JUDGMENT 1. - This case has a chequered history and relates to the embazzelment / misappropriation of a sum of Rs. 3900/-, the amount, which, ostensibly, is said to have been paid for the repairs/conversion of 60 BC 375 (E) transmitters from 24 volts to 12 volts, but in fact the said number of transmitter-sets according to the case of the prosecution, were not available, all the sets having been converted/repaired earlier from 24 volts to 12 volts and the amount was miss-appropriated by accused-appellant Laxman Singh, and others, who hatched a conspiracy to defalcate the aforesaid amount. The incident relates to the year 1953 when the above number of transmitter sets are said to have been given for conversion from 24 volts to 12 volts to parties including Ram Prakash, one of the accused appellants in this case. An inquiry was held by Jagannath Prasad, the then Member of Judiciary and on the basis of that report, the then Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur had ordered filing of the FIR and FIR No. 119 dated April 2, 1957 was lodged by one Kashi Prasad, the then Dy. Superintendent of Police, Jaipur. Thus, it will be clear that the case in fact is of the year 1953 and as such it is 37 years old. Even, the present appeal has remained pending for about 13 years and though, there have been hearing more than once in different Benches of this Court, but the case could not be disposed of for one reason or the other. The very fact that this case took as many as 24 years in the trial court and this appeal having remained pending in this Court for about 14 years, goes to show that there is much to be desired in the administration of criminal justice as this procedure can hardly be said to reasonable and due procedure established by law as required by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , held that speedy trial is a part of fundamental right of life and liberty. The Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. v. Home Secretary State of Bihar, Patna, AIR 1979 SC 1360 , held that speedy trial is a part of fundamental right of life and liberty. One of the reasons for delay in disposal of criminal cases is that even on requests being made by the High Court for creation of such number of courts as are necessary to cope with ever-increasing criminal work, the Government does not create the courts in time. The number of Courts which are sought to be created is never created and after recommendation is made by the High Court to establish/create criminal courts at different parts of the country, it is only after years that only a few courts are created and by the time such decision is taken, the pending increase in courts, the problem is not solved. It is saying that - `A stitch in time saves nine'. Therefore, if the courts are created in time to cope with ever-increasing load of work, it is most likely that the administration of criminal justice will benefit and the criminal cases will not remain pending for long. This is a situation towards which attention of the High Court and the Government is necessary to be drawn, as recent trend of the courts is that if trial of even most menious cases is not concluded within a reasonable time and some courts in cases of murder under Section 303 IPC had fixed time of about 7 years and speedy trial being a part of fundamental right o life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, the trial is likely to be quashed Instance are not lacking where this Court and other High Courts as well as Apex Court even in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, have quashed trials on the ground of abnormal delay in the disposal of case. One of the grounds agitated by the learned counsel for the appellants in this case is that the trial took almost 24 years and it cannot be said that there has been speedy trial in this case and therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the accused-appellants have been found guilty on various courts, this Court should set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence and acquite the accused-appellants. I will have the occasion to examine this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants at the latter stage in this judgment, but in my opinion, there can be two opinions that speedy trial is a part of fundamental right as has been held by the Apex Court and unless such a procedure is established that the trial in criminal cases is expedited, it can be said that a person is deprived of his fundamental right to life and liberty. 2. Accused-appellant Laxman Singh in the year 1952-53 was Dy. Superintendent of Police, Wireless, in the Police Department of the Government of Rajasthan. 83 BC 375 (E) transmitters were lying in Army Store situated in Cossipore and were the remains of IInd World War. The above number of sets were operated on 24 Volts Batteries and out of above 83 transmitter-set was defective and therefore 82 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets remained with the Wireless branch of the Police Department of the Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur, of which Laxman Singh, accused-appellant was Dy, Superintendent and accused - appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma was Sub-Inspector incharge of the stores. Accused-appellant Ram Prakash was the proprietor of M/s Radionics, MI Road, Jaipur. There is no dispute between the parties that the above sets were required for use by Wireless department at the outlying areas because during those days there was dacoity menace in various parts of this province, and operating the above transmitters on 24 Volts was very troublesome and therefore they were to be converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. There is also no dispute that all the 82 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets were modified from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. But the case of the prosecution is that in the year 1953 when 60 disputed BC (E) transmitter-sets are said to have been modified by Ram Prakash accused-appellant at his shop. Radionics, MI Road, Jaipur such number of transmitter-sets were not available for modification having been already modified earlier and the accused-appellants are said to have hatched conspiracy to commit various offences. It may be stated that learned trial court came to the conclusion that 60 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets were not available for modification from 24 Volts to 12 Volts and therefore the bills for 60 sets in conspiracy of the accused-appellants were prepared and the amount of Rs. 3900/- was misappropriated or converted to their own use by the accused-appellants. It may be stated that learned trial court came to the conclusion that 60 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets were not available for modification from 24 Volts to 12 Volts and therefore the bills for 60 sets in conspiracy of the accused-appellants were prepared and the amount of Rs. 3900/- was misappropriated or converted to their own use by the accused-appellants. Therefore, record is to be examined to come to the conclusion, whether as is the case of the prosecution, and as has been held by the learned trial court, whether on the dates when the order was placed with Ram Prakash for modification or conversion of 60 transmitter-sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts, the above number of transmitter-sets was available or not ? 3. From a perusal of the statement of S. I.S. Kanwar. PW 5, who was Assistant Sub Inspector of the Wireless Branch of the Police Department at the relevant time as well as from a perusal of register M/1 and entry Ex. P/2 at page 7 of the aforesaid register (Store ledger), it can be said without any dispute that there is an entry that relating to 83 number of BC 375(E) radio transmitters and it can therefore be said that as said by the prosecution one set was defective and 82 sets of 24 Volts were in the stock with the Wireless Department of the Police in the year 1952. It has also come in the statement of PW 5 S.I.S. Kanwar that the aforesaid number of transmitters were handed over to the accused-appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma and those were in his custody. Therefore, there does not appear any dispute that the number of BC 375(E) transmitter-sets with the police department (Wireless) Rajasthan, Jaipur was 83 and one set was defective & therefore only 82 sets remained, which looking to the then existing dacoity menace, were to be converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. It can also be said on the basis of statement of PW 5 S.I.S. Kanwar that none of the above sets, out of 82 as aforesaid, was received for modification/conversion from 24 Volts to 12 Volts in the departmental workshop as there was one workshop the Wireless Section of the Police Department. 4. It can also be said on the basis of statement of PW 5 S.I.S. Kanwar that none of the above sets, out of 82 as aforesaid, was received for modification/conversion from 24 Volts to 12 Volts in the departmental workshop as there was one workshop the Wireless Section of the Police Department. 4. The eighty-two BC 375(E) transmitter-sets are said to have been converted/modified from 24 volts to 12 volts as under:- (i) By Universal Radio - 53 sets (ii) By Rajasthan Radios - 9 sets (iii) By Punjab Radios - 5 sets (iv) By Radio Centre - 7 sets (v) By India Radiogram - 7 sets (vi) By Radiowala - 1 set Total - 82 sets. Jeevat PW 5 was the Proprietor of Universal Radios and he stated that on being shown BC 375(E) transmitter-sets which were in the Wireless Workshop he told Laxman Singh that same could be converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. He stated that he sent quotations under Ex.P 66. Thereafter, he got order Ex.P 67 and he had given his bills Ex.P 68 for the work done by him. He also states that other bills Ex P 69 and P 70 were also given by him and received the amount of the aforesaid bills under receipt Ex.P 71 and P 72. He states that though he had modified/converted 53 number of BC 375(E) transmitter-sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts, but payment was made only for 48 sets. According to him these sets were given to him by accused-appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma who was Store keeper of the Wireless department at that time. According to him quotation was given on verbal orders of Laxman Singh. It can said from his statement that he had modified /converted 53 sets of BC 375(E) transmitter-sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts & payment had been made to him only for 48 sets. This was during the period from June 13, 1953 to August 5, 1953. Rajendra Singh PW 12 was proprietor of Rajasthan Radios, MI Road Jaipur in the year 1953-54. He states that he was also receiving transmitters in his shop for repairs/modification/conversion. He states that the accused-appellant Laxman Singh at the relevant time was incharge of the wireless branch and accused-appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma was the store-keeper. Rajendra Singh PW 12 was proprietor of Rajasthan Radios, MI Road Jaipur in the year 1953-54. He states that he was also receiving transmitters in his shop for repairs/modification/conversion. He states that the accused-appellant Laxman Singh at the relevant time was incharge of the wireless branch and accused-appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma was the store-keeper. He further states that quotations were by Wireless department for modification/conversion of BC 375(E) transmitter-sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts and he received a letter Ex P 74 from the Wireless department and he replied the same vide letter Ex.P 77 which is in his hand and signed by him. A look at Ex.P 77 will show that it is dated 17-5-1953. He quoted the rate of Rs. 65/- per transmitter-set for conversion. Rajendra Singh PW 12 states that he had received an order of conversion of BC 375(P) transmitter-sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. He had been given 9 sets for modification and he submitted his bills Nos. 103 (Ex. P 25) dated July 1, 1953 and No. 105, Ex.P 28 dated August 7, 1953 for six and three sets respectively. Payment was made only for six sets and no payment was made for 3 sets. Thus, from the statement of PW 9 Jeevat and PW 12 Rajendra Singh, it can be said that in all 62 sets were given for modification / conversion from 24 Volts to 12 Volts and they were modified but payment was made for 48 sets Universal Radios and for 6 sets to Rajan Radios. Charn Das PW 7 had his shop 'Punjab Radios' Dariba Pan Jaipur, of which he was proprietor. He stated that he had also been given five BC 375(E) transmitter-sets for conversion from 24 Volts. He modified/converted them and submitted his bills but no payment was made to him. This makes total number of BC 375(E) transmitter sets as 67. Man Mohan Dandiya PW 23 was proprietor of Radiowala, MI Road, Jaipur at the relevant time. He states that at the instance of Laxman Singh, M.C. Sharma accused-appellant had given him a wireless set for modification in the year 1953. This was to be modified/converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. He had modified it and submitted his bill Ex.P/91. He was not paid for the same on the ground that conversion has not been done correctly. This was to be modified/converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. He had modified it and submitted his bill Ex.P/91. He was not paid for the same on the ground that conversion has not been done correctly. Besides this, it can also be said that 17 BC 375 (E) transmitter sets were modified/converted by Radio Centre and bill dated July 1, 1953 was submitted. Similarly, 7 sets were modified by India Radiograms vide bill No. 107/31 dated July 24, 1953. The total number of BC 375(E) transmitter sets which were modified/converted from 24 Volts to 12 Volts thus comes to 82. The accused-appellant Laxman Singh in his statement under section 373 Cr.PC does not dispute that Jeevat Ram given 53 sets for modification, but he said that 48 such sets were not of BC 375(E) type and were of some other type. Jeevat Ram had taken the sets on trial basis but his work was not satisfactory and therefore under the oral orders of Inspector General, no payment was made. The accused-appellant has said that all the sets were not of BC 375(E) 24 volts and there were other sets also in the stock register which had been given for repairs/modification & 60 sets were still available. That apart, some of the sets which had been repaired/ modified were defective and they were given for modification. Similar pleas have been raised by Mahesh Chand Sharma. The case of the accused-appellant Ram Prakash, proprietor of Radionics is that he had received 60 BC 375(E) transmitters for modification from 24 volts to 12 volts and he had been paid the amounts. Earlier, he had submitted a bill Ex. P/105, but due to the treasury objection, the amount was split into four bills Ex.P/106 to Ex. P/109 and he received the amount of the aforesaid bills. Thus, his case is that he had received the sixty sets for modification and he submitted his bills and received the amount of Rs. 3900/-. 5. The defence examined DW Gurdev Singh who claimed to be the proprietor of Radio Centre to whom 7 sets had been given for modification are stated earlier. He states that he received an order for modification of 10 transmitter sets from 24 volts to 12 volts and the transmitters were BC 375(E) type. He submitted his bill for 7 transmitters and transmitters separately. He states that he received an order for modification of 10 transmitter sets from 24 volts to 12 volts and the transmitters were BC 375(E) type. He submitted his bill for 7 transmitters and transmitters separately. He returned the transmitters to the store-incharge after modification but the payment it was not made to him. He also stated that he had received an order for modification on June 20, 1953. 6. Learned Special Judge concluded that 60 BC 375(E) sets were not available on July 31, 1953 for modification/conversion and no order was placed with Radionics of which Ram Prakash was the proprietor and the amount of Rs. 3900/- which was paid was misappropriated by the accused-appellants. In a riving at the aforesaid conclusion besides holding that 82 sets had already been modified/converted from 24 volts to 12 volts the learned Special Judge also held that Ram Prakash accused-appellant has failed to prove that there was an entry of the payment of Rs 3900/- from the wireless department in respect of modification/conversion of 60 sets of BC 375(E) transmitters from 24 volts to 12 volts. Thus, basically, learned Special Judge has raised an inference that because 60 BC 375 (E) sets were not available tor conversion from 24 volts to 12 volts no order could be placed and bad been placed and firstly a single bill for Rs. 3900/- was taken but there was a treasury objection and therefore, the amount of the said bill was split in four bills. In the opinion of the learned Special Judge the fact that despite the above objection of the treasury the amount of Ex. P/105 was split in four bills because the Inspector General of Police was not empowered to sanction more than Rs. 1000/-, goes to show that the accused-appellants hatched conspiracy and without getting the sets modified/converted the amount was withdrawn. 7. Before I take up the case on merits, and arrive at the conclusion whether the various charges stand proved against the accused-appellant or not, I consider it proper to deal with the legal objections raised by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants. 7. Before I take up the case on merits, and arrive at the conclusion whether the various charges stand proved against the accused-appellant or not, I consider it proper to deal with the legal objections raised by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants. They are as under : I. Whether the accused having been discharged by the learned Sessions Judge on earlier occasion on the ground that offences other than offence under Section 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short PC, Act) could only be tried on commitment and the case was not committed and the learned Sessions Judge having refused to frame charge under Section 5 (2) of PC Act, a second trial on warranted by law ? II. Whether the trial by the learned Special Judge, Rajasthan CBI Cases, Jaipur, is without jurisdiction because there were more than one Special Judge for the Jaipur city area and it has not been specified which of the two Special Judges shall try the case and the effect of failure to specify the Special Judge, there being more than one Special Judges for the area, is that the trial of the accused-appellants was without jurisdiction? III. The incident is of the year 1953 and the FIR was lodged in the year 1957 and the trial of the case took about 24 years and the accused have been denied speedy trial, if so, what is its effect ? 8. I will take up the above points in the order in which they have been framed.Re : I. It has already been stated earlier that the incident is in relation to the year 1953 & to be more precise so far as the present case is concerned, the period is from Oct. 26, 1953 to May 31, 1954. The case of the prosecution is that the three accused-appellants conspired together to do an illegal act for obtaining illegal pecuniary benefit and forged the records of the wireless department. As per the case of the prosecution Laxman Singh accused-appellant with the help of other accused-during the aforesaid period got prepared and verified certain false bills and on their basis drew from the State Treasury re-moddeling charges of 60 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets amounting to Rs. 3900/- at the rate of Rs. As per the case of the prosecution Laxman Singh accused-appellant with the help of other accused-during the aforesaid period got prepared and verified certain false bills and on their basis drew from the State Treasury re-moddeling charges of 60 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets amounting to Rs. 3900/- at the rate of Rs. 65/- per set Kashi Prasad lodged a report on April 2, 1957 at Police Station Kotwali Jaipur and a case under See. 409 IPC was registered and investigation was set in motion, which took almost 7 years to complete the same. A charge-sheet was filed before the learned Special Judge, Jaipur city on February 4, 1964 under sections 420, 409, 468 and 120-B IPC as well as Section 5(2) of the PC Act against the two accused-appellants Laxman Singh and M.C. Sharma and V.D. Sharma. In that charge-sheet Ram Prakash accused-appellant alongwith one Gurdev Singh was cited as prosecution witness. Learned Special Judge (D.C. Sharma) took cognizance of the offence. Charges were framed on June 15, 1964 by him under Section 409, 420, 468 and 120-B IPC but no charge under Section 5(2) of PC Act was framed' The accused in that case including the accused-appellants namely Laxman Singh, V.D. Sharma and M.C. Sharma (as stated earlier Gurdev Singh was not the accused in that case and he was cited as prosecution witness) pleaded not guilty. Some of the prosecution witnesses were examined and on May 18, 1967 an application was made on behalf of the accused-persons challenging the validity of the trial on the ground that they could not be tried by the Sessions Court on the charges under sections 469, 420, 468 and 120-B IPC unless they were committed to the court of session. An application was filed on behalf of the prosecution that a charge under Section 5(2) of the PC Act also framed but the then Special Judge Shri G.M. Mehta who was later on elevated to the Bench of this Court, rejected the application on May 19, 1967 filed on behalf of the prosecution. The said order reads as under - "...... The said order reads as under - "...... There is no good ground to frame charge under Section 5(2) of the PC Act against the accused for three reasons; the first is that though the accused were discharged for the said offence by this Court on 15-6-64, the State preferred no revision against the said order and felt satisfied with the charges that were framed against the accused. The second is that no new material has come before the court to add to the charge already framed against the accused. The third is that the charge already framed against the accused cover the allegations against them. I do not therefore feel inclined to add to the charges already framed by this Court against the accused persons." 9. As a result of the aforesaid order only such charge remained which could be tried by the Sessions Judge on commitment to it. The application filed on behalf of the accused was allowed and it was held that the court was not competent to try the aforesaid offences. The charge-sheet returned to the prosecution to file the same if so advised before the competent Court. It was after a period of more than one year i e. on July 24, 1968, that the charge-sheet was split into three charge-sheet which were presented before the learned Special Judge Jaipur City, Jaipur. Admittedly there are no new facts and the charges are also the same but the only difference was that two more persons were arrayed as accused, namely Gurdev Singh and Ram Prakash who were earlier cited as prosecution witnesses. 10. It was contended by the learned counsel for the accused-appellant that in the earlier cases accused-appellants Laxman Singh and M.C. Sharma having been discharged, no fresh chargesheet could have been filed even by splitting one charge-sheets into two charge-sheets moreso, when both the charge-sheets were based on the same facts and there was no fresh material on which the other charge-sheets could have been filed. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the case of Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar, AIR 1962 SC 876 , and moreso, to its para 59, in the majority judgment as S.K. Das, J. had given dissinting judgment. The facts of the case are contained in para 40 and the relevant part is in para 59 of the judgment. The facts of the case are contained in para 40 and the relevant part is in para 59 of the judgment. The learned Judge approved the view taken in similar cases referred to in the aforesaid judgment, by the various High Courts that is nothing in law which prohibits to entertain second complaint where previous complaint has been dismissed under Section 203 Cr. PC. The learned Judge further said- "I also accept the view that as a rule of necessary caution and of proper exercise of the discretion given to a Magistrate under s. 204(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure exceptional circumstances must exist for the entertainment of a second complaint on the same allegations in other words, there must be good reason why the Magistrate thinks that there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the second complaint, when a previous complaint on the same allegations was dismissed under s. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The court referred to Queen Empress v. Dolegobind Dass, ILR 28 Cal 211 , wherein Maclean C.J. said:- "I only desire to add that no Presidency Magistrate ought in my opinion, to re-hear a case previously dealt with by a Magistrate of co-ordinate jurisdiction upon the same evidence only, unless he is plainly satisfied that there has been some manifest error or manifest miscarriage of justice". It can therefore be said that if there has been manifest error or miscarriage of justice, even on same facts a second complaint is not barred. It can therefore be said that if there has been manifest error or miscarriage of justice, even on same facts a second complaint is not barred. A similar objection was raised during the trial of the case on behalf of the accused-appellants before the learned Special Judge and the learned Special Judge under his order dated September 24, 1968, repelled the contention not only in this case but also in the other special criminal case No. 6/68 and held that even on facts which are available on record the learned Special Judge instead of refusing to frame a charge under Section 5(2) of PC Act should have framed a charge under Section 5(2) of PC Act, as in the opinion of the learned Special Judge there has been manifest error apparent on the face of record giving rise to manifest miscarriage of justice in not framing charge against the accused under Section 5(2) of the PC Act in the previous trial and more than one reason has been given in dismissing the application filed on behalf of the accused-appellants that second trial is without jurisdiction. No revision against the aforesaid order of the learned Special Judge was taken before this Court. Though, I will under point regarding delay in trial will deal with the question as to what is the effect of such an inordinate delay of 24 years, but suffice it to say for the present that in the order dated September 24, 1968, the learned Special Judge had dealt with this aspect of the matter also but to me it appears that by that time the Apex Court had not held that under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, speedy trial is a part of fundamental right of life and liberty, and what is the effect of denial of speedy trial. But so far as legal position is concerned, it cannot be said that it has any force. 11. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that there were more than one Special Judges for the same area i.e. Jaipur city on July 24, 1968 when the charge-sheet was filed, the one was Sessions Judge Jaipur City and the other was officiating Civil Judge and Addl. Sessions Judge with Head Quarters at Jaipur, for the whole of Rajasthan which also included Jaipur city municipal limits. Sessions Judge with Head Quarters at Jaipur, for the whole of Rajasthan which also included Jaipur city municipal limits. According to sub-section (2) of section 7 of Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952, specification had to be made in the aforesaid provision by the State Government as to which of the two special Judge should try which case. As there was no such specification the trial was without jurisdiction. In support of his contention, learned counsel as placed reliance on the case of Dr. Kailash Nath Haldiya v. State of Rajasthan, RLW 1974-428 , wherein a learned Single Judge of this Court had no doubt taken a view which has been canvassed by the learned counsel for the accused-appellants. But so far as the present case is concerned, in my opinion, the controversy stands at res by a decision of this Court in the same case, S.B. Cr. R No. 599/1971 against the order of Shri T.C. Bhagat, Special Judge No. 2 Jaipur City, dated May 7, 1972. The learned Single Judge under his aforesaid judgment dated August 8, 1972, held that the case has been transferred under the orders of this Court and the general scheme of Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 1952 makes it clear that a court of Special Judge is a court subordinate to the High Court and consequently it is within the power of the High Court to transfer a case from the court of one Special Judge to any other Special Judge. This court therefore, repelled the contention and said that the law is clear that the order of this court transferring a case from one special Judge to another Special Judge creates jurisdiction in the latter court in the same way as the transfer of a case by this court from one sessions division to another sessions division. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of this court the controversy does not survive and it cannot be said that any legal question remains to be adjudicated by this court in so far as the present case is concerned.Re III 12. Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of this court the controversy does not survive and it cannot be said that any legal question remains to be adjudicated by this court in so far as the present case is concerned.Re III 12. The contention of the learned counsel for the accused-appellants is that because the trial of the case took almost 24 years after the alleged misappropriation/cheating and took about 20 years in the trial court in disposal of the case, right of the accused for speedy trial which right has been recognised by the Supreme Court under Article 21 of the Constitution of India as a fundamental right, has been denied to the accused-appellants and therefore, on this ground the conviction of the accused-appellants should be set aside and they should be acquitted, moreso when this appeal has been pending for about 9 years. It has already been said earlier that Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon (Supra) has said that speedy trial is a part of fundamental right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. So far as the aforesaid case of Hussainara Khatoon is concerned the court was primarily concerned with pre-trial release of the offender. The court said that if the court was satisfied after taking into account on the basis of information placed before it, that the accused has his roots in the community and is not likely to abscond it can safely release the accused on his personal bond. The court also laid down various factors to determine whether the accused has his roots in the community which would deter him from fleeing. Dealing with the word `shall be deprived of life and personal liberty according to the procedure prescribed by law, the court said that a procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be reasonable, fair or just `unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as`reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as`reasonable, fair or just and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21 It was a case where the accused was behind the bars and had not been released on bail during the trial. In the case of T.V. Vateshwaran v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1983 SC 361 , the court was dealing with a case of long delay in execution of sentence of death. The court said that the dehumanising factor of prolonged delay in the execution of a sentence of death has the consequential implication of depriving a person of his life in an unjust, unfair and unreasonable way as to offend the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. The court further said that the appropriate relief in such a case is to vacate the sentence of death, Delay exceeding two years in the execution of a sentence of death should be considered sufficient to entitle the person under sentence of death to invoke Article 21 and demand the quashing of the sentence of death. In the case of State of Bihar v. Uma Shankar Kotriwal and Ors., AIR 1981 SC 641 , which was a case under s. 3/7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, there was a protracted trial running for 20 years. The High Court had' quashed the proceedings and the Supreme Court refused to interfere. The court said that it cannot be lost sight of the fact that the trial has not made much head-way even though no less than 20 years have gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only to monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearance in court, apart from anxiety. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only to monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearance in court, apart from anxiety. The court also said - "It may well be that the respondents themselves were responsible in a large measure for the slow pace of the case inasmuch as quite a few orders made by the trial Magistrate were challenged in higher courts, but then there has to be a limit to the period for which criminal litigation is allowed to go on at the trial stage. In this view of the matter we do not consider the present case a proper one for our interference in spite of the fact that we feel that the allegations disclosed the commission of an offence which we regard as quite serious." 13. In S. Guin and Ors. v. Grindlays Bank Ltd., AIR 1986 SC 289 , the court was dealing with a case where an appeal against the acquittal was pending in the High Court. The accused were acquitted of the charge of obstructing the Bank officers from entering into the Bank premises. They were acquitted by the trial court and appeal against acquittal remained pending in the High Court for 6 years. The High Court allowed the appeal. The court placing reliance on its earlier case of S. Veerabadran Chettiar v. E.V. Ramaswami Naicker and others, AIR 1958 SC 1032 wherein the court said that as the case has become stale it is not proper to direct further inquiry into he complaint which stood dismissed for last about 5 years, even if the High Court has wrongly disagreed with the view taken by the trial court with regard to the gist of the offence punishable under Section 341 IPC. In Madhesewardhari Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1986 Patna 324 , the court said that the right under Article 21 of the Constitution to speedy public trial is identical in content with the express constitutional guarantee inserted by the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution. The Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution in terms says "in all criminal-prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. The Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution in terms says "in all criminal-prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Even on principle it is obvious that on the plain language of the Sixth Amendment to the American Constitution, the fundamental right of a speedy trial is not confined to any particular category of offences. The language employed is unfettered and without any such restriction. The court further said that the American precedent, which is the fountainhead of the concept of speedy public trial, has now consistently extended it without limitation to all offences and all criminal prosecutions. 14. In view of the aforesaid position of law, it cannot be disputed that the Apex Court has taken a view that speedy trial is a fundamental right and if there is unusual or abnormal delay in the trial of the case, than the court has to take and should have taken into consideration the delay in the trial and if necessary quash the proceedings. But the question is as to whether if the trial is concluded and it has not been speedy trial, the conviction and sentence can be set aside? 15. In the instant case as said earlier the incident is of the year 1953, but came to the notice in the year 1957 and FIR was lodged in the year 1957. It can be said that only one charge sheet was filed and in that Gurdev Singh who is accused-appellant in this case, was cited as prosecution witness. It can be said that he alongwith others was examined as prosecution witness. So far as Gurdev Singh is concerned he did not support the prosecution case and said that he modified/repaired BC 375(E) transmitters and received the amount of Rs 3900/- at the rate of as. 65/- per set. It can be said that he alongwith others was examined as prosecution witness. So far as Gurdev Singh is concerned he did not support the prosecution case and said that he modified/repaired BC 375(E) transmitters and received the amount of Rs 3900/- at the rate of as. 65/- per set. It can also be said that in the aforesaid trial of the Special Case under order dated May 19, 1968, the accused-appellants were discharged for the reasons which have already been stated in this order and it was observed that the charge-sheet be returned to the prosecution with the direction to produce the same in the competent court, if so advised and it was thereafter that the charge sheet was split into two others and one of them out of which the present appeal arises, Ram Prakash was also shown as one of the accused persons and that charge-sheet was filed on July 24, 1968. Besides other objection before the learned Special Judge, an objection was raised that it is not expedient that the accused be tried for offence which was committed as back as March 1954 and in the aforesaid case reliance was placed on the case of Ramekhal Tiwary v. Madan Mohan Tiwary and another, AIR 1967-1156 , wherein the accused in that case was discharged by the Magistrate of the offence under Section 307 IPC, the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court held that it was not expedient that the appellant in that case should be tried after so much lapse of the time before the sessions court for offence committed as long back as on September 30, 1958. The Special Judge had said that the facts of that case were different inasmuch as in that case there was complete trial whereas in the present case the appellants had not faced the trial for various offences. It was observed by the learned Special Judge that it is no doubt true that the alleged offences ware committed by the accused in the years 1953 and 1954 and a long period of fourteen to fifteen years has elapsed, but looking to the seriousness of the allegations against the accused, the court did not feel inclined to throw away the charge-sheets and allow the accused to go without trial simply on account of long delay, specially when the cause of delay are not known. In my opinion the concept of speedy trial being a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India came at a letter stage when the Supreme Court in the case of Hussainara Khatoon s case (supra) took that view and therefore by the time the learned Special Judge decided the case, such a view was not taken by the courts including the Apex Court. Be that as it may the question as framed in the earlier part of this judgment is even if there has been delay in the trial and the trial his resulted in conviction can be said that the trial stands vitiated and accused-persons who have been convicted and sentenced are entitled for acquittal ? 16. The aforesaid question was examined by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjai Shah, AIR 1981 SC 1675 , the court was examining the case of acquittal by the High Court. The court in para 2 of its order mooted a question as to what is remedy if the trial is unduly delayed ? The court said that in United States where the right to a speedy trial is a constitutionally guaranteed right, the denial of a speedy trial has been held to entitle an accused person to the dismissal of the indictment or the vacation of the sentence. The court also said - "But in deciding the question whether there has been a denial of the right to a speedy trial, the court is entitled to take into consideration whether the defendant himself was responsible for a part of the delay and whether he was prejudiced in the preparation of his defence by reason of the delay. The court is also entitled to take into consideration whether the delay was unintentional caused by over-crowding of the court's docket or under-staffing of the Prosecutors. Strunk v. United States, (1973) 37 Law Ed. 2nd 56 is an instructive case on this point. As pointed out in the first Hussainara case ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) the right to a speedy trial is not an expressly guaranteed constitutional right in India but is implicit in the right to fair trial which has been held to be part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. As pointed out in the first Hussainara case ( AIR 1979 SC 1360 ) the right to a speedy trial is not an expressly guaranteed constitutional right in India but is implicit in the right to fair trial which has been held to be part of the right to life and liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. While a speedy trial is an implicit ingredient of a fair trial, the converse is not necessarily true. A delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial. The delay may be occasioned by the tactic or conduct of the accused himself. The delay may have caused no prejudice whatsoever to the accused." The court also said that- "The question whether a conviction should be quashed on the ground of delayed trial depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case. If the accused is found to have been prejudiced in the conduct of his defence and it could be said that the accused had thus been denied on adequate opportunity to defend himself, the conviction would certainly have to go. But if nothing is shown and there are no circumstances entitling the court to raise a presumption that the accused had been prejudiced there will be no justification to quash the conviction on the ground of delayed trial only". It will therefore be clear that the court draw distinction in cases where the trial was not concluded and has been delayed and for the delay the accused has not been responsible and the accused has not employed delaying tactices and in cases where the trial has concluded and conviction has been recorded and sentence imposed. In the earlier type of cases despite the gravity of the offence, the court has taken a view that speedy trial being fundamental right, denial of it is sufficient to quash the prosecution whereas in the latter category of cases the court has said that before the conviction and sentence of an accused can be set aside it is further necessary to show that the accused had been prejudiced in his defence and unless prejudice is shown to have been caused, merely on the ground of delayed trial the conviction and sentence of the accused cannot be set aside. I will at a later stage of this judgment deal with this aspect of the case in order to see it as a result of delayed trial the case of the accused has been prejudiced. In my opinion, on the ground of mere delay in trial the conviction and sentence of the accused cannot be set aside, unless the accused can show that as a result thereof his case has been prejudiced. No doubt if on merits, which shall be hereinafter discussed no case will be made out, the matter will be different. No doubt the delayed trial may also be considered and is extenuating circumstance so far as the sentence to be awarded is concerned. Merits 17. I will now take the case on merits. It has already been said earlier that there is no dispute that only 83 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets were received from Kosipur and they could only be operated on 24 volts and for proper use in dacoity infested areas in Rajasthan they had to be converted for use on 12 volts batteries. It is neither the case of the prosecution nor of defence that there were more 82 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets. One set out of 83 sets was defective and could not be modified. Learned Special Judge has concluded that all the 82 sets had been modified/converted from 24 volts to 12 volts much before July, 1953 and therefore no set, what to say 60 sets of BC 375 (E) type was available for modification / rectification / conversion when they are said to have been modified/converted through Radionics of which appellant Ram Prakash was the proprietor. The break-up of 82 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets which were modified/converted as aforesaid prior to July 1953 has already been given in the earlier parts of this judgment and at the cost of repetition it may be said that some sets were not converted/modified from Universal Radios of which Jeevat Ram was the proprietor and he has been examined as PW 6, 7 sets w re modified from Radio Centre, 9 from Rajan Radios, 5 from Punjab Radios, one from Radio Wala and 7 from India Radiogram Corporation. Out of 82 sets payment was not made for 14 sets which were not said to have been repaired/modified/converted properly. Ex. Out of 82 sets payment was not made for 14 sets which were not said to have been repaired/modified/converted properly. Ex. P/74 was in fact typed on May 14, 1953, but it does not appear to have been dispatched on the same day and it was entered in the despatch register on July 31, 1953. A perusal of the aforesaid document will show that quotations were not invited from Radionics, of which Ram Prakash was the proprietor, and were invited from other parties, PW 17 Bhenru Singh was receipt and despatch L.D C. in the police wireless department, Jaipur and he admits that Ex.P/74 bears his initial BSM ane he had typed it. He also states that the name of the firm to which it was sent was handwritten which is in the handwriting of accused-appellant M.C. Sharma. He also admits that the entries in the despatch register are in his hand. He also admits that the entry in the despatch register Ex. P/80, at page 41, marked as Ex.P/80/1 is in his hand. It is also stated by this witness that the letter Ex.P/74 was typed on May 14, 1953 but he had received it for despatch on July 31, 1953 and on that very day he had despatched it after making an entry in the despatch register. He is unable to say with whom the aforesaid letter remained till July 3, 1953. It is stated that it is M.C. Sharma accused-appellant who had taken it by hand after the same was entered in the despatch register. He has proved the signature of M.C. Sharma as Ex. P/80/1. He could not explain as to who had sprinkled ink over 'May' written on Ex P/74. His attention was drawn to the despatch register Ex. P/82 dated May 14, 1953 and states that those letters which were despatch on that day find entry as Ex. P/82/1. He states that Ex. P/74 which was typed on May 14, 1953 was not despatched by him on May 14, 1953 and there is no entry of despatch in Ex. P/80 1. He also states that the despatch number in Ex. P/67 is also dated May 31, 1953 and he has received all the papers for despatch on July 31, 1953. It can be said from his statement that the letter Ex. P/80 1. He also states that the despatch number in Ex. P/67 is also dated May 31, 1953 and he has received all the papers for despatch on July 31, 1953. It can be said from his statement that the letter Ex. P/74 was typed on May 14, 1953, but it was entered in the despatch register on July 31 1953 and under it quotations were called from various parties including quotations for modification / conversion of BC 375 (E) transmitter sets from 24 volts to 12 volts, but he has not been able to explain about the ink being sprinkled over the word 'May' and the despatch was shown on July 31, 1953. He admits that he did not mention the date of despatch below the date which was typed. He states that he must have done so under the orders of the accused-appellant Laxman Singh but does not state categorically that he has done so under the orders of Laxman Singh. He admitted that the practise was that if the despatch date was other than the one typed, the despatch date was to be given below the typed date, but according to him all the four papers including Ex. P/74 were despatched because Laxman Singh had ordered it. He denied the suggestion that despatch register Ex. P/80 was forged by him later on. From his statement it appears that the letter Ex. P/74 was in fact typed on May 14, 1953 and though he had stated that it was despatched on July, 31, 1953 but looking to his entire statement when there has been departure from usual practice as aforesaid that the date of despatch was not mentioned below the typed date, but it was over-written, it is not possible to hold that Ex. P/74 was in fact despatched on July 31, 1953 as is the case of the prosecution. But in my opinion that will not make much differences because the crux of the case is whether an order was placed with Radionics for repairs/conversion of 60 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets and whether this number of transmitter-sets of that type was available ? P/74 was in fact despatched on July 31, 1953 as is the case of the prosecution. But in my opinion that will not make much differences because the crux of the case is whether an order was placed with Radionics for repairs/conversion of 60 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets and whether this number of transmitter-sets of that type was available ? If the answer will be that this number of transmitter-sets was not available or could not be available, then it will have to be inferred that 60 sets as aforesaid were not and could not have been given for repairs/conversion to Radionics of which Ram Prakash was the proprietor. 18. It may be stated at the very outset that the learned Special Judge in his judgment dated May 11, 1977, at typed page 16 (bottom) has concluded that prior to the date when 60 sets are said to have been given for repairs for modification/conversion to Radionics, 61 sets out of the disputed 82 BC 375(E) transmitter sets had already been converted from 24 volts to 12 volts and therefore 60 more sets could not have been available for conversion / modification and could not have been given to Radionics. In the opinion of the learned Special Judge 48 sets had been converted/modified by Universal Radios, 7 by Radio Centre and 6 by Rajasthan Radios and 7 sets by Radiogram. The defence of the accused-appellants is that out of 82 sets only 61 sets as aforesaid were modified and 48 transmitter-sets were not modified by Universal Radios, Chaura Rasta, Jaipur but they were of other type of sets which were modified. From the evidence on record which has been discussed at length by the learned Special Judge, there can be no doubt that in fact Ex.P 74 was typed on May 14, 1953 and under it quotations were called for from various parties but Radionics was not one of them. There can be no dispute by reading Ex.P 74 alongwith P/66, P/77, P/80 as well as oral testimony including that of Jeevat Ram and Gurdev Singh that they had given their quotations at the rate of Rs. 65/- per set for modification of BC 375 (E) transmitters sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. Jeevat Ram PW 6 states that he had modified 48 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets and not of any other type sets. A look at Ex. 65/- per set for modification of BC 375 (E) transmitters sets from 24 Volts to 12 Volts. Jeevat Ram PW 6 states that he had modified 48 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets and not of any other type sets. A look at Ex. P/67 will show that this letter admittedly bears the signature of accused-appellant Laxman Singh and it is in respect that M/s Universal Radios of which Jeevat Ram was the proprietor was asked to collect 48 BC 375(E) transmitter-sets also or modification and to submit its bill in duplicate as per rates quoted by it. Thus, from the prosecution case it is satisfactorily established that out of 61 transmitter-sets which were modified/converted, as has been held by the learned Special Judge, 48 transmitter-sets were of BC 375(E) out of the lot of 82 sets and not of any other type, but at the same it can be said that the practise was that after the sets bad been repaired they were used to be received in maintenance work-shop of the wireless department and were to be tested. It has come in the evidence PW 5 S.I.S. Kanwar the than Asstt. Sub Inspector of Police Wireless Organisations that there was workshop of wireless section. He further states that before any set was sent out of the work-shop they were tested in the workshop. It is also stated by him that after the sets including the type of BC 375(E) transmitter-sets were modified/converted by private dealer and were received in the work-shop, they were to be tested. He also states that the record was maintained in work-shop of the sets going for repairs outside and record was also maintained of the sets repaired in the work-shop known as work-shop maintenance register. Earlier it was known as job register and the defect was also to be mentioned therein. He also states that under his supervision the technicians used to test and repair the sets. PW 5 Kanwar also states that during those days there was rush of work and therefore full record could not be maintained by him. He also makes a categorical statement that some of the records of wire-less set which were modified locally was not maintained fully. PW 5 Kanwar also states that during those days there was rush of work and therefore full record could not be maintained by him. He also makes a categorical statement that some of the records of wire-less set which were modified locally was not maintained fully. From his statement therefore, it will be clear that procedure was that generally even such of the sets which will include BC375(E) transmitter-sets also, which were modified locally were received in the work-shop and were tested and thereafter were sent to different destinations. The Possibility cannot be excluded that set which might have been received after modification may or may not have been modified correctly and even as per the case of the prosecution payment was not made for some of the sets as they had not been modified correctly. It may be stated that during the trial of the case various applications were filed on behalf of the accused-appellants and more so by accused-appellant Laxman Singh to requisition the job register and in this connection reference may be made to the application filed on behalf of the accused-appellant on January 13. 1970 which is available at page 15/20B and 15/21B in which a request was made that the job register No. 4 of 1953-54 commencing from June 10, 1952 he requisitioned. It does not appear that the aforesaid job register was ever produced by the prosecution before the court. It can therefore be said that there are entries in the job register about modification / conversion / rectification, if any, in respect of all types of transmitter-sets and as per practise then prevalent after the sets were modified outside they were received in the work-shop and tested and thereafter they were despatched to various stations for operation in the then dacoity infested areas. It can also be said on the material on record that there was rush of work during those days and the procedure for inviting quotation for getting the sets repaired, passing of bills for payment thereof was not strictly followed. While dealing with various points in the earlier part of this judgment it has been held that unless the accused shows that as a result of delayed trial prejudice has been caused to him in his defence, conviction and sentence cannot be set aside. While dealing with various points in the earlier part of this judgment it has been held that unless the accused shows that as a result of delayed trial prejudice has been caused to him in his defence, conviction and sentence cannot be set aside. In my opinion, in this case despite the application made on behalf of the accused the job and maintenance register was not produced by the prosecution and alongwith the abnormal delay in the trial, it can be said that as a result of non-production of job registers, the case of the accused-appellants has been prejudiced. 19. Ex. M/2 is Store ledger register. It appears from various entries in it that it is for the period from June 26, 1953 till November, 1954 and even onwards as some entries are also there in respect of the year 1955. This register is for BC 375(E) transmitter-sets and it cannot be said on the basis of the register whether 81 sets which were entered in the store ledger were the modified sets from 24 volts to 12 volts or were not modified. This register contains entries for issue of the aforesaid transmitter sets and it can be said on the basis of the entries made therein that upto June 23, 1953 as many as 7 sets had been issued to various out-stations and therefore as on May 23, 1953, there were as many as 75 sets available. It can also be said that on July 21, 1953, to Co. RAC II Raisingh Nagar as many as 4 sets were issued and 71 sets remained in balance. It can also be said from various entries contained therein which have been marked exhibits that BC 375(E) transmitter-sets which have been mentioned therein had been issued. On October 4, 1953, as per the entry in the Store Ledger register Ex. M/2, there were as many as 67 transmitter sets in balance and on October 1, 1953, vide Ex. P/5, as many as 7 sets were issued to RAC comp. 4 Bn RAC Jaisalmer and therefore, after October, 1953, there were as many as 60 sets in balance. It was on November 26, 1953 that there was handing-over and taking over of the charge by the incharge of the work-shop. As a result of the aforesaid entries in the store ledger register Ex. 4 Bn RAC Jaisalmer and therefore, after October, 1953, there were as many as 60 sets in balance. It was on November 26, 1953 that there was handing-over and taking over of the charge by the incharge of the work-shop. As a result of the aforesaid entries in the store ledger register Ex. M/2, it can be said that on October 1, 1953, even after the issue of the transmitter-sets 60 transmitter-sets remained in balance. There is no mention whether 81 BC 375(E) transmitter sets were entered in the store ledger register or for that matter 60 sets which remained as aforesaid which were modified or unmodified sets or what was there condition. It has come in the statement of PW. 5 SIS Kanwar that he handed over charge on May 3, 1954 and then 57 B 375(E) sets were in stock and which were of 12 volts. But there is no dispute and which were of 12 volts. But there is no dispute between the parties that on all these dates all sets had been modified/converted from 24 volts to 12 volts. He also stated that other type of sets had come from Cosipur. Thus, in my opinion looking to the the prevailing circumstances as stated earlier, prescribed procedure was not followed a positive finding cannot be recorded that 60 BC375 E) transmitter-sets were not available for modification / conversion or could not be valuable for modification and the possibility that even earlier if they might have been modified through other agencies they might have come defective and, therefore, they had to be again sent for modification/conversion cannot be excluded, moreso, in the absent of production of job and maintenance register in which such entries were made as per the case of the defence. That register was not produced despite the request and applications having been made by the accused appellants. 20. Learned Special Judge on the basis of circumstantial evidence has concluded that the accused-persons hatched conspiracy to cheat the Government for a sum of Rs. 3900/- accused-appellant Ram Prakash forged bills and received the payment. There is no direct evidence that after the payment was made to Ram Prakash accused-appellant, out of a sum of Ks. 3900/- any amount was paid to either Laxman Singh or M C. Sharma. 3900/- accused-appellant Ram Prakash forged bills and received the payment. There is no direct evidence that after the payment was made to Ram Prakash accused-appellant, out of a sum of Ks. 3900/- any amount was paid to either Laxman Singh or M C. Sharma. The circumstances on which the learned Special Judge has concluded that the accused persons hatched a conspiracy are (1) 60 sets of BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets could not have been available and were not available to be given for modification/conversion to Radionics of which Ram Prakash accused-appellant was proprietor (2) no quotations were invited from Radionics or for that matter from any other party (3) once a bill of Rs. 3900/- was given by Ram Prakash but there was treasury objection and the amount of Rs. 3900/- was split in four bills which in my opinion cannot lead to the only one and irresistible conclusion that any conspiracy as alleged was hatched by the accused appellants. It has already been said earlier that possibility that there were and could be 60 BC 375 (E) transmitter-sets available for modification/conversion, cannot be excluded. Merely because quotation were not invited and I have said earlier that as a result of rush of work at times procedure was not followed and quotations were invited even orally, in my opinion cannot be an incriminating circumstance. At best it may be a procedural and financial irregularity but not an offence. So far as the splitting of the amount of bill for Rs. 3900/- into four bills is concerned it too is a financial irregularity and it alone or even with other circumstance is not sufficient to fasten the criminal liability on any of the accused-appellants. Thus, the circumstances which have been taken into consideration by the learned Special Judge cannot be said to the such which cannot lead to the only inference that the accused persons hatched a conspiracy as held by the learned Special Judge. 21. I am therefore, of the opinion that the various offence cannot be bax said to be made out against the accused - appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. 22. Consequently, I hereby allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence. 21. I am therefore, of the opinion that the various offence cannot be bax said to be made out against the accused - appellants beyond a reasonable doubt. 22. Consequently, I hereby allow this appeal and set aside the judgment of conviction and sentence. The conviction of accused - appellant Laxman Singh under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471, 477-A IPC and section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act is set aside and sentence awarded to him under those counts is also set aside. The conviction of the accused - appellant Mahesh Chand Sharma under Sections 120-B, 420, 468, 471, 477-A, IPC and Section 5(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act is set aside and the sentence awarded to him under counts is also set aside. Similarly, the sentence accused-appellant Ram Prakash under section 120-B, 420, 468, 471 and 477-A IPC is set aside and the sentence awarded to him under those counts is also set aside. The accused-appellants are acquitted of all the charges. They are on bail. They need not surrender to their bail-bonds which are hereby discharge.Appeal Allowed. *******