A. K. CHATTERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE present opposite party no. 1, Amala Bala, made an application under section 145, Cr. P. C. against one Sudhir Mondal, since deceased, who was the predecessor of the present petitioners, before a competent Executive Magistrate alleging, inter alia, that she was the owner in possession of a certain plot of land which formerly belonged to her father Harihar and the learned Magistrate directed the Officer-in-Charge of the concerned police station to make an enquiry and report. Subsequently on perusal of the report, the learned Magistrate drew up a proceeding under section 145, Cr. P. C. and directed the parties to put in written statement in support of their respective claim. Ultimately on the 25th March, 1988 the learned Magistrate found that Amala Bala was in actual possession of the disputed land when the proceeding was drawn up and also directed the local Junior Land Reforms Officer, who was appointed a Receiver in the mean time, to deliver possession of the disputed land to her. It is this order which is sought to be revised mainly on the ground that the learned Magistrate had committed a gross illegality in proceeding under section 145, Cr. P. C. as there was nothing before him to satisfy that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed. ( 2 ) IN opposing the application the learned Advocate for the said opposite party has made two-fold submissions. In the first place it was contended that even if the learned Magistrate did not strictly comply with the provision of section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure it was only a curable irregularity as no prejudice was caused to the petitioners and secondly in any case the final order passed by the learned Magistrate cannot be struck down as the petitioners did not challenge the initial order drawing up the proceeding. ( 3 ) THE l earned Advocate for the petitioners has pointed out that in the preliminary order passed by the learned Magistrate on the 3rd May 1984, all that was stated was that the police report revealed that Sudhir Mondal, the predecessor-in-interest of the present petitioners wanted to stay forcibly on the land of Amala Bala and as a shanty was made by him he was liable to be evicted. In the same order the learned Magistrate also noted that said Sudhir Mondal undertook in writing to vacate the land within a specified date but he did not do so. It was, therefore, argued on behalf of the petitioners that the learned Magistrate made this order in disregard of the mandate in section 145, Cr. P. C. under which he was required to state the grounds of his satisfaction regarding the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace. There is no doubt that the learned Magistrate made no such record and, therefore, it is to be decided whether such omission will have the effect of vitiating the proceeding making it liable to be quashed. The learned advocate for the said opposite party has tried to rely upon the Full Bench decision of Allahabad High Court in Kapoor Chand and Another vs. Suraj Prasad, AIR 1933 All. 264. In that case it was held that the jurisdiction of a Magistrate to take action under section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure arises from the fact that he has received certain information and that he was satisfied as to the truth of that information and if he had jurisdiction, he was not deprived of it merely because the procedure followed by him was defective or erroneous. The Full Bench therefore, rejected the argument that omission on the part of the Magistrate to record the fact that he was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed and further omission to record the grounds on which he was so satisfied was an illegality and took the view by the test of prejudice that such omission was merely an irregularity which was cured by the provision of section 537, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. On the basis of this decision the learned Advocate for the said opposite party put forth the argument that in this case too the omission of the learned Magistrate referred to by the petitioners was merely an irregularity which was cured by section 465, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as there was no failure of justice. This contention cannot, however, he accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It will appear that in Kapoor Chand's case (supra) an application was made under section 145, Cr. This contention cannot, however, he accepted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. It will appear that in Kapoor Chand's case (supra) an application was made under section 145, Cr. P. C. alleging that the opposite parties were trying to interfere with the possession of a certain property and that there was likelihood of a breach of the peace. It further appears that a police enquiry was ordered by the learned Magistrate who on receipt of the police report recorded that there appeared to be some basis for the com- plaint. Therefore there is no doubt that in that case there was an allegation of the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace which was also supported by the result of a police enquiry. On the other hand, in the case before us even the application under section 145, Cr. P. C. made by Amala Bala did not contain any allegation whatsoever about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace and it does not appear that there was any police report or any other information before the learned Magistrate to that effect. Thus there was absolutely nothing before the learned Magistrate to show the existence of such a dispute which clearly distinguishes this case from the one cited by the learned advocate for the opposite parties. The correct legal position is that if there is material before the learned Magistrate to show that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed and after applying his mind thereto if he decided to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. , then an omission to record the grounds of his satisfaction may be regarded as a mere irregularity not affecting his jurisdiction and consequently if it did not cause any prejudice to the party concerned the proceeding would not be invalid. Reference may be made in this connection to another decision of the same High Court, Ram Peary and Others vs. Dankua, AIR 1949 All. 402 which also considered and relied upon the Full Bench decision referred to earlier. Reference may be made in this connection to another decision of the same High Court, Ram Peary and Others vs. Dankua, AIR 1949 All. 402 which also considered and relied upon the Full Bench decision referred to earlier. In Ram Peary's case, it has been clearly laid down that if there was material before a learned Magistrate upon which he felt satisfied that there was a likelihood of a breach of the peace, an omission to record a formal order as required by section 145 (1), Code of Criminal Procedure may be regarded as a curable irregularity but if there was nothing on the record to indicate that the learned Magistrate had any information before him about the likelihood of a breach of the peace then the proceeding taken by him would be wholly without jurisdiction. ( 4 ) TO support the argument that the omission by the learned Magistrate to state about the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace or the grounds for such satisfaction was merely a curable irregularity, the learned advocate for the said opposite parties has relied upon the Bench decision of this Court in Khudiram Mondal vs. Jitendra Nath Mondal and another 56 C. W. N. 608 which following the view expressed in Khosh Mohammed Sircar vs. Nazir Mohammed, 9 C. W. N. 1065, held that if certain elements existed the Magistrate could exercise jurisdiction under section 145, Cr. P. C. , but if the initial order recorded by him was not in conformity with the prescribed method, it might be an irregularity not affecting his jurisdiction, but only the mode of its exercise and it would vitiate the final order only if it had caused prejudice. This authority hardly lays down any different view and indeed it had approved the Full Bench decision in Kapoor Chand's case (supra ). It may be mentioned that in Khudiram's case (supra) too, it was stated in the initial order that it appeared to the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed though there was no statement of the grounds for the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate regarding such likelihood. It may be mentioned that in Khudiram's case (supra) too, it was stated in the initial order that it appeared to the Magistrate that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed though there was no statement of the grounds for the satisfaction of the learned Magistrate regarding such likelihood. Thus this decision does not come to the aid of the opposite parties as in the case before us there was no material at all before the learned Magistrate to show the existence of a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace which clearly distinguishes it from the decision under consideration. Apart from above decisions, there is a chain of authorities for the proposition that to assume jurisdiction to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. the Magistrate must be satisfied that a dispute regarding an immovable property exists which is likely to cause a breach of the peace. Therefore, the clear legal position is that if the learned Magistrate is satisfied that a dispute of the nature contemplated in section 145, Cr. P. C. exists he gets jurisdiction to proceed under that section but if he omits to record his satisfaction or the grounds thereof it would be a mere irregularity not affecting his jurisdiction and, therefore, his order cannot be assailed unless there is failure of justice. On the other hand, if there was nothing at all before the learned Magistrate to show that there was any such dispute he would have no jurisdiction to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. and if he does so, it would be an illegality. In the instant case, as already pointed out even the application under section 145, Cr. P. C. filed by Amala Bala made no allegation about the existence of such a dispute nor the report of the police enquiry or any other intention before the learned Magistrate suggested anything about it. In this situation the proceeding drawn up by the learned Magistrate must be regarded as wholly without jurisdiction and therefore illegal. P. C. filed by Amala Bala made no allegation about the existence of such a dispute nor the report of the police enquiry or any other intention before the learned Magistrate suggested anything about it. In this situation the proceeding drawn up by the learned Magistrate must be regarded as wholly without jurisdiction and therefore illegal. ( 5 ) THE learned advocate for the said opposite party has then tried to support the order passed by the learned Magistrate on the ground that since the initial order was not challenged by the petitioners as being without jurisdiction and as they filed written statement, entered into evidence and awaited till the off chance of getting a favourable judgment, they cannot be allowed to assail the final order. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed upon the decision of Orissa High Court in Padma Charan vs. Prafulla Chandra, 1975 Cri. L. J. 1190. No doubt this view has been taken by Orissa High Court apparently following the decision of Patna High Court in Shib Narayan Das vs. Satya Deo Prasad, AIR (30) 1943 Pat. 44 which again relied upon the decision of this court in Kuloda Kinkar Roy vs. Danesh Mir 10 C. W. N. 257. Both in Shib Narayan's case (supra) and Kuloda Kinkar's case (supra), there were materials before the Magistrate to show that a dispute existed which was likely to cause a breach of the peace ; in the former case a dispute was raised regarding the sufficiency of such material while in the latter case it was pointed that the Magistrate did not record the grounds upon which he was satisfied about the existence of a dispute though the learned Judges found that the order was undoubtedly right which did not cause prejudice to any party. Therefore, there cannot be any manner of doubt that in both these cases the Magistrate had ample jurisdiction to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. and there was no illegality in such proceeding. Now since in both these cases the proceedings were not without jurisdiction and as such not illegal, any observation made by the learned Judges as to whether in an illegal proceeding it was open to the aggrieved party to come up in revision against the final order without assailing the initial order, can only be regarded as an obiter deserving due respect. In Kuloda Kinkar's case (supra), Their Lordships also took note of an English decision, Farquharson vs. Morgan (1894) 1 Q. B. 552, wherein the rule was laid down that where total absence of jurisdiction appeared on the face of the proceeding in an inferior court, the superior court was bound to interfere but it was very rightly pointed out by the learned Judges that this rule did not apply in the circumstances of the case before them apparently because there was no absence of jurisdiction of the learned Magistrate to proceed under section 145, Cr. P. C. But further observation of the learned Judges that the aforesaid rule was never adopted by the courts of this country is not quite understood as it appears that Their Lordships' attention were invited to at least four authorities, including Queen Empress vs. Gobind Chander I. L. R. 20 Cal. 520 (1893) and Their Lordships recorded in another part of the judgement that it might be conceded that those cases did tend to show that as long as the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 and 1882 were in force, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction did interfere with orders made under section 145 (or the corresponding section of the repealed Codes) when such orders had been made without jurisdiction and under circumstances similar to those alleged to exist in the case before Their Lordships [ Kuloda Kinkar's case (supra) ] that is, when the aggrieved party sought to revise the final order without challenging the initial order. Reference may again be made to Ram Peary's case (supra), wherein the Allahabad High Court had set aside a final order made by a Magistrate under section 145, Cr. P. C. on the ground that there was no foundation of the jurisdiction to proceed under the said section, although the aggrieved party did not come up in revision against any earlier order. Thus upon a conspectus of the relevant law on the subject it is found that while the Orissa High Court is of the opinion that a final order cannot be challenged without asailing the initial order which is also supported by the obiter of Patna High Court as well as of this Court in Kuloda Kinkar's case (supra), contrary view has been taken by Allahabad High Court and in a series of cases by this Court including Gobind Chander's case (supra ). In such situation it should be held that weight of judicial authorities favour the view that when a Magistrate proceeds under section 145, Cr. P. C. without any jurisdiction at all and ultimately makes an order, the aggrieved party can very well come up in revision against such order even though he did not challenge the initial order. Therefore the second branch of the argument of the learned advocate for the said opposite party must be rejected. ( 6 ) ON the above premises it is held that the impugned order and the proceeding cannot be sustained. The revisional application is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order passed by the learned Magistrate on 25. 3. 88, is set aside and the proceedings, being M. Case No. 94 of 1984, is quashed. Appeal allowed.