Judgment :- K.M. NATARAJAN, J, This appeal is filed by the 3rd defendant in the suit O.S. 175 of 1979 on the file of the Subordinate Judge of Coimbatore. 2. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of this appeal can be briefly stated as follows: The first respondent herein, who is the plaintiff in the suit, filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs. 89632-50 on the basis of a mortgage deed dated 3.2.1965 executed by one Sankarappa Thevar and his son, the first defendant, agreeing to pay interest at 12 per cent per annum. Subsequently, Sankarppa Thevar died and the first defendant is his only legal heir and legal representative. The second defendent is a subsequent mortgagee of the property on the same date as the plaintiff. The 3rd defendant purchased item 2 of the hypothecal in court auction in or about 1974. Hence they were impleaded as parties in the suit. 3. The second defendant in the suit remained ex-parte. The first defendant in his written statement claimed benefits of Act. 4 of 1938 and also partial discharge to the extent of Rs. 8000. The third defendant, who is the appellant herein, had contended in her written statement that she is a prior mortgage of item 2 of the suit property. The first defendant became a subscriber ofa chit conducted by her. On 21.1.1964, he created an equitable mortgage and received the chit amount and it is only on the basis of the said equitable mortgage, she filed a suit in O.S. 64 of 1972 and obtained a decree and in execution thereof, brought item 2 of the suit property for sale and she herself punchased the same in Court auction. She had no notice of the present mortgage on the date of the suit and so she could not give an opportunity to the present plaintiff to redeem her mortgage. She therefore prayed that a suitable decree may be passed directing the plaintiff to pay the sum due to her, in the event of the second item of the suit property is desired to be brought to sale. 4. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues and the relevant issue for decision in this appeal is issue No. 3, viz., “What is the nature of decree to be passed regarding item 2 of the suit property?” 5. 4. The learned trial Judge framed as many as four issues and the relevant issue for decision in this appeal is issue No. 3, viz., “What is the nature of decree to be passed regarding item 2 of the suit property?” 5. The trial Court found issue No. 3 against the third defendant and issue Nos. 1 and 2 in favour of the plaintiff and conseqently passed a preliminary decree as prayed for. Aggrieved by the same, the third defendant has preferred this appeal. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant Mr. N. Varadarajan submitted that the reasening given by the lower Court for rejecting the plea of equity raised by the appellant is not sustainable, The learned counsel further submitted that though the encumbrance certificate produced by the appellant in this suit is one that was obtained after the institution of the suit the appellant had already obtained another encumbrance certificate in connection with the execution proceedings in O.S. 64 of 1972. But, there is no mention in the earlier E.C. also about this suit mortgage in favour of the plaintiff in this suit. Even otherwise, learned counsel submitted that though under Sec. 56 of the Transfer of Property Act the appellant being a court auction purchaser is not entitled to the benefits, yet the court has got ample discretion in equity to grant the request of the appellant. In this connection, the learned counsel brought to our notice two decisions of this court reqported in Sarangapanipillai v. Kumbakonam Bank Ltd. 1 and Jagannathan v. Ammtham and others 2 , 1980 T.LN.J. 402,. In 78 L.W. 35 referred to above, Venkatadri J. held that the principle of marshalling as provided in S. 56 of the Transfer of Property Act, can be applied to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of a prior mortgage. It is the constant equity of the court that if a creditor has two funds he shall take his satisfaction out of that found upon which another creditor has no lien. Marshalling implies the existence of two sets of properties one of which is subject to both the mortgages and the other is subject only to the earlier mortgage. It is the constant equity of the court that if a creditor has two funds he shall take his satisfaction out of that found upon which another creditor has no lien. Marshalling implies the existence of two sets of properties one of which is subject to both the mortgages and the other is subject only to the earlier mortgage. In the above quoted case also, there was court auction sale and the auction purchaser pleaded equity and the learned Judge relied on an earlier decision of the Patna High Court in Lakshminarayana v. Jammajai 3 , wherein it was held as follows:— “Upon a proper interpreation of the section, it is manifest that it covers only the case of voluntary sale and that it cannot apply to a person who purchases the mortgaged properties in execution of a money decree. But the provisions of the sec tion are not exhaustive The real position is that in a case of this description, there are two conflicting principles, the first being the principle that the mortgagee is entitled to have his dues satisfied out of the mortgaged properties in any manner he chooses , and the other principle being that the purchaser for value without notice of the mortgaged property ought not to suffer any detriment due to any mistake or lack of bona fides on the part of the mortgagor. It is a question of adjustment of equities upon the particular facts of each case. It was conceded by Mr. P.R. Das that the appellant would be entitled to marshalling of securities only if he makes out a case that he was a bona fide purchaser for value of the property without notice of the prior mort gage.” If this ratio is applied to the facts of the present case, in equity this Court has got ample power to order sale of the properties purchased by the third defendant appellant if the other properties were not sufficient to satisty the decree. 7. The above view has also been affirmed by the latter decision, viz. 1980 T.N.L.J. 402, referred to above wherein the learned Judge laid down the principle as follows — “If there are no equities in favour of such a party, the decree holder is, of course entitled to sell the properties in any order he chooses, of course, subject to directions of court. 1980 T.N.L.J. 402, referred to above wherein the learned Judge laid down the principle as follows — “If there are no equities in favour of such a party, the decree holder is, of course entitled to sell the properties in any order he chooses, of course, subject to directions of court. If an auction purchaser at a court sale makes out a case that he was a bona fide purchaser for value of the property without notice of the prior mortgage or cnarge, the court may, in its discretion, apply the principle of marshalling on a consideration of the particular equity involved. This has been recognised by the Div ision Bench of the Patna High Court in A.I.R 1953 Patna. 193. Later, another Bench of the same High Court in AIR 1962 Pat 236 , after referring to the aforesaid earlier Bench judgment, also took the same view, S.K. Jha J. of the same High Court in AIR 1975 Pat. 223 has taken the view that where no order of sale of the mortgaged property has been prescribed by the mortgage decree, the executing Court, has in certain exceptional circumstances where equity demands it, a discretion to regulate the order in w hich the mortgaged properties ought to be sold and the power of the executing court in this regard is very limited and is intended only for the purpose of adjusting equities between the parties in exceptional cases. Venkatadri J. in ILR 1965-1 Mad. 154 held that there is a discretion vested in the court in fixing the order in which the property should be put up for sale, and this discretion is to be exercised in a reasonable and just manner consistent with the equities of the case”. 8. The learned counsel also drew our attention to 0.34, R. 4 C.P.C. wherein it is provided, that while passing a preliminary decree, there is to be a provision to the effect that the plaintiff shall be entitled to apply for a final decree directing that the mortgaged property or a sufficient part thereof be sold, and submitted that the entire property need not be put for sale and only such sufficient part thereof so as to satisfy the decree can be directed to be sold. 9. 9. We find in the instant case, that it is not in dispute that the third defendant-appellant herein who got an equitable mortage in her favour subsequently filed O.S. 64. of 1972. Further, it is stated that the encumbrance certificate obtained by the third defendant-appellant did not reveal the existence of the suit mortgage and, therefore, the plaintiff coult not be impleaded in that suit. Further, she is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of the encumbrance in favour of the plaintiff in this suit. As against the evidence of the third defendnt appellant there is no contra evidence on the side of the plaintiff to show that there was any collusion between the third defendant-appellant and the first defendant in this suit and we find that in view of the ratio laid down in 78 L.W. 35 referred to above and in view of the provisions under Order 34 rule 4 C.P.C, the Court has ample discretion to pass necessary directions regarding the order in which the property should be put up for sale, on the question of equity, though not under Sec. 56 of the Transfer of Property Act. Nothing has been pointed our by the learned counsel for the plaintiff as to why this Court should not exercise the, equity in favour of the third defendantappellant. In the circumstaces, we feel that the plaintiff-first respondent in the suit can be directed to bring items 1 and 3 to 5 for sale in the first instance as one lot and if they are not sufficient to satisfy the decree, then the plaintiff is entitled to bring the second item for sale subsequently. 10. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed and the decree passed by the Court below is modified directing the plaintifffirst respondent to bring items 1 and 3 to 5 for sale in the first instance. If they are not sufficient to satisfy the decree, then the plaintiff-first respondent is entitled to bring the second item for sale subsequently. There is no order as to costs.