MOHAN, C. J. ( 1 ) THESE are cases coming before us by an order of reference made by a Division Bench of this court in these Writ Petitions. Two points are referred to us: (1) Whether a permit granted covering a route prior to the promulgation of a draft scheme under section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, could be set aside in an appeal on the ground that after the grant, before or after the filing of the appeal, the draft scheme came into force under which the route became a notified route and no stage carriage permit could be granted? (2) Whether a stage carriage permit granted to a person in respect of which timings have not been assigned and/or the permit had not been issued, is liable to be set aside on the ground that subsequent to the grant, draft scheme prepared under Section 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 had been published covering the route in question? ( 2 ) THE matter came before the Division Bench itself in view of the conflicting opinion rendered in two cases. In SAYYAD KALEEL AHMED v. STATE TRANSPORT APPELLATE tribunal W. Ps. 352 and 474 of 1981 a Division Bench was of the view that the permit granted cannot be set aside on the ground a draft scheme under Section 68c has been published which covered the route. The contrary view in AMEER PASHA v. K. S. T. A. T W. P. 5101 of 1979 DD 2-7-1982. was to the effect that though a permit had been granted prior to the promulgation of the scheme, the permit was liable to be set aside by the Appellate Authority, if the draft scheme under Section 68c was published subsequent to the grant either before or after the filing of the appeal. In this case, arguments have been advanced before us stating all these schemes forming the subject-matter of the Writ Petitions, came to be issued under Section 68c of the Old Motor vehicles Act, 1939 on 16-6-1968 and 3-3-1988 viz. , Chitradurga scheme, Mysore scheme and kolar schemes respectively. Therefore, it is argued, the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 having come into force on 1-7-1983, these schemes lapsed by reason of Section 100 (4) of 1983 Act. , Chitradurga scheme, Mysore scheme and kolar schemes respectively. Therefore, it is argued, the Motor Vehicles Act of 1988 having come into force on 1-7-1983, these schemes lapsed by reason of Section 100 (4) of 1983 Act. Therefore, the setting aside of the permit because of existence of Section 68c promulgated under 1939 Act, as a result of which the Appellate Authorities took the view as was stated in these cases, whether valid or not, need not be gone into. The matters may be remitted to the Tribunal for fresh consideration in the light of the lapsing of the scheme and in the light of the provisions of the 1988 Act. These, in short, are the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners. ( 3 ) IN opposition to this, the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation submits that it is incorrect to state that the schemes had lapsed. On the contrary, if one looks at the repealing provision under Section 217, it would clearly go to show that Section 100 (4), by reason, of section 217 (2) (e), would be applicable only to the procedure in so far as it talks of disposal of not determination of the scheme. Therefore, the substantive provision of lapse would not be covered by Section 217 (2) (e ). The result will be schemes promulgated under 1939 Act could continue subject to the limitation of 3 years or 5 years as the case may be as decided by the supreme Court in ONKARSINGH AND ORS. v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, agra AND ORS. and K. T. DHARANENDRAH v. REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY and ORS. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the State of Karnataka would submit Section 99 of the 1988 Act confers the 3. AIR1987 SC 1324 , JT1987 (1 )SC 526 , 1987 Supp (1 )SCC76 4. AIR1986 SC 1719 , 1986 (1 )SCALE561 , (1986 )3 SCC259 , [1986 ]2 SCR735 , 1986 (2 )UJ1 (SC ) power for promulgation of the scheme only on the State government, while such a promulgation or power was vested under the State Transport undertaking as defined under Section 68a of 1939 Act. Therefore, where, other than the government, any one of these Undertakings, had promulgated a scheme, to that, Section 100 (4) to 1988 Act would be inapplicable, if, otherwise by the intention it would have been so stated explicitly. Therefore, where, other than the government, any one of these Undertakings, had promulgated a scheme, to that, Section 100 (4) to 1988 Act would be inapplicable, if, otherwise by the intention it would have been so stated explicitly. ( 5 ) WE have given our careful consideration to the above arguments. Admittedly, new Motor vehicles Act viz. , 1988 Act came into force on 1-7-1989. Under these circumstances, the question would arise as to what would happen to draft scheme promulgated under Section 68c of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Section 217 deals with repeal and savings. In Clause (e) of sub-section (2), it is specifically stated as follows: " (2) Notwithstanding the repeal by Sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments. . . . . . . . . (e) any scheme made under Section 68c of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) or under the corresponding law, if any, in force in any State and pending immediately before the commencement of this Act shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100 of this Act. " It should be noted carefully Section 68c is specifically referred to here. Under Section 68-C, the power to promulgate a scheme was - conferred upon the State Transport Undertaking. The definition of such an Undertaking could easily be covered by referring to Section 68a. We extract the same: "68a. In this Chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, (a) "road transport service" means a service of motor vehicles carrying passengers or goods or both by road for hire or reward; (b) "state transport undertaking" means any undertaking providing road transport service, where such undertaking is carried on by ( i) the Central Government or a State Government; (ii) any Road Transport Corporation established under Section 3 of the Road Transport corporations Act, 1950; xxx XXX XXX (iv) any municipality or any corporation or company owned or controlled by the Central government or one or more State Governments, or by the Central Government and one or more state Governments. "By a reading of the above, it will clearly show that such a State Transport Undertaking under section 68a (b) might include the Government or might not include the Government. When it refers to a scheme permit under Section 68c, it cannot, by any stretch, mean only the scheme framed by a State Government. "By a reading of the above, it will clearly show that such a State Transport Undertaking under section 68a (b) might include the Government or might not include the Government. When it refers to a scheme permit under Section 68c, it cannot, by any stretch, mean only the scheme framed by a State Government. Under those circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention that merely because under Section 99 of the New Act, the Government is given the power to promulgate draft scheme, it would refer to only such of those schemes as was formulated by the Government. Such a construction would amount to reading something into the act. Therefore, when Section 68c is talked of, it would refer to the draft scheme, as proposed by any one of those Undertakings under Sub-clauses (i) to (iv) of Section 68a of 1939 Act. With this, we pass on to the next question whether it would refer to only the procedure and nor, the substantive part thereof. Section 217 (2) (e) which has already been extracted states scheme shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Section 100. When it says 'disposed of', that means entire gamut of Section 100 will come into play. There is no scope for restricting the word 'disposed of only to the procedural aspects. On the contrary, other limitation contained under that section viz. , Section 100, including Sub-section (4) will come into play. Otherwise, it would amount to re-writing Clause (e) of Sub-section (2) of Section 217. 'disposal', in our view, would mean determination not mere procedural aspects. Therefore, there is no escape from Sub-section (4) In this back-ground, we are to analyse the question whether the scheme had lapsed as on today. Sub-section (4) of Section 100 states that within a period of one year from the date of publication, proposal regarding scheme be published in the official gazette under Sub-section (1 ). In other words, the limitation of one year would, in strict terms, apply only to a scheme published under Sub-section (1) of Section 100. But then what happens to the scheme framed under Section 68c of the old Act? One year limitation will have to be applied here also by construing the section in a reasonable way. We have already seen that this 1988 Act has come into force on 1-7-1989. But then what happens to the scheme framed under Section 68c of the old Act? One year limitation will have to be applied here also by construing the section in a reasonable way. We have already seen that this 1988 Act has come into force on 1-7-1989. Therefore, till 1-7-1990, if it had not been finalised in accordance with section 100 (4), the proposal shall be deemed to have been lapsed. In other words, in reckoning one year period, we must have regard to 1-7-1989 as the starting point of limitation. Otherwise, if the contention of the petitioners were to be accepted, all schemes framed under the Old Act would automatically lapse. It should also be noted carefully that though the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in terms did not lay down any time limit for approval of the scheme, it is the Court which, while interpreting, came to lay down the limitation in the two Supreme Court Cases viz. , AIR1987 SC 1324 , JT1987 (1 )SC 526 , 1987 Supp (1 )SCC76 and AIR1986 SC 1719 , 1986 (1 ) SCALE561 , (1986 )3 SCC259 , [1986 ]2 scr735 , 1986 (2 )UJ1 (SC ). Therefore, it is impossible for us to accept that the one year period from, the date of publication of proposal must be reckoned from the publication of the scheme under Section 68c, firstly because that would not be a reasonable way of interpretation, secondly because Sub-section (4) itself talks of from the date of publication of proposal under Sub-section (1 ). Accordingly, we hold, as on today the draft schemes not having been finalised, have lapsed. If this be so, there is no necessity to decide the questions of law that have arisen before us. The matter Will have to go before the Tribunal for re-consideration in the light of the position that the schemes are lapsed and in the light of the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. With this, matter will go back to the Division Bench for passing necessary orders.