in service of the respondents for about past 11 years and, therefore, if he has satisfactorily discharged his duties for these 11 years than his services cannot be terminated on this ground that in the year 1978 he was convicted of an offence Under Section 4/2 of the Act and was released on probation. More ever, in this case, no opportunity of hearing was afforded to the petitioner before passing his termination order. It is not know what type of offence was there and whether during these 11 yrs., he has conducted himself in a manner which may necessitate visiting of such a harsh punishment to him i.e. retrenchment from service. I am fully convinced that this act on the part of the respondents is violative of principles of natural justice the petitioner was not afforded an opportunity of hearing and secondly, his conviction does not involve moral turpitude and the Act itself has been withdrawn. In this view of the matter the service of a retrenchment after about 18 years should not have been availed by the respondents to get rid of the employee. It, therefore, appear that the petitioner has been retrenched from service for some extreneous purposes Under the garb of the fact that he was found guilty of the offence Under Section 4/2 of the Act in the year 1978, Thus, his retrenchment/termination is bad in the eye of law, and, therefore, his termination order Ex. 2 deserves to be set aside. 13. In the result, I accept this writ petition, set aside the order Ex.2 dated 31-9-1989 and direct the respondents to take the petitioner back on duty treating him to be in continuous service. So far as back wages are concerned, the petitioner must raise an Industrial Dispute before the appropriate Govt. to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal and if it is found that he was not gainfully employed any where also during this period, then proper relief may be granted to him by the concerned Tribunal. 14. So far as back wages are concerned, the petitioner must raise an Industrial Dispute before the appropriate Govt. to be referred to the Industrial Tribunal and if it is found that he was not gainfully employed any where also during this period, then proper relief may be granted to him by the concerned Tribunal. 14. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties and left to bear their own costs of this writ petition.Petition allowed. *******