P. K. MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS writ petition was moved on behalf of Subodh Kumar Das, a Tahasildar, challenging an order of reinstatement dated September, 8, 1987, which is Annexure 'a' to the writ petition. ( 2 ) BY the said order, in terms of the judgment hand decision of S. R. Roy, J, of this Court, dated January 19, 1987, in C. R. 10977 (W) of 1978,-the writ petitioner, an ex-Tahasildar of Bhangore II L. R. Circle, was reinstated in service with effect from February 19, 1987, and posted at Baruipur L. R. Circle. ( 3 ) MR. Tapankumar Mukherjee (III), learned Advocate appearing at the anal hearing of the writ petition has placed the following facts for consideration of this court. ( 4 ) THE petitioner was appointed as a Tahasildar by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Alipore Sadar, by order dated January 13, 1961. Thereafter, a departmental proceeding was initiated in respect of the petitioner and the petitioner was placed under an order of suspension by order dated December 28, 1977, and ultimately, the petitioner's service has been terminated by an order dated December 7, 1978, by the respondents, without issuing any show cause notice. ( 5 ) ULTIMATELY the petitioner moved a writ petition before this Court challenging the order of termination and S R. Roy, J,. by judgment and order dated January, 19, 1987, made Rule absolute quashing the impugned order of suspension which is set out hereinbelow:"the Rule issued be accordingly made absolute and the impugned termination of the petitioner's service dated December 7, 1978 (Annexure 'g') is set aside. This will, however, not debar the respondents from proceeding against the petitioner in accordance with law. However, unless such proceedings are commenced within a period of 30 days from this date, the petitioner should be deemed to have been reinstated in service under a renewed Agreement on the expiry of said period, which the respondents shall execute immediately. No order is made for Costs". sd/- Sudhir Ranjan Roy, J. ( 6 ) MR. Tapankumar Mukherjee (III), learned Advocate appearing at the final hearing of the writ petition referring to the impugned order from page 17 of the writ petition submitted before this Court. No order is made for Costs". sd/- Sudhir Ranjan Roy, J. ( 6 ) MR. Tapankumar Mukherjee (III), learned Advocate appearing at the final hearing of the writ petition referring to the impugned order from page 17 of the writ petition submitted before this Court. In view of the clear order of S. R Roy, J after setting aside the order of termination and the petitioner having been reinstated to service, the petitioner was entitled to all back wages, as if, the petitioner has not been dismissed from service. ( 7 ) IN support of this branch of submission, he has referred to a judgment of the Supreme Court in the ease of Devendra Pratap Narain Rai Sharma vs. State of UP and Ors. reported in A. I. R 1962 S. C. 1334. In the said case, Shah, J. delivering the judgment, in para 10 observed, as follows: the High Court in dealing with the appellant's claim to salary during the period of his suspension pending the earlier enquiry observed that there was no justification for not granting the appellant his full pay for the period after the date of the suit. But the counsel for the State Uttar Pradesh asserted that it is open to the State, notwithstanding the direction, to award as remuneration to the appellant for the period for which he was under suspension any amount which on a reconsideration of the matter in the light of the relevant rules and after hearing the appellant the State Government considers just and proper. This power, counsel contends arises by virtue of Rule 54 of the Fundamental Rules framed by the State of Uttar Pradesh under the authority conferred under Article 309 of the Constitution". ( 8 ) IT was also observed in Devendra Pratap's case (supra) to the following effect: "if the State Government was competent to order a fresh enquiry, we see no reason why it would be incompetent to direct suspension of the appellant during the pendency of the enquiry". ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee, has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court on this point, in the case of Khem Chand vs. Union of India and 0rs. reported in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 687. ( 9 ) MR. Mukherjee, has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court on this point, in the case of Khem Chand vs. Union of India and 0rs. reported in A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 687. Wherein, the Supreme Court in considering the effect of the order of suspension, observed as follows:"an order of suspension of Government servant does not put an end to his service under the Government. He continues to be a member of the service inspite of the order of suspension. The real effect of the order of suspension is that though he continues to be a member of the Government service he is not permitted to work and further, during the period of his suspension he is paid only some allowance generally called "subsistence allowance" which is normally less than his salary instead of the pay and allowances he would have been entitled to if he had not been suspended. There is no doubt that the order of suspension effects a Government servant injuriously. There is no basis for thinking, however, that because of the order of suspension he ceased to be a member of the service". ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the petitioner submits before this Court that although S. R. Roy, J, in making the Rule absolute and setting aside the order of suspension had given liberty to proceed against the petitioner in accordance with law and to initiate any proceeding within a period of 30 days, but no proceeding having been initiated, the effect of reinstatement is that the petitioner has not been suspended at all, in view of the aforesaid observations in the case of Khem Chand (Supra ). Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the petitioner is entitled to all back wages from the date of suspension, that is, from December 28, 1977, till the date of reinstatement, that is, September 8, 1987, and the impugned order of reinstatement by reinstating the writ petitioner with effect from February 19, 1987, cannot be sustained in law. ( 11 ) MR. Accordingly, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the petitioner is entitled to all back wages from the date of suspension, that is, from December 28, 1977, till the date of reinstatement, that is, September 8, 1987, and the impugned order of reinstatement by reinstating the writ petitioner with effect from February 19, 1987, cannot be sustained in law. ( 11 ) MR. Suprokash Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the respondents has strongly placed reliance on the liberty given by S. R. Roy, J. by his Lordship's judgment dated January l9, 1987, whereby, his Lordship observed that the petitioner should be deemed to have been reinstated in service under a renewed agreement on the expiry of the said period which the respondents shall execute immediately. ( 12 ) I have considered the submissions of both parties at length and I am of the view that in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, the limitations imposed by S. R. Roy, J. in His Lordship's judgment dated January 19, 1987, cannot and should not take away the right of reinstatement in service from the date of suspension, as the pronouncement of the Supreme Court on this point is clear and suffers from no ambiguity and that is the law laid down by the Supreme Court, in terms of the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. ( 13 ) ACCORDINGLY, in my view, the writ petition is entitled to succeed and the impugned order of reinstatement in so far as it purports to reinstate the writ petitioner with effect from February 19, 1987, is set aside and the respondents are directed to reinstate the writ petitioner with effect from the date of suspension, that is, December 28, 1977, and pay all arrear salaries in revised pay scale in accordance with law within a period of three months from communication of the operative part of the order and in accordance with law. ( 14 ) THE writ petition is allowed as above.