SHIVASHANKAR BHAT, J. ( 1 ) THE first petitioner is a trade union and 2nd petitioner it its treasurer. Writpetition is filed in a representative capa cityrepresenting 123 workmen. Accordingto the petitioners, these workmen wereworking in the respondent company forseveral years, in the jobs of permanentand perennial nature, but were deniedemployment. Earlier they were purportedto be employed as 'contract labours',though, as a fact they were direct emp loyees. For regularisation or absorption,these workmen agitated and the matter was pending before the Labour Court, Mangalore, by virtue of the referencedated 19-11 -1985. The respondent com pany,after disconnecting the contractor,had also, in fact, directly employed these 123 workmen calling some of them ascasual workmen. However, on 27-6-1987 all these workmen were orally told thatthey had no work and their services werenot required. Hence the writ petition,invoking Sec. . 25f and 25n of the Indust rial Disputes Act. ( 2 ) THE respondent denied that the workmen were direct employees. It pointed out that in the reference pendingbefore the Labour Court the case of 1193workmen including the 123 workmenreferred in the writ petition, was pendingadjudication and that the petitioners arehaving an effective alternative remedyand therefore this court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction. On merits, therespondent has contended that theseworkmen were not eligible to rely on Sec. 25f or 25n of the I. D. Act. ( 3 ) MR. Krishnaiah, the learned counselfor the petitioners, pointed out that, thecause of action for the writ petition aroseduring the pendency of the reference, bythe discontinuation of the services of 123workmen in the year 1987; therefore,pendency of reference is irrelevant forthe disposal of this writ petition on merits. It was also contended by Sri Krishnaiah,that, reference to Labour Court is not anefficacious remedy, because of the vastdelay involved in the proceedings beforethe Labour Court, the reference to Labourcourt, Mangalore, made as early as in theyear 1985 is still pending, in this regard. ( 4 ) DELAY in the disposal of the legal proceedings and accumulation of a largenumber of cases before the courts andtribunals, by themselves, cannot be aground to ignore the statutory forumscreated to resolve the disputes and toexercise the writ jurisdiction straightaway. The same difficulties are to be faced bythis Court also. ( 4 ) DELAY in the disposal of the legal proceedings and accumulation of a largenumber of cases before the courts andtribunals, by themselves, cannot be aground to ignore the statutory forumscreated to resolve the disputes and toexercise the writ jurisdiction straightaway. The same difficulties are to be faced bythis Court also. The remedy is not toby-pass the effective alternative remediesand permit the opening of the doors ofwrit courts, but the remedy is to (1)increase the number of such statutoryforums and (ii) post competent Presiding Officers without delay. Writ court'sdiscretion has to be exercised with referenceto the facts of individual cases. Existence of an effective alternative forumunder Law, is one of the main factors tobe considered, while refusing the exerciseof writ jurisdiction; possibility of delay bythe said alternative, statutory forum hasto be ignored as irrelevant. Rarely wecome across a right sought to be enforced,which cannot be brought within the pur viewof one or the other valuable funda mental rights enshrined in An. 14, 19 or21 of the Constitution. The statutoryrights created by welfare legislations likeindustrial Disputes Act, are traceable tothe requirements of fair procedure beforeaffecting the right to livelihood, which issought to be enforced as an ingredient ofart. 21 of the Constitution. When theemployer is the State or its instrumenta lity,the arbitrariness behind the denial of employment can also be attacked as violativeof Art. 14 of the Constitution. Inother words, the employees of the Stateand its instrumentalities, can alwaysignore the existence of statutory remedies,to enforce those rights, and invoke Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, if thecontention of petitioners is to be accepted. ( 5 ) WHILE creating statutory rights like Sec. 25f or 25n of the I. D. Act, thelegislature thought it fit to create anappropriate forums (like the Industrialtribunal or the Labour Court) to enforcethose rights, vesting vast powers in thoseforums. Should this court ignore thewisdom of the legislature in creating thosefotums while recognising the rights createdunder the very statutes ? ( 6 ) THE age old dictum is - "if the statute which creates the obligation, whetherprivate or public, provides in the samesection or passage a specific means orprocedure for enforcing it, no other methodthan that thus provided can normally beresorted to for that purpose" (Maxwell oninterpretation of Statutes-11th edn. page382 ). ( 6 ) THE age old dictum is - "if the statute which creates the obligation, whetherprivate or public, provides in the samesection or passage a specific means orprocedure for enforcing it, no other methodthan that thus provided can normally beresorted to for that purpose" (Maxwell oninterpretation of Statutes-11th edn. page382 ). When the legislature has thoughtit fit to create new forums to enforce therights created by it, this Court (speciallywhile exercising the constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 226) should respectthe legislative wisdom; frequent bypassing the statutory forums would beindicative of the suspicion as to thecom petent of such statutory forums, whichis not at all conducive to the properfunctioning of statutory bodies entrustedwith judicial powers. The purpose of lawenforcement (which is part of this Court'sjurisdiction) includes recognition of competence in the bodies created by the statute. As I have already observed, thedelay in the disposal of cases by the sestatutory bodies, by itself cannot be aground to bypass them and approach thiscourt directly; avoidance of delay has tobe achieved by other means. ( 7 ) THE dispute raised in this writ petition is substantially the subject matter of thereference before the Labour Court. The questions raised require investigation ofrival set of facts pleaded by both sides. Jurisdiction of the Labour Court underthe provisions of Industrial Disputes Actis very wide, so as to include in it a powerto create fresh legal relationships also. ( 8 ) IN the case of dismissal or removal of a workman from service, the remedy of theaggrieved workman was, held to be, toinvoke Sec. 10 of the Industrial Disputesact and seek a reference - vide Hariba v K. S. R. T,c. [1983 (1) Kar. L. J. 261] andsreenivasulu v General Manager,ksrtc [1984 (2) Kar. L. J. 307]. ( 9 ) BY virtue of Sec. 2a of the Industrial Disputes Act, where an employer discharges,dismisses, retrenches or other wiseterminates the services, of anindustrial workman, any dispute pertainingor incidental to such an action, is deemedto be an industrial dispute; therefore, theindustrial workman is not under the mercyof any Union or his co-employees to havehis grievance redressed in these matters. In the instant case, actually, it is unnecessaryeven to invoke this provision, because,the Union has been espousing the causeof the concerned workmen and in fact isthe first petitioner in this writ petition. The writ petition is filed during the pendencyof reference before the Labourcourt. In the instant case, actually, it is unnecessaryeven to invoke this provision, because,the Union has been espousing the causeof the concerned workmen and in fact isthe first petitioner in this writ petition. The writ petition is filed during the pendencyof reference before the Labourcourt. The Labour Court's jurisdiction toexamine the nature of the erstwhileemployment of these workmen and togrant as appropriate relief is not doubtedby the petitioners. In case of any doubtabout the scope of the pending reference,parties can have it clarified or enlarged bytaking suitable steps. ( 10 ) IN these circumstances, I consider this a case where writ jurisdiction ought notto be exercised. ( 11 ) STATE of Bombay and Others v The Hospital Mazdoor Ssba and Others (AIR1960 SC 610) was relied by the learnedcounsel for the petitioners. The Bombayhigh Court entertained a writ petition,challenging the retrenchment of twoworkmen and granted relief to the work men;workmen had relied on Sec. 25fi and 25h of I. D. Act. The Supreme Courtupheld the decision of the Bench ofbombay High Court. ( 12 ) IN the above case, the propriety of exercising the writ jurisdiction was not atall considered by the Supreme Court. Parties concentrated on the questionwhether 'hospitals' faii within the conceptof 'industry' and whether provisions ofi. D. Act were applicable; the questionraised was purely one of law and of muchpublic importance; the facts involved inthe said case are entirely different from* the present fact situation. ( 13 ) MR. Krishnaiah, strongly relied on the observations of Supreme Court at paras32 and 33 in Olga Tel I is case (AIR 1986sc 180) and contended that the fundamental rights of the workmen, specially. Art. 21 was involved here and hence existenceof an alternative remedy is not abar against invoking the writ jurisdiction. If 'right to life' includes 'right to livelihood',denial of employment illegallyoffends Art. 21, was the basis of thiscontention. Theoritically, there is agreat force in Mr, Krishniah's contention. But, here, the basic questions are, whe ther,there has been an illegal denial of employment; if not, whether, the respon dentshould be directed to provide emp loyment tothe workmen by creating a newlegal relationship. These involve investi gationof disputed facts under the firstquestion and a consideration of severalother facts including the economics ofproviding employment to these largenumber of employees. Alternatively, thecourt may have to consider the questionof adequately compensating these work men,if circumstances warrant such arelief. These involve investi gationof disputed facts under the firstquestion and a consideration of severalother facts including the economics ofproviding employment to these largenumber of employees. Alternatively, thecourt may have to consider the questionof adequately compensating these work men,if circumstances warrant such arelief. ( 14 ) THEREFORE, I cannot agree with Sri Krishnaiah that, this is a fit case forexercising the writ jurisdiction. ( 15 ) MR. Krishnaiah aiso referred to anun reported decision of the Supreme Courtin Sankar Mukheriee and Others v Unionof India and Others (W. P. No. 2123 of1982- D. D. 16-11-1989 ). Governmentof Icdia in the exercise of its powersunder Sec. 10 of Contract Labour (Regulationand Abolition) Act, 1970 issued anotification. prohibiting the departmentscovering 65 jobs in the establishments ofindian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. ,from employingcontract labours; however, jthe job ofloading and unloading of bricks fromwagons and trucks was excluded fromthe purview of the notification. Thisexclusion was challenged by filing thewrit petition in Supreme Court as violativeof Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Supre mecourt upheld the petitioners' conten tionand held that the benefit ofnotification should be available to the jobof loading and unloading of bricks also,as the said job was not dissimilar fromother jobs. This decision, again, is basedon admitted facts of the said case. ( 16 ) MR. Prabhakar the learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that, here,the main question is whether these work menwere 'contract labours' or directemployees of the respondent; if they are'contract labours', they cannot seekabsorption as a matter of right. Thelearned counsel relied on, - (1) AIR 1985 SC 760 para 11; (2) AIR1990lab. andi. C. 405 (A. Pra) (3) 1989 (2) L. L. J. 312; (4) 1979 (1) L. L. J. 41; and (5) 1980 (1) L. L. J. 503 (SC ). ( 17 ) IN the view, I have taken of the writ jurisdiction and the availability of aneffective alternative remedy to the peti tioners,it is unnecessary to discuss thedecisions cited by Sri Prabhakar. ( 18 ) CONSEQUENTLY this writ petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No costs. --- *** --- .