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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

1990 DIGILAW 290 (MP)

Halkuram v. Ram Prasad

1990-07-31

R.C.LAHOTI

body1990
ORDER R.C. Lahoti, J. -- 1. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings in the nature of execution has been set aside by the Sessions Court and the aggrieved party has come up in revision to this Court. 2. The property in dispute, in proceedings u/s. 145 CrPC registered as case No. 166/72 before S.D.M. Basoda, is a plot of land measuring 20'x40'. By order dated 22.3.74, the property was attached and handed over in the custody of a receiver. At the end, it was declared that the petitioner (Party No.2) was in possession of the property on the date of the passing of the preliminary order and hence was entitled to the delivery of possession from the receiver. This order was confirmed in revision. At any time, earlier to the initiation of present proceedings, the petitioner was not delivered with the possession of the property through the S.D.M. Court. These facts are not in dispute. 3. It appears that in between certain civil proceedings commenced between the parties wherein this petitioner prayed for an interim injunction and therein he stated that the receiver had delivered the possession to him. In making such a statement, as the subsequent events show, the petitioner was either mistaken or ill-advised presumably tempted by the idea of securing an injunction in his favour from the civil Court, because later on, he tried to wriggle out of his admission of having been delivered with possession by the receiver by stating that he had mistakenly made that statement. As the order of the S.D.M. shows, proceedings u/s. 188 and 448 IPC were initiated against the non-petitioner No. 1 (Party No.1) whereat he was acquitted by giving benefit of doubt because the documents showing delivery of possession to the petitioner were either not produced or were not proved. 4. On 17.8.1983, the petitioner filed an application before the S.D.M. complaining that the original order dated 22.3.74 had not been carried out till then, by physical delivery of possession over the disputed property to him, which was still required to be done. 4. On 17.8.1983, the petitioner filed an application before the S.D.M. complaining that the original order dated 22.3.74 had not been carried out till then, by physical delivery of possession over the disputed property to him, which was still required to be done. In reply dated2.9.1983, non-petitioner No.1 came out with several objections stating that the petitioner was not entitled to delivery of possession and his application was liable to be dismissed but he (non-petitioner No.1) did not make a clear statement as to whether the property in dispute was still in the custody of the receiver or was in his own possession. The S.D.M. directed delivery of possession. The Sessions Judge has reversed the order. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a valid and legal order u/s. 145 CrPC passed by a competent Court, having not been superseded by any order to the contrary of a Court of competent jurisdiction (either a superior Court or a civil Court), was liable to be executed so as to confer the petitioner with the fruits of the order. The learned counsel for the non-petitioner No.1 has opposed the petitioner's prayer by submitting that the petitioner having once admitted that he had secured the possession over the property in dispute at a point of time subsequent to the date 22.3.1974, decision would have the effect of superseding the order of the Executive Magistrate. Merely by making a declaration as to the person who, in the opinion of the Magistrate, was in possession of the property on the date of the preliminary order or within two months thereof and forbidding the disturbance in possession over such property, the Magistrate does not become functus officio. If the Magistrate finds that the successful party was deprived of possession by the opposite party, the successful party has to be restored with possession. Otherwise, the order of the Magistrate would be ineffective and the success of the successful party would be a success on paper merely. So also, if a receiver was appointed and vested with custody over the property, the property being custodia legis, the receiver holding the property on behalf of the Court, the Court shall entrust back the possession to the successful party. So also, if a receiver was appointed and vested with custody over the property, the property being custodia legis, the receiver holding the property on behalf of the Court, the Court shall entrust back the possession to the successful party. Merely because there has been a delay on the part of the successful party in applying for restoration of possession, that will not deprive either the Court of the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for restoration nor would deprive the successful party from inviting the attention of the Court to do what it was its duty to have done even otherwise. The unsuccessful party should not and cannot be permitted to defeat the order of the Executive Magistrate by taking resort to technical plea or pleas devoid of merit. 6. In the opinion of this Court, both the Courts below have gone as stray and missed to strike at the bull's eye. The petitioner having complained that the order in the original proceedings was not carried out to its legitimate end by delivering possession over the property in dispute to him, and the opposite party having raised a contest, the Executive Magistrate ought to have made an enquiry into the question as to with whom the possession was to be found on the date of the making of the application by the petitioner, that is, on 17.8.83. If the possession was still with the receiver then the matter posed no problem because the receiver being an agent of the Court, the possession would virtually be with the Court which could and should have been handed-over to the petitioner legitimately without any loss of time. On the contrary, if it would have been found that the possession was with the opposite party who had been unsuccessful in the original proceedings then that would have been undoubtedly in defence of the original order rendering that party liable to prosecution u/s. 188 and 448 IPC Action u/s. 144 or u/s. 107 CrPC could also have been initiated against the erring party. Even proceedings for contempt of Court founded on the violation of the original order could have been initiated. All these are several modes of enforcing the final order passed u/s. 145 CrPC. Even proceedings for contempt of Court founded on the violation of the original order could have been initiated. All these are several modes of enforcing the final order passed u/s. 145 CrPC. In any case, the petitioner Halkuram (Party No.2) could not have been denied a relief and asked to stay out of the Court in spite of the final order u/s. 145 CrPC holding good in his favour. 7. The revision is allowed. The orders of both the Courts below are set aside. The case is remitted back to S.D.M. Basoda who shall restore the application dated 17.8.83 to his file and thereafter proceed to dispose of the same in accordance with law and consistently with the observations made hereinabove.