Judgment B. N. Agrawal, J. 1. This application has been filed for quashing the cognizance taken under Sections 166, 427, 504 and 580 of the Penal Code and summoning the petitioners to face trial. 2. The opposite party no.1 filed a petition of complaint in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Patna, stating therein, inter alia, that petitioner no.1, who was officer-in-charge of a police station filed requisition for issuance of warrant of arrest as well as processes against one Rakesh alias Babloo son of the complainant and the court passed an order issuing processes against the aforesaid person. On 18-1-1989 for execution of the processes under Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Code the petitioner no.1 and petitioner no.2 (sub-Inspector of Police) are said to have entered the house of the complainant forcibly after breaking open the door armed with weapons. The complainant having learnt about the said order got records of criminal case, in which processes were issued, inspected and the court directed the complainants son who is an accused in that case to surrender. The complainants son thereafter surrendered in court and upon his surrender the court passed an order for staying execution of the processes. The petitioners obtained a copy of the order and went to his house to serve the same upon the accused persons. It is said that the accused persons did not receive the courts order which was produced by the complainant and inspite of the stay order, in execution of the processes issued under Sections 82 and 83 of the code, the accused persons had taken out various articles from the house of the complainant abusing him, which necessitated filing of the present complaint, upon which the learned magistrate after examination of the complainant on solemn affirmation and holding enquiry under Sec.202 of the Code took cognizance and summoned the petitioners to face trial. Hence this application for quashing the prosecution. 3. Hence this application for quashing the prosecution. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that order taking cognizance is fit to be quashed as the cognizance was barred under Sec.197 (2) read with Sec.197 (3)of the Code which run thus : " (2) No Court shall take cognizance of any offence alleged to have been committed by any member of the armed Forces of the union while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, except with the previous sanction of the Central Government. (3) The State Government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2) shall apply to such class or category of the members ot the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order, as may be specified therein, wherever they may be serving, and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "central Government" occurring therein, the expression "state Government" were substituted. " Sec.197 (3) lays down that the State government may, by notification, direct that the provisions of sub-section (2)of the said Sec.197 of the code shall apply to such class or category of the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order as may be specified therein wherever they may be serving and thereupon the provisions of that sub-section will apply as if for the expression "central Government" occurring therein, the expression "state Government" were substituted. 4. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners has produced before me a copy of the Bihar Gazette dated 16-5-1980 published in extraordinary issue of the Bihar Gazette on 24th of May, 1980, which reads thus : "in exercise of the power conferred by sub-section (3) of Sec.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act II of 1974), the governor of Bihar is pleased to declare that the provisions of sub-section (2) of the said section shall apply to the officers and men where even they may be serving the State of Bihar of the bihar Police Force charged with the maintenance of public order and who have been appointed by the inspector General of Police, bihar, or any other officers specially authorised to appoint any persons to such force under the police Act (Act V of 1961)". According to the said notification the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 197 of the Code shall apply to all the officers and men belonging to Bihar police Force charged with the maintenance of public order who are working at any place within the State of Bihar and whose appointing authority is either the Inspector General of Police, bihar, the equivalent post of which now is Director General-cum-Inspector general of Police or such other officer specially authorised to appoint any person to such force under the police Act. Admittedly, the petitioners appointing authority is Director general-cum-Inspector General of Police. Therefore, by virtue of the aforesaid notification, one of the pre-requisites for application of the provisions of sub-section (2) of Sec.197 of the code is attracted to the case of the petitioners as they are such members of Bihar Police Force who are charged with the maintenance of public order. A question arises as to whether officer-in-charge of the police station and Sub-Inspector of Police can be said to be members of armed force charged with the maintenance of public order. This question had arisen before a Division Bench of Gujarat high Court in the case of Bhikhaji vaghaji V/s. L. K. Barot and others, (1982 Cr. Law Journal, 2014) where their lordships while dealing with similar notification in a case of Police Inspector laid down that he can be said to be member of armed force of the State charged with maintenance of public order. It was further laid down that even if a police officer is such who sometimes can be charged with the maintenance of public order and sometimes for maintenance of law and order, he is entitled to claim protection under Sec.197 (2) of the Code, if other condition is fulfilled for application of Sec.197 (2) of the Code. 5 The other pre-requisite for application of Sec.197 (2) of the code is that the offence complained of must be committed by such an officer of Bihar Police Force while acting or purporting to act in discharge of his official duties. From a bare perusal of the case of the complainant, as stated above, it would appear that the offence in question were committed by the accused persons while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duties. From a bare perusal of the case of the complainant, as stated above, it would appear that the offence in question were committed by the accused persons while acting or purporting to act in discharge of their official duties. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the complainant submitted that it cannot be said that the act committed by the accused was in discharge of their official duties. In my view, there is very thin line of distinction between a case where an act complained of can be said to have been committed in discharge of official duties and a case where it can not be said to be so. In cases where it can be said that there is reasonable nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of official duties and where the two are interwoven, it can be said that the offence was committed while acting or purporting to act in discharge of official duties. In my view, upon a bare perusal of the petition of complaint, it would appear that there was a reasonable nexus between the act complained of and discharge of official duties and both were interwoven. This being the position, i am clearly of the view that both the conditions precedent for application of Section 197 (2) of the Code are fulfilled in the case in hand ; as such the order taking cognizance becomes wholly unwarranted and prosecution of the petitioners cannot be allowed to continue as continuance thereof would amount to an abuse of process of Court. 6. In the result, this application is allowed and prosecution of the two petitioners is hereby quashed. I may, however, observe that this order will not prejudice cases of either party in any pending civil litigation as statement has been made at the bar that a suit is pending between the parties relating to the present occurrence. Application allowed.