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1990 DIGILAW 304 (DEL)

SITHA LAKSHMI KRISHNAN v. GIAN PARKASH

1990-09-18

M.L.VERMA

body1990
M. L. Varma, J: ( 1 ) THIS is a regular First Appeal against the orderdated 20. 5. 75 of the. Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Delhi, (hereinafterreferred TO to as the Tribunal) on an application under Section 110a of the Motorvehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter REFERRED TO to as the Act ). This application hadbeen made by the appellants herein claiming compensation of Rs. 2,00,000. 00in all on account of the death of one Shri S. Krishnan. It was registered as suitno. 234/70. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs. 37,950. 00only as compensation. The Tribunal also ordered payment of interest at the rate of 6% perannum from the date of the award till the date of realisation. ( 2 ) IN this appeal filed on 18. 10. 75 the award has been challenged onvarious grounds by the appellants. It is worth-noting that in ground No. 5 ofthe Grounds of Appeal the appellants took the stand that the compensationpayable to them comes to more than Rs. 2,50,000. 00 and have claimed thattherefore the Tribunal ought to have awarded the sum of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 tothem as compensation. The appellants therefore restricted their claim forcompensation in the appeal also to Rs. 2,00,000. 00 in all. There is no cross appealfiled by respondent No. 2, Union of India. ( 3 ) DURING the pendency of this appeal an application under Order 41rule 33 and Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code was filed on 20. 4. 87 on behalf of theappellants. This application was registered as CM 1374/87. The prayer in thisapplication was that the increase in the pay and allowances of governmentservants may be taken note of while allowing the compensation since thedeceased was also a government servant. It was contended in this applicationthat the subsequent events such as the rise in salary and allowances due to therecommendations of the various Pay Commissions should be taken into accountwhile awarding the compensation. Notice of this application was issued to therespondents. Union of India, respondent No. 2, was served with the notice ofthe application. However, no counter affidavit reply to this application wasfiled on its behalf. On 17. 8. 87 it was ordered that this application be taken upfor consideration along with the main appeal. ( 4 ) A rather tall claim had been made in this application and theinitial sum of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 was sought to be raised to Rs. 5,00,000. 00. However, no counter affidavit reply to this application wasfiled on its behalf. On 17. 8. 87 it was ordered that this application be taken upfor consideration along with the main appeal. ( 4 ) A rather tall claim had been made in this application and theinitial sum of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 was sought to be raised to Rs. 5,00,000. 00. According to the appellants this was on account of the normal increases which thedeceased would have got as a result of the upward revision of pay-scales witheffect from 1. 1. 7-3 and on various other dates as mentioned in the applica-tion. By a process of arithmetical calculations a figure of Rs. 5,00,000. 00 wasarrived at. ( 5 ) THIS appeal was earlier disposed of by an oral judgment dated10. 1. 89 passed by S. B. Wad,j. On that date no one had appeared for therespondents. The amount of compensation was enhanced and restricted tors. 2,00,000, by Wad, J. This was because the initial claim made by theclaimants was only Rs. 2,00,000. 00. The enhancement was made on the basisof certain figures mentioned in the CM 1374/87. On that basis Wad, J. hadheld that the compensation would work out to Rs. 2,59,200. 00 but finallyordered the enhancement of compensation to Rs. 2,00,000. 00 in all. The claimof the appellants herein made in that application for enhancing the compensation to Rs. 5,00,000. 00 was not accepted. It may be noticed that the appellantsherein had not appealed against the said judgment and order of Wad, J. ( 6 ) SINCE the aforesaid judgment of Wad, J. was delivered when noone had appeared on behalf of respondent No. 2; an application was movedon behalf of the said respondent under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code read with Order 9rule 13 praying for "setting aside the order dated 10. 1. 89" and for re-hearingthe matter "on merits". This application was allowed after notice to the nonapplicants/appellants herein. Consequently the appeal was re-heard by me. ( 7 ) IN the appeal the questions which survive for consideration arethe questions regarding the adequacy of the amount of compensation to bepaid to the appellants/claimants; the rate of interest payable on the compensation amount as well as the date from which such interest should be paid. ( 8 ) THE facts of the case are simple. Most of the relevant facts arenot in dispute. ( 8 ) THE facts of the case are simple. Most of the relevant facts arenot in dispute. The husband of appellant No. 1, namely, the. said Shri S. Krishnan was working as an Investigator in the office of the Chief Controllerof Imports and Exports, Ministry of Foregin Trade, Government of India,"new Delhi. On 1. 4. 70, while he was driving a scooter No. DLJ 6474, he metwith an accident which proved fatal. The deceased was born on 22. 3. 39 andwas just over 34 years old on the fateful day When he died as a result of thefatal injuries suffered by him because of the accident. He left behind his widowviz. appellant No. 1, a minor son viz. appellant No. 2. two minor daughtersviz. appellants 3 and 4 and a widowed and dependent mother viz. appellantno. 5. ( 9 ) UNFOTTUNATELY the mother died during the pendency of this appeal. However, her death is of no Consequence as the claim and the appeal are bythe L. Rs. of the deceased and the appeal does not abate. The claim madeunder the Motor Vehicles Act is in a representative capacity and the other L. Rs. are there to pursue the claim. It has been held that Order 22 Civil Procedure Code and theprovisions regarding abatement are not applicable to the proceedings for compensation for fatal accidents. Reference may be made in this regard to thejudgment of this Court in the case of Rom Sahai and Another v. Rabia Begumand Others, 1969 ACJ 56 . ( 10 ) AS noticed above an application was filed by the aforesaid personsunder Section 110a of the Act in their capacity as the legal representatives ofthe deceased S. Krishnan. As also noticed, Rs. 2,00,000. 00 were claimed ascompensation on account of the death of S. Krishnan as aresult of the fatalaccident. The fact of accident and the liability of the offending vehicle is not indispute. The Tribunal found that the deceased was not at fault and that theoffending vehicle involved in the. accident causing the death of S. Krishnanwas Jeep No. DLE 4174 belonging to respondent No. 2. The Tribunal has alsoheld that the claimants/appellants herein are the legal representatives of thedeceased his monthly salary was Rs. 583. 25 p. On this, the Tribunal workedout a sum Of Rs. 300. 00 only per month as the dependency of the family. Thisis almost half of the salary. The Tribunal has alsoheld that the claimants/appellants herein are the legal representatives of thedeceased his monthly salary was Rs. 583. 25 p. On this, the Tribunal workedout a sum Of Rs. 300. 00 only per month as the dependency of the family. Thisis almost half of the salary. The Tribunal took 24 as the multiplier factoron the basis that the deceased, being 34 years old, would have retired at theage of 58 years on 22. 3. 1994. On the basis of the dependency and themultiplier factor the Tribunal worked out a figure of Rs. 86,400. 00. ( 11 ) THE sum of Rs. 86,400. 00 was reduced to Rs. 37. 950. 00 by makingvarious deductions totalling Rs. 48,450. 00. A sum of Rs. 24,924. 00 was deductedon account of the pension that the petitioners would get during the course of. 24years from 2. 4. 70. Rs. 11. 000. 00 was deducted on account of this amount havingbeen received on the insurance policy of the deceased. Further sums of Rs. 560. 00 and Rs. 230. 00 which had been received by the appellants herein asgratuity and bank balance of the deceased were also deducted. The aforesaidamounts worked out to Rs. 41,754. 00 and after deducting this sum from Rs. 86,400. 00 a figure of Rs. 44. 646. 00 was arrived at. From the figure of Rs. 44. 646. 00a further sum at the rate of 15% was deducted for lump sum payment anduncertainties of life. By this process the Tribunal came to the figure of Rs. 37,950. 00 and awarded this amount as compensation. ( 12 ) MR. Goyal learned Counsel for the appellants rightly made agrievance of the facts that the Tribunal has neither awarded nor even considered the earnings that the deceased may have made on account of the increasein his salary in his scale of pay which he would have got in the normal course. The Tribunal has also not considered the earning capacity of the deceasedafter his retirement keeping in mind the life expectency. The economic valueof the deprivation Of the husband, father and son respectively of the claimants,the loss of affection, the shock, pain and suffering because of the death of thedeath of the only male member in the family has not been taken into accountby the Tribunal. Mr. The economic valueof the deprivation Of the husband, father and son respectively of the claimants,the loss of affection, the shock, pain and suffering because of the death of thedeath of the only male member in the family has not been taken into accountby the Tribunal. Mr. Goyal rightly contended that the deduction made bythe Tribunal on account of pension that would be received by the appellantsherein over the period of 24 years is unwarranted particularly when thetribunal has ignored that after retirement the deceased would have beenentitled to much more pension if he had been alive. Similarly, no deductionshould have been made for lump sum payment or for gratutity or for insurance,as has been held by Sultan Singh. J. in the case of Delhi Transport Corporationv Harbans Kaur and Others, 1983 ACJ 110 . In this judgment the learned Judgehas noticed various judgments of this Court (most of them being of Divisionbench s) wherein it has consistently been held that no amount should bededucted from the quantum of compensation on account of any of the aforesaid items or under any of the aforesaid heads. ( 13 ) THE Tribunal overlooked the fact that insurance was paid becauseof the provision already made by the deceased for his family. This could nothave been deducted from the pecuniary loss of the appellants on account ofthe untimely and unnatural death of the deceased. The deduction on accountof the gratuity is even more unintelligible since the deceased would have gota much higher amount as gratuity if he had been alive and continued to be inservice and had retired in the normal course. There is much less justificationfor deducting Rs. 230. 00 as bank balance of the deceased. In a recent judgmentof this Court delivered by S. B. Wad, J. , in the case of Delhi Transport Corporation and Others vs. Kamlesh Arora and Others reported in 1989 (2) ACJpage 1034 it has again been laid down that no deduction should be made foruncertainties or lump sum payments. ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants urged that the whole approachof the Tribunal was wrong. ( 14 ) LEARNED Counsel for the appellants urged that the whole approachof the Tribunal was wrong. He contended that whereas it has been held by thesupreme Court in the case of Concord of India Insurance Company Limited v. Nirmala Devi, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1666 == (1979) 4 SCC page 365=1980acj page 55 that in motor accident cases determination of compensationmust be liberal and not niggard; the Tribunal has adopted the converse andnarrow minded approach in fixing the quantum of compensation. Apart fromthe deductions which had wrongly been made by the Tribunal, Mr. Goyalpointed out that the amount of dependency worked out by the Tribunal at asum of Rs. 300. 00 per month is not a fair estimate since the deceased had fivedependants viz. the claimants, and therefore, Mr. Goyal pointed out that itwas not possible that the deceased would have spent nearly one-half theamount of his salary on himself or otherwise than on his dear and near onesbeing his five dependants. Mr. Goyal contended that the Tribunal should haveawarded Rs. 2,00,000. 00 claimed as compensation being a fair estimate of thepecuniary loss. He further contended that in view of C. M. 1374/87 thecompensation to beawarded to the appellants should be increased tors. 5,00. 000. 00. ( 15 ) THE learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants were entitled to the benefit of the increased pay and allowances whichthe deceased would have got in the normal course. According to Shri Goyalthe future probable pecuniary, loss suffered by the family had to be arrived atfor computing and awarding the compensation. He submitted that subsequentevents should be taken into account for calculating the quantum, of compensation. In support of this contention Shri Goyal relied upon the judgment ofsuitan Singh, J. of this Court in the case of Satyawati Pathak v. Hari Ram andothers, reported in 1983 ACJ page 424 as well as the judgment of the Supremecourt in the case of Mrs. Manjushri Raha and Others v. B. L. Gupta andothers, reported in 1977 ACJ page 134. ( 16 ) SHRI V. K. Makhija learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 contendedthat the amount of compensation could not and should be calculated on thebasis of higher salary which the deceased may have got on promotions if he hadbeen alive. This, according to him, would be speculative. ( 16 ) SHRI V. K. Makhija learned Counsel for respondent No. 2 contendedthat the amount of compensation could not and should be calculated on thebasis of higher salary which the deceased may have got on promotions if he hadbeen alive. This, according to him, would be speculative. Since it could notbe said whether the deceased would have got promotions if he had been alive. Besides, according to him, there was no such claim made in the original application nor is there any evidence on record on this point, in support of hiscontention Shri Makhija relied upon the decision of this Court in the caseof Kamlesh Arora and Ors. (supra) where it was held that the question ofadditional payments for allowances and increase in salary in future would bethe correct position as regards dependency of the family. In that case thecontention on behalf of the claimants was that the deceased would have risento the position of Manager in the company earning asalary of Rs. 3,000. 00per month. This contention was supported by a letter written by the employercompany in which the deceased was working which was produced in thetribunal. ( 17 ) THE upward revision of pay-scale pursuant to the recommendationof the Third Pay Commission was made effective from 1. 1. 1973 as stated inc. M. 1374/87. The appeal was filed on 18. 10. 1975. In this appeal also thegrievance was that the compensation of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 as claimed should havebeen awarded by the Tribunal. No reason has been given why the claim forhigher or larger amount of compensation was not made at the time of filing ofthe appeal. No reason has been given why an application seeking to increasethe original claim was not made soon after 1. 5. 1982 on which date, as per C. M. 1374/87 an award is supposed to have been given-by some Board of Arbitration. It is now well Settled that in motor accident claim cases claimants should nottry to make a fortune out of mis-fortune. ( 18 ) RELIANCES placed by Shri Goyal on the judgments in the cases ofsatyawati Pathak (supra) and Manjushri Raha (supra) are not very helpful tothe appellants. In Satyawati Pathak s case although subsequent events fordetermination of emoluments were taken into account the amount of compensation awarded was limited to the claim originally made. ( 18 ) RELIANCES placed by Shri Goyal on the judgments in the cases ofsatyawati Pathak (supra) and Manjushri Raha (supra) are not very helpful tothe appellants. In Satyawati Pathak s case although subsequent events fordetermination of emoluments were taken into account the amount of compensation awarded was limited to the claim originally made. In that case also itappears that ahigher claim had been made on the basis of the increase in thescales of pay by making an application for taking into consideration the revisedpay-scales as recommended by the Third Pay Commission. It was, however,held in that case that if alive the deceased would haye opted to draw the emoluments under the revised pay-scales instead of the old pay-scales In the caseof Manjushri Raha also it has been observed in paragraph 7 of the judgmentthat the Courts below had not taken into account the salary which the deceasedwould have earned while reaching the maximum of his grade. In the applicationbeing C. M. I 374/87 it is not stated as to what the deceased would haveearner as his pay and allowance if he had reached the top of his grade and asto when he would have reached the top of his grade. ( 19 ) IT may be noticed here that no authority was cited before me onbehalf of the appellants for awarding a higher amount than originally claimed. As observed above in this very case Wad, J. had restricted the amount of compensation to Rs. 2,00,000. 00 which was the claim originally made. The appellants herein had not filed any appeal against this. In Satyawati Pathak s casealso the amount of compensation ultimately awarded was limited to the claimoriginally made. In Manjushri Raha s case the amount awarded by the. Tribunalwas increased but was much below the original claim made in that case. ( 20 ) COMPENSATION to be awarded must be just and fair to all. It isarrived at on the basis of data which cannot be ascertained accurately and mustnecessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. Arithmetical processmay not always result in arriving at the amount of fair compensation and itmay actually lead to injustice sometimes. The measure of fair compensationis a matter of fair. estimate on generalisation. The fact that the original claimwas for Rs. 2,00,000. Arithmetical processmay not always result in arriving at the amount of fair compensation and itmay actually lead to injustice sometimes. The measure of fair compensationis a matter of fair. estimate on generalisation. The fact that the original claimwas for Rs. 2,00,000. 00 that in this appeal again this claim was reiterated, thatwhen Wad, J. , enhanced the compensation awarded by the Tribunal but restricted it to the original claim of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 no appeal was filed; would lendcredence to the fact that the appellants themselves considered and regarded thesum of Rs. 2,00,000. 00 as fair and just-compensation to them for the futurepecuniary loss suffered by them on account of untimely death of S. Krishnan. Neither Counsel was able to show why the amount of compensation shouldeither be less than or more than Rs. 2,00,000. 00. ( 21 ) MR. MAKHIJA, learned Counsel for respondent No. 2,couldnotconvince me as to why the compensation to be awarded should be less thanrs. 2,00,000. 00. In fairness, it may be noticed that he did not seriously challengethe contention of Mr. Goyal on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunalshould have awarded Rs. 2,00,000. 00 which was originally claimed as compensation. Mr. Makhija very vehemently submitted that the compensation amountshould be restricted to the claim originally made. Since no reply or counteraffidavit had been filed to C. M. 1374/87, Mr. Makhija could not traverse thefigures mentioned in this application. He did not seriously dispute that thepetitioner would have earned an average of about Rs. 200. 00 p. m. and in thatevent the dependency of about Rs. 800. 00 p. m. would be a reasonable estimate. On this basis the amount of compensation would work out to overrs. 2,30,000. 00 with 24 being the multiplier factor. While disposing of thismatter earlier also Wad, J. , had taken 24 as the multiplier factor and theaverage salary of the deceased atrs. l,280. 00 p. m. on the basis of the figuresgiven in C. M. 1374/87. On that basis the compensation worked out tors. 2,59,200. 00 but it was restricted to Rs. 2,00,000. 00 as originally claimed. ( 22 ) IN my view also the appellants should get Rs. 2,00,000. 00 as compensation. To my mind, this would be a fair and just amount of compensation. I would also take 24 as the multiplier factor. Taking that multiplier thedependency would work out to approximately Rs. 680. 2,00,000. 00 as originally claimed. ( 22 ) IN my view also the appellants should get Rs. 2,00,000. 00 as compensation. To my mind, this would be a fair and just amount of compensation. I would also take 24 as the multiplier factor. Taking that multiplier thedependency would work out to approximately Rs. 680. 00 p. m. on Rs. 2,00,000. 00. As noticed above, S. B. Wad, J. had also taken 24 as the multiplier factor whichis what the Tribunal had also done. This multiplier factor was arrived at inview of the age of the deceased at the time of his death and the age of retirement of Government servant being 58 years in normal circumstances. Thedependency worked out by the Tribunal was too low. As already held above,the deductions made by the Tribunal are not Justified in law. I am of theopinion that since the earning capacity of the deceased after retirement, keepingin wiew the life expectancy, was not taken into consideration, no deductionshould made from the amount of compensation. Besides, deduction is alsonot warranted for the reason that no monetary value for the deprivation ofthe husband, father and son respectively of the claimants is being worked outwhile awarding compensation nor has anything been awarded for the loss ofaffection, shock and pain suffered at the death of the only male member in thefamily. ( 23 ) COINING now to the question of the awarding of interest, it maybe noticed that the claimants had claimed 9% (nine per cent) p. a. in the originalclaim as also in this appeal. Under Section 110c interest is to be awardedfrom the date of application making the claim. In some of the cases interesthas been awarded from the date of death i. e. even prior to the date of theclaimapplication. In my view, the claimants are entitled to 9% (nine per cent) p. a. as interest on the amount of compensation from the date of claim applicationtill the date of payment. Mr. Goyal cited various authorities, some of whichwere of the Supreme Court where interest of 12% p. a. had been awarded. However, since in the original claim only 9% p. a. had been claimed as interest,therefore, I am awarding the same. The claimants/appellants herein shouldget 9% (nine per cent) p. a. as interest on the compensation from the date of theclaim application. However, since Rs. 27. 950. However, since in the original claim only 9% p. a. had been claimed as interest,therefore, I am awarding the same. The claimants/appellants herein shouldget 9% (nine per cent) p. a. as interest on the compensation from the date of theclaim application. However, since Rs. 27. 950. 00 as awarded by the Tribunalhad been paid to the appellants, interest of 9/o would bepaid on Rs. 2,00,000. 00from the date of claim application till the date of payment of Rs. 37,950. 00 andthereafter on the balance of the amount viz. Rs. 1,62,050. 00. ( 24 ) MR. Makhija pointed out that a sum of Rs. 62,050. 00 had beendeposited in Court pursuant to an order dated 21. 5. 1990, therefore, the respondent No. 2 should not be burdened with interest on this. amount after the dateof deposit in this Court. I am unable to agree with this contention for thereason that the appellants herein could not withdraw this amount nor have useof the same. Under similar circumstances this Court had awarded interest onsuch a deposited amount also in the case of Satyawati Pathak (supra) whereinsultan Singh, J. , relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in AIR1968 SC 1047 for awarding interest on the deposited amount also since theclaimants had not been able to withdraw the same. ( 25 ) IN conclusion I hold that the appellants are entitled to compensationof Rs. 2,00,000. 00. They are also entitled to interest at the rate of 9% (nine percent) p. a. from the date of application till the date of payment. This 9% is to bepaid on Rs. 2,00,000. 00 from the date of application till the payment of Rs. 37,. 950. 00 and thereafter on the sum of Rs. 1,62,050. 00 till the date of payment ofthis amount along with full interest. The amount of Rs. 62. . 050. 00 deposited inthis Court can be withdrawn by the appellants herein immediately. I furtherdirect that the full amount payable to the appellants by respondent No. 2 viz. thecompensation and the interest thereon should be paid to the appellants withinone month from today. The amount of Rs. 62. . 050. 00 deposited inthis Court can be withdrawn by the appellants herein immediately. I furtherdirect that the full amount payable to the appellants by respondent No. 2 viz. thecompensation and the interest thereon should be paid to the appellants withinone month from today. If there is any further delay in making the paymentsas directed herein then the appellants would be entitled to 12% p. a. as intereston the balance of the amount due to the appellants, that is to say; the appellants would then be entitled to an interest of 12% p. a. on the balance amount ofcompensation till the date they are paid their full dues by respondent No. 2, iffull payment is not made to the appellants within one month from the date ofthis judgment. This direction is being issued for the reason that the claimantshave been deprived of this amount for nearly 15 (fifteen) years during whichperiod they must have had very hard times. Therefore, there should be nodelay in payments being made to them now. ( 26 ) THE appeal is allowed and disposed of accordingly. There will be no order as to costs.