S.N.Phukan, J — This matter has come before us on a reference being made by one of us (Hon'ble Phukan, J) sitting singly. 2. The question for decision is ^whether the ratio laid down by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1974 disposed of on 13.12.1977 requires reconsideration. In that revision, the learned Single Judge while disposing of the revision petition filed by an accused, who was convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, for short, the Act held that even after a person is prosecuted after following the provisions of section 20 of the Act "fresh sanction" would be required if further report from the Central Food Laboratory is received under section 13 of the Act. We quote below the relevant portion of the said judgment: "Mr. D.K.Bhattacharyya, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted before me that the conviction of the petitioner is liable to be set aside on the following grounds : a). Lack of proper sanction for prosecution, b). Violation of the mandatory provisions of section 10(7) of the Act and Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act. I find that there is sufficient force in the contention of Mr. Bhattacharyya. There is no dispute that there can be no prosecution of any accused for an offence under the Act without sanction as required under section 20 of the Act. In the instant case the sanctioning authority accorded sanc­tion for prosecution of the petitioner on the 6asis of the report of the Public Analyst which disclosed that there was mixture of millet with Atta. This was the only defect which was found by the Public Analyst. The sanctioning authority naturally accorded the sanction in view of this defect as pointed out by the Public Analyst in his rapport. Now, under section 13 of the Act the report of the Public Analyst has been superseded by the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory. There is nothing in the report of the Director of the Central Food Labor­atory to show that the Atta contained any mixture of millet. The marginal defects in respect of two other items found by the Director of Central Food Laboratory, as mentioned above, were not before the sanctioning authority at the time he accorded the sanction. There is nothing in the report of the Director of the Central Food Labor­atory to show that the Atta contained any mixture of millet. The marginal defects in respect of two other items found by the Director of Central Food Laboratory, as mentioned above, were not before the sanctioning authority at the time he accorded the sanction. That being the position it is evident that there was no valid sanction for prosecution of the petitioner for sale of adulterated Atta on the two grounds as revealed by the report of the Director of the Central Food Laboratory which was submitted long after the sanction given by the Civil Surgeon, for prosecution of the petitioner." 3. At the out-set, we may point out that the learned Single Judge used the expression 'sanction' though in section 20 of the Act of the word 'consent' appears. We quote below sub-section (1) of section 20 of the Act. "20. Cognizance and trial of offences - (I) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under section 14 or section 14-A shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government cr a person authorised in this behalf by general or special order, by the Central Govt. or the State Govt. Provided that a prosecution for an offence under this Act may be instituted by a purchaser referred to in section 12, if he produces in Court a copy of the report of the Public Analyst along with the complaint." 4. Reading section 20 we find that what is provided in the said section is the consent of the authority mentioned in the section before a persons can be prosecuted. According to Chambers 20th Dictionary, New Edition 1983 consent' means to agree, to allow and word 'sanction' means giving authority. According to Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition 'consent' means a concurrence of wills. The word 'sanction' means an authorisation of anything. We are of the considered opinion that the sanction is a wider term and white granting such sanction there has to be application of mind; whereas consent means to agree to any proposal. If we read section 20 we are of the opinion that authority mentioned in that section has to give consent for prosecution and not sanction as laid down by the legislature. 5. If we read section 20 we are of the opinion that authority mentioned in that section has to give consent for prosecution and not sanction as laid down by the legislature. 5. We may also refer to a decision of the Apex Court in State of Bombay vs. Purshottam Kanaiyalal, AIR 1961 SCI wherein their Lordships observed as follows "In our view, under this section, the prosecution can be in­stituted (1) by the State Government; (2) by a local authority, (3) by a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or (4) by a person similarly authorised by a local authority. Further, a prosecution can also be instituted with the consent of any of these four authorities." 6. From the proviso of sub-section (1) we find that in case of prosecution instituted by a purchaser referred to section 12 of the Act such a consent under section 20 is not necessary, Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor has drawn our attention to section 20A of the Act and has submitted that for prosecution of any person under the1 said section consent under section 20 is not necessary. 7. From the provisions of the Act, we find that an accused person can, only after he is prosecuted, after obtaining consent under section 20, avail of the provisions of section 13 more parti­cularly sub-section (2). Thus unless, a prosecution is started a sample cannot be sent to the Central Food Laboratory on the prayer of the accused and as such there cannot be any scope for further consent under section 20 of the Act, 8. We find from the above Criminal Revision that this aspect of the matter was not taken into consideration by the learned Judge. 9. Reading sections 13 and 20, we have no hesitation in hold­ing that prosecution has to be first started with the consent of the authority under section 20 and only thereafter section 13 comes into play. In other words, the accused can pray for sending his sample to the Central Food Laboratory only after the prosecution has started after obtaining consent as provided under section 20 and as such taking of fresh consent for second time cannot and does not arise. 10. As stated earlier Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor has rightly pointed out that for taking cognizance under section 20A of the Act by the Court, no sanction is necessary. 10. As stated earlier Mr. Narzary, learned Public Prosecutor has rightly pointed out that for taking cognizance under section 20A of the Act by the Court, no sanction is necessary. That, apart under sub-section (1) of section 20 if a prosecution is started by a purchaser referred to in section 12 no consent is necessary. 11. Our attention has been drawn by the learned Public Pro­secutor to a Single Bench decision of the Bombay High Court in Mnkund Ukba Shimpi vs. Premji Durgarai Shah and another, 1981 All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 671 wherein it was held that institution of criminal case under the Act after obtaining consent is in order and it was not necessary for the Food Inspector to secure fresh approval after receipt of the report from the Central Food Laboratory, This matter also came up for consideration before a Division Bench of Gujrat High Court in State of Gujarat vs. Ambalal Maganlal, 1978 Crl LJ 1036 wherein it was also held that second consent is not necessary after obta­ining report from the Central Food Laboratory. With respect we agree to the above ratio. 12. For the reasons stated above with respect we are unable to accept the view of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the above Criminal Revision No. 94 of 1974. 13. Relying on the above decision of the learned Single Judge, the trial Court passed the acquittal order. As we have not acce­pted the views expressed by the learned Single Judge we are of the opinion that the acquittal order was not justified. Accordingly, we allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment and order and convict the accused person under section 7/16 of the Act. 14. Coming to the sentences we note that occurrence took place in the year 1979 and the accused was acquitted by the learned trial Court on the basis of the decision of this Court. Considering the above two aspects we are of the opinion, that it is not a fit case to send the accused to go behind the bar and in our opinion the sentence of fine will meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, we impose a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default one month simple imprisonment. The accused person shall pay the aforesaid amount within a period of 3 months from today. Accordingly, we impose a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default one month simple imprisonment. The accused person shall pay the aforesaid amount within a period of 3 months from today. In the result, the appeal is allowed as indicated above.