V. GOPALASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is preferred by the informant in the case, who is also the father of the victim girl, against the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Jaipur, in Sessions Trial No. 213 of 1985 acquitting the accused (the present opposite party No. 1) of the charge u/s. 376, I. P. C. ( 2 ) THE gist of the prosecution case that at village Rahamba (within Dharmasala police station in Cuttack district) on 30-1-1985 at about 8 p. m. as the informant's daughter Champina (P. W. 2) aged about eight years was going to see a Casakathia performance in the village, on the way, the accused took her to his house and committed rape on her and thereby rendered himself liable u/s. 376, I. P. C. ( 3 ) THE accused pleaded that as there was previous enmity between the informant and his father' the informant, through his daughter PW2, has foisted this false case against him. The defence has examined two witnesses to prove the previous enmity between the informant and the accused's father. ( 4 ) THE prosecution has examined in all six witnesses to prove its case. PW 2 is the victim girl and PW 1, the informant, is her father and PW 3 is her mother. PW 4 is the doctor who examined the victim girl and the accused. PW 5 was examined to state that PW 1 had informed him on the very night of occurrence about the accused committing rape on his daughter. PW 6 is the Investigating Officer in the case. ( 5 ) THIS is a revision preferred by the informant, the father of the victim girl, against an order of acquittal acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 376, I. P. C. against which the Government had a right of appeal, but had chosen not to prefer the appeal. While considering the revision on its merits, it is necessary that this Court should be aware of its limitations in the matter of exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 401, Cr. P. C. (which corresponds to Section 439 of the old Code) against an order of acquittal. While considering the revision on its merits, it is necessary that this Court should be aware of its limitations in the matter of exercising revisional jurisdiction under S. 401, Cr. P. C. (which corresponds to Section 439 of the old Code) against an order of acquittal. For the purpose of appreciating the exceptional circumstances which justify the exercise of such revisional jurisdiction, the following observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Chinnaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 1788, are considered material and relevant and hence quoted below". . . . . . . . . . . . IT is not possible to lay down the criteria for determining such exceptional cases which would cover all contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind, which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be : where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is valid under the law. These and other cases similar in nature can properly be held to be cases exceptional in nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . "the view that the instances mentioned by the Supreme Court in Chinnaswamy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) as justifying interference with orders of acquittal in the exercise of revisional powers were illustrative and not exhaustive was approved by the Supreme Court in Ayodhya Dube v. Ram Sumer Singh, AIR 1981 SC 1 415 : 1981 Cri LJ 1016. ( 6 ) FOR the purpose of the present revision the following extracts from the judgment of the trial court are considered material and relevant and hence quoted below :"10. ( 6 ) FOR the purpose of the present revision the following extracts from the judgment of the trial court are considered material and relevant and hence quoted below :"10. The testimony of PWs 1, 3 and 5 being discrepant and far from being probable in view of the foregoing discussions and analysis thereof, they do not inspire any confidence as there appears some exaggerated version in respect of the alleged occurrence. So PW 2 is the only witness for the prosecution to prove the case. It is well settled that where the victim is a child of tender age, her statement should not be used without corroboration. The Privy Council held that as a matter of prudence, a conviction should not be based upon an uncorroborated evidence of a child witness. 11. . . . . . . . . Of course the evidence of the DWs do not definitely prove the enmity, yet prosecution cannot avail itself of the same. Whatever it is, leaving aside the defence story since there is lacuna in the investigation in withholding the examination of blood and semen of the accused as I have indicated earlier, it cannot be said that the accused was the author of the crime. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " (Underlining is mine) from the above quoted observations of the trial court it is clear that though the trial court found that there was nothing in the evidence of the victim girl (PW2) to disbelieve her version that rape was committed on her, yet it could not come to a definite finding that it was the accused who was the author of the crime as there was no corroboration to the testimony of PW 2 that it was the accused who committed rape on her. ( 7 ) IN Bharvada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 : 1983 Cri LJ 1096, the Supreme Court observed thus"corroboration is not the sine qua non for a conviction in a rape case. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule is adding insult to injury. In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with fences tinged with doubt, disbelieve or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being ostracized by the society or being looked down by the society including by her own family members, relatives, friends and neighbours. She would face the risk of losing the love and respect of her own husband and near relatives, and of her matrimonial home and happiness being shattered. If she is unmarried, she would apprehend that it would be difficult to secure an alliance with a suitable match from a respectable or an acceptable family. In view of these and similar factors the victims and their relatives are not too keen to bring the culprit to book. And when in the face of these factors the crime is brought to light there is a built-in assurance that the charge is genuine rather than fabricated. "from the above quoted observations of the Supreme Court it is clear that the law does not require corroboration and, therefore, if the evidence of the prosecutrix is believed, there is no bar to convict the accused on her testimony alone. ( 8 ) RAMESHWAR Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 Cri LJ 547, is a case where accused Rameshwar was charged with committing rape on a young girl of eight years of age. ( 8 ) RAMESHWAR Kalyan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 : 1952 Cri LJ 547, is a case where accused Rameshwar was charged with committing rape on a young girl of eight years of age. In that case while dealing with the issue whether the conviction of an accused in a rape case become illegal merely because it is based on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, the Supreme Court held thus" The rule, which according to the cases has hardened into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential before there can be a conviction but that the necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it must be present to the mind of the judge, and in jury cases must find place in the charge, before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. The tender years of the child, coupled with other circumstances appearing in the case, such, for example, as its demeanour, unlikelihood of tutoring and so forth, may render corroboration necessary but that is a question of fact in every case. The only rule of law is that this rule of prudence must be present to the mind of the judge or the jury as the case may be and be understood and appreciated by him or them. There is no rule of practice that there must, in every case, be corroboration before a conviction can be allowed to stand. " ( 9 ) IN Shaikh Zakir v. State of Bihar, AIR 1983 SC 911 : 1983 Cri LJ 1285, the Supreme Court held that if a conviction is based on the evidence of a prosecutrix without any corroboration it will not be illegal on that sole ground. ( 10 ) RELYING on the above cited decisions of the Supreme Court, in Babaji alias Bajia Mallik v. State of Orissa, 62 (1986) CLT 393, this Court held that the rule requiring corroboration is not a rule of law but a rule of prudence and the need for corroboration, as a matter of prudence, except in cases where the circumstances make it safe to dispense with it must be present to the mind of a Judge before a conviction without corroboration can be sustained. The aforesaid rule of prudence necessitating corroboration applies whether the victim girl is a child or an adult. The aforesaid rule of prudence necessitating corroboration applies whether the victim girl is a child or an adult. ( 11 ) SURESH v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1 122 : 1981 Cri LJ 746, is a case where the sole testimony of the five-year old son of the deceased was relied on for convicting the accused under Section 302, I. P. C. , as the court believed the child to be a witness of truth and not a witness of imagination as most children of that age generally are. ( 12 ) HENCE it is seen that the trial court has committed a serious error of law in the matter of appreciation of the evidence of the victim girl aged about eight years when it observed thus : ". . . . . . . . . It is well settled that where the victim is a child of tender age, her statement could not be used without corroboration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . " ( 13 ) SECTION 157 of the Evidence Act provides :"in order to corroborate the testimony of a witness, any former statement made by such witness relating to the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before any authority legally competent to investigate the fact may be proved. " (Underlining is mine) in Rameshwar Singh's case (supra) the statement of the victim girl aged about eight years before her mother about the rape committed on her about four hours after the incident was received as corroborative evidence. The reason for the delay was that the victim girl's mother was not at home when she went there. In that context the "at or about" condition was considered by the Supreme Court and on such consideration the Supreme Court observed that the main test is whether the statement was made as early as can reasonably be expected in the circumstances of the case and before there was opportunity for tutoring or concoction. ( 14 ) THE following evidence merits careful consideration : (1)THE victim girl PW2 deposed that on going home she narrated about the incident to her mother when her mother also weeped with her. ( 14 ) THE following evidence merits careful consideration : (1)THE victim girl PW2 deposed that on going home she narrated about the incident to her mother when her mother also weeped with her. (2) The evidence of the victim girl's mother PW 3 shows that the victim girl returned home crying and told her that the accused had committed rape on her. (3) The victim girl's father PW 1 stated in his evidence that on the relevant night at about 9 p. m. , when he returned home, he found his wife (PW3) and daughter (PW2) weeping and that on his questioning them, both of them told him that the accused had committed rape on PW 2. On a perusal of the judgment of the trial court it is seen that it has not duly considered the above evidence, though the above evidence, if believed to be true, would have been relevant under Section 157 of the Evidence Act and served as corroborative evidence in support of the evidence of the victim girl. ( 15 ) WHAT should be the approach of a court while assessing the medical evidence is indicated by the following observations of the Supreme Court in Chimanbhai Ukabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 484 : 1983 Cri LJ 822 at page 487 of AIR :"ordinarily, the value of medical evidence is only corroborative. It proves that the injuries could have been caused in the manner alleged and nothing more. The use which the defence can make of the medical evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have been caused in the manner alleged and thereby discredit the eye-witnesses. Unless, however, the medical evidence in its turn goes so far that it completely rules out all possibilities whatsoever of injuries taking place in the manner alleged by eye-witnesses, the testimony of the eye-witnesses cannot be thrown out on the ground of alleged inconsistency between it and the medical evidence. "in the present case, the doctor PW4, on examination of the victim girl on 31-1-1985, found bruise 2 mm. on the outer aspect of the left libia majora and opined that it may be caused by erected penis. "in the present case, the doctor PW4, on examination of the victim girl on 31-1-1985, found bruise 2 mm. on the outer aspect of the left libia majora and opined that it may be caused by erected penis. The doctor P. W. 4 examined the accused on 1-2-1985 at 9-15 a. m. and found a lacerated wound 2 mm x 1 mm on the fraenum of the penis and he opined that the age of the injury was within 48 hours and further opined that it may be caused by forcible penetration through the vagina of an immature girl. The above medical evidence, if found reliable lends corroboration to the evidence of the victim girl that rape was committed on her. ( 16 ) THE evidence of the victim girl shows that due to the rape committed on her, there was bleeding from her vagina and her pant was wet with blood. The mother of the victim girl (P. W. 3) deposed that she saw bleeding from the vagina of her daughter (P. W. 2) and her pant was stained with blood. P. W. 3 stated that she washed the private parts of her daughter with hot water. Drawing certain inferences from the medical evidence, the trial court disbelieved the version of P. W. 3 that she found bleeding from the vagina of her daughter. M. O. I was the pant which the victim girl was wearing at the time of occurrence. The Serologist found stains of human blood on the pant. The trial court has not duly considered the importance of the finding of the Serologist that the victim girl's pant was stained with human blood. In Manga v. State of Haryana, AIR 1979 SC 1194 : 1979 Cri LJ 939, a case of rape, the Supreme Court observed that the medical evidence can hardly be relied upon to falsify the evidence of the eye-witness because the medical evidence is guided by various factors based on gueses and certain calculations. In the present case, the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 4) is not in accordance with the accepted principles of law on the aspect of the appreciation of medical evidence. ( 17 ) THE evidence of the parents of the victim girl (P. Ws. In the present case, the trial court's appreciation of the evidence of the doctor (P. W. 4) is not in accordance with the accepted principles of law on the aspect of the appreciation of medical evidence. ( 17 ) THE evidence of the parents of the victim girl (P. Ws. 1 and 3) shows that they found the pant of the victim girl M. O. I stained with some sticky substance like semen and their evidence is corroborated by the Serologist's report that the pant M. O. I was stained with semen. The trial court did not duly consider the significance of this evidence. ( 18 ) FROM my above discussion of the relevant material on record, it is clear that the trial court committed a serious error of record when it based its order of acquittal on the erroneous assumption that there is no corroborative evidence in support of the evidence of the victim girl. ( 19 ) FOR the reasons stated above, I find that the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court is the result of faulty reasoning and lack of judicial approach and the same is, therefore, not sustainable in law. As I am proposing to remand the case to the trial court it is not proper on my part to discuss the evidence at length and hence only, I confined myself to a consideration of those facts and points of law which were considered necessary for a just disposal of this revision. ( 20 ) WHILE remanding the case to the trial court for retrial of the accused-opposite party, I wish to make it clear that the scope of such retrial is very limited, in that the trial court is directed to dispose of the case in accordance with law, after giving full opportunity both to the prosecution and the defence to argue afresh before him only on the basis of the evidence already adduced in the case. So neither party should be allowed to adduce any further evidence in the case. So neither party should be allowed to adduce any further evidence in the case. ( 21 ) IN the result, the judgment of the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Jaipur acquitting the accused of the charge u/ S. 376, I. P. C. is hereby set aside and the Sessions Trial Case No. 213 of 1985 is remanded to the trial court for disposal according to law as soon as possible in accordance with the directions given in the preceding paragraph. Accordingly, the revision is allowed. The lower court records be sent back immediately. Revision allowed.