JUDGMENT : A. Pasayat, J. - The factual and legal controversies being common these three writ applications were heard analogous and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. One Krushna Chandra, Petitioner in "OJC No. 2139 of 1987 (since dead and substituted by his legal heirs) and his two sons, Basanta Kumar and Hemanta Kumar, Petitioners in OJC Nos. 2138 of 1987 and 3844 of 1988 respectively, filed returns u/s 6(1) of the Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (in short 'the Act'). Two other returns were filed by Urmila and Pramila, both daughters of Krushna Chandra. The competent authority (opp. Party No. 3) disposed of the returns filed by the daughters holding that they had no right over the property in respect of which the returns Were filed. The ceiling cases in respect of the other returns were heard analogous and identical orders were passed in each of them. After allowing certain exemptions and exclusions, three ceiling limits including built up areas with residential units for retention were calculated to be Ac. 1.485, and the area to be surrounded was determined to be Ac. 2,666. He also directed that the petition filed u/s 20 of the Act was to be forwarded to the Government in Housing and Urban Development Department (opp, party No. 1). The adjudication was challenged in appeal before the Member, Board of Revenue (opp. Party No. 2), who affirmed the orders passed by the competent authority. I he legality and propriety of the orders passed by the competent authority and the appellate authority is impugned in the present writ applications. Even though several grounds were indicated in the writ applications and were initially urged during the course of hearing, the learned Counsel for the Petitioners restricted the challenge to the following grounds: (1) The lands covered with buildings are out of the purview of the Act and they are not to be taken into consideration while computing the computable area for determination of the vacant land. Even if the lands with buildings were to be reckoned, only the land on which dwelling-units stood can be subjected to computation, while' the built up area used for commercial purposes was to be totally excluded in view of the definition of 'vacant land' as defined in Section 2(q) of the Act. The provisions of Section 4(g) have no application. Even if the lands with buildings were to be reckoned, only the land on which dwelling-units stood can be subjected to computation, while' the built up area used for commercial purposes was to be totally excluded in view of the definition of 'vacant land' as defined in Section 2(q) of the Act. The provisions of Section 4(g) have no application. In support of this contention reliance was placed on a decision of the Alhhabad High Court in the case of State of U.P. and Another Vs. District Judge, Varanasi and Another, . (2) land appertaining to khata No. 49, plot No. 787 measuring Ac. 0.502 decimals, which were leased out to Burma Shell Petrol Pump and which had underground petrol reservoir should have been totally kept out of consideration. (3) The lands used for agricultural and horticultural purposes were unfit for construction in terms of Rule 530(b)(iv) of the Orissa Municipal Rules, 1953 (in short 'the O.M. Rules') and without considering the evidence adduced, the competent authority has decided otherwise and the conclusions being unreasoned are unsustainable. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Benjamin Mohanty Vs. State of Orissa and Another, . (4) The competent authority did not consider the hal record-of-rights which would have proved the actual extent of land over which the Petitioners had possession. He placed reliance on the sabik record-of-rights, which indicated an erroneous approach. (5) Even though two applications u/s 20 were filed on 16-1-1984 and 8-12-1984, yet no action thereon was taken. Further the continuance of the proceedings during the pendency of the applications u/s 20 rendered the orders void Reliance was placed on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sajendra Nath Tagore v. Competent Authority and Ors. reported in 1981 (1) CHN 261 . On behalf of the State and functionaries under the Act, it was submitted that the contention that lands on which structures were raised for dwelling purposes are beyond the computation is contrary to law as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. etc. etc. v. L.J. Johnson and Anr. reported in AIR 1983 S.C. 1103. etc. etc. v. L.J. Johnson and Anr. reported in AIR 1983 S.C. 1103. The provisions of Section 4(g) and the Explanation amended to Section 4 itself indicate that the area over which structure stood and which was used for the purpose other than dwelling house was available to be considered while computing the computable area. The plea that the agricultural and the horticultural lands were unfit for construction was duly considered by the competent authority and on consideration of the available materials he came to the conclusion that the plea was untenable. The hal settlement records were duly considered and the plea of the Petitioners that they were in possession of lesser area, on enquiry was found to be incorrect. The law does not provide for any concession for underground construction. There is no embargo on the competent authority to proceed with the determination of excess area when an application u/s 20 is pending. 3. The rival contentions raise some interesting points and it would be proper to quote some of the relevant provisions of the Act and the O.M. Rules. Urban land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Section 2. Definition. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires (a) to (d).... (e) 'dwelling unit', in relation to a building or a portion of a building means a unit of, accommodation, in such building or portion used solely for the purpose of residence: (f) to (k).... (I) 'to hold' with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land, means (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgage or under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities (m) to (p).... (q)'vacant land' means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an agglomeration, but (sic) not include (i) Land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated: .... Section 4. Ceiling limit. (q)'vacant land' means land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, in an agglomeration, but (sic) not include (i) Land on which construction of a building is not permissible under the building regulations in force in the area in which such land is situated: .... Section 4. Ceiling limit. (1) to (8) (9) Where person holds vacant land and also holds any other land on which there is a building with a dwelling-unit therein, the extent of such other Land occupied by the building and the" land appurtenant thereto shall also be taken into account in calculating the extent of vacant land by such person. (10) to (11) .... Explanation For the purposes of this section and Sections 6, 8 and 10 a person shall be deemed to hold any land on which there is a building (whether or not with a dwelling unit therein.... Orissa Municipal Rules, 1953. Rule 530. Area of plots and built up area: (a).... (b) No land shall be used as site for the erection or re-erection of the masonry building (i) to (iii) .... (iv) if the soil or sub soil is saturated with water in consequence of which there is likely to be dampness of floor and walls of the building. 4. We shall first deal with the contention relating to non-consideration of the hal 'record-of-rights. In substance the argument of the Petitioners is that they were in possession of lesser area of land and that to reflected by the hal record-of-rights. According to them, possession is the yardstick and without enquiry as to the actual extent over which the Petitioners had possession the determination with reference to the sabik record-of-rights was illegal. We find that Section 2(1) is the answer to the proposition raised by the Petitioners. Statutorily it is provided that determination has to be made with reference to area held, which means to own such land or to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee of under an irrevocable power of attorney or under a hire purchase agreement of partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the slid capacity or capacities. If on enquiry it is held that a returnee 'holds' or 'owns' land, merely because he may possess it lesser extent, would not entitle him to claim the determination is to be made only in respect of the are claimed to be possessed by him. If such a view is taken, it would lead to unholy attempt being made to show that possession was less, though in law it was for a higher area. 5. So far as the contention of the Petitioners relating to inclusion of land with constructions used for commercial purposes is concerned, a reading of the Explanation appended to Section 4 and section...is sufficient.... Explanation appended to Section 4 provides that for the purposes of Sections 4, 6, 8 and 18, a person shall be deemed to hold land on which there is a building whether or not with a dwelling unit therein if he owns such land and the building etc. Sub-section (1) of Section 6 clearly indicates that the location, extent, value and such other particulars relating to all vacant lands and of any other land on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling unit therein has to be indicated in the statement required to be filed (under lining by us). Section 18 which deals with penalty for concealment of particulars of vacant land also indicates that if a person required to file a statement has concealed particulars of any land (other than vacant land) on which there is a building, whether or not with a dwelling-unit therein shall be penalised. The only conclusion that can be drawn on consideration of these provisions is that unmistakably the legislature wanted that the extent of land with constructions used for purposes other than dwelling has to be included while determining the computable area under the Act. We, therefore, find it difficult to agree with the view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in the case of State of U.P. and Anr. v. District Judge Varanasi and Anr. (supra). 6. Coming to the contention relating to propriety of inclusion of land used for agricultural and horticultural purposes, we find that the functionaries under the Act were correct in their view to include land used for agricultural and horticultural purposes, as the same was included in the master plan for purposes other than agriculture. (supra). 6. Coming to the contention relating to propriety of inclusion of land used for agricultural and horticultural purposes, we find that the functionaries under the Act were correct in their view to include land used for agricultural and horticultural purposes, as the same was included in the master plan for purposes other than agriculture. In view of the Explanation (sic) to Section 2(O) the said view is Correct. But the authorities have not addressed themselves to the alternative plea of the Petitioners that even if the rand was used for agricultural or horticultural purposes it was unfit for construction and therefore, could not have been treated as vacant land. In the case of Chaturbhuja Modi v. Special Officer and Competent Authority Urban Agglomeration Cuttack and Ors. O.K. No. 1138 of 1987 decided today we have highlighted the ingredients necessary for getting exclusion ill respect of this unfit for construction. Enquiry has not been conducted h the present Case in the proper perspective. This matter, therefore needs reconsideration by the competent authority keeping in view our observations made in the said decision. 7. So far as the land leased out to Burma Shell Petrol Pump is concerned, we find that there is no provision in the statute for inclusion of land on which there is an underground construction This is a matter which can be considered by the State Government while dealing with the Petitioners' applications for exemption u/s 20 of the Act. 8. The only other material point that survives is legality of the draft and the final statements prepared under Sections 8 and 9 respectively. In our considered view, the mere pendency of an application u/s 20 does not have the effect of bringing the proceeding to grinding halt. It is definitely not the intention at the legislature to make the proceeding static the moment an application u/s 20 is filed. The proceeding can be continued upto Section 8(3) stage. When it is brought to the notice of the competent authority that an application u/s 20 is pending, it is desirable that the competent authority will decide in each case whether to proceed beyond the Section 8(3) stage. The proceeding can be continued upto Section 8(3) stage. When it is brought to the notice of the competent authority that an application u/s 20 is pending, it is desirable that the competent authority will decide in each case whether to proceed beyond the Section 8(3) stage. Such continuance is not likely to adversely affect the rights of the person concerned if objections to draft statement are received, the competent authority would apply his mind to the question whether it is desirable to proceed to pass order u/s 8(4), notwithstanding the pendency of the exemption application. The desirability of such a course is on account of the fact that the final statement required to be proposed contains a column relating to land exempted u/s 8. Similar view has been expressed by the Gujurat High Court in the case of Avanti Organisation, Rajkot and etc. Vs. The Competent Authority and Additional Collector, Rajkot and Another. The Central Government also considering this aspect has issued guidelines in the following terms. The Board will make its re commendations to the State Government which will pass appropriate orders u/s 20(1)(a) copies of these orders will be sent to the Competent Authority concerned so that he can note the exemptions and process the statements filed by the person u/s 6. If the competent authority, on consideration of materials finds that the objection is not relating to the Land in respect of which the exemption is sought u/s 20, than he can proceed further upto Section 10(2) stage. But under no circumstances it would be desirable to proceed beyond the Section 10(2) stage, if the exemption application has not been disposed of by then. If the process is not arrested at the end of Section 10(2) stage and is allowed to continue upto the Section 10(3) stage many difficulties and tricky situations may arise. As a consequence of the finalisation of the Section 10(3) stage, the land vests with the State Government free from all incumbencies. At the same time, the State Government is empowered to grant exemption in respect of the very same land by application of the provisions contended in Sections 3 to 24 of the Act. Such an anomalous situation definitely is not the legislative intent. Therefore, such a situation is to be avoided. At the same time, the State Government is empowered to grant exemption in respect of the very same land by application of the provisions contended in Sections 3 to 24 of the Act. Such an anomalous situation definitely is not the legislative intent. Therefore, such a situation is to be avoided. It would be, however, desirable to avoid all such unsavory situations by disposing of the application u/s 20 with promptitude. That would obviate the difficulties which are likely to be uncountered in the event of proceeding beyond Section 8(3) stage. We find it difficult to accept the view 'of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Sajanendra Nath (supra) to the effect that the draft and final statements prepared are invalid and ineffective if an application u/s 20 is pending. As a corollary we must indicate that a valuable right of this Applicant is involved in the disposal and in the interest of justice, equity, fair-play and salutary principles of natural justice, the authorities would do well to grant an opportunity to the party seeking exemption to place materials in support of its case. Where prayer for exemption is intended to be refuted, it would be desirable to grant him such an opportunity. Though specifically not provided for in the Act, there is no specific exclusion of the principles of natural justice; even by implication. Where a statutory provision does not include natural justice, the requirement of affording an opportunity of being heard can be assumed, particularly when the proceedings are quasi judicial (See 1989 IV SVLR (T) 11) Carborundum Universal Limited v. The Central Board of Direct Taxes New Delhi Supreme Court has stressed on this desirability even for administrative proceedings. (See Raj Restaurant and Another Vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, ). The Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Nandakishore v. State of M.P. reported in AIR 1981 MP 33, has correctly indicated the position. We do not agree with the contrary view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in the case; of Avanti Organisation (supra). It appears from record that the competent authority has riot yet dispatched one of the applications filed by the Petitioners u/s 20. He should do it without further loss of time. 9. We do not agree with the contrary view expressed by the Gujarat High Court in the case; of Avanti Organisation (supra). It appears from record that the competent authority has riot yet dispatched one of the applications filed by the Petitioners u/s 20. He should do it without further loss of time. 9. In the result, the matter is remitted back to the competent authority to deal with the question of suitability or otherwise of construction on the land used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, and as to whether the land qualities for exemption in terms of Rule 503(b)(iv) of the O.M. Rules. Competent authority (opp. party No. 1) is directed to dispose of the applications u/s 20 Wed by the Petitioners expeditiously but not later than three months from today after giving due opportunity to the Petitioners of being heard in the matter. The final statement shall be prepared by the competent authority after receipt of the decision of the State Govt. relating to the applications u/s 20 of the Act. 10. The writ applications are accordingly disposed of, but in the circumstances without any order as to costs. D.P. Mohapatra, J. I agree. Application disposed of.