JUDGMENT - RATNAPARKHI M.S., J.:—The order passed by the Collector, Nagpur on 5-7-1989 in Revenue Case No. 3/1988-1989 of Mowad Municipal Council, Mowad (Annex. F) has been challenged in this writ petition. 2. Facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows: There is a Municipal Council at Mowad in Nagpur District. The elections to this Municipal Council were held sometimes in April 1985. According to respondent No. 3 prior to these elections an Aghadi styled as a Janata Aghadi was constituted and 20 candidates were sponsored by this Janata Aghadi to contest all the 20 wards. They had also issued a manifesto. They went before the electorate with this manifesto. Thirteen persons belonging to the Janata Aghadi were returned. The present petitioners 1 to 3 and the respondent No. 3 were among them. The respondent No. 3 was the leader of this Janata Aghadi. The elected members took over office after the elections. The respondent No. 3 was elected as a President of the Municipal Council. The working went on quite smoothly upto 1988. Thereafter the present petitioners started remaining absent and at times they avoided or refrained from voting against the directions of the Janata Aghadi, with the result that no candidate of the Janata Aghadi could be elected either to the Standing Committee or to other bodies of the Municipal Council. Not satisfied with this, a special meeting was requisitioned under section 55-A of the Maharashtra Municipalities Act to pass a vote of no-confidence against the respondent No. 3. It is his case that all the three petitioners joined hands with the opposition. However, this resolution failed and he is still in office. 3. The respondent No. 3, therefore, filed a complaint before the Collector under section 3 of the Maharashtra Local Authority Members' Disqualification Act, 1987. The main grievances made by him in this application were that because of the hostile attitude of the three petitioners the official candidates had to withdraw from the contest. It is also his contention that by doing these acts they voluntarily gave up the membership of Janata Aghadi, which sponsored them and got them elected. It is also contended that they avoided or abstained from voting in the meeting of the Municipal Council contrary to the directions issued by the Aghadi. The conduct of the petitioners leads to disqualification. It is also his contention that by doing these acts they voluntarily gave up the membership of Janata Aghadi, which sponsored them and got them elected. It is also contended that they avoided or abstained from voting in the meeting of the Municipal Council contrary to the directions issued by the Aghadi. The conduct of the petitioners leads to disqualification. Hence he requested the Collector to pass an order disqualifying them. 4. This petition was opposed by the present petitioners. They denied that the Janata Aghadi was ever constituted. They also denied that they contested the elections on the symbol of the Janata Aghadi. According to them, they have not done any act which leads to the disqualification under the said Act. It was also their contention that the Maharashtra Local Authority Members' Disqualification Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act” for the sake of brevity) was brought on the statute book in 1987, whereas they were elected long back in April, 1982. Therefore, the provisions of this Act do not govern them and they cannot be disqualified. The learned Collector on hearing both the sides passed the impugned order. He came to the conclusion that the Janata Aghadi was brought into existence. It has its own manifesto and the petitioners and respondent No. 3 along with others contested the elections on the common symbol of the Janata Aghadi. He also came to the conclusion that by their conduct the petitioners gave up their membership of the Janata Aghadi. He also came to the conclusion that by voting against the official party candidates, they acted contrary to the directions issued by the Aghadi and this also results in disqualification. He, therefore, declared that all the three petitioners are liable to be disqualified and accordingly passed the order disqualifying them. It is this order which has been the subject matter of challenge before this Court. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioners (who have suffered disqualification) strenuously urged before us that the Collector decided the case without giving them any opportunity to lead the evidence and, therefore, this decision is liable to be set aside as the principles of natural justice were violated. He urged before us that the petitioners filed preliminary objections without going into the merits of the case. The objections can be found at page 125 of the record before the Collector. He urged before us that the petitioners filed preliminary objections without going into the merits of the case. The objections can be found at page 125 of the record before the Collector. According to them, the application was filed with the mala fide intention. It was contended that the petitioners had filed an application for better particulars which were never supplied. There was no evidence which could enable the Collector to reach to the conclusion which he has reached. On merits they denied that there was any Aghadi formed and that the petitioners contested the elections on the common symbol of the Aghadi. When the objections are read as it is it could be easily found that they were not preliminary but they were objections on merits inasmuch as formation of the Aghadi was disputed and similarly the petitioners contesting on the common symbol of the Aghadi was denied. The application which the petitioners filed for better particulars is also interesting. It can be found at page 117 of the record. No particulars have been asked for in this application. On the other hand what they asked for was the documents which were brought on record by the office of the Collector. The order sheets recorded by the Collector in the case were before us and at no stage the petitioners or the respondents asked for an opportunity to lead oral evidence. There is thus no force in the arguments that the case was decided without giving them an opportunity. 6. The learned Collector had before him Article 1 which is an appeal to the electorate. Names of 20 persons (including the present petitioners and the respondent No. 3) can be found there. The document prima facie shows that the Aghadi was formulated (prior to these elections) of which the present respondent No. 3 was the leader. It also shows that 20 persons including the present petitioners contested on the symbol of this Aghadi (under the leadership of the respondent No. 3). There is then another Document No. 2 which is the manifesto. The names of all 20 persons who contested the elections are shown in this document. Names of so many persons have been stated below this manifesto. This document also shows that Janata Aghadi was formed. There is then another Document No. 2 which is the manifesto. The names of all 20 persons who contested the elections are shown in this document. Names of so many persons have been stated below this manifesto. This document also shows that Janata Aghadi was formed. The respondent No. 3 was the leader of this Aghadi and under his leadership all the 20 persons (including the present petitioners) contested the elections. These facts do not appear to have been controverted before the Collector. The Collector did rely on this material and on this material he came to the conclusion that there was a Janata Aghadi of which the respondent No. 3 was the leader and all the 20 persons including the petitioners and the respondent No. 3 contested the elections on the common symbol of the Aghadi This is a finding of fact which cannot be agitated before this Court while acting in writ jurisdiction. 7. It will, therefore, be proper to proceed with the proposition that there was a Janata Aghadi of which the respondent No. 3 was the leader and all these 20 persons including the present petitioners and the respondent No. 3 contested the elections on the common symbol. The petitioners and the respondent No. 3 are elected to the Municipal Council, Mowad. 8. Mr. Dharmadhikari, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3. strenuously urged before us that the petitioners have incurred a disqualification within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. The petitioners and the respondent No. 3 are elected to the Municipal Council, Mowad. 8. Mr. Dharmadhikari, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3. strenuously urged before us that the petitioners have incurred a disqualification within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Act. For proper appreciation of the controversy, it will be necessary to reproduce the relevant provisions: Section 3 reads as follows: “3(1) : Subject to the provisions of sections 4 and 5, a councillor or a member belonging to any political party or aghadi or front shall be disqualified from being a councillor or a member— (a) If he had voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or aghadi or front; or (b) If he votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Zilla Parishad or as the case may be Panchayat Samiti contrary to any directions issued by the political party or aghadi or front to which he belongs or by any persons or authority authorised by any of them in this behalf, without obtaining in either case, the prior permission of such political party or aghadi or front person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party or Aghadi or front person or authority within 15 days from the date of such voting or abstention: Provided that such voting or abstention without prior permission from such party or Aghadi or front at election of any office, authority or Committee under any relevant municipal law or the Maharashtra Zilla Parishad and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 shall not be condoned under this clause. (Remaining portion is not relevant for our purpose), Reading of sub-section (1) of section 3 thus makes it clear that law contemplates two sorts of conduct which results in the disqualification (1) if a member has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party or secondly, if he votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of the Municipal Council contrary to the directions issued by the political party or Aghadi or a front to which he belongs. Mr. Dharmadhikari, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3 strenuously urged before us that by acting contrary to the directions of the party, these petitioners impliedly gave up the membership of the party on the symbol whereon they got themselves elected. 9. Mr. Dharmadhikari, the learned Advocate for the respondent No. 3 strenuously urged before us that by acting contrary to the directions of the party, these petitioners impliedly gave up the membership of the party on the symbol whereon they got themselves elected. 9. Now the term “voluntarily giving up his membership” has not been defined under the Act. As far as the common law is concerned, 'voluntarily giving up membership' would mean resignation. However, according to Mr. Dharmadhikari “voluntarily giving up membership” can be by implication and the conduct of the members would be the relevant factor for deciding this point. What Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously urged before us is that the resignation is not the only mode of voluntarily giving up the membership. There are also other modes according to him. The Objects and Reasons which compelled the legislature would be relevant for this purpose. 10. Our attention was invited to the Objects and Reasons with which the bill came to be introduced. They are: “With a view to eradicating the evil of political defection in the Parliament on the national level and in the State Legislatures on the State level, the Parliament has amended the Constitution of India by the Constitution (52nd Amendment) Act, 1985. At the level of district, taluka, city and town different local authorities were charged with the administration of functions relating to local Government. These local authorities were in the main, elective. The field local Government constituted a training ground for the State and national Government. Many of our ablest, Statesmen and Legislators had received their earliest training in the sphere of local Government. The local authorities might become the pioneers in various fields of political activities. The evil of political defection was also present in the local authorities which were the base of our democratic institutions. It was, therefore, expedient to prevent political defection in certain local authorities also in the State.” 11. These were the Objects and Reasons which made the Government to introduce this Bill. Suffice it to say at this stage that for eradicating the, evil of political defection in the local authorities this Act came to be passed. What Mr. Dharmadhikari contended before us was that if the objects of the Bill were eradication of political defection, then the Act has to be construed in a way so that it achieves the ultimate object. What Mr. Dharmadhikari contended before us was that if the objects of the Bill were eradication of political defection, then the Act has to be construed in a way so that it achieves the ultimate object. We find ourselves unable to accept this vague formula. The Government may have in their minds the laudable objects regarding which there may not be any doubt. The Court is not called upon to give sanctity to these objects. The Court is called upon to interpret the Act which is alleged to have been enacted with these objects. It is now an accepted principle of interpretation of statutes that the Court has to examine the statute as it stands. It cannot inject something more in the statute so as to make a statute fulfil the objects, however, laudable they may be. This Court will, therefore, attempt to interpret the terms which are used in the Act but it will not inject something into the statute which the statute does not contain initially. 12. It is from this point of view that we are called upon to interpret the term “compulsorily gives up his membership”. “Giving up membership” is a positive act and it is related to the member. Something has to come from the member himself. The conduct of the member, howsoever inconsistent it may be, cannot lead to the implied giving up of the membership. In fact cases are in existence where a person continues to be member of a party in spite of his actions which are contrary to the interests of the party. There is thus no question of “giving up of the membership by implication.” To repeat it once again 'giving of the membership' is a positive act of a member which the member has to do, but his conduct though inconsistent with the policies of the party or the philosophy of the party cannot be tantamount to his giving of the membership only. Such inconsistent conduct may amount to indiscipline and if the party has any disciplinary rules, appropriate action can be taken against the member. Thus the conduct of a member inconsistent with the philosophy of the party may furnish a cause for taking disciplinary action against the member, but it does not automatically result in the cessation of membership. Such inconsistent conduct may amount to indiscipline and if the party has any disciplinary rules, appropriate action can be taken against the member. Thus the conduct of a member inconsistent with the philosophy of the party may furnish a cause for taking disciplinary action against the member, but it does not automatically result in the cessation of membership. We have so many statutes which provide for the disqualification of the members but the disqualification occurs only when a member is punished for the so-called misconduct. 13. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners 1 to 3 have not tendered their resignations to the party. According to the order passed by the Collector, they still continue to be the members of the party. Even taking the arguments of Mr. Dharmadhikari at their face-value, the conduct of the petitioners does not in itself constitute the cessation from the party. Thus there being no cessation and there being no voluntary resignation, it cannot be said by any stretch of imagination that the petitioners have voluntarily given up the membership of such political party. 14. Reliance was placed by Mr. Dharmadhikari on 'the dictum of the Supreme Court in (Ramji Missar v. State of Bihar)1, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1088. It was a case under the Probation of Offenders Act. Under the provisions of that Act, a person below the age of 21 years was entitled to the benefit of probation. The question which was posed before that Court was, at what point of time this age should be reckoned, whether it should be at the time when the offence is committed or whether it should be at a time when the judgment is pronounced, either by the trial court or the appellate or revisional Court. The law was silent on this point. The controversy was restricted only to this aspect and the Supreme Court observed that as regards the crucial date of reckoning the age where an Appellate Court modifies judgment of the trial Court and when section 6 becomes applicable to a person only on the decision of an appellate or a revisional Court, it must be held that it is the date upon which the trial Court had to deal with the offender. Relying upon this dictum, Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously urged before us that the objectives of law have to be seen for interpreting it. Relying upon this dictum, Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously urged before us that the objectives of law have to be seen for interpreting it. If the argument is restricted only to this aspect, we would agree with Mr. Dharmadhikari. But what Mr. Dharmadhikari wants to urge before us is that the objective of the Act is to prevent defection and, therefore, the term 'voluntarily giving up the membership' has to be interpreted so as to make the conduct of a person tantamount to resignation by necessary implication. Thus what Mr. Dharmadhikari wants this court to do is not only to interpret the law, as it is, but to inject something which the law does not contain. We find ourselves unable to accept this argument. 15. Reliance was also placed on another dictum of the Supreme Court in (New India Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, Bihar)2, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1207. The Supreme Court observed : “It is a recognised Rule of interpretation of statutes that the expressions used therein should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute, and which effectuate the object of the legislature. If an expression is susceptible of a narrow or technical meaning, as well as a popular meaning the Court would be justified in assuming that the Legislature used the expression in the sense which would carry out its object and object that which renders the exercise of its powers invalid.” 16. None can dispute this ratio. What Mr. Dharmadhikari urged before us, and quite strenuously, is that if the objectives of the statute call for a wide interpretation, then the Court should not be hesitant in giving that interpretation. We would not have hesitated to give wide interpretation if the words used in the act were not unambiguous. As far as the Act is concerned, the words admit of no ambiguity. The objective of this Act is to prevent defection. A person who voluntarily gives up his own party, would automatically incur a disqualification under section 3(1)(a), as it stands. We are called upon to interpret this term “voluntarily gives up”. We cannot substitute any other term so that it could achieve the objective of the Act. After all it is within the exclusive, competence of the legislature to frame the Act. In their wisdom they have used this specific term. We are called upon to interpret this term “voluntarily gives up”. We cannot substitute any other term so that it could achieve the objective of the Act. After all it is within the exclusive, competence of the legislature to frame the Act. In their wisdom they have used this specific term. It may be in the minds of the legislature that “voluntarily giving of membership” would be a conduct entitling disqualification. That is why they have used this term. It would not be open for the Courts in these circumstances to inject something more in the statute which the statute does not contain. In fact what Mr. Dharmadhikari suggested in his argument was that as soon as a person indulges in anti-party activities, that should straightway result in disqualification. According to Mr. Dharmadhikari the indulgence of an incumbent in anti-party activities does necessarily result in implied giving up the membership. It is this interpretation which he wants to place on the words. We find ourselves unable to accept this sort of interpretation. According to us by enacting section 3(1) of the said Act, the legislature has made it clear that it is only giving up the membership of the party, which would result in disqualification and according to us, there could be no implied giving up membership by conduct. 17. Mr. Dharmadhikari then invited our attention to other material placed before the Collector and the Collector it appears was impressed by this material. The other material was 1) the petitioners not attending the meetings, 2) not voting for the Janata Aghadi candidate and 3) joining hands with the opposition. Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously urged before us that this conduct of the petitioners takes the case within the four corners of section 3(1)(b) of the Act and it itself results in disqualification. According to us, absentism voting or abstention from voting and joining hands with the opposition does not in itself entail disqualification. Mr. Dharmadhikari strenuously urged before us that this conduct of the petitioners takes the case within the four corners of section 3(1)(b) of the Act and it itself results in disqualification. According to us, absentism voting or abstention from voting and joining hands with the opposition does not in itself entail disqualification. The section itself says that the disqualification will occur if he votes or abstains from voting in any meeting of a Municipal Corporation, Municipal Council, Zilla Parishad or as the case may be, Panchayat Samiti, contrary to any directions issued by the political party or Aghadi or front, 'to which he belongs or by any person or authority authorised by any of them in this behalf, without obtaining prior permission of such political party or aghadi or front, person or authority. What this sub-section contemplates is that before the meeting the party or aghadi have to take a definite stand and have to issue directions to the members. It is only after issuance of these directions that the action on the part of the member contrary to such directions would, result in disqualification. If examined from this angle there is nothing on record to show that before the meetings were held, the Janata Aghadi had taken any stand. There is nothing to show that the Janata Aghadi or anybody on their behalf had given any directions to the members. It is only contravention of such directions that results in the disqualification. In the present case, there being no directions either by the Aghadi or by any authority in that behalf, there is no question of acting contrary to the direction. 18. This according to us, is the crux of the situation. The learned Collector held that 1) there was Janata Aghadi, 2) That the respondent No. 3 was the leader of that Aghadi and 3) the petitioners Nos. 1 to 3 were elected on the common symbol from that Aghadi. We need not go behind this finding of fact. The point, still remains whether the petitioners voluntarily gave up their membership of the Aghadi and secondly whether they acted contrary to the directions given by the Aghadi- or any authority authorised by the Aghadi. It is not the case that the petitioners voluntarily gave up the membership. We need not go behind this finding of fact. The point, still remains whether the petitioners voluntarily gave up their membership of the Aghadi and secondly whether they acted contrary to the directions given by the Aghadi- or any authority authorised by the Aghadi. It is not the case that the petitioners voluntarily gave up the membership. There is absolutely no material to show that any directions were given by the Aghadi or by an authority authorised by the Aghadi and there can be no question of acting contrary to the directions. The learned Collector, however, had a very casual approach. Though the order passed by the Collector runs into nine pages, eight pages have been devoted only to the statement of facts and material adduced before him. The only paragraph which contains the reasons is the penultimate paragraph on page 9 of the order where he says: “The facts discussed in foregoing paragraphs reveal that the three respondents were set up for general elections of Municipal Council, Mowad in 1985 by the Janata Aghadi and they were elected as councillors as belonging to the Janata Aghadi. Similarly from the information placed on record it is disclosed that three respondents have acted against the mandate of the Janata Aghadi and have voted against the party in standing and Subject Committees' election held in 1988 and joined hands with the opposition party and they have not obtained any permission from the party, person or authority. It is abundantly proved that the three respondents are liable to the disqualified for the reasons stated above.” 19. This reasoning of the learned Collector does not appeal to reason. To repeat it once again, the misconduct, however gross it may be does not automatically result in disqualification. For attracting the disqualification, sub-section 1(a) requires a positive act on the part of the member in voluntarily giving up the membership. Sub-section (1)(b) requires a direction to be issued by the Aghadi and it is only acting contrary to such direction that results in disqualification. 20. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Collector was not at all justified in holding that the petitioners have incurred a disqualification within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the said Act. The order of the Collector is liable to be quashed. The petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. 20. In our opinion, therefore, the learned Collector was not at all justified in holding that the petitioners have incurred a disqualification within the meaning of section 3(1)(a) and (b) of the said Act. The order of the Collector is liable to be quashed. The petition, therefore, deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order passed by the Collector is hereby quashed. Rule is made absolute in terms above. In the circumstances of the case there shall, however, be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. -----