JUDGMENT Nathoo Lal, Member - These are two second appeals no. 69 and 70 of 82-83 of district Bareilly filed by Ramvir Singh and Hem Singh respectively against the common order passed by Additional Commissioner, Bareilly in Appeal No. 1140/77 and 68/1131 of 1981-82 Ramvir Singh v. Smt. Satyawati and Hem Singh v. Smt. Satyawati which were preferred against the judgment decree dated 16-8-1982 in suit no. 11 of 1981-82 passed by Sub-Divisional Officer, Faridpur district Bareilly under section 229-B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act to be called the 'Act' hereinafter. 2. Since both the appeals filed in this court are against the same order, I am inclined to dispose them of with this common judgment and order as consolidated appeals. 3. The facts of the case are that plaintiff-respondent Smt. Satyawati wife of Amar Singh and Smt Rajwati wife of Sujan Singh resident of village Deeppur, pargana and tehsil Faridpur district Bareilly brought a suit in the court of Assistant Collector, First Class and Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur district Bareilly impleading defendant-appellants Hem Singh and Ramvir Singh along with several others as defendants with the allegations that plot no. 160 area 10 biswas and plot no 161 area 2 bighas 2 biswas situate in village Tiraha, Pargana and Tehsil Faridpur district Bareilly are the bhumidhari tenancy land of the plaintiffs and originally defendants no. 3 to 6 Brij Nandan and others were bumidhars of this land who transferred the same in favour of plaintiffs under a registered sale deed dated 11-7-1966 and handed over possession while defendants no 1 and 2 Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh have got no concern with the land in suit nor they have ever been in possession but as a result of their cunningness they could manipulate entries in their names in revenue records which have got no legal affects on the rights and title of the plaintiffs The plaintiffs, therefore, sought ejectment and expunction of entries in the name of defendants. The suit was contested by the appellants Ranvir Singh and Hem Singh and a written statement was also filed by defendants Brij Nandan and others. The suit was contested by the appellants Ranvir Singh and Hem Singh and a written statement was also filed by defendants Brij Nandan and others. After concluding the trial of the suit on the basis of the documentary and oral evidence the Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur/Assistant Collector First Class decreed the suit under his judgment and decree dated 16-8-1982 and ordered ejectment of defendants no 1 and 2 who are the appellants. The defendants feeling aggrieved came before the Commissioner and filed two separate appeals one by Ranvir Singh and the other by Hem Singh which both were decided by the Additional Commissioner Bareilly under a common judgment and order dated 17-5-1983 whereby both the appeals were dismissed with costs which has paved the way for the litigation to come to this court in second appeals which have been separately filed by Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh. 4. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have perused the record. 5. It is to be mentioned here that appellants have filed some documentary evidence in this court which are certified copies and which include a copy of notice issued by the Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur on 30-5-1968 in case no. 70 under section 33/39 of U. P Land Revenue Act; Hem Singh v. Brij Nandan decided on 19-6-1968; a copy of order passed by Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur on 19-6-1968 in the above referred case, a copy of the statements of Sarvashri Hem Singh appellant, Sri Ubhairaj Singh, Pradhan of village Deeppur and Lekhpal Sri Ram Prakash recorded in the above said case ; certified copies of five years settlement khatauni Part Doyam relating to the period of 1373 to 1376 Fasli in respect of khata no. 29 and khatauni of village Tiraha for 1372 to 1375 Fasli for khata no. 27 and the copy of report dated 7-10-1966 submitted by Tehsildar Faridpur. No objection against the admission of these documents as additional evidence in the second appeals has been filed by the respondents and in an application filed by Amar Singh it has been disclosed that the documents filed on behalf of the appellants have already been mentioned in the judgment of the trial court. The admission was allowed on payment of cost of Rs. 100/ which was received by the counsel for the respondent and the admission of additional evidence became final. 6. The admission was allowed on payment of cost of Rs. 100/ which was received by the counsel for the respondent and the admission of additional evidence became final. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant during the course of his arguments has pointed out that the question involved in the dispute is with regard to the perfection of tenancy rights by the appellants on the basis of their non standing continued adverse possession which has been proved by documentary evidence supplemented by oral evidence which has been admitted by both the learned courts below but the findings recorded are not in accordance with the evidence on record. The learned counsel has gone ahead with his contention that in the khasra of 1369 Fasli the particulars of P.A. 10 issued are clearly mentioned and the learned trial court as well as the learned first appellate court could not appreciate this piece of evidence and wrongly held that the entries are not in accordance with law. Oral evidence has corroborated the documentary evidence and the adverse possession is undoubtedly proved so as to prove the perfection of rights and title of the defendants-appellants. The learned counsel for the appellant has further urged that since the rights and title of the defendants-appellants had already matured and perfected by the year 1374 Fasli on the basis of limitation of a period of six years of adverse possession as the legal position stood at that time; the execution of sale deed on 11-7-1966 conferred no tenancy rights on the vendees because of the fact that the vendors had already lost their rights in the disputed land and could not transfer the same in favour of the plaintiff-respondents (the amendment under the Act came on 14-10-1971 corresponding to 1379 Fasli increasing the period of limitation from six years to 12 years for the maturity of rights on the basis of adverse possession). Commenting on the observations of the learned court below, the learned counsel for the appellant has contended that unless the document is proved to be forged the copies of public documents are admissible in evidence and are to be relied upon as there is a presumption of correctness of such document under the Indian Evidence Act unless the document is proved to be forged. The learned counsel for the appellant has also argued that there is a legal presumption that the acts done by the public servants in their official capacity are to be taken to have been done impartially in discharge of their official duties unless the contrary is proved and if the copy of P.A. 10 could not be available it was no fault on the part of the defendant-appellants and the entries ought to have been believed. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand has vehemently argued laying stress on the point that there are concurrent findings of facts recorded by the learned courts below which cannot be interfered with in the second appeal by this court. The learned counsel for the respondent has also contended that the burden to prove validity of evidence lay on the defendants-appellants who claim their rights on the basis of these entries in their favour and there can be no presumption about the validity of entries. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant, in reply argued referring to 1977 AWC 772 (H.C.) that if the oral evidence has not been considered by the first appellate court it can be a ground for the reappraisal of evidence by this court because it would not amount to the interference in the concurrent findings of facts because the findings recorded are not supported by oral evidence. 9. I have given a thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties and I totally agree with the contentions made by the learned counsel for the appellant. From the perusal of record and from the perusal of the findings recorded by the learned trial court as well as by the learned first appellate court it would be clear that both the learned courts below have come to the conclusion after discussing the evidence that the entries in the revenue records as well as the oral evidence on record go to prove the adverse possession of the defendants-appellants but the learned trial court although has not discussed the oral evidence in detail but in the findings has observed that the names of Brij Nandan and others are recorded in village records till 1374 Fasli although in the khasra for 1369 Fasli the defendants-appellants Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh came to be recorded to be in possession over the land in dispute. The learned trial court has also admitted that the Lekhpal has given particulars and details of the P.A. 10 with number and date in the khasra and same is the position of the khasras of 1370, 1371 and 1372 Faslis and also that in the khasra for 1373 Fasli the entry in the hand writing of supervisor Kanungo is there to the effect that the names of Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh in possession over the land in dispute would be recorded in the khatauni and as the tenants of clause 9 while in the khasra for 1374 Fasli their names are recorded in column 6 as Shikmi tenant. The learned trial court has also admitted that the witnesses produced by the defendant appellants have also stated with regard to the possession of the defendant-appellants. Now after this conclusion on the basis of evidence on record there was no option for the learned trial court except to have declare perfection and maturity of rights of defendants-appellants and the suit naturally ought to have failed and dismissed. But the learned trial court proceeding further with the discussion while recording the findings on issues no. 1 and 2 relating to the rights and title of plaintiffs and of defendants and has created some doubts in his mind with regard to the genuineness of the entries in village records particularly with regard to their validity. The learned trial court observed referring to R.D. 1981 page 112 and 114 as cited by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs in that court, that the main question is whether P.A. 10 was actually issued and was served on the recorded tenure holder as well as on the Chairman of the L.M.C. and unless these facts are proved the entries of possession cannot be held to have validly been recorded and the view expressed by the learned trial court is that the burden lies on the defendants to prove these facts about the issue on P.A. 10 and their service on the persons concerned The learned trial court has farther observed that it was the duty of defendants no. 1 and 2 to have get the list of P.A. 10 summoned to prove that it was issued to the real tenant and to the Chairman L.M.C. and also the diary of Lekhpal would have been summoned on the initiative of the defendants to prove that the Lekhpal had observed all the formalities of rules and law of Land Records Manual while making such entries in village records and mere oral evidence is not sufficient to prove the facts which are inevitable to prove the validity of entries. Drawing the conclusion of the above discussion the learned trial court has observed that even if the Lekhpal might have disclosed and entered the serial number of the list and the number of diary and the date etc. all the particulars relating to P.A. 10 in the remarks column of khasra but unless it is proved that the extract of P.A. 10 was actually served on the recorded tenure holder and on the Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha, the entries of possession cannot be held to be in accordance with rules nor they can be sufficient evidence to prove the tenancy rights on the basis of adverse possession in favour of the defendants-appellants no. 1 and 2. 10. The above discussions have almost been endorsed by the learned first appellate court and the learned trial court below has agreed with the observations made by learned court and has drawn the same conclusions for dismissing the appeals. Thus it is clear that so far as the documentary and oral evidence available on record to prove the fact of adverse possession of defendants-appellants over the disputed land are sufficient to the perfection and maturity of tenancy rights on that basis is concerned both the learned courts below have admitted that the evidence adduced by the defendants-appellants is sufficient but the only lacuna pointed out by both the courts below is about the validity of these entries only on the grounds that the extract of P.A. 10 was not served on the recorded tenure holder as well as on the Chairman of L.M.C. as per rules in compliance of para A-80 and A-81 of the Land Records Manual. The observations made and the views expressed by both the learned courts below with regard to the validity of entries are based on mis-conception, and cannot be accepted simply because under the provisions of A-80 and A-81 of the Land Records Manual, duty has been cast upon the Supervisor Kanungo to check up the report submitted by the Lekhpal on the basis of partal with regard to the possession of persons other than the recorded tenure holders and it is the responsibility of the Supervisor Kanungo to verify the proposed entries of adverse possession on the spot and to get the copies of PA. 10 issued to the recorded tenure holder and to the Chairman of the L.M.C. if the same had not earlier been issued. The Supervisor Kanungo while verifying the proposed entries of adverse possession on the basis of PA. 10 is expected to enquire whether the copies have been issued or not and under the provisions of Indian Evidence Act as well as under the provisions of section 44 of the UP LR Act there are legal presumption with regard to the correctness of public document and correctness of the entries made in the annual register. Moreover, it is the undoubted legal position that all the official acts done by the public servants in discharge of their official duties are considered to have been done honestly and with impartiality unless the contrary is proved and as such the Supervisor Kanungo and the Lekhpal being the public servants are always considered to perform their duties honestly and impartially with due deligence and the entries made and the records prepared by them during the course of discharge of their duties are presumed to be true and correct and its for the person making allegations that such entries are forged that burden shall lie upon him to prove such allegations about the fact of forgery to have been done with the records. There is nothing on record to show that any forgery has been alleged or has been committed by the then Lekhpal and Kanungo who had made entries of possession in the khasra and made entries of P.A. 10 with particulars of the number of list of P A. 10 the number of diary and the date etc in the khasra nor any evidence has been led to that effect. Certain objections were raised by the plaintiffs and they were given full opportunity to file evidence in rebuttal if they had any doubt with regard to the genuineness of the entries contained in the documents filed in evidence by the defendants because if the forged copies can be filed, the same could be contradicted by filing the genuine copies to be issued from the original records and unless such contradiction is proved, the genuineness cannot be doubted because the public documents are to be believed without any evidence to prove them. Thus the conclusions by the learned trial court as well as by the learned Additional Commissioner with regard to the copies of P.A. 10 are not having any force and it was not the duty of the defendants-appellants to have summoned the diary and the list the P.A. 10 etc. in original when the papers relating to the compliance of Para A80 and A81 of the Land Records Manual are proved by the evidence made available on record and in case of any doubt the learned trial court could have summoned the original records himself to remove such doubts. When it is proved that the P.A. 10 was issued as mentioned in the documents filed, its service is to be presumed on the recorded tenure holder and on the Chairman of the L.M.C. The recorded tenure holder naturally always denies the service of P.A. 10 on him and can never accept that the P.A 10 was served on him and the Chairman L.M.C. is not an interested person. Moreover the matter of service is always a very old fact. Thus proving of service of P.A. 10 is not necessary to prove the validity of entries made particularly when no forgery is proved about them. 11. There is another very Important point in dispute which is having decisive effect on the case. Moreover the matter of service is always a very old fact. Thus proving of service of P.A. 10 is not necessary to prove the validity of entries made particularly when no forgery is proved about them. 11. There is another very Important point in dispute which is having decisive effect on the case. From the perusal of written statement filed by defendants Brij Nandan, Babu Ram and Sheo Charan etc who are said to have been the vendors of the plaintiff's and who were the original recorded tenure holders, it is evident that in paragraph 4 of their written statements they have admitted that Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh had got the entries in their names made in the revenue records during five years settlement and record operations about which they could not receive any intimation and the thumb impressions or the signatures in their names if any are available they may be considered to be farzi in order to relieve them from the liability about those entries. This written statement was filed much before the defendants-appellants appeared and filed their written statement with specific pleadings that their names were recorded in place of Brij Nandan and others as bhumidhars in the khatauni in the record operations of five years settlement under the orders of Sub-Divisional Officer. It appears clearly that Brij Nandan etc did know that notices about the record operations relating to five years settlement were received by them and they have put their thumb impression and signatures on the notices in token of receipt but they had not appeared before the Settlement Officer nor filed any objections against the proposed correction of records relating to the land in dispute and therefore they sought excuse before hand when the fact of record operations had not still been alleged by the defendants-appellants that notice was served on them. The certified copies filed by the appellants in this court go to prove that notice of case no. 70 u/Sec. 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act Hem Singh v. Brij Nandan decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur district Bareilly on 19-6-1968 was served on Brij Nandan and Babu Ram etc and they put their thumb impressions on the notice in token of service. 70 u/Sec. 33/39 of U.P. Land Revenue Act Hem Singh v. Brij Nandan decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer Faridpur district Bareilly on 19-6-1968 was served on Brij Nandan and Babu Ram etc and they put their thumb impressions on the notice in token of service. The statements of Pradhan and Chairman L M.C. of village Deeppur was also recorded during those record operations in the above referred case who stated about the possession of Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh over the land in dispute and said that Brij Nandan and others have got no concern with the land now. Similar is the statement of Lekhpal recorded in that case. The khatauni for 1373 Fasli to 1376 Fasli relating to five years settlement in the village records goes to show that the names of Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh were recorded as the tenants of clause 1 Ka while earlier khatauni for 1372 F to 1375 Fasli prior to record operations of the five years settlement goes to show that Brij Nandan and others were recorded as the tenants of clause 1 while under the orders of the Sub Divisional Officer their names were expugned from the khatauni and the names of Hem Singh and Ranvir Singh the defendants-appellants were mutated in their place. It would be clear from the provisions of section 57 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 that regarding the corrections made in record of rights as a result of the revisions of maps and records during record operations relating to settlement that there is presumption as to the correctness of entries made. The provisions of section 57 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act provides that all the entries in the record of rights prepared in accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be presumed to be true unless the contrary is proved. So far as the entries made in the khatauni 1373 to 1376 Fasli on the basis of the order of the Sub Divisional Officer passed in a correction of papers case during five years settlement are concerned there is nothing on record to prove contrary to such entries and the entries shall be presumed to be true. So far as the entries made in the khatauni 1373 to 1376 Fasli on the basis of the order of the Sub Divisional Officer passed in a correction of papers case during five years settlement are concerned there is nothing on record to prove contrary to such entries and the entries shall be presumed to be true. It is also a point going totally against the plaintiffs respondents that their names could not be mutated in record of rights on the basis of the sale deed said to have been executed in their favour by the recorded tenure holder nor there is sufficient evidence to show as to whether any mutation was sought under section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act and the same was refused. 12. From the discussions and the observations made above I arrive at the definite conclusions that the findings recorded by the learned trial court and the observation and discussions made by the learned Additional Commissioner in that regard are absolutely against the evidence on record and are clearly perverse findings which are held to be bad in law and must be set aside. The second appeals must therefore succeed. The second appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial court dated 16-8-1982 and the judgment and order passed by the Additional Commissioner dated 17-5-1983 are set aside and the suit of the plaintiffs is dismissed. Costs on the parties.